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ERRATA

p. 2, n. 2, l. 1: delete quotation marks;
l. 3, read "In most cases, etc.
p. 216, l. 7 (of Greek): for σύκ read οὐκ.
p. 363, l. 9: for Socrates' read Timaeus'

ERRATA TO VOL. V

p. 422, for mollia *sed* tenui read mollia *sit* tenui.
p. 434, footnote: for heu *signis* read heu *siquis;* for *laiquis* read aliquis.
p. 435, for "in which the first part seems" read "in which the future participle seems"; and for "contemporary propinquos" read "complementary propinquos."
p. 437, for *a tri tua* or *a tri utua* read a $\bar{t}n$ tua or a $\bar{t}n$ utua.

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THE LAW OF BREVES BREVIANTES IN THE LIGHT OF PHONETICS

BY E. A. SONNENSCHEIN

It is my object in this paper to discuss a question which is probably troubling the minds of a good many students of old Latin verse, and if possible to suggest a solution. But I want to avoid going into a multitude of details which would probably only confuse the main issue. I will write briefly, as to fellow-students who are well acquainted with the phenomena to which I refer and who will themselves supply the gaps in my exposition and correct it, if it falls at some points into overstatement. For criticism I shall be grateful. If I am on altogether wrong lines, the sooner I am put right the better for me.[1]

[1] In a former paper (*Classical Review* XX [1906], 158 f.) I said that the phenomena coming under the head of the "Breves Breviantes" law may require to be reinterpreted if Plautine verse is to be regarded as "semi-quantitative" rather than fully quantitative. I will not attempt here to justify the use of the term "semi-quantitative"; for that would lead me into a discussion of the important part played by accent (word-accent and sentence-accent) in Plautine verse, and for that I have not room.—I note that my general position has been challenged by Professor Harkness (*Classical Philology* II, 63); in reply I would beg him to note the difference between "inner falls" and "outer falls" (see p. 9 below). Quantitative rhythm of the iambic or trochaic order depends on the shortness of the inner falls (i.e., those which come between the two rises of the iambic or trochaic dipody) just as much as on the length of the rises. But a long syllable may be used at either end of the series – ⏑ – without disturbing the quantitative rhythm. This is shown by Greek verse, in which the outer, but not the inner, falls can be formed by a long syllable. The Greek comedians, no doubt, often form their inner falls of two short syllables; but not, I think, without some sacrifice of the true iambic rhythm. When the step is taken of admitting a long syllable to the inner fall I maintain that the verse can no longer be described as fully quantitative.

The existence of a law of Breves Breviantes—or something which corresponds to what is commonly described by that name—in the sphere of Latin morphology is indisputable. We are face to face with such shortenings as *benĕ*, *malĕ*, *amăt*, *lubĕt*, *monĭtus* (by analogy of *monĭtūrus*, from *monĕtūrus*, cf. *Monēta*), etc.—shortenings the evidence for which may be seen in any classical writer of Latin verse.[1] It seems unfortunate, however, that this law should be described by a term which ignores an essential factor of the shortening. So far as I have observed, at any rate, all writers on the subject make the presence of a *stress* on the Brevis or on the syllable which follows the Brevianda an element in the case, without which the law would be inoperative: *bĕnĕ*, *mălĕ*, etc.; *pudĭcĭtiam*, *iuvĕntūtis*, etc. (these latter being found only in OL verse, Amph. 930, 154, etc.). The term "shortening shorts," however, suggests that a short syllable has in itself the power of shortening the syllable which follows, by a process which some writers have described as "assimilation of quantity," apart from stress of voice.[2]

Another point that I notice in the current statements of this law is the inadequacy of the phonetic explanation which is offered. Victor Henry defends the doctrine of assimilation of quantity as follows:

> Iambic words like *duŏ* show a curious peculiarity. It is physically possible to pronounce successively an accented short vowel and an unaccented long vowel; but, especially if the accent is strongly marked, it will be noticed that the long vowel then tends scarcely to exceed in length the preceding short vowel. Hence, in versification previous to the Augustan age, all words of this kind were treated, at the option of the writer, either

[1] The fact that *mŏlēr* and *frŭgēr* have a short final syllable in the earliest Latin, just as much as *pătĕr*, has been recently accounted for by Skutsch (*Glotta* II. 151 f.) by the supposition that all these forms are properly vocatives, which have taken over the function of nominatives. In many exceptions to the law the long quantity may be explained as restored by analogy.

[2] "The term 'Breves Breviantes' originated as an explanation of certain facts of OL verse structure: and if the facts in question admit of a better explanation, some new term will be called for in morphology also. In most cases the reduction of a vowel is due to weakness of stress; but it may also be due to increase of speed on the part of the speaker, when he is conscious that he has to utter a good many sounds in one breath-group." (I take this statement from a letter by my friend Professor Lippmann, whom I am glad to find in general sympathy with the contention of this paper.)

as iambics or as pyrrhics, and we find the scansion *rŏgā* = *rŏgă*, *pătă*, *uidĕ*, *dŏmĭ*, *uŏlŏ*, *rŏgŏ*, *hŏmŏ*, etc.[1]

The appeal is to the experience and ear of the reader.

Similarly Lindsay remarks, "We ourselves, if we pronounce a phrase of this kind, feel that the short syllable *că-* exercises a shortening influence in this position upon the following long syllable *-vē*."[2]

I know of no such law of phonology as is here implied. In an English word like "echo" the second syllable is to my ear longer than the first; indeed such words as "echo," "shadow," "never" tend to become fully iambic before a pause, the second syllable being lengthened as a kind of balance to the accented first syllable. Thus the ordinary prose pronunciation of "shadow" seems to me not very different from that which it has in Tennyson's verse (*The Last Tournament*)—

And friends and foes were shadows (⏑ –) in the mist.

Distrusting my own ear I appealed to Mr. Henry Sweet, and he gave me welcome and unequivocal confirmation.

There can be no doubt that in such words as *echo* the second vowel is longer than the first. When such words are drawled the lengthening falls entirely on the unaccented vowel, as in "what a *pityyy!*" That there is no necessity for shortening *dúŏ* into *dúŏ* is proved by the fact that in Old English the final *u* of the neuter plural is dropped at the end of long monosyllables like *hūs*, *word*, but kept in such words as *sċīpu* . . . .

exactly the opposite of what we should expect from the law of Breves Breviantes. So much for the phonetic basis of the law!

[1] *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, Eng. Transl., 87.

[2] *A Short Historical Latin Grammar* 34 f. Compare the following statements of Skutsch and Lindsay in reference to the pronunciation of words like *uoluptatem:* "Everyone can convince himself by a practical experiment how difficult it is, when speaking with a certain degree of rapidity, to give its proper length to the middle syllable of a group consisting of ⏑ – ×, if the first or the third syllable has an expiratory accent of the strength which we must ascribe to the Latin accent: one's own experiment will convince one better than a theoretical argument" (Skutsch *Forschungen* 7). Lindsay says (*Latin Language* 201 f.): "The normal scansion of all these second syllables is that of classical poetry; but the position of the syllable between a short syllable on the one hand and an accented syllable on the other made it especially liable to be slurred in pronunciation, so that the dramatic poets, who followed more closely the pronunciation of everyday life than others, felt themselves at liberty, when the exigencies of meter demanded, to treat it as a short syllable." That the second syllable of words like *uoluptātem*, *fenestrātus* offers some impediment to utterance, and that it is difficult for our English or German organs of speech to do full justice to its length, is no doubt true.

I hasten to withdraw the note which I wrote in the Appendix to my edition of the *Rudens* (ed. Minor, 1901, p. 169).

It seems then that the term "Breves Breviantes" might well be replaced by some term which should suggest a more adequate explanation of the facts of morphology to which it is applied.

But what I am concerned with here is not morphology but Old Latin prosody, the most prominent feature of which is in current theory brought into connection with the above-mentioned morphological facts. It is supposed that the shortenings found in *benĕ*, *malĕ*, etc., find their counterparts in OL verse, which is said either to shorten long syllables following a short, or to "reflect the pronunciation of everyday life" (Lindsay), or to treat long syllables following a short as "metrically short." Take Skutsch's statement of the law:

> An iambic sequence of syllables which has the stress (*Ton*) on the short syllable, or which is immediately followed by the stressed syllable, becomes pyrrhichie (*wird pyrrhichisch*).[1]

The last two words are, probably intentionally, ambiguous; "becomes pyrrhichie" may mean either "becomes a pyrrhic" or "becomes equivalent to a pyrrhic"; the latter might be identical with "counts as a pyrrhic"—which was all that the originator of the law meant when he used the word *gelten* in his formula.[2] The word *Ton* in Skutsch's statement is also ambiguous, and intentionally so; it is selected, as the author says, so as to cover ictus (verse-stress) as well as accent (word-stress). Brix expressed the same thing more explicitly when he said that the *ictus metricus* is very frequently equivalent in verse to the word-accent.[3] Lindsay, regarding the *ictus metricus* as inoperative in this connection, words the law as follows, and attempts (not very successfully in my opinion) to explain all the phenomena by an appeal to the word-accent or the sentence-accent:

> After a short syllable an unaccented syllable, which was long by nature or (more frequently) by position, was pronounced half-long in ordinary

[1] (1901); in the *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der romanischen Philologie* 33; repeated in the author's *Forschungen, Plautinisches und romanisches* 64. See also Skutsch *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre* 282, 142, 261.

[2] C. F. W. Müller *Plautinische Prosodie* (1869) 35.

[3] Müller-Brix to the *Poenulus*, 1st ed. (1868), p. 14; 3rd ed. (1887, by Niemeyer), p. 16.

speech, and scanned by the dramatic poets either long or short, when the accent fell on the following syllable or on the preceding (short) syllable.[1]

There is also another important difference between Lindsay and his immediate predecessors (Müller, Klotz, and Skutsch). They say nothing about these shortenings being based on the pronunciation of ordinary life; Müller's phrase "count as short" seems, indeed, to imply something different from actual shortening; and Klotz went so far as to declare the shortening to be a purely metrical phenomenon: thus he called the law a *metrisches Kürzungsgesetz* and said explicitly that the syllables which were *treated as short* by the OL dramatists were long in actual speech—a doctrine which in this form has found few supporters; for "metrical shortening" is only another name for *conventional* shortening, and verse so written is verse for the eye, not for the ear. Skutsch adopts an intermediate position. While, on the one hand, he denies (see below, p. 7) that these shortenings reflect the pronunciation of ordinary speech, he maintains that they are *analogous* to certain well-known phenomena of actual speech (*benĕ*, *malĕ*, etc.) and in accordance with the physiology of sound, i.e., that the effect of the *ictus metricus* in cases like *turbĭnĕs* is essentially similar in character to the effect of the accent in cases like *bĕnĕ*, though the former was never heard in ordinary speech; for the *ictus metricus*, like the word-accent, was an expiratory stress, and where the two come into conflict he holds that the accent must give way in order that the rhythm of the verse may not be sacrificed.

But, different as these statements are in some respects, they have one element in common—the doctrine that the syllables in question were in some sense shortened in OL verse. The very names *Iamben-Kürzungsgesetz*, *Breves Breviantes*, admit of no other interpretation. I admit that the phrases "counting as short," "scanned as short," and "metrically short," strictly interpreted, only mean that these syllables, though really long, were treated *as if they were short*. But Skutsch and his followers did not mean, when they spoke of iambic shortening, to imply that no real shortening takes place; and Lindsay definitely commits himself to the statement that the syllables in question were pronounced half-long (i.e., half-short) in

[1] *Jahresbericht über Plautus* (1907) 171; cf. Intr. to his edition of the *Captivi* 30.

ordinary speech; nor can he mean that the pronunciation in verse was different; for he tells us elsewhere that "Plautus scanned as he pronounced." Now it seems not to be generally realised that this doctrine of shortening involves phonetic difficulties of the gravest kind. No difficulty of pronunciation is involved in shortening the final syllable of words like *abī*, *malō*, *bonās*, *manūs*, or the second syllable of *verēbamini*, *vidēbatur*, or the first syllable of (*bene*) *ēvenisse*, (*id*) *ēventurum*, etc. But appreciably to shorten a syllable which is long by position (i.e., closed by a consonant and followed by another consonant) is in some cases physically impossible except by dropping one or more of the consonants.[1] Are we then to suppose that the word *apstulisti* was pronounced *a-stulisti* in ordinary speech and in the *Aulularia* of Plautus, l. 645 (*Quid apstulisti hinc?* beginning a trochaic septenarius)? In some cases, no doubt, a different division of syllables would get over the difficulty: *a-psurde*, *Ale-xander*, *voluptatem*, *sene-ctutem*, *o-mnes*, etc., are conceivable, though hardly plausible. But *a-pstulisti* is unpronounceable, and so is *e-xprobras*. The only way of shortening the first syllable of this word in *Trin.* 318—*quid exprobras?*—is to turn the *x* into an *s* and attach it to the next syllable (*e-sprobras*), neither of which measures exactly commends itself: the word has its ordinary quantities in *Most.* 300—*quor exprobras?* These are not isolated examples: we have the same problem to face in connection with the supposed shortening of the first syllable of a host of words like *inclamare*, *indignus*, *indiligenter*, *invocatus*, *argentam*, *hercle*, and of the second syllable of words

[1] This may sound like an overstatement in view of the fact that the law of Breves Breviantes is accepted by many scholars who are eminent phoneticians; but it is confirmed by the great authority of Mr. Henry Sweet. In reply to a question addressed to him by the present writer as to whether he considers it physically possible to shorten *fenestra*, *uoluptatem*, *abstuli*, *supellex*, he says "I cannot conceive of any quantitative prosody making such groups as *str*, *bst*, *ll* short without omissions: *pt* could be made short by pronouncing the two consonants simultaneously as in the English *exactly*." And again "Such a group as *str* could not possibly be made or felt to be short even under the weakest accent—not in any language. It could not even be regarded as half-short." If anyone doubts whether *bst* takes time to pronounce let him articulate the German word 'pst' (=hush).—These difficulties, or difficulties like them, seem to have been felt by Sommer, who in a note on p. 142 of his *Handbuch der lat. Laut- und Formenlehre* says "The phonological explanation (*lautphysiologische Ratio*) of this is not yet clear. In itself a syllable consisting of a vowel + consonant can never be short in pronunciation." The name Abdulhamid has its first syllable long whether it be pronounced *Abd-ul-hamid* or *Ab-dul-hamid*.

like *quadringenti* (which Lindsay would write *quadrigenti*), *tabernaculum*. The necessity of dropping a consonant in order to produce shortening is especially clear where there is a doubled consonant—unpronounceable at the beginning of a syllable; e.g., *accepisti, ecce, occulto, supellectilis, annona:* yet it is generally supposed to be a characteristic of Latin, as of modern Italian, that both the consonants were pronounced in such cases. Nor is this the end of the *impasse* into which we are led by a strictly phonetic interpretation of the doctrine of Breves Breviantes. For there are numerous examples in Plautus of words in which a syllable *closed by a consonant and also containing a naturally long vowel* has, according to this law, to be somehow shortened: e.g., *īnsidiae*. Here, even if the *n* could be taken over to the next syllable (a phonetic impossibility) we should still be left with a long *i*. How the syllable *īn-* can have been short or even half-short in ordinary speech passes my comprehension, especially as there are plenty of instances in Plautus in which the first syllable of this word is clearly long (e.g., *Curc.* 25). Yet we are asked to believe that in two successive lines of the *Pseudolus* (anapaestic meter) Plautus scanned and pronounced the first syllables of *īgnobilis* and *īnsidias* short: *Pseud.* 592 f. Other cases of this kind are *īgnavus* (Ter. *Eun.* 777), *īgnorabitur* (Plaut. *Men.* 468), *īnfimatis* (*Stich.* 493), *īnfuscabat* (*Cist.* 19), *ōrnatu* (*Trin.* 840*b*). Even more conclusive, as not needing any ancient testimony as to their quantity, are cases like *vides quae sim* (*Most.* 199), *iuben mi ire* (*Amph.* 929). These syllables in this position were undoubtedly long (at least as long as a syllable containing a final long vowel, e.g., *amō*) in ordinary speech. This was fully recognized by Skutsch on one occasion; he called it a "prinzipielle Unrichtigkeit" of Anton Marx that he took the "shortenings" of Plautus and Terence as evidence of the quantities of the vowels in ordinary speech.[1] Yet Skutsch still believes in real "shortening" in OL verse, ascribing it to conditions analogous to, though not identical with, those prevailing in ordinary speech (see above, p. 5) Apparently he does not realize the phonological difficulties to which I

[1] *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* XXII (1902), 1238: review of Anton Marx's *Hülfsbüchlein für die Aussprache der lat. Vokale in positionslangen Silben*, 3d ed., 1901.

have alluded above. It is easy to say that the syllables in question were shortened, but difficult to suggest *how* they were shortened or to conceive of the form which the words would assume as the result of such a process.

In comparison with the difficulty just discussed all other difficulties involved in the doctrine of Breves Breviantes shrink into insignificance. Yet it must be added that the theory of shortening is exposed to the old criticism of Bentley—"Mutantur tantum rei; crimen ipsum non eluitur: aut hi aut illi sunt culpae damnandi" (*Schediasma* 12 f.). This might be otherwise worded nowadays, in view of Lindsay's appeal to a "half-short" pronunciation in ordinary speech. But there is nevertheless a difficulty. Apart from the fact that the syllables in question are very often to be scanned as long in OL verse (e.g., *Capt.* 452 *abī*, 843 *iubē; Men.* 215 *venī; Bacch.* 777 *tacēs; Rud.* 442 and *Merc.* 359 *voluptatem; Trin.* 3 *adest*), what induced the dactylic poets to go back to the long pronunciation? The answer ordinarily given—that the usage of Ennius and his followers was of the nature of an artificial reaction against the popular pronunciation of their times—does not satisfy me, for various reasons. For one thing, poetry made up of a succession of words pronounced in a manner corresponding to the pronunciation of the English "wind" in verse[1] would surely have been an offense to the ears of Roman readers. Besides, Latin was not so rich in short syllables and poor in long ones that the poets would have deliberately chosen to make syllables long which they might have made short. On the contrary they adopted various devices in order to secure short syllables.[2]

There still remains to be considered the evidence of artistic prose. There is no trace of the operation of a law of Breves Breviantes in the clausulae of Cicero's Orations, so far as I have been able to discover from Zielinski. On the contrary the *Clauselgesetz* postulates a long syllable in such cases. Thus the words *mihi, tibi, sibi, ibi, ubi*, have the second syllable long (Zielinski,[3] p. 183); so too the adverbial *modo*, and the words *ego, lego* (*abdō*). And among

[1] Cf. Lindsay *Introd. to Capture* 22.

[2] See Bednara "Aus der Werkstatt der daktylischen Dichter" *Archiv für lat. Lexikogr. und Gram.* XV, 225–52.

[3] *Das Clauselgesetz in Cicero's Reden* 1904.

Zielinski's examples will be found scansions like *possessoribus ăgrī tamen emantur* (p. 47), *impŭdēntissima* (p. 64), *et vŏlŭptatibus* (*ibid.*), *patria mŏrī patiamini* (p. 77), *dŏlō mălō seiungere* (p. 86). The language of Cicero's speeches is, I suppose, as near an approximation to the language of ordinary life as we are likely to get. It is surely almost unthinkable that he should here have adopted an artificial pronunciation in order to secure a rhythmical ending for his clausulae; such a proceeding would have covered him with ridicule. And the fact that his practice agrees in the main with that of the dactylic poets may be appealed to as evidence that their prosody too was not of an artificial nature.

The bed-rock on which the whole theory of shortening rests is the observation of Müller that an iambic sequence of syllables (⏑ –) may form the rise or the fall of a foot in OL dramatic verse.[1] Hence it is assumed that if in Latin we find ⏑ – where the Greeks would have put ⏑ ⏑ the second of the two syllables must be somehow shortened. Is this assumption justified? That is the question I wish to raise. I suggest that it is not. I see no a priori impossibility in the rise or fall of a foot being formed of two syllables of which the first is short, but the second long; and hence I find no need for a doctrine of shortening. Of course a rise or fall so constructed is quantitatively defective; but OL verse is quantitatively defective in another and an even more important respect—the habitual use of long inner falls.[2] If the Roman ear found nothing intolerable in the first and third lines of the following passage (and such lines occur on every page of Plautus), why should it necessarily have objected to the second?[3]

> Pro di im*mor*tales, in *aqua* numquam credidi
> Vol*up*tatem inesse tantum! ut hanc traxi lubens!
> Nimio *minus* altus pute*us* visust quam prius (*Rud.* 458 ff.).

[1] I venture to use the terms which I have coined (see 2d ed. of the *Mostellaria*, 1907, p. 146) as a substitute for the terms "thesis" (*Hebung*) and "arsis" (*Senkung*)—or "arsis" and "thesis" as I should write if this article were to be published in England.

[2] The majority of falls (outer and inner taken together) are dimoric in OL dramatic verse.

[3] To my ear the second line is more rhythmical than the others, because it has all its inner falls short. On the shortness of the fall that comes between the two rises of each dipody quantitative rhythm depends.

I will put in two pleas in explanation of a usage which Bentley, too, thought very pardonable. In the first place, a rise or fall of the form ⏑ – is only relatively unquantitative; for at least one of the two syllables is short, and this short syllable comes first, and so gives to the dissyllabic rise or fall a start on the right lines. Secondly, it seems never to have been noticed that in the case of a *rise* formed with ⏑ – the short syllable which comes first is insufficient by itself to fill up the rise, which cannot be of smaller compass than two morae. Thus in a line like *Bacch.* 147,

Omitte, Lyde, ac *cave* malo.—Quid, *cave* malo?

when the speaker or reader comes to the rise of the third foot (and of the fifth) and is confronted with the short syllable *ca-*, he cannot stop there but is compelled by the demands of his ear (which expects a long syllable) to take in the next syllable as part of the rise. That the syllable thus taken in (*-vē*) makes the rise as a whole too long is true. But this only amounts to saying that a rise so constituted is not quantitatively exact. It ought to be dimoric; it actually is trimoric. A little extra length in a rise is at any rate a fault on the right side. Yet it is quite conceivable that the length of the second syllable would be slightly reduced in utterance *wherever it involved no difficulty of pronunciation to do so.* The use of ⏑ – to form a fall involves, no doubt, more difficulty; for in the case of iambic and trochaic verse any fall may be, and an inner fall ought to be, monomoric. But, as the outer falls may be just as well long as short in Greek verse, and as the Greek comedians had gone great lengths in admitting dimoric inner falls of the form ⏑ ⏑,[1] their Roman imitators went one better (or worse) by obliterating the distinction between the inner and the outer fall to a great extent;[2] and with this distinction there also disappeared, to a great extent, the quantitative distinction between the fall and the rise. In this way I explain to myself how it was that the OL verse writers came to extend to falls in iambic and trochaic verse the practice which they

[1] E.g. (to take an extreme case), *κατάβα, κατάβα, κατάβα, κατάβα.—καταβήσομαι*, Arist. *Wasps* 979. See note of Starkie.

[2] I have not forgotten that Klotz maintained that accented long syllables were excluded from inner falls; but Plautus admits them far more frequently than Klotz knew.

had come to regard as justified in rises. Perhaps the way was made easier by the dimoric falls of anapaestic verse; in a line like *Stich.* 37,

Tace sis: *cave* sis audiam ego istuc

or *Men.* 362,

Te hic stare foris, *fores* quoi pateant

the word of the form ⏑ – needs no more justification in the fall than in a rise of any kind of verse.

The above suggestion of mine might be regarded as hazardous were it not supported by the structure of some other kind of verse. But I am in a position to appeal to an analogous case. That Germanic verse has a quantitative element in it is recognized by the best authorities (Sievers and Schipper). The rises are formed as a general rule by syllables which are both long and accented. The falls are formed by unaccented syllables (or syllables bearing only a secondary accent), either short or long, or by several such (x or xx or xxx); and what is of immediate importance for my purpose is that any rise may be resolved into ⏑x, i.e., *into an accented short syllable followed by a syllable which may be either short or long.* The analogy to the Plautine *cáuĕ* is perfect. An illustration of the same thing may be given from modern English verse, if my readers will allow me to scan it in the way I think it ought to be scanned. Shakespeare shall give us an example of the pure dissyllabic rise (⏑ ⏑):

My father's *spĭrĭt* in arms; all is not well.

Milton provides an instance of the rise of the form ⏑ – (*P. L.* VI, 660):

Out of such *prison* those *spirits* of purest light.

To our English ears *spirits* (⏑ –) is as acceptable as *spirit.* Why then should not Plautus have allowed himself a *potest* as well as a *potis*, especially in a language which had a preponderance of long syllables?

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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HOMER[1]

By Robert J. Bonner

Laws in the sense in which the Xenophontic Pericles[2] defined them—*πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσὶν οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή*—are not found in Homer. But there were nevertheless definite ideas of *ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή*, though they had not yet been formulated in codes and constitutions. And the notion of orderliness and of obedience to the prevailing standards of right and justice was expressed by such words as *εὐνομίη*, *εὐηγεσίη*, and *εὐδικίη*. The *θέμιστες* were the nearest approach to laws. Strictly speaking they were pronouncements of the king indicating in an authoritative fashion what was right and proper (*θέμις*) in a particular set of circumstances. The usual occasion was the arbitration of a dispute. To the Zeus-born and Zeus-nurtured king was granted the scepter and the *θέμιστες*.[3] When the lesser chiefs as representatives of the ruling aristocracy dispensed justice they, too, were intrusted with the *θέμιστες* and held the scepter when they pronounced judgment.[4] Originally the decisions were regarded as divine inspirations; but the use of the adjective *σκολιαί* in connection with *θέμιστες* shows that the notion of a divine source had practically disappeared.[5] None of these inspired judgments are recorded in

[1] Special phases of the legal history of Greece in the Homeric age, e.g., the meaning of *θέμιστες*, the trial scene pictured on the shield of Achilles, and the punishment of homicides, have always attracted a great deal of attention. Of the trial scene Leaf observes "there are probably no twelve consecutive lines in the Homeric poems which have been obscured by so many explanations" (*Journal of Hellenic Studies* VIII, 122 ff.). But no one, I believe, has collected all the data furnished by the poems for a first chapter of Greek legal history. The present paper is the result of an attempt to reconstruct the Homeric judicial system.

[2] Xen. *Memorab.* i. 2, 42.

[3] *λαῶν ἐσσι ἄναξ καὶ τοι Ζεὺς ἐγγυάλιξε ‖ σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσι βουλεύῃσθα.*—*Il.* ix. 98–9.

[4] *Ibid.* i. 234 ff. [5] *Ibid.* xvi. 387.

the poems, but the well-known judgment of Solomon will serve as an illustration.[1]

The word δίκη came to share with θέμιστες the general idea of justice, and is used to supplement the Homeric legal vocabulary. Thus a person who refuses to do what is right is ἀθεμίστιος, but a righteous man is δίκαιος, not θεμίστιος. And the abstract idea of justice is expressed not by θεμιστοσύνη but by δίκη. Θεμιστεύω in the sense of "pronounce judgment" occurs, but δικάζω is the more common word. Κρίνω is also used of the exercise of judicial functions in such phrases as κρίνωσι θέμιστας.

In modern criminal law self-help[2] in the form of self-defense against aggression plays an important rôle subject to certain restrictions. But in the Homeric age there were no restrictions upon the exercise of self-help save such as were imposed by the individual's own weakness. The general custom of carrying arms greatly facilitated recourse to this method of obtaining redress.

[1] I Kings 3:16 ff. Cf. Gilbert *Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte des griechischen Gerichtsverfahrens* 463. Hirzel (*Dike, Themis, und Verwandtes* 40) regards θέμις as "die Erklärung eines göttlichen Willens, des Willens des Zeus." "Aber," he continues, "das Gebiet der θέμις reicht noch weiter. Ueberall wo ein Allgemeines herrscht, als Natur (*Il.* ix. 133 ff.), als Gewohnheit (*Od.* xiv. 129 ff.), und Sitte (*Od.* xi. 450 f.), oder wo es auch nur als Regel des socialen und politischen Lebens einen leisen Zwang ausübt (*Od.* iii. 186 f.), empfand der Grieche einen höhern Willen, eine θέμις, ohne dass dieser Wille gerade ein vernunftiger, geschweige denn ein göttlicher zu sein brauchte." Maine (*Ancient Law* 4 f.) has pointed out that these judgments are not based on custom but themselves contain the germs or rudiments of customs. Δίκη means "way," "habit," or "custom" (*Od.* xviii. 215), "what is right or due" (*Od.* ix. 215; *Il.* xix. 180), "justice" (*Od.* xiv. 84; *Il.* xvi. 388), and "a judgment" (*Od.* iii. 244; *Il.* xvi. 541). Finsler ("Das Homerische Königtum," *Neue Jahrbücher* XVII, 329) denies that δίκη ever means a "judgment"; cf. Maine *op. cit.* 5, and Hirzel *op. cit.* 57. Hirzel's view that "way" or "custom" is a derived rather than the original meaning of δίκη is not convincing.

[2] Anyone may resist attacks upon himself or his property. But the law requires that the resistance shall not be more than is sufficient for the purposes of self-defense; for the prevention of a wrong, not its redress, is the object of self-defense. But in the case of certain wrongs the common law allows true remedial self-help. One may expel a trespasser, retake goods of which he is the rightful owner, or abate a nuisance. So far as assisting another to defend himself is concerned, it is certain that a person may always defend those whose relation to him implies protection. It has even been held that a man may defend anyone; but his right to assist is no greater than the other's right to defend himself. In practice these rights are materially restricted by the prohibition against carrying weapons. I follow the example of Sir Frederick Pollock in using the English equivalent of the expressive German *Selbsthülfe*. The distinction between self-defense and self-help which he points out has no application here (*The Law of Torts* 154).

Relatives and friends were always expected to espouse the cause of the injured. Even wrongdoers could count on the assistance of their kinsmen. Odysseus in his character of Cretan refugee wondered why Telemachus was not aided in his troubles by his brothers: *οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ μαρναμένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται.*[1] And later, disguised as a beggar he said to the suitors, "Many an infatuate deed I did, giving place to mine own hardihood and strength, and trusting to my father and my brethren."[2]

Within his own household the master punished his servants even to the extent of inflicting death.[3] And like the Cyclopes each man *θεμιστεύει παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων.*[4] It was the duty of the father to avenge the wrongs of those who were under his protection, including the servants.[5]

Of self-help in obtaining redress for the killing of relatives there are a number of instances. Thirteen homicides are mentioned apart from the slaying of the suitors and of the followers of Aegistheus and Agamemnon.[6] The typical wanderer from his native country is the fleeing homicide;[7] and the typical trial scene pictured on the shield of Achilles arises out of a homicide. There is no trace in the poems of the later conception that homicide involves the pollution both of the slayer and of those who associated with him. Eumaeus the swineherd comes close to this conception, so far as the slayer himself is concerned, when he refuses the wager of the disguised Odysseus involving his death at the hands of Eumaeus if his prophecy regarding the return of his master is not fulfilled:

> *ξεῖν', οὕτω γάρ κέν μοι ἐϋκλείη τ' ἀρετή τε*
> *εἴη ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἅμα τ' αὐτίκα καὶ μετέπειτα,*
> *ὅς σ' ἐπεὶ ἐς κλισίην ἄγαγον καὶ ξείνια δῶκα,*
> *αὖτις δὲ κτείναιμι φίλον τ' ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἑλοίμην·*
> *πρόφρων κεν δὴ ἔπειτα Δία Κρονίωνα λιτοίμην.*[8]

[1] *Od.* xvi. 97 ff. [2] *Od.* xviii. 139 ff.

[3] Odysseus punished with death the goatherd and the faithless maidservants.

[4] *Od.* ix. 114 ff. Amyntor cursed his son and drove him into banishment for debauching his concubine (*Il.* ix. 447 ff.). Other instances of punishment inflicted are noticed in the general discussion of homicide.

[5] One of Odysseus' charges against the suitors was that they had debauched his female servants. [6] *Od.* iv. 536.

[7] *Il.* xxiv. 480. When Odysseus desires to conceal his identity and account for his wandering from Crete he pretends that he slew a man (*Od.* xiii. 259).

[8] *Od.* xiv. 402 ff.

The suitors even propose to seek the counsel of the gods regarding the contemplated murder of Telemachus.[1] Outside of the circle of the dead man's kinsmen and friends[2] there is no indication of any popular sentiment against ordinary homicide. It would be hard to imagine a more cowardly murder than the fictitious slaying of the son of Idomeneus by Odysseus. And yet Eumaeus receives the self-confessed murderer, as he supposed, with all the respect due a stranger in accordance with the prevailing customs.[3] There are a number of homicides mentioned who were living as honored members of communities to which they had come as exiles. The slaying of parents, however, met with universal condemnation. Phoenix, the aged companion of Achilles, tells of his feud with his father and of his design to slay him. But owing to his fear of "the people's voice and the many reproaches of men," who would call him parricide, he refrained.[4] In later Greek story Orestes slew his mother Clytemnestra; but in Homer it is neither stated nor necessarily implied that he was responsible for her death. So the honor he won for avenging his father's murder does not imply public approval of matricide under any circumstances.[5] And we may be sure that the wife who compassed the death of her husband would be roundly condemned. Menelaus has nothing to say of Clytemnestra's share in the plot against Agamemnon; Aegistheus is alone responsible for his death. Nestor, too, seems to lay the blame of her treachery to her husband upon Aegistheus and the *μοῖρα θεῶν*, though he does call her *στυγερή*.[6] Agamemnon's spirit speaks bitterly of her, and says she has brought disgrace not only upon herself but upon her whole sex.[7] As a rule men shrank from slaying a guest. Heracles' murder of Iphitus is aggravated by the fact that Iphitus was his guest.[8] And the refusal of Eumaeus to accept Odysseus' wager which has already been quoted affords further evidence of this prevailing sentiment.[9]

[1] *Od.* xvi. 402. [2] *Ibid.* iii. 310; iv. 535. [3] *Ibid.* xiii. 259 ff.

[4] *Il.* ix. 459 ff.; cf. Buchholz *Homerische Realien* II, 83.

[5] *Od.* i. 298. [6] *Ibid.* iii. 269 ff., 310. [7] *Ibid.* xi. 429 ff.

[8] *Ibid.* xxi. 27 ff.: *ὃς μὲν ξεῖνον ἑόντα κατέκτανεν ᾧ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ, ‖ σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὄπιν αἰδέσατ' οὐδὲ τράπεζαν ‖ τὴν ἧν οἱ παρέθηκεν.*

[9] *Ibid.* xiv. 402 ff.

The idea that murder is a menace to society is modern; in Homer it is regarded as the concern of the relatives alone and such partisans as they can assemble. Public sentiment not only tolerated blood-feuds, but even demanded that men should avenge the death of their kinsmen. Shame and disgrace were the portion of him who failed to take vengeance on the slayer of brother or son, while honor and glory awaited him who performed this duty.[1] And fortunate were they who left behind them near kinsmen to punish their slayers.[2] Some scholars, influenced by the later Athenian practice of confining the institution of legal proceedings against a slayer within certain limits of relationship, have sought for traces of a similar practice in Homer. Leist[3] attempts to show that the blood-feud did not extend beyond cousins; other kinsmen and relatives by marriage participated only as assistants. To make his point he is obliged to translate ἕται by "cousins" in one passage, and "brothers" in another. Naturally the nearest relatives took the leadership if they were in a position to do so.[4] There is no doubt that if Menelaus had returned home earlier he would not have waited for Orestes to avenge Agamemnon.[5] But in the absence of near relatives distant kinsmen and even friends would readily take up the blood-feud.[6] The question as to the right to exact vengeance could arise in practice only in cases where an agreement to accept blood-money was reached. Such an agreement could satisfactorily be made only with someone who could give a reasonable guarantee that the slayer would not be molested. In the only specific instance of an agreement to accept a blood-price the relationship is not mentioned.[7]

[1] *Od.* xxiv. 433: λώβη γὰρ τάδε γ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι, || εἰ δὴ μὴ παίδων τε κασιγνήτων τε φονῆας || τισόμεθ'. Cf. Orestes *Od.* i. 298.

[2] *Od.* iii. 196: ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ παῖδα καταφθιμένοιο λιπέσθαι || ἀνδρός. Cf. *Il.* xiv. 485.

[3] Leist *Gräco-italische Rechtsgeschichte* 42; κασίγνητοί τε ἕται τε *Od.* xv. 273: ἕται καὶ ἀνεψιοί (*Il.* ix. 464).

[4] Lipsius *Attisches Recht* 7: "Der Kreis der zur Blutrache verpflichten Verwandten erscheint nicht genau begrenzt; zunächst sind es natürlich Söhne, Brüder, Väter, aber auch Vettern und wenigstens an einer Stelle auch die entfernteren Verwandten." Among the more distant relatives may be mentioned grandnephews and great-grandnephews (*Il.* ii. 665).

[5] *Od.* iv. 546 ff.: ἦ γάρ μιν ζωὸν γε κιχήσεαι, ἦ κεν Ὀρέστης || κτείνεν ὑποφθάμενος. Cf. *Od.* iii. 309.

[6] *Od.* xxiii. 119. Cf. Achilles and Patroclus.

[7] *Il.* xviii. 498.

Homicide amongst relatives was commonly settled by banishment; and the exile seems to have been in no danger if he afterward met a kinsman of himself and his victim. There must have been a number of such possibilities on the expedition against Troy. Medon, the illegitimate son of Oileus, who slew his stepmother's brother, must have met his half-brother Ajax, the nephew of his victim.[1] But sometimes a family feud arose and the life of the slayer was in danger. Thus Tleptolemus, who slew his great-uncle, fled with a large number of followers owing to the threats of his relatives: *ἀπείλησαν γάρ οἱ ἄλλοι || υἱέες υἱωνοί τε βίης Ἡρακληείης.*[2] Althea is said to have called down curses on her son Meleager, who had slain her brother; but in spite of her desire for his death he was neither slain nor banished.[3]

In the case of homicides outside of the family the first instinct of the slayer was to flee. The more important the victim the more serious was the predicament of the slayer: *δεινὸν δὲ γένος βασιλήιόν ἐστι κτείνειν.* Even if the slain man was a humble person with few to avenge him the only safety was in flight.[4] The fate of the various homicides mentioned in the poems seems to indicate pretty clearly that voluntary banishment was the usual issue.[5] Eight of the thirteen went into exile. These figures are, of course, not entirely conclusive, because there is but little occasion for mentioning those who fell victims to the vengeance of the enraged kinsmen, or those who paid the blood-price. When men of rank were concerned in a homicide the resulting feud might involve so many as to amount to civil war. Tleptolemus, to avoid a disastrous feud, gathered his faction together and founded a settlement in Crete.[6] Civil war would have been the result of the feud between Odysseus and the relatives of the suitors had they not become reconciled. When once the fugitive got away he did

[1] *Il.* xv. 332 ff. [2] *Ibid.* ii. 665. [3] *Ibid.* ix. 565.

[4] *Od.* xvi. 401; xxiii. 118 ff.

[5] I include in this list Odysseus in his character of Cretan exile (*Od.* xiii. 259). The others are as follows: Medon, *Il.* xiii. 696; xv. 332; Lykophron, *ibid.* xv. 431; Epigeus, *ibid.* xvi. 573; Patroclus, *ibid.* xxiii. 85 ff.; an unnamed Aetolian, *Od.* xiv. 378; Theoclymenus, *ibid.* xv. 271; Tleptolemus, *Il.* ii. 655 ff.; all these were banished. Aegistheus was slain. The unnamed slayer in the trial scene paid blood-money. Heracles (*Od.* xxi. 27), Meleager (*Il.* ix. 565) and Orestes were not molested.

[6] *Il.* ii. 655.

not seem to be in any danger. Twice the fleeing slayer is called a suppliant. But what he asks for is not protection but shelter, or assistance in continuing his flight. There is no instance of any attempt to molest a fugitive in his place of banishment. Theoclymenus, it is true, professed to fear pursuit, but apparently his fears were groundless.[1] The lot of the murderer banished for life must often have been hard, but this feature is never mentioned in Homer. The spirit of Patroclus speaks bitterly of his banishment though he found in Peleus a noble patron and in Achilles a loving comrade.[2] Aegistheus is the only murderer who suffered death. He had committed a dastardly murder, and Nestor suggests that if Menelaus had slain him he would have denied him funeral rites. But it is too much to infer that a slain murderer was ever in danger of being treated as Achilles proposed to treat Hector. Menelaus himself gives no hint of such an intention had he forestalled Orestes in slaying Agamemnon's murderer.[3] Three homicides paid no penalty. Heracles slew a stranger whose death could have been avenged only by war.[4] Meleager's distinguished services in saving his city from sack probably enabled him to defy the machinations of his incensed mother;[5] the punishment of Orestes by avenging furies is unknown to Homer.[6]

The acceptance of blood-money seems to have been comparatively rare. Apart from the trial scene pictured on the shield of Achilles, which arose out of an agreement to settle a homicide for a blood-price, there is no specific case. A man who has settled with the slayer of a brother or a son for a large sum is cited in a simile of the *Iliad* (ix. 632–35) as the highest type of commendable, though perhaps unusual, self-restraint. We do not know what considerations induced relatives to accept blood-money. There is

[1] *Il.* xvi. 573; *Od.* xv. 271.

[2] *Il.* xxiii. 85 ff.

[3] *Od.* iii. 256 ff.; iv. 547.

[4] *Od.* xxi. 28; cf. *Il.* xvi. 58–59: *τὴν ἂψ ἐκ χειρῶν ἕλετο κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων* || *Ἀτρεϊδης ὡς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην* for the position of a stranger.

[5] *Il.* ix. 565 ff.

[6] Murderers are spoken of in one passage as men seized by a grievous curse: *ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀνδρ' ἄτη πυκινὴ λάβῃ, ὅς τ'ἐνὶ πάτρῃ* || *φῶτα κατακτείνας ἄλλων ἐξίκετο δῆμον* (*Il.* xxiv. 480–81). The *ἄτη* is best taken as that which caused the homicide. The notion of *ἄτη* following a homicide seems to belong to a later period. But Homer does mention curses called down upon wrongdoers (*Il.* ix. 453 ff.; 565 ff.; *Od.* ii. 135).

no trace of a tendency to put pressure on relatives to induce them to forego the blood-feud. Neither is there any indication that the circumstances under which the homicide was committed were ever taken into account. The modern classification of homicide as justifiable and excusable was unknown. Neither was any distinction made between *φόνος ἀκούσιος* and *φόνος ἑκούσιος*. Patroclus committed the homicide for which he was banished, *οὐκ ἐθέλων*. This case shows further that not even extreme youth saved one from the penalties of manslaughter.[1]

There is no clue to the origin of the practice of taking blood-money. It has been suggested that it was to defray the expenses of sacrifices to appease the spirit of the dead. There is a hint of this in Achilles' promise to share with the spirit of Patroclus the ransom he received for Hector's body.[2] Neither is there any trace of the modern idea of compensation measured by the damages suffered by surviving relatives.[3]

Adultery, seduction, or rape was punished by the husband or nearest relative in the case of a free woman, by the master in the case of a slave. Aegistheus' adultery with Clytemnestra is regarded as aggravating the murder of Agamemnon, and his death at the hands of Orestes is an expiation of the seduction as well as of the murder.[4] The injured husband might slay the adulterer or he might, like Hephaestus in the lay of Demodocus, exact a fine.[5] Anteia, the wife of Proetus, falsely accused Bellerophon of attemped rape and insisted that her husband should slay him.

[1] *εὖτέ με τυτθὸν ἐόντα Μενοιτίου ἐξ Ὀπόεντος*
ἤγαγεν ὑμέτερόνδ' ἀνδροκτασίῃς ὑπο λυγρῇς
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε παῖδα κατέκτανον Ἀμφιδάμαντος
νήπιος, οὐκ ἐθέλων, ἀμφ' ἀστραγάλοισι χολωθείς· (*Il.* xxiii. 85 ff.).

In a modern court such a homicide might be adjudged excusable if indeed the perpetrator was of an age at which he could be tried at all. Under seven years there is no liability; between seven and fourteen there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for entertaining a criminal intent.

[2] *Il.* xxiv. 595; cf. Brehier *De Graecorum Judiciorum Origine* 38 ff.

[3] Lord Campbell's act of 1846 enabled the wife, husband, parent, and child to collect the actual damages suffered by the death of one who was killed by somebody's "wrongful act, neglect, or default." Similar statutes in this country have added a *solatium* to the actual damages. But the principle has nowhere been extended so as to include homicides of every kind.

[4] *Od.* i. 35 ff. [5] *Od.* viii. 266 ff.

Accordingly Proetus took steps to encompass his death by guile after banishing him.[1] Amyntor punished his son Phoenix for debauching his concubine by cursing and banishing him.[2] One of the explicit charges which Odysseus made against the suitors before he proceeded to slay them was, δμωῇσιν δὲ γυναιξὶ παρευνάζεσθε βιαίως. This amounts to rape if indeed βιαίως is to be taken literally.[3] But in view of the fact that these women are afterward punished for unchastity we must not look for the precision of an Athenian indictment in Odysseus' charge. The conduct of both suitors and servants was an intolerable insult to the master and called for redress.[4]

Robbery in the form of cattle-lifting and piracy was extremely common. Against piracy the individual, even when aided by his friends, had but slight means of protection. Both piracy and cattle-lifting on a large scale were matters for the community as a whole to redress. Against ordinary stealing a man had some chance of protecting himself. If under cover of mist or darkness his sheepfolds or herds were raided he might trace the lost animals and seek to recover them.[5] But the mere finding of stolen animals would not suffice if the robber who operated by stealth was prepared to resort to force. Iphitus lost his life in trying to recover some stolen horses from Heracles.[6] But the vigilant owner might surprise the thief in the act; and men were not infrequently wounded in protecting their cattle and sheep.[7]

Assault and battery arising out of disputes of various kinds must have been of common occurrence among men who habitually carried arms. For example, a quarrel about boundary stones such as is described in a simile of the *Iliad* might easily lead to a personal encounter.[8] Threats of violence no doubt often caused men to refrain from insisting on their rights.[9]

Lipsius points out that the redress sought by an injured person included not merely the restitution of property destroyed, stolen,

[1] *Il.* vi. 160 ff. [2] *Il.* ix. 454 ff. [3] *Od.* xxii. 37. [4] *Od.* xxii. 418.

[5] *Il.* iii. 20 f. Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, was a skilful thief (*Od.* xix. 396).

[6] *Od.* xxi. 22 ff. [7] *Od.* xvii. 471 ff.

[8] *Il.* xii. 421 ff.; cf. the fight between Irus and Odysseus (*Od.* xviii. 1 ff.).

[9] Laomedon is said by threats of violence to have defrauded Apollo and Poseidon of their wages (*Il.* xxi. 435 ff.).

or withheld, but also substantial damages.[1] The suitors offer to make terms on this basis; and the Trojans agreed to return Helen and her treasures together with suitable damages if Menelaus slew Paris in the duel.[2] When Agamemnon proposes to return Briseis to Achilles he offers a handsome gift. To these examples cited by Lipsius may be added the offer of Antilochus[3] to pay reasonable damages as well as to restore the prize he wrongfully won from Menelaus in the chariot race. When the suitors propose that Telemachus send his mother back to her father he refuses to dismiss her against her will partly because her dowry will have to be restored together with a substantial sum in the way of damages. It is true that the words *κακὸν δέ με πόλλ' ἀποτίνειν Ἰκαρίῳ* may refer to the restitution of the dowry only; but the next line, *ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς κακὰ πείσομαι*, shows that more than mere restitution is contemplated.[4] In effect the wager in the trial scene and the *μοιχάγρια* in cases of adultery amount to damages.[5]

The curses which injured persons called down on the heads of those who wronged them may in some cases have acted as a deterrent. Amyntor's curse on his son who debauched his concubine was fulfilled; and Telemachus refused to drive his mother from the palace partly through fear of her curses.[6]

When an outrage was committed by a stranger the injured person might himself seek to recover stolen property by presenting a claim to the community to which the stranger belonged, as Mentor (Athena in disguise) proposed to do.[7] But that such a

[1] Lipsius *op. cit.* 9 ff.

[2] Cf. the version preserved by Herodotus (ii. 118) according to which an embassy under Menelaus demanded the return of Helen and the stolen property as well as *τῶν ἀδικημάτων δίκας*.

[3] *Il.* xxiii. 591 ff.

[4] *Od.* ii. 132 ff. Lipsius thinks the dowry alone is in question. But the words *πόλλ' ἀποτίνειν* suggest a penalty. See *Il.* ix. 634, where they are used of paying blood-money.

[5] Such damages are variously described as *ποινή*, *ἄποινα*, and *τιμή*. Fanta (*Der Staat in der "Ilias" und "Odyssee"* 84) wrongly regards *πεῖραρ* as referring to the wager (*Il.* xviii. 501).

[6] *Il.* ix. 453 ff.; *Od.* ii. 135 ff.; cf. *Il.* ix. 566 ff.

[7] *ἀτὰρ ἦλθεν μετὰ Καύκωνας μεγαθύμους*
εἶμ', ἔνθα χρεῖός μοι ὀφέλλεται, οὔ τι νέον γε,
οὐδ' ὀλίγον· —*Od.* iii. 366–67.

The use of this excuse by Athena shows that these claims were not uncommon.

course involved considerable risk is clear from the fate of Iphitus, who was slain by Heracles while seeking to recover some stolen horses. As a rule the whole community took up these claims and took steps to obtain compensation. Thus Odysseus when a mere lad was sent by his father and the council of elders to Messenia to obtain redress for the theft of a number of sheep by Messenians.[1] The attitude of a community toward a marauder who thus exposed them to claims for damages is well illustrated by the measures taken by the Ithacans to punish Eupeithes who, by joining in a Taphian raid against a friendly people, had rendered the Ithacans liable to claims for redress. It was only the intervention of Odysseus that saved him from death and confiscation of property.[2] Failing redress by peaceful means the injured people usually resorted to reprisals. The accruing booty was divided among those who had suffered loss of property by the elders acting as a court of claims.[3] Such a claim was called χρεῖος.

It is obvious that communities possessing any sort of organization must make some provision for the amicable settlement of disputes between citizens. The possession of ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι and θέμιστες distinguishes the civilized communities from the barbarous peoples of the Homeric age just as δίκη and νόμος marked the same distinction in later times.[4] But modern investigators are by no means agreed as to the kind of provision that was made for the administration of justice. Three different views have been advanced: (1) The parties chose arbitrators who had no power to enforce their awards. (2) The judges were chosen from among the γέροντες and like modern judges had the power of enforcing their decisions. (3) The judges were really magistrates and represented the king.[5] Unquestionably the administration of

[1] *Od.* xxi. 16 ff.

[2] *Od.* xvi. 420 ff. This incident will receive fuller treatment in the discussion of the judicial power of the people.

[3] *Il.* xi. 685 ff. Cf. Lécrivain "Le droit de se faire justice soi-même et les représailles," *Mémoires de L'Academie des Sciences de Toulouse* (1897) 277. Lécrivain and the writers whom he quotes dismiss the Homeric period with a mere reference to the mission of Odysseus and the raid of Nestor.

[4] *Od.* ix. 112; Herod. iv. 106.

[5] These views are conveniently summarized by Thonissen *Le Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne* 23. Finsler, *Das Homerische Königtum* 320-21, 329, denies that a king ever acted as judge.

justice began with arbitration. Naturally the disputants would seek to obtain the services of a person who had a reputation for impartiality and wisdom without regard to rank or official position. We even hear of a woman, Arete, queen of the Phaecians, who acted as an arbitrator.[1] But the prestige of the king must have marked him as the natural arbitrator. And it is the arbitral function of the Homeric kings that Aristotle[2] has in mind when he says τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. Homer, it is true, nowhere pictures a king dispensing justice. But this is a mere accident, for Idomeneus proposed to Ajax to submit their dispute to Agamemnon.[3] And Minos settling disputes in the spirit land certainly had his prototype in such kings as Nestor who περὶ οἷδε δίκας and Sarpedon who Λυκίην εἴρυτο δίκῃσί τε καὶ σθένει ᾧ.[4] Everywhere in ancient times kings and tyrants exercised judicial functions.[5] Deioces of Persia and Pisistratus[6] of Athens administered justice as arbitrators. Accordingly we are justified in assuming that the Homeric ruler, whether a Zeus-nourished king or the official head of an aristocratic government, was constantly called upon to act as arbitrator. From a royal arbitrator to a court of γέροντες is not a far cry. In the earliest portion of the *Iliad* the chiefs are called δικασπόλοι, and in the *Odyssey* δικασπόλος ἀνήρ is a synonym for nobleman.[7] Clearly it was an established practice to refer disputes to the lesser chiefs acting either individually[8] or in a body as they appear in the trial scene. An ambitious aristocracy would not fail to recognize the advantages that would accrue to themselves from the establishment of a regular court of arbitration to which disputants might refer their differences. In the Greek camp before Troy there was a place in or adjoining the ἀγορά which was set apart for the administration of justice,[9] and was provided with seats for the judges. The appearance of a trial scene on the

[1] *Od.* vii. 74. [2] *Politics* 1285*b*. [3] *Il.* xxiii. 485.

[4] *Od.* iii. 244; *Il.* xvi. 542.

[5] Among the Lydians, Persians, Egyptians, and Hebrews, Herod. i. 14, 96–97, 100; ii. 129; II Sam. 15:2.

[6] Arist. *Const. of Ath.* xvi. 5; cf. Stesagoras of the Chersonese, Herod. vi. 38.

[7] *Il.* i. 237 ff.; *Od.* xi. 184 ff.

[8] For an individual arbitrator see *Od.* xii. 439–40.

[9] *Il.* xi. 807; xviii. 497, 504.

shield of Achilles as a typical incident of public life and two similes drawn from judicial activities point to some sort of judicial organization. Court sessions were probably held with some degree of regularity and might last all day.[1] There is no indication that recourse to these courts was obligatory. Doubtless the tendency of public opinion was to support the man who was willing to arbitrate his differences with a fellow-citizen. The interests of the aristocracy would be materially advanced by fostering such a tendency. By the time of Hesiod the processes of arbitration had practically become compulsory.[2]

In the Homeric age the usual method of bringing a dispute to arbitration was by challenge and wager. When Idomeneus and Ajax had a dispute regarding the identity of the leader in the chariot race the Cretan leader said, "Come then, let us wager a tripod or a caldron and make Agamemnon, Atreus' son, our umpire, which mares are leading."[3] And when Eumaeus the swineherd refused to believe the disguised Odysseus when he asserted that his master would return, Odysseus offered to stake his life against a suit of clothes that he spoke the truth. The parties to a challenge entered into a solemn agreement confirmed by oath to abide by the decision.[4] The famous trial scene on the shield of Achilles is another instance of arbitration on challenge and wager. Like all the scenes represented on the shield this really combines a series of pictures.[5] That is to say, several pictures would be required to illustrate the poet's description. Without discussing at this point the various interpretations that have been offered, I shall present the explanation that seems to me to be the most plausible. The text is given for convenience of reference:[6]

497 λαοὶ δ' εἰν ἀγορῇ ἔσαν ἀθρόοι· ἔνθα δὲ νεῖκος
ὥρώρει, δύο δ' ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς
ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου· ὁ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι

[1] *Il.* xvi. 387–88; *Od.* xii. 439.

[2] Hesiod *Works and Days* 35 ff.; cf. Gilbert *op. cit.* 461.

[3] *Il.* xxiii. 485; Lang, Leaf and Myers' translation.

[4] *Od.* xiv. 391 ff.; cf. *ibid.* xvi. 102–3.

[5] Dareste *Annuaire des Études Grecques* XVIII, 91.

[6] *Il.* xviii. 497–508.

δήμῳ πιφαύσκων, ὁ δ' ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι·
ἄμφω δ' ἰέσθην ἐπὶ ἴστορι πεῖραρ ἑλέσθαι.
λαοὶ δ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον, ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί·
κήρυκες δ' ἄρα λαὸν ἐρήτυον· οἱ δὲ γέροντες
ἧτ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ,
σκῆπτρα δὲ κηρύκων ἐν χέρσ' ἔχον ἠεροφώνων·
τοῖσιν ἔπειτ' ἤισσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον.
κεῖτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
τῷ δόμεν, ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι.

A man had been killed some time before the trial, and his kinsmen and friends rallied to take vengeance on the slayer, whose friends also supported him in large numbers. Finally the bulk of the community was ranged on one side or the other.[1] A compromise seemed advisable, and an agreement to settle the blood-feud for a sum of money was reached. The scene on the shield presents the principals disputing about the payment. The one claims that he has paid the money in full; the other denies it. In the market place each man, surrounded by his partisans who had sided with him in the earlier stages of the feud, tells his side of the case to those within hearing. At length one challenges the other to stake a talent apiece and refer the dispute to arbitration. An agreement to abide by the verdict is made and confirmed by oaths.[2] The talents constituting the wager are deposited before the elders seated in the place of justice, each with a scepter, the emblem of the judicial office. Around them surge the partisans so closely that the heralds are obliged to restrain them. The litigants then present their cases amid the applause of their partisans. In succession the elders express their views; the majority determined the verdict. The two talents were awarded to the winner of the suit.

A more detailed discussion of the difficulties with which these lines fairly bristle will serve to make clear the basis of this interpretation. Many scholars have maintained that the deep popular interest can be accounted for only by assuming that the homicide is an issue. My theory that the present dispute is connected with an earlier feud will account for the interest in a case involv-

[1] This I infer from the deep interest which the people take in the trial.

[2] For an agreement (ῥήτρη) of this kind see *Od.* xiv. 393 ff.

ing a mere debt. Those who regard the homicide as the issue interpret *ὁ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι* to mean "the one promised to pay all," and *ὁ δ' ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι* to mean "the other refused to accept anything."[1] It may be admitted that linguistically this translation is possible, though Lipsius[2] argues convincingly against it. It is assumed that the arbitration is to determine whether the relative shall be obliged to accept blood-money. A minor difficulty lies in the word *πάντα* (499). How could a man who insisted on his right to pay a blood-price because the homicide was, let us say, *ἀκούσιος* be said to promise to pay *all*? But there is a more serious difficulty. There is nothing to show that relatives could be forced to accept blood-money; neither is there any evidence of a growing popular sentiment in favor of a settlement.[3] Quite the contrary is the case. Banishment, as we have seen, is the usual fate of the slayer. Moreover the acceptance of blood-money is cited as an example of extreme self-restraint.[4] But it by no means follows that the passion of the man is restrained if he accepted blood-money under compulsion; his heart might still be seething with anger and a desire for revenge. Surely the poet is thinking of a man who acted of his own free will. Leist[5] assumes that when the homicide was *ἀκούσιος* the relatives were obliged to accept money. Unfortunately for this theory, in the only instance of *φόνος ἀκούσιος* the slayer, Patroclus, a mere youth, was banished.[6] So far as the evidence of the poems

[1] Leaf *Journal of Hellenic Studies* VIII (1887), 122 ff.

[2] Dareste, *Nouvelles Études* 6, is unconvinced by the criticisms of the view of Leaf by Lipsius in *Leipziger Studien* (1890) 228 ff.

[3] In view of the killing of Aegistheus I do not understand how Leaf can say, "There is, I believe, no case in the poems where blood is ever exacted for blood."

[4] *Il.* ix. 632–37:

καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος·
καὶ ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ' ἀποτείσας,
τοῦ δέ τ' ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
ποινὴν δεξαμένῳ. σοὶ δ' ἀλληκτόν τε κακόν τε
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι θεοὶ θέσαν εἵνεκα κούρης
οἵης.

Leaf cites this passage to prove that the payment of a fine instead of exile was the recognized course.

[5] *Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte* 330 ff.

[6] This case has already been discussed in some detail.

goes the distinction between φόνος ἀκούσιος and φόνος ἑκούσιος played no part in determining the fate of the slayer, neither is it a necessary assumption to explain the trial scene. Various rôles have been assigned to the people. Gilbert suggests that they are compurgators (*Eideshelfer*);[1] others believe that they decided to which of the elders the prize of two talents went. The ἴστωρ has been variously identified as a witness, as the king, as the chairman of the γέροντες. The scholiast regards the ἴστωρ as a witness; but this view is now regarded as incorrect. An objection urged by Dareste[2] is fatal. If the case was to be decided by the testimony of a witness, what need was there of pleas by the parties or of discussions by the elders? Dareste's[3] former view that ἐπὶ ἴστορι merely means "by arbitration" is the most satisfactory. There is no evidence that either a king or an elder acting as an arbitrator selected by the parties ever referred the case to the council of elders. If it was customary for the king to ask the aid of the elders in arbitrations why did not Idomeneus instead of naming Agamemnon as the proposed arbitrator in the dispute between himself and Ajax offer to submit the matter to the Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες as did Menelaus in his dispute with Antilochus?[4] Neither is there any mention of a presiding officer of the council of elders in this connection.[5]

The former view[6] that l. 506 refers to the litigants has been generally abandoned, though much may be said in its favor. But

[1] Gilbert *op. cit.* 469, n. 1.

[2] *Annuaire des Études Grecques* (1884) 94 ff.

[3] *Op. cit.* 95. "L' ἴστωρ et les γέροντες sont une seule et meme chose." (So also Lipsius *Leipz. Stud.* [1890] 231.) His later view in *Nouvelles Études D'histoire du Droit* (1902) 11, is that the ἴστωρ is the sole judge and that the elders are assessors.

[4] *Il.* xxiii. 485, 573.

[5] After the Pylians had made a successful raid on the Eleans, the king selected a portion of the plunder to recoup losses he had suffered at the hands of the Elean raiders. The elders acting as a court of claims divided the remainder amongst those who had lost property. If the king acted in this case he is not distinguished from the nobles (*Il.* xi. 670 ff.).

[6] Doederlein translates δίκαζον by *causam suam agebant*, and Heyne by *alter post alterum causam egerunt*. It is evident that ἧσσον suits the eager litigants better than the judicial elders. But the stumbling-block is δίκαζον. It is said that δικάζω in the active is never used of a litigant. To maintain this rule we are obliged to regard Menelaus both as plaintiff and judge in the same case (*Il.* xxiii. 570). This case is discussed later. There is a distinct change of scene. The poet is now describing the

so far as the legal interpretation is concerned it is of no consequence. Of vital importance, however, is the interpretation of l. 508. According to the most widespread view it refers to the judges. This interpretation introduces an unparalleled feature into the trial. It is not strictly a counterpart of the Roman practice of giving a reward to the judge in the *Legis actio sacramenti*, for here the reward goes to only one of many judges.

Sir Henry Maine believes that the two talents were for the judge "who shall explain the grounds of his decision most to the satisfaction of the audience."[1] Beyond this point it is impossible to follow the proceedings. It would seem necessary to confine the contest for the prize to those of the judges whose opinion agreed with the verdict; otherwise the people might reach a conclusion at variance with that of the council. For we may be sure that the merits of the case would play a large part in the popular decision. Such a result would assuredly defeat the purpose of the arbitration. On the other hand, if the prize must be assigned to one of the majority judges, what is the basis of the decision? In a case involving a question of fact (i.e., was the money paid as alleged?) there could be but little difference between the affirmative opinions in point of merit. Laurence has emphasized this feature of the theory in a vein of mild and well-deserved satire.[2] It is to avoid this highly improbable situation that Leist, Leaf, and other followers of Maine have without sufficient warrant assumed that the homicide is itself in issue. This would allow some considerable variety of reasons for reaching the same conclusion, but it involves a difficulty quite as serious, for everything in the poems points to the fact that the relatives always decided whether they would accept the blood-price or not.

But the line is capable of quite another rendering. Lipsius has shown that in accordance with Homeric usage δίκην εἰπεῖν may be rendered "plead a cause." He cites Ἀχιλῆα δίκῃ ἠμείψατο, "answered Achilles with a claim of right," and δίκας εἴροντο

proceedings in court. And it is certainly surprising that the only line which deals with the proceedings should be devoted to the process by which a decision is reached which is of little interest in comparison with the pleas of the parties.

[1] *Ancient Law* 364.

[2] "Judges and Litigants," *Journal of Philology* VIII (1879), 125 ff.

ἄνακτα, "they were asking the king concerning their rights." To these may be added ἐπὶ ῥηθέντι δικαίῳ, "a (fair) claim of right."[1] From the linguistic standpoint there is perhaps but little to choose between the two renderings; but Lipsius finds in μετὰ τοῖσι a decisive argument: "Die Bedeutung der Präposition aber lässt nur die Wiedergabe mit 'vor, bei' zu und verbietet die Gleichsetzung mit einem Genetive." Μετὰ τοῖσι simply means "in court." The two talents, then, must go to the man in whose favor the verdict was given.

Two views regarding the source and significance of the two talents are prevalent. Lipsius, who regards them as the blood-price paid into court by the slayer, admits that two talents is a small sum for the price of a slain man. In the only other case where blood-money is mentioned the amount is said to have been large: "Yet doth a man accept recompense of his brother's murderer or for his dead son; and so the slayer for a great price abideth in his own land." It is pointed out that the close relationship, that of brother or son, accounts for the largeness of the sum. But even if we accept the assumption that in the trial scene the slain man is a distant relative of the plaintiff, the sum is still too small. Two talents are the fourth prize in a chariot race in which the first is a tripod and a woman and the third a caldron. Is not a freeman of more value than a slave woman, and that too not of the best, as may be seen by a comparison with the women offered by Agamemnon to Achilles?[2] Indeed, a woman or a tripod is the usual prize in a chariot race;[3] and a tripod or a caldron is an ordinary wager in a trivial dispute between Ajax and Idomeneus.[4] Was the life of a man held so lightly by even a distant relative? Surely lifelong banishment could not be com-

[1] *Od.* xi. 570; *Il.* xxiii. 542; *Od.* xviii. 414; xx. 322.

[2] *Il.* xxiii. 262–70. These women not only were skilled in handiwork (ἔργα ἴδυιαι), but possessed personal charms (αἳ κάλλει ἐνίκων φῦλα γυναικῶν, *Il.* ix. 130).

[3] *Il.* xxii. 164. This phase of the question is treated by Ridgeway, *Journal of Philology* X, 80 ff. In a later paper (*Journal of Hellenic Studies* VIII, 133) he discusses the value of the Homeric talent and shows that it is not too large a sum for a reward to the best judge. He finds that the talent is equal in value to an ox. The results of these investigations tend to confirm the objection that two talents are quite insufficient for the blood-price.

[4] *Il.* xxiii. 485.

muted for so small a sum. As a wager a talent is not excessive. The tripod or the caldron which are mentioned in the proposed wager between Ajax and Idomeneus might cost more than two talents apiece, as may be inferred from the prize list in the chariot race.

The wager has been compared with the *poena sponsionis et restipulationis* of Roman law which went to the successful litigant. In Attic law it survives in a modified form in the παρακαταβολή deposited by the plaintiff and forfeited in case of failure either to the state or to the defendant according to the nature of the case.[1] In effect the wager corresponds to the damages which according to Homeric practice usually accompanied restitution and redress.

But the strongest argument in favor of the wager theory is the general Homeric custom of bringing a dispute to an issue by means of a wager. There are traces of challenge to battle as a means of settling disputes which is in effect a wager. After the chariot race Achilles proposed to give to Eumelus the second prize, because owing to an accident he had lost his leading position and was compelled to drop out. But Antilochus protested and claimed the mare because he was second in the race:

> τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ δώσω· περὶ δ' αὐτῆς πειρηθήτω
> ἀνδρῶν ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃσιν ἐμοὶ χείρεσσι μάχεσθαι.[2]

Achilles yielded and gave Antilochus the mare. The award was at once protested by Menelaus on the ground that Antilochus had won by a foul, and the dispute was finally settled by a challenge to Antilochus to take an evidentiary oath, which is also a species of wager. At first Menelaus called upon the chiefs to arbitrate between himself and Antilochus without favor (μηδ' ἐπ' ἀρωγῇ).[3] The method of arbitration here suggested is no doubt the same as in the trial scene. As Menelaus immediately rejects his own suggestion in favor of a challenge to take an evidentiary oath which first occurred to him when he was fouled, no details are given. Trial by evidentiary oath consists in tendering to an opponent an oath embodying his contentions or in offering to take an oath

[1] Meier and Schoemann *Der attische Process*[2] 815 ff.

[2] *Il.* xxiii. 553–54; cf. Bréhier *De Graecorum Judiciorum Origine* 96.

[3] *Il.* xxiii. 574 ff.

embodying one's own contentions.[1] Here Menelaus challenges Antilochus to swear that he did not win by a foul. The oath is refused and the prize goes to Menelaus. Had Antilochus cared to take the oath at the risk of being δαίμοσιν ἀλιτρός, he would have been entitled to the prize according to the terms of the challenge. This is implied in Menelaus' saying during the race, οὐδ' ὣς ἄτερ ὅρκου οἵσῃ ἄεθλον. No money wager is required in this kind of trial, but Antilochus expresses his willingness to pay the usual damages. This offer is, of course, quite gratuitous. But it serves to show how firmly fixed was the custom of demanding damages along with the restitution of an article wrongfully taken. Menelaus' words, εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν αὐτὸς δικάσω, are commonly taken to mean that he proposes to act as judge and that, too, in his own case.[2] Now Menelaus had rejected his own proposition to submit the dispute to the arbitration of the chiefs lest people should criticize him and say, "Menelaus by constraining Antilochus with false words has gone off with the prize." Trial by evidentiary oath was preferred expressly because the result would be just (ἰθεῖα), and there would be no chance for a decision ἐπ' ἀρωγῇ. Under these circumstances no one, I fancy, would be more surprised than Menelaus himself to find that his words are interpreted to mean that he was judge in his own case. He would, doubtless, have readily agreed with Plato[3] that the gods and not men are the judges in this kind of trial. The confusion arises from pressing the meaning of δικάσω too closely, owing to a desire to preserve a distinction between the active and middle voices. Menelaus simply means to say, "I'll make my right in the matter clear." As a matter of fact the chiefs who are asked to criticize his proposal are the only persons who can be regarded as judges. This is the only instance of a case decided by an evidentiary oath.

There is no instance of an oath rendered by a disputant in support of his own contentions; but it was perhaps not uncommon in practice. Hermes in the Homeric[4] hymn offered to swear that he had not stolen the cattle. And Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is said to have excelled all men in stealing

[1] Plato discusses the evidentiary oath, *Laws* 948B.

[2] Gilbert *op cit.* 464. [3] *Laws* 948B. [4] *Hymn to Hermes* 324.

and swearing, was apparently able to escape responsibility when charged with theft by swearing that he was not guilty.[1]

Witnesses are nowhere mentioned in Homer in connection with arbitrations. The gods in whose names oaths were sworn are called *μάρτυροι* or *ἐπιμάρτυροι*. They are not only witnesses but sureties or guarantors of the compact or treaty, because they punish perjurers.[2] For the person in whose interest they act they are protectors. Zeus is called the *μάρτυρος* of strangers, because when called upon to witness a wrong done to the stranger he punishes the wrongdoer.[3] Here we have the origin of human witnesses and sureties. In place of gods, men are summoned to the making of a contract to insure its provisions being carried out. But this stage was not reached in the age of Homer.[4] Occasionally the word *μάρτυρος* is used of those who are familiar with some event or situation;[5] but they are not summoned either as formal or as general witnesses. The word *μαρτυρίη* in the *Odyssey* is not used in a technical sense.[6]

Some scholars regard the omission of testimonial evidence as purely accidental.[7] The earliest mention of witnesses occurs in Hesiod.[8] But this affords no ground for inferences regarding the Homeric age. For the judicial system that prevailed in the time of Hesiod is considerably more advanced than that of the age of Homer, as is shown by the development of compulsory legal processes. The Homeric arbitrator had to rely upon what Gilbert aptly calls his "eigene Combination" (resourcefulness), or the voluntary evidentiary oath of one of the parties.

Crimes and criminals[9] are unknown to Homer. The conception of crime as a wrong which was a menace to society was not yet

[1] *Od.* xix. 396; cf. *Il.* x. 267; Ovid *Met.* xi. 312.

[2] *Il.* iii. 274 ff.; vii. 76; cf. Nagelsbach *Homerische Theologie* 265. [3] *Od.* xvi. 423.

[4] In the "Song of Demodocus" (*Od.* viii. 266 ff.) Poseidon offered to be surety for Ares. This passage is of late origin but preserves a link in the process of development.

[5] *Il.* i. 338; ii. 302.

[6] *πάρος δέ μιν* (Ariadne) *Ἄρτεμις ἔκτα*
Δίῃ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ Διονύσου μαρτυρίῃσι. —*Od.* xi. 325.

[7] Gilbert *op. cit.* 467; Buchholz *Homerische Realien* 87.

[8] *Works and Days* 282, 371.

[9] Levi (*Delitto e Pena nel Pensiero dei Greci* 38) finds one exception: "Un solo tipo di degenerato, come direbbesi ora, ricorda *l'Iliade:* Tersite."

formulated, though it is dimly foreshadowed in the feeling of abhorrence for the fomenter of civil strife so well voiced by Nestor:[1]

ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἑκεῖνος
ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος.

Every community, however, was more or less familiar with wrongdoers whose deeds affected the whole community alike. A common example of this class of offender is the man who by committing depredations upon a neighboring people involves his fellow-citizens in responsibility. Neither the king nor the council ever undertook to deal with offenses of this class. They were punished, if at all, by the people. Even in a Homeric community public opinion was quickly crystallized[2] and easily translated into action through the medium of the popular assembly. According to the prevailing view such action is mere mob violence.[3] But, however much apparent justification this view may have in the differences between the orderliness and precision of modern legal machinery, and the rough-and-ready methods of a primitive people, it is based upon a misconception. The term mob violence is properly applied only to the acts of people who usurp the functions of the regular courts. In the absence of any provision for the punishment of public offenders,[4] the people were obliged to take measures for their own protection. If they met together and acted after due deliberation they constituted a popular court quite as much as the Athenian assembly that tried Miltiades.[5] The essential difference between the assembly of the "Ten Thousand" which tried Xenophon for aggravated assault and the mob of soldiers that attacked the market clerks is that in the former case

[1] *Il.* ix. 63 ff.

[2] There was practically no restriction upon freedom of speech. Jebb ("Ancient Organs of Public Opinion," *Essays and Addresses* 139 ff.) points out how the poet keeps us informed of the trend of public opinion by constantly quoting remarks or conversations that sum up the sentiments of a crowd.

[3] Cf. Lipsius *Das attische Recht* 6; Gilbert *op. cit.* 447. Finsler ("Das Homerische Königtum," *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil.* XVII, 321 ff.) recognizes fully the judicial power of the people, but treats it only incidentally: "Eine richterliche Gewalt hat, wie ebenfalls schon erwähnt worden, der Demos, wenn er den Eupeithes an Leib und Gut straffen will, oder die Frier Halitherses mit Busse und Mentor mit Vernichtung bedrohen."

[4] The king in his capacity of general might punish breaches of discipline; cf. *Il.* xii. 248.

[5] Herod. vi. 136. This is the first trial before the assembly of which we have any account (Lipsius *Das attische Recht* 180).

they acquainted themselves with the facts, while in the latter many of the participants were entirely ignorant of the cause of the attack.[1]

Definite information regarding the right to summon meetings of the people for either deliberative or judicial purposes is lacking. It has been assumed that the right belonged to the king alone; but no one questioned the authority of Telemachus to call a meeting to deal with the suitors.[2] And yet we may be sure that this point would have been raised by the suitors, who were anxious to prevent the intervention of the people, if the sole right to summon the assembly belonged to the king. At a later time Penelope proposed to have Laertes appeal to the people.[3] And the suitors themselves after their attempt to waylay and kill Telemachus were in dread of another appeal to the people which might result in their banishment.[4] Both Nestor and Odysseus were surprised that the people did not interfere to protect Penelope and Telemachus.[5] Aegyptius, an adherent of the suitors, clearly intimates that anyone in distress might appeal to the people provided the matter was of public import.[6] It was always the natural instinct of Greeks to resort to the place of assembly even without special summons when anything happened that concerned the whole community. Thus the Ithacans on hearing of the slaughter of the suitors assembled of their own accord in the *ἀγορά*.[7] Moreau[8] is unquestionably right

[1] Xen. *Anab.* v. 7. 19 ff.

[2] It is surprising to hear that this is the first meeting since the departure of Odysseus. Fanta (*Der Staat in der "Ilias" und "Odyssee"* 87) regards this as proof that the king regularly summoned the assembly. There is a strong temptation to regard the statement of Aegyptius as a rhetorical exaggeration. Moreau ("Assemblées Politiques chez Homère," *Revue des Études Grecques* VI [1893], 214) remarks: "Il est sans doute extraordinaire qu' Ithaque ait passé vingt ans sans agora, et, si j'osais, je dirais volontiers que je n'en crois rien." Finsler, *op. cit.* 321, sees in the meeting "die Wiederkehr geordneter Zustände." This seems to be correct. The interests of the suitors made it desirable that there should be no meetings; cf. *Od.* xvi. 361 ff.

[3] *Od.* iv. 735 ff. There is no indication that Laertes had special authority during the absence of Odysseus, whose representative was Mentor (*Od.* ii. 225 ff.).

[4] *Od.* xvi. 375 ff.

[5] *Od.* iii. 214 ff.

[6] *νῦν δὲ τίς ὧδ' ἤγειρε; τίνα χρειὼ τόσον ἵκει*
ἠὲ νέων ἀνδρῶν, ἦ οἱ προγενέστεροί εἰσιν; —*Od.* ii. 28 f.

[7] *αὐτοὶ δ' εἰς ἀγορὴν κίον ἀθρόοι ἀχνύμενοι κῆρ.* —*Od.* xxiv. 420.

[8] *Op. cit.* 213. Finsler, *op. cit.* 327, believes that the right to summon the assembly belonged to the king or to any noble.

in saying "Il n'est pas téméraire d'admettre que le droit de convocation est un droit populaire ouvert à tous."

There was practically no difference between the procedure of a popular court and that of a deliberative assembly. A typical meeting of the people for judicial purposes is that summoned by Telemachus to deal with the suitors. Telemachus brings up what is apparently a private grievance; but as Halitherses hinted, it really concerned the whole people.[1] And the event proved that this was the case, for Odysseus demanded that they make good the material losses occasioned by the constant feasting of the suitors.[2] Three speakers presented the case against the suitors, and four addressed the assembly in their favor. Telemachus did not ask for the punishment of the suitors nor for the restitution of his property.[3] At best he hoped to be able to induce or force them to leave the palace. *ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρὶν φραζώμεσθ' ὅς κεν καταπαύσομεν· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ παυέσθων·* says Halitherses, one of Telemachus' active supporters.[4] But the threats of the suitors deterred the people from taking any active measures.

As a result of the slaughter of the suitors Odysseus was himself charged with offenses against the community. After disposing of the bodies of the slain suitors the people resorted to the *ἀγορά*. Eupeithes, the father of Antinous, was the first speaker. He began, not by asking aid in avenging the deaths of the suitors, but by asking for the punishment of Odysseus as a public offender: *ὦ φίλοι, ἦ μέγα ἔργον ἀνὴρ ὅδε μήσατ' Ἀχαιούς.*[5] Speeches against the proposal of Eupeithes were made by partisans of Odysseus. Halitherses pointed out that the men richly deserved their fate, and Medon, the herald, a pardoned adherent of the suitors, expressed his conviction that the gods were on the side of Odysseus.[6] Finally a majority decided to slay Odysseus. By a curious reversal of fortune Eupeithes now led the people against the man who years before had saved him from a similar predicament. As a member of a marauding band of Taphians he had raided the Thesprotians, an allied people. The Ithacans decided

[1] *Od.* ii. 45, 166 ff. [2] *Od.* xxiii. 356.

[3] He does, indeed, suggest restitution, but in a very guarded manner. Cf. *Od.* ii. 74.

[4] *Od.* ii. 167. [5] *Od.* xxiv. 426. [6] *Od.* xxiv. 439 ff.

to put him to death and to confiscate his property, but he fled to the palace and his life was saved by the influence of Odysseus.[1] Our information about this case is meager. The people met in the absence of the king and reached a decision with which he was not in accord. But there is no hint that they exceeded their powers. The implication is, rather, that they yielded to the persuasions, and not the power, of Odysseus in allowing the guilty man to go free. Judging from the orderly procedure against Odysseus we may assume with some degree of confidence that this case was handled in much the same way. Paris, like Eupeithes, had by carrying off Helen exposed his people to reprisals on the part of the Greeks. Hector[2] has this situation in mind when he says:

> ἀλλὰ μάλα Τρῶες δειδήμονες· ἦ τέ κεν ἤδη
> λάϊον ἔσσο χιτῶνα κακῶν ἔνεχ' ὅσσα ἔοργας.

Stoning was the usual mode of executing the death penalty, and it may very well be that Hector was referring to contemplated judicial proceedings against Paris before a popular court. The suitors in threatening to fine Halitherses for aiding and abetting Telemachus contemplated the use of the judicial powers of the people for their own ends. No doubt they possessed sufficient ascendancy over the people to secure their acquiescence in the punishment of Halitherses, though the charge against him could not have appealed to any considerable number of them.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* xvi. 420 ff. As has been pointed out, it was the practice to hold the whole community responsible for cattle-lifting, even when only a few participated.

[2] *Il.* iii. 56 f.

[3] αἴ κεν νεώτερον ἄνδρα παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδὼς
παρφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν ἑτοτρύνῃς χαλεπαίνειν
αὐτῷ μὲν οἱ πρῶτον ἀνηρέστερον ἔσται
. . . . . .
σοὶ δέ, γέρον, θωὴν ἐπιθήσομεν. —*Od.* ii. 188 ff.

Finsler (*op. cit.* 322) thinks that in the case of Mentor also judicial proceedings were contemplated (*Od.* xxii. 216 ff.).

WILAMOWITZ ON Θ[1]

By A. Shewan

Θ is a book which has had much attention from dissectors of the *Iliad*. It has that on its surface which never fails to draw their fire. It does not require a careful reader of Homer to see that many of its lines occur in other parts of the poems. So it is said to be a cento, and late. The style of the lay is held to confirm the conclusion. Dr. Leaf, it is true, though he makes the most of the "want of originality," finds that Θ displays "great spirit and movement," so that one is tempted to ask if spirited poetry was ever in such humor made. It is a feat for a centoist to be proud of. But others mark a reprehensible abruptness in the composition. Wilamowitz shows that τὸ κόλον is as conspicuous in it as in the μάχη which gives the canto its name. The objection seems to be overdone. There is what may appear to be abruptness; there are "excursions and alarms." But if ever Homer was justified in introducing these, it was at the point in his story when Zeus at length betakes himself to Ida, with a grim determination to make the Achaeans pay for Agamemnon's insult to Thetis' son. The day must go against them; but surely we need not be surprised that they and their Olympic allies do not submit to this entirely new experience without desperate attempts to avert defeat. The poet does not forget that there are deities in Olympus who do not see eye to eye with Zeus, and other champions of the Achaean cause besides Achilles. With true Achaean sympathy he even makes Zeus relent toward Agamemnon for a moment. Changes of scene between heaven and earth, and varying fortune in the field are natural enough at such a crisis. They produce a pleasantly diversified action. We have heard the reverse complaint when fighting is prolonged and unrelieved by incident or transition. The poet is then monotonous and dull. He must always tell his tale as the individual critic would have told it, *s'il avait eu le bonheur d'être Homère*. But grant that there is all the

[1] "Ueber das Θ der Ilias," *Sitzungsber. d. königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften* (1910), XXI.

abruptness that the critics see. It is evidence of a new bard only if an author may never change his style. The battle canto of *Marmion* can be shown to have more abruptness than other parts of the lay. It would probably have had more still, had there been unruly gods and their sympathies to consider.

The attack on Θ goes back to the days of Lachmann and Hermann. The latter termed the lay *ein auffallendes Beispiel des elendsten Nachahmerstils.* That is surely an extraordinarily harsh judgment. Köchly dubbed its author *centonarius*, and Kayser drew out the parallelisms. In more recent years Naber, Leaf and others have supported the view that the author was a late plagiarist. So Jebb, who also thought that Θ and I were added to the *Iliad* by a poet who conceived the idea of extending the epic by adding another defeat of the Achaeans. In Dr. Leaf's words, Θ is a "prologue to I." See also Christ, *Prolegg.* 69 f. But this leads to a strange result. I has been shown—by Dr. Monro, who nevertheless seemed to think it an essential part of the *Iliad*—to be "Odyssean" in its language, and Dissectors accept the proof. Yet no one has discovered that Θ, which, according to the prologue theory, must have been contemporary in origin with or later than I, has this Odyssean taint. We cannot understand how it has escaped it, if Jebb and Leaf and Wilamowitz are right.

Other authorities take a very different view. Grote thinks that Θ, far from being the work of a late *Flick-Poet*, belongs to the Achilleid or *Ur*-poem. Friedländer, in his well-known work, *Die hom. Krit. von Wolf bis Grote*, appears to agree. So Geddes, in his development of the Grotian theory. Father Browne, however, who is a follower of Geddes, thinks Θ is late and Odyssean (*Handbook of Homeric Study*, 111). Other opinions are stated and discussed in Ameis-Hentze's *Anhang*. We may add the newest hypothesis, that of Mülder and others, who hold that the *Mēnis* came late and was used to bind groups of lays into an *Iliad*. To these authorities Θ was a lay in one such group. "Any number of such theories can readily be devised, if we wish to be original" (Lang, *Homer and the Epic*, 128). An excellent defense of the book is to be found in Calebow's *De Iliadis libro octavo* (1870). Friedländer, a sober critic, also protests (*op. cit.*, 31 f.) that the enemies of Θ are not justified

in arguing lateness because the composition is to them inferior and exhibits some *Hast und Kürze*.

Wilamowitz develops the theory of Leaf and Jebb and makes it more precise. Θ was composed by a rhapsode of the seventh century, in order to bring I and K, then *Einzellieder*, into a gap in the then *Iliad*, in which H was followed by Λ. Wilamowitz' words are, "to make a bridge from H over I and K to Λ and beyond." But this appears not to be a quite accurate description. There was, in the *Iliad* as assumed, no gap requiring to be bridged, for Λ then followed H, much as Θ does now. The better statement would be that the rhapsode wanted to bring in I and K, saw that that could be done between H and Λ, and did it by composing Θ. We may note, as regards K, that this theory runs counter to other views of the origin of that pariah of the *Iliad*, and especially to the story, which has been made so much of by Dissectors, that it was a separate lay till Pisistratus took pity on it and gave it its present place. As regards I, many will have difficulty in believing it ever was an *Einzellied*, and there are many more who will continue to regard the offer of atonement in it as an absolutely essential part of the Story of Achilles as told in the *Iliad*. I is the fulfilment of Athenê's promise in A 213, as the opening of K is of Achilles' warning in A 243.

Wilamowitz has first to fix the limits of the new *Verbindungsstück*. He decides that it extends from H 323 to a point in I between the *Agora* and the *Boulé* early in that book. This piece is shown by internal evidence to be a homogeneous mass. It is the work of the rhapsode, and we need not object to or criticize the proof of its unity. What is of concern to Unitarians is the demonstration that it is late. The grounds are (p. 398) (1) the borrowings from other parts of the *Iliad*, (2) the dependence of Θ on cyclic poems, (3) a reference to the *Theogony* of Hesiod, and (4) peculiarities of language. We take them in order.

First, as to the borrowings. The equations relied on are:

a) Θ 491 = K 199, *ἐν καθαρῷ, ὅθι δὴ νεκύων διεφαίνετο χῶρος*— very appropriate, it is said (p. 373), of some men who have (in K) scrambled through the fosse to sit down for a talk, but an *Unding* of an army of 50,000 men. So Θ has borrowed the line from K.

The line is certainly good in K, but that it was absurd of the poet of Θ to use it of the spot where the Trojan *Agora* was held cannot be admitted. Editors make no objection. In twelve commentaries I find no absurdity noted. On the other hand it is easy to take objection to K 199–203. The passage "can be cut out clean." That always raises a presumption of interpolation. Paley thinks 199–201 may be interpolated. Bothe brackets *ὅθι δὴ . . . . πιπτόντων*. Stier sees in 199 a clear reference to Θ 491.

b) A marked feature of the *Verbindungsstück* is a certain *Streben nach Parallelismus*. Its author was ever striving to duplicate descriptions or incidents. It is mainly by this that the limits of the new composition can be fixed. The trail of the parallelizer is over it all. Critics of the dissecting school usually see in such parallelizing evidence of two poets, one of them a late imitator. Wilamowitz reasons differently. An illustration of his position is to be found on pp. 377 f. In I 14 ff. Agamemnon harangues the host weeping copiously; but that you can hardly have a king speak in public with a stream of tears flowing down his cheeks is, to Wilamowitz, "incontestable." Surely a strange assertion. Few, we think, who know Homer's Agamemnon, will agree. But Wilamowitz finds absurdity, and explains it thus. The *Nachdichter* is contrasting Agamemnon with Hector, whose "splendid appearance" he had described in Θ 493–96. There the Trojan leader "leans on his huge spear, which glitters with bronze and gold." That description of Hector is taken from Z 318 ff. So we have at once an example of the "parallelizing art of the poet and of his dependence on other parts of the *Iliad*."

We are concerned only with the alleged borrowing from Z. Plagiarism by Θ is decreed because in Z the description is "magnificent," the poet calling special attention to Hector's *of*fensive weapon as he visits his brother Paris, who is at the moment furbishing his *de*fensive armour and bow. This appears to be stated in all seriousness, and we leave it to carry conviction as it may, without further comment.

It is added that Zenodotus did not read the lines in Θ—though it is difficult to see how they can be cut out. But Aristarchus took the opposite view (Pierron, *a.l.*), and modern editors do not bracket

the lines. See also Ludwich, *Aristarchs hom. Textkrit.* I 270. The lines are admirable in Θ. They are good in Z also. It is most thoroughly Homeric to repeat a happy description, and Zenodotus' *διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ γεγράφθαι* has nothing in it.

c) I 92–95 = H 323–26 (p. 380 n). In each passage it is stated that, after a feast, discussion is initiated by Nestor, *οὗ καὶ πρόσθεν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή*. In H the lines must be an interpolation, because no "good counsel" of Nestor's had preceded; in I it had. But different views are taken of *καὶ πρόσθεν*. It seems best, with Dr. Leaf on I 94, to interpret "*of old*, without any particular reference." So Paley.

d) The list of chiefs (Θ 262 ff.) who rally against the Trojans is a "miserable plagiarism" from that in H 164–68 of the heroes who offer to fight Hector (p. 390). For in Θ the chiefs do nothing, "which is explicable only by the appropriation of extraneous lines." Nine chiefs are mentioned, and four of them, Diomede, Aias, Teucer and Agamemnon, *are* active in the sequel—the brief sequel before Zeus interferes (Θ 335) to closure the Achaeans' efforts. But could there be greater unreason than to require the poet to mention all or most of the chiefs again? Is he never to have any discretion allowed him?

e) Θ 331–34 = N 420–23 (p. 390 and n)—a well-known case. In the former Teucer, disabled by Hector, in the latter Hypsenor, speared by Deiphobus, is carried off by Mekisteus and Alastor. In this case the lines are pronounced original in Θ and an interpolation in N (though others, as Christ, *Prolegg.* 65, 70, hold that Θ imitates N). In N, it is said, the poet first lets Hypsenor be killed and then be carried off "groaning" (if *στενάχοντα* must be read), which is of course absurd. But all that is said in N (411 f.) of the effect of Deiphobus' spear-cast is that he wounded Hypsenor in the liver, *εἶθαρ δ' ὑπὸ γούνατ' ἔλυσε*. The assumption that this means "killed on the spot" is not warranted. In most of the other occurrences of the phrase, Λ 578, Ṕ 349, E 176, Π 425, N 360, O 291, Ω 498, ξ 69, 236, ω 381, it may mean either "killed" or, in a general way, "disabled," "put *hors de combat*." In *υ* 118 it certainly does not mean "killed." Nor does it in X 335. There, as perhaps in N, the poet no doubt means to imply that a death-blow had been given,

but certainly not that the individual smitten died as soon as struck. In λύτο γούνατα, whether by itself or in the common formula λ. γ. καὶ φίλον ἦτορ, there is never any approach to the suggestion of death. We might refer to the parallel expression λῦσε δὲ γυῖα. It is often used of a man who is apparently killed. In Φ 406, Π 805 and Ψ 726, it means something far short of that. Another reason given is that in N Antilochus had driven off Asios' horses and so could not be present to protect Hypsensor after he fell. But there is nothing in that. Antilochus had time to dispose of the horses and return to the fray.

f) Agamemnon's speech, I 17 ff., has been taken from B 110–41 (p. 378). Wilamowitz himself admits that the lines are suitable in I. He seems, however, to err in thinking Agamemnon had summoned only the ἄριστοι. The assembly was an *Agora*. See lines 11, 13, 33, and Dr. Leaf's *Introduction* (though in his note on 17 there is speculation).

γ) The remaining cases may be grouped together. Θ 342–45 appear to be modeled on O 1–3 (p. 383 n), but another piece of O "must" Θ, because O 376 = Θ 244. H 370 f. is from Σ 298 f. (p. 392 n), and H 379 f. from M 31 f. (p. 395). The scene in Olympus in the opening of Θ and the mutinous move of Hera and Athené are from A and E respectively. That "does not require discussion." In all these cases no reasons are given, and the simple reply in every one of them is, why not vice versa?

Next, Θ is late because it is dependent on cyclic poems—the *Ilias Parva* certainly and perhaps the *Cypria*.

α) Θ 348 and 349 = Ω were inserted in the *Iliad* by Barnes from the "spurious Platonic dialogue" (Leaf, *a.l.*) *Alcib.* ii. Wilamowitz says the lines do not suit in Θ, "and so are from a Cyclic epos" (p. 375 n). Why? That Quintus Smyrnaeus, VI 644 ff., makes the Trojans camp before the Achaean wall after a victory does not help to this conclusion. Wilamowitz finds it "very easy to believe," but there is no evidence.

β) In the same note it is said to be very easy to believe that in the pursuit of Nestor by Hector the poet of Θ has used the *Ilias Parva*, and on p. 388 that "the rescue of Nestor by Diomede is known to be imitated (Athenaeus) only from the beautiful scene in the

same Cyclic poem which we know from Pindar (*Pyth.*, VI 28 ff., with scholia).[1] So the dependence of the lay on a Cyclic poem is established." Apparently *Ilias Parva* is a slip for *Aethiopis*, to which all the conjectures refer.[2] So Heyne, on the passage in Pindar, and Fennell quoting Paley. But no fragment of the abstract of Proclus or of the *Aethiopis* relating the incident in Pindar's ode is given by Kinkel, and the section on the Cyclics in the Appendix to Monro's *Odyssey* is silent about it. In fact Welcker (*Ep. Cycl.*, II, 174), though he thinks Pindar took it from Arctinus, says it is nowhere expressly ascribed to the latter.

In Pindar's ode one of Nestor's horses is shot by Paris. Memnon spears at the old man. Antilochus throws himself in front of his father, receives the spear, and is killed. So the only point common to Pindar, supposed to be following a cyclic poem, and Θ, is the shooting of Nestor's horse by Paris. The death of Antilochus at Memnon's hands is known to Homer (δ 187).

Why must we impute imitation to Θ? Granting that Pindar took the scene from Arctinus, why may not Arctinus have taken the shooting incident from Θ and Memnon's part from δ? Or why bring in a cyclic poet at all? Pindar may have himself combined the accounts in Homer and added Antilochus' devotion from some other traditional source. Nothing is clear.

c) The Burial of the Dead, it is said, may have been taken from the *Cypria*, but it is admitted that this cannot be proved (p. 393).

d) The stay of the Achaeans at Lemnos on their way to Troy, Θ 230, corresponds to the call at Tenedos mentioned in the *Cypria* (p. 394 n).

We are not compelled or even tempted in any of these cases to believe that Θ is imitating some cyclic poem, known or unknown. On the contrary, the well-known dependence of cyclic poetry as a whole on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* favors the suggestion that the Cyclics are the imitators as in so many other cases.

[1] There appears to be nothing in the scholia as given in Boeckh's edition of Pindar to support the allegation of imitation or derivation.

[2] Robert (*Homerische Becher* 25) also says of the passage in Pindar that it is a reference to "the *Ilias Parva* or the *Aethiopis*." But Memnon was slain in the latter and could not appear in the former, the action of which is later.

As regards Hesiod, Θ 13–16 and *Theogon.* 720–25 are compared. Wilamowitz settles the order of the lines in the latter, and says that it seems to him, "and is accepted by Robert,[1] that the author of Θ refers to the *Theogony*, through which the position of Heaven, Earth and Tartarus, and the punishment of the Titans were made popular" (p. 389 and n). The points of similarity between the passages are the occurrence in each of the phrase ἐς Τάρταρον ἠερόεντα (in the *Theogon.*, it is in a line generally regarded as spurious), and Θ 16 almost = *Theogon.*, 720. Besides this, Θ 15 almost = *Theogon.*, 811, which is in a passage which Rzach brackets.

It is argued that the passage in Θ is the later because there is *Steigerung* in it; it improves on the *Theogony* by putting Tartarus below Hades. But this affords extremely slight ground against Θ. We might as reasonably argue that the *Theogony* is later, because the exaggeration natural to the more primitive account has been to some extent toned down. I notice that Cauer finds the *Steigerung* in Hesiod! He says (*Grundfragen*², 342 n) *Hesiod Theog. 720 ff. hatte den homerischen Gedanken übertreibend ausgemalt.* He refers no doubt to Hesiod's most hyperbolical bronzen anvil. A safer conclusion is Dr. Leaf's on Θ 12—"it is hard to say which" poem imitates the other. In his first edition he said Θ 13 ff. seemed to have been in Hesiod's mind. One cannot wonder at a change of view when where is so little to go upon.

The text of the *Theogony* is declared by the authorities to be in a very bad condition. It "seems to have undergone successive recensions and interpolations of the early rhapsodists" (Paley, *Hesiod* 156). And the conclusion of the *Titanomachia*, in which our lines occur, seems to have fared as badly as most parts. Schömann (*De Compos. Theogon.* 15 f.) says it has so many defects that it is not to be attributed to Hesiod, but to a diaskeuast. Cf. Gerhard *Ueber d. Hes. Theogon.* 114, 140, 148 ff. and 156; Fick, *Hesiods Gedichte* 19 f. and 74 f., who rejects 720–819 as a modern interpolation; Welcker, *Die hes. Theogon.* 104 and 133 ff., who rejects 721–819; Flach, *Die hes. Theogon.* 94, and others. If these authorities are right, we must hesitate before concluding that Θ is later than a late interpolation in Hesiod. All the lines which Θ is supposed to

[1] See *Stud. zu Il.* 168. Θ 13 ff. must be borrowed, because Θ is so very modern.

borrow are to the critics extremely doubtful quantities. The case against it is consequently of the weakest.

With the conclusion thus arrived at, that Θ is as late as the seventh century, the language of the book is found to agree. But the linguistic peculiarities are not enumerated. It may be hoped that such an enumeration will yet be made, so that the strength of the proof from them may be estimated. If a list be drawn up from Dr. Leaf's commentary, they can hardly be said to be numerous or striking. They do not appear to be more serious in the aggregate than those which editors find in A. If we test by the Digamma and compare the results with those for A, we find there is no more neglect of ϝ in Θ than in that book of the *Ur-Ilias*. It seems impossible that Θ can be, as Wilamowitz thinks, of or near the age of Archilochus, in whose work ϝ is non-existent. Nor do the Articular uses indicate that Θ is a late composition. The list given by Miss Stawell (*Hom. and the Il.* 285) compares favorably with that for A or any other "early" book. Only τὼ δ' ἵππω, δείσαντε, 136, is worthy of remark. ἵππω δὲ δϝείσαντε may be suggested; cf. 133, where editors propose βροντήσας δὲ δϝεινόν for βροντήσας δ' ἄρα. Strange forms are rare. Robert (*op. cit.* 166) specifies five *iterative* verbs. He and others take these as a sign of late origin. But see Bréal's condemnation of that assumption in his review of Robert's work in *Journ. d. Savs.* (1903) 143. If these verbs are such an indication, it is an extraordinary thing that in K 5–16, a passage said to be interpolated in a very late book, the *Nachdichter* fails to use them, though he has a good opportunity. Unusual prepositional usages and constructions, and pseudo-archaisms appear to be few in number in Θ. We have already observed that no attempt has been made to prove it "Odyssean" in its language, though I, which called it into being, is supposed to be so.

There is one part of Θ with which much less fault has been found than with others, and which to many even of the hostile critics of the book is a piece of genuine old poetry—the *Aristeia* of Teucer, 263–334. Wilamowitz (p. 390) styles it "a fresh, choice piece, the superiority of which to the rest of Θ strikes everybody." The latter part of this statement cannot be accepted. But Wilamowitz goes on to say that borrowed lines are not found in the *Aristeia*. Dr. Leaf, however,

enumerates 18 such lines, and that is a far from sufficient statement. If we analyze the 69 verses of the episode by the method made popular by Kayser, we find that there are not ten for which, in whole or part, an exact equivalent or a model cannot be found elsewhere in the poems. The *Aristeia* is thus proved to be a cento, and ungenuine and late—as much as other parts of Θ are to most Dissectors—by the application of this absurd device. It is absurd, because any passage of any book can be proved to be late, as compared with some other, if some similarity of subject or incident be present. A sufficient number of equations can generally be discovered, for, as Rothe has observed, there is hardly a line in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* which is not like some other. In Ellendt's *Drei hom. Abh.*, 57 ff., we find set out all the lines and parts of lines in Λ which occur, or are similar to others which occur, elsewhere in the poems. The mass is so great that we shall be compelled to say that, if there be anything in the parallel-passage method, Λ cannot possibly be the bit of *Ur*-poetry which it is almost universally considered to be. And Ellendt's statement has a more particular interest for us here. He finds (p. 56) that Λ "betrays in many references acquaintance with H and Θ." So the method, in other hands, leads to a conclusion which is the exact opposite of that of Wilamowitz and Kayser.

The Homeric repetitions, rightly considered, are among the best proofs of unity of authorship. Their abuse by those Dissectors who simply specify equations and infer that one passage or the other is late and ungenuine, is a very bad feature of Homeric criticism. Erhardt (*Entstehung* xcv) characterizes it as *eine der grössten Schwächen der neueren Homerkritik*. $x=y$, $\therefore x>y$ or $y>x$, as you please, is the convenient mode of proof. It is amazing that such procedure should have become popular even with the critical rank and file; it is deplorable that it receives the sanction of great scholars. Rothe's work, *Die Bedeutung der Wiederholungen für d. hom. Frage* (on which cf. Cauer, *Grundfragen*[2] 486 ff.), was an effectual antidote to a long succession of dreary treatises on the subject. As theorists the professional repetition-mongers have been silent since. In practice the method is still the most popular means of discrediting tracts in the poems. It behoves Unitarians to expose it wherever they find it employed.

It is one of the features of the present essay, which of course displays the erudition and acuteness which distinguish all the work of its great author. And Unitarians may be sincerely grateful to him for some well-deserved rebukes administered to Dissectors generally. It is refreshing to read that Θ is not after all a mere cento; that it is not full of interpolations (cf. Robert *op. cit.* 167; Θ is an *Einheit*, and not a line is to be athetized); that parallelism may be evidence of homogeneity and does not necessarily imply imitation and separate authorship; that the critics' inferences from linguistic peculiarities are often fallacious; that the notion of the *Sagenverschiebung* men that the two Aiases were originally one is an *Ungeheuerlichkeit*, and so on. But passages are still adjudged spurious with a haste which is unbecoming, the deductions from repetitions are rash, and generally the evidence adduced is far too slight to warrant the conclusions drawn. There is too much of the peculiar procedure which distinguishes so many Homeric treatises written in the cause of disruption.

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WORDS FOUND IN THE *ILIAD* AND IN BUT ONE BOOK OF THE *ODYSSEY*

By John A. Scott

It is the purpose of this paper to supplement the article published in *Classical Philology* V, 42 ff., under the title "Odyssean Words Found in But One Book of the *Iliad*." The method followed in the earlier paper will be employed in this: under each book a list of words found in that book only in the *Odyssey* and in the *Iliad* will be given, and also a list of words of common occurrence in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to that single book. Numerals have not been counted, the comparative and superlative of adjectives and adverbs are not distinguished from the positive, such kindred forms as *νώνυμος*, *νώνυμνος*, *ἄργυφος*, *ἀργύφεος* are counted as being the same, and the simple verb is not distinguished from the compound, unless the compound has a meaning essentially different from the meaning of the simple. The text used is that of Ludwich. The list of words used in the *Iliad* and in but one book of the *Odyssey* is as follows:

α. *ἄιστος*,-*αλαστέω* (simple or compound, the compound appearing in this book), *ἀνδρόφονος*, *ἀπηλεγέως*, *ἀσπερχές*, *βριθύς*, *διχθά*, *ἐρυκανάω*, *θαλπωρή*, *θεοπρόπος*, *μετακιάθω*, *λόγος*, *ὀμφαλός*, *πήληξ*, *στίξ*, *τηλεκλυτός*—16.

Of these words *στίξ* is found in the *Iliad* forty-two, *ἀνδροφόνος* sixteen, *πήληξ* nine, and *ὀμφαλός* seven times. *αἴθων*, a word of frequent occurrence in the *Iliad*, is restricted in the *Odyssey* to this book and *σ*.

β. *ἄλιος* (vain, futile), *ἀπείρητος*, *ἀποτίνυμαι*, *ἀταρτηρός*, *ἐπιστεφής*, *Θέμις*, *θεοπροπέω*, *θωή*, *κελάδων*, *κηρύσσω*, *λιγύφθογγος*, *περικτίονες*, *πολύμυθος*, *-πρήθω*, *πτέρυξ*, *-στάζω*, *στεῖρα* (a part of a ship)—17.

Of these words *ἄλιος* is found in the *Iliad* sixteen, *κηρύσσω* six times, each of which appears in this book twice. *αἴσυλος*, a word common in the *Iliad*, is restricted in the *Odyssey* to this book and *ε*.

γ. Ἀγαμεμνόνεος, ἄγυρις, ἄδμητος, ἀτάλαντος, αὐτῆμαρ, ἀντμήν, Ἀχαικός, βαθύζωνος, Γόρτυν, ἐγχεσίμορος, ἐννύχιος, ἐυμμελίης, ἦνις, θαάσσω, ἱλάσκομαι, ἱππηλάτα, Καύκωνες, μεγακήτης, μενεπτόλεμος, μήστωρ, μικρός, Νηληάδης, ὁμοιόω, ὀπτόθι, πεμπώβολον, πολύχρυσος, πρέσβα, πυράγρη, σβέννυμι, σκαιός, Τένεδος, τένων, Τριτογένεια, Τυδεύς, Φαιστός—35.

Of these words ἀτάλαντος is found in the *Iliad* twenty-six, ἱλάσκομαι seven, ἱππηλάτα nine, μενεπτόλεμος nine, μήστωρ fifteen, σβέννυμι eight, and τένων eight times. ἦνία, of common use in the *Iliad*, is found in the *Odyssey* in this book and in ζ only,

δ. ἀδελφεός, ἀκλεής, ἀλοσύδνη, ἀμολγός, ἀμφασίη, ἀμφιμέλας, ἄνυσις, ἀριστεύω, γονή, δοῦλη, δράκων, ἔνδιος, ἐξαίρετος, ἐξαίσιος, Εὔμηλος, ἐφετμή, ἠυγένειος, ἠχήεις, θάομαι, θεσπιδαής, θοῦρος, Θυέστης, ἱδρόω, ἵππειος, κάπη, κασιγνήτη, κεραός, κητώεις, κόρος, κυβιστητήρ, κύπειρον, λαμπετάω, μινυρίζω, Νηλήιος, νιφετός, ὄχος, πάρδαλις, Παιήων, τετρήεις, πότε, ῥηξήνωρ, σαόφρων, ταναήκης, τέκμωρ, Τρφός, Τυδείδης, Φεραί, φρίξ, χρυσηλάκατος—49.

Of these words ἀδελφεός is found in the *Iliad* sixteen, ἀριστεύω twelve, δράκων eight, ἐφετμή nine, θεσπιδαής seven, θοῦρος twenty-seven, κασιγνήτη nine, and ὄχος fifty-eight times. ἄγκος is found in the *Odyssey* in this book and in ρ only.

ε. ἄδην, Αἰγαί, ἀλιμυρήεις, ἀλιόω, ἀλιτρός, ἄμμορος, ἁρμόζω, ἁρμονίη, δάσκιον, Δημήτηρ, εἶλαρ, ἐπίκλησις, ἐρέχθω, ἐρίβωλος, θαλάσσιος,-θηλέω, κάμπτω, δοκεύω, καρφαλέος, κελαρύζω, κερκίς, κηκίω, κλιτύς, μέλεος, νέω (to swim), ὀπωρινός, παλιμπετής, Πιερίη, Πληιάδες, πτύω, σέλινον, Σάλυμοι, ταράσσω, τηλόσε, Τιθωνός, τορνόω, τρίπολος, φράσσω, χειμέριος—39.

No one of these words is used with notable frequency in the *Iliad*. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: ἀγάλλομαι found also in ζ, αἴσυλος β.

ζ. αἰπεινός, ἀλκί, ἀποσταδά, (ἀποσταδόν), δίνη, ἐπιζαφελῶς, εὔκυκλος, εὔτροχος, ἠμόνειος, ἠνιοχεύω, θάλος, καναχή, κλειτός, μάστιξ, μεθήμων, παρθένος, περιμήκετος, πηγαί, πῖσος, πλυνοί, στείβω, -τρέω, Ὑπέρεια—22.

Of these words αἰπεινός is found in the *Iliad* thirteen, κλειτός fourteen, μάστιξ twenty, -τρέω twenty-three times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: ἀγάλλομαι ε, αὖω ιω, ἠνία γ.

η. ἀγαπήνωρ, ἀγκάς, ἀφραδέω, γανάω, ἐραννός, Ἐρεχθεύς, ἐύννητος, κύανος, μῆλον (a fruit), νεῆνις, -νέω (to spin), νυμφίος, ὀθόνη, σκόλοψ, -τραπέω, τρυγάω—16.

Of these words *ἀγκάς* is found in the *Iliad* five, *σκόλοψ* eight times. *νείατος* (*νέατος*), a word very frequently used in the *Iliad*, is used in the *Odyssey* in this book and in *o* only.

θ. *αἰνίζομαι, ἀκμόθετον, ἀλίγκιος, ἄλυτος, ἀμφιγυήεις, ἀπάντη, ἀρτίπος, βραδύς, -βροτολοιγός, γάστρη, δηριάομαι, δηρίομαι, ἐκάεργος, ἐνηής, ἐπίσκοπος, ἐρισθενής, ζωάγρια, ἠπεδανός, θάλλω, θέρμω, θυήεις, Ἰλιόθι, κεραίζω, κλυτοτέχνης, κόμπος, κονίω, κραιπνῶς, κριτός, λειαίνω, Λῆμνος, μετάφρενον, νῆις, Οἰχαλιεύς, οὖρον, παλαισμοσύνη, πάλη, πενθερός, πρηκτήρ, ῥιπή, Σίντιες, τέρμα, φιλομμειδής, χρυσήνιος, χωλός, -ψαύω*—45.

Of these words *βροτολοιγός* is found in the *Iliad* twelve, *ἐκάεργος* seventeen, *κεραίζω* seven, *κονίω* seven, *μετάφρενον* sixteen, *ῥιπή* six, *τέρμα* eight, and *φιλομμειδής* five times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἀγών ω, ἀκοντίζω χ.*

ι. *ἁζαλέος, ἀπέλεθρος, ἄρσις, ἀρόω, ἄφθιτος, βουλυτόνδε, γλήνη, ἐγχείη, εἰροπόκος, ἑλύω, εὖνις, ἔχθος, ἠέριος, ἠλασκάζω, θερμαίνω, ἱερεύς* (*ἱρεύς*), *Ἰλιόθεν, κλυζέσκω* (*κλύζω*), *Κύθηρα, λάσιος, λήιον, λοιβή, λύσις, λωφάω, μαντοσύνη, μάρμαρος, μηκάς, μιλτοπάρῃος, νηδύς, νήιος, ὀκριόεις, ὀρφναῖος, οὐθαρ, παιδαμάτωρ, πανύστατος, πάτος, πῖαρ, πίτνω, ποιμαίνω, ῥοῖζος, συνεχής, τετράκυκλος, τετραχθά, τριχθά, ὑπουράνιος, ὠδίνω*—46.

Of these words *ἱερεύς* (*ἱρεύς*) and *ἄφθιτος* are found each in the *Iliad* eight times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἄζομαι ρ, αὔω ζω, βουληφόρος ν, καμπύλος φ.*

κ. *ἄιδρις, ἀλλοφρονέων, ἀραιός, ἀωτέω, βαθυδίνης, βοτάνη, βουκολέω, ἐλέγχιστος, ἐνοπή, ζέω, ἠνοψ, ἰτέη, καλλιπλόκαμος, κίνυμαι, κοναβίζω, κράνεια, κυκεών, λύκος, μέσσαυλος, ὅμαδος, ὀρέστερος, περιωπή, πολυφάρμακος, Πράμνειος, σκαίρω, σκοπιάζω, στεφανόω, ταμίης, ὑπηνήτης, ὑπόσχεσις, φαεσίμβροτος, -χρίμπτω*—32.

Of these words *ἐνοπή* is used in the *Iliad* seven, *λύκος* seven, *ὅμαδος* twelve, and *-χρίμπτω* seven times. *ἠγεμών*, a word of common occurrence in the *Iliad*, is found in the *Odyssey* in this book and in *o* only.

λ. *ἀγανοφροσύνη, ἀγέρωχος, ἀγκοίνη, ἄθαπτος, Αἰακίδης, Αἰολίδης, Ἀλωεύς, ἀμβατός, ἀμός, Ἀμφιτρύων, ἀνδροκτασίη, ἄνω, ἀρηίφατος, Ἀριάδνη, ἀταλός, αὐτοσχεδίη, γάνυς, Γόργειος, δικασπόλος, δόξα, ἑλκέω, ἐνθένδε, ἐννεάπηχυς, ἐπιμίξ, ἑπτάπυλος, ἔραμαι, εὐρυπυλής, Ἐφιάλτης, Ἥβη, Ἡρακληείη, θαλίη, θέσκελος, θρασυμέμνων, ἰαχή, Ἰαωλκός, ἱδρώς, ἱππιοχάρμης, Καδμεῖος, Κασσάνδρη, κρῆθεν,*

-κτίζω, κνέω, -κύπτω, λάχνη, λιτή, μήνιμα, Μινύειος, Νεοπτόλεμος, Οἰδιπόδης, οἰοπόλος, ὀσσάκι, παρθένιος, πέδονδε, πέλεθρον, Πελίης, Πήλιον, πίτνημι, ποδώκης, πολυάιξ, Πολυδεύκης, πολυσπερής, πρόμος, πυλάρτης, Σίσυφος, Σκῦρος, τελαμών, Τελαμών, Τελαμωνιάδης, τοσσάκι, τρέμω, ὑσμίνη, Φθίη, φυσίζοος, Ὦτος—74.

Of these words *ἀγέρωχος* is found in the *Iliad* seven, *ἔραμαι* seven, *ἰαχή* nine, *ἰδρώς* eighteen, *ποδώκης* twenty-three, *πρόμος* seven, *τελαμών* twelve, and *ὑσμίνη* forty-six times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἄαπτος* χ, *ἄθαπτος* χ, *ἀτειρής* ν, *ἐγχείη* ι, *νίκη* χ.

μ. ἀγορῆθεν, αἰζήιος (αἰζηός), ἀλγέω, ἄληκτος, ἀρνευτήρ, βάραθρον, γάνυμαι, -εμέω, δελφίς, ἐναρίθμιος, ἐξονομακλήδην, ἐρινεός, ἐρωέω (to leave), Ἰήσων, λάσκω, -λευκαίνω, λιγυρός, -μαιμάω, -μορμύρω, μυκηθμοῦ, νεώτερος, ὄζος, ὀρθόκραιρος, πολεμήιος, πολύαινος, πόρος, σκέπτομαι, σκόπελος, στεινωπός, στήλη, στηρίζω, στρεύγομαι, φιτρός, -χαίνω (χάσκω)—34.

Of these words *αἰζήιος* (*αἰζηός*) is found in the *Iliad* seventeen, *-μαιμάω* seven, *ὄζος* eighteen, *πολεμήιος* seven, and *στήλη* six times.

ν. ἀγχόθι, ἀπάτη, ἀπειλή, ἀρδμός, -αρήγω, ἀρτεμής, ἀστός, ἄτος, βλάβομαι, γερούσιος, ἐριβῶλαξ, ἑτοιμάζω, εὐρυσθενής, καλλιγύναικα, λίθεος, μέλισσα, πηκτός, πολυθαρσής, πολύφλοισβος, πρεσβύτατος, Τρωιάς—21.

Of these words *-αρήγω* is found in the *Iliad* twenty, *ἄτος* six, *ἐριβῶλαξ* fifteen, and *πολύφλοισβος* six times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἀτειρής* λ, *βουληφόρος* ι, *δαίζω* ξ.

ξ. ἀγητός, ἀγκών, Αἰτωλός, ἀμαιμάκετος, Ἀνδραίμων, ἀπριάτην, ἀταρπός, ἄφενος, γεραίρεις, γνήσιος, δνοπαλίζω, δόναξ, ἴος (εἷς), ἑλεός, ἕλος, ἐμμαπέως, ἐνύπνιον, ἐπημοιβός, ἑυκλείη, ἐυρρείτης, ζῶμα, ζωστήρ, ἠθεῖος, ἤθεα, Θόας, καλάμη, κρύσταλλος, νηκερδής, νύσσω, παλλακίς, περίδρομος, ῥωπήια, σταυρός, στερεῶς, συβόσιον, -τεκταίνομαι—36.

Of these words *ἀγκών* is found in the *Iliad* six, *ζωστήρ* sixteen, and *νύσσω* twenty-five times. *δαίζω*, a word of common use in the *Iliad*, is found in the *Odyssey* in this book and in ν only.

ο. ἀρηίφιλος, ἄχθομαι, βασιλεύτερος, ἐπαιγίζω. ἐπιτηδές, ἐρίμυκος, εὔχαλκος, θύος, ἰύζω, καλλίκομος, κηώεις, λάβρος, μάστις, μῶνυξ, παμποίκιλος, πείρινς (πείρινθα), ποίκιλμα, τόκος, Ὑπερησίη, Φύλακος, φωριαμός—21.

Of these words *ἀρηίφιλος* is found in the *Iliad* twenty-seven, *ἄχθομαι* five, *μῶνυξ* thirty-three, and *τόκος* five times. Words fre-

quent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἡγεμών κ, νείατος η.*

π. ἄριστον (the early meal), ἄτιμος, ἀτρεκής, βοάγριον, δεκάς, ἐπασσύτερος, ἐπιμέμφομαι, κακομήχανος, κατηφέω, μεγάλως, ὀπτεύω, περιώσιον, πολύβουλος, ὑποθημοσύνη, ὕψι, φοβέω, χῆτος—17.

Of these words ὕψι is used in the *Iliad* eight, and *φοβέω* forty times.

ρ. ἀκήρατος, ἀλυσκάζω, ἄντιτα, ἀργεννός, δείελος, ἔθω, ἐνδέξια, ἔκαθεν, ἐπουράνιος, ἑταίρη (ἑτάρη), ἐύφρων, ἰσχίον, ἰωή, κλητός, κοναβέω, κυκλοτερής, λαγωός, ὁμοκλή, πλευρή, σιωπάω, ταχυτής, τολμήεις, τραπεζεύς, φθείρω—24.

Of these words *ἀργεννός* is found in the *Iliad* five, *ἰσχίον* five, and *ὁμοκλή* six times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἄγκος δ, ἄζομαι ι, ἄμοτον ζ, ἐπαυρίσκω σ.*

σ. ἀεικίζω, ἀζηχής, αἰσχρῶς (αἰσχρός), ἀκοντιστής, ἀλαπαδνός, ἀμοιβηδίς, ἄρκιος, ἀρωγός, ἀχρεῖος, ἄχρι (ἄχρις), βουγάιος, βραχίων, βρωτύς, γενετή, ἐπιτροχάδην, ἐρκίον, ἔρματα, θλάω, κάγκανος, κέλαδος, κοίρανος, κοσμήτωρ, κῶμα, μεθύω, μορόεις, μῶλος, νῆστις, ὀνείδειος, ὀνειδίζω, -πατάσσω, πίσυνος, πολυτλήμων, τρίγληνος, ὦλκα (ὠλξ)—34.

Of these words *ἀεικίζω* is used in the *Iliad* seven, *κοσμήτωρ* seven, *μῶλος* six, and *ὀνείδειος* six times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *αἴθων α, ἐπαυρίσκω ρ.*

τ. -άγχω, ἀδεής, ἀεργός, ἀκαλαρρείτης, ἀκριτόμυθος, ἀκροπόλος, ἀμέρδω, ἀμήχανος, δαίδαλον, Δευκαλίων, δινωτός, δίπλαξ, διπλόος, δυσώνυμος, ἔαρ, Εἰλείθυια, ἐλεφαίρομαι, ἑπακτήρ, Εὐρυβάτης, ἰσχάνω, Κνωσός, κορωνίς, κραδάω, κρόμυον, λαμπρός, λικριφίς, νιφόεις, ὀλοφυδνός, ὀμφαλόεις, ὀπιπεύω (ὀπιπτεύω), ὀτραλέως, Πελασγοί, πέταλον, πολυηχής, πολύστονος, πτύξ, σκότος, τερμιόεις, φρίσσω—39.

Of these words *ἀμήχανος* is found in the *Iliad* eight, *δαίδαλον* six, *κορωνίς* fifteen, *λαμπρός* eleven, *πτύξ* six, *ὀμφαλόεις* twelve, *σκότος* fifteen, and *φρίσσω* seven times. *κόρυς*, a word of frequent use in the *Iliad*, is found in the *Odyssey* in this book and in *ω* only.

υ. ἀγορητής, ἀεικείη, αἰγλήεις, ἀλείτης, ἀμαλός, ἀφαυρός, ἀφραίνω, ἀψόρροος, βροντή, ἐλίσσω, κερτομίη, μά, μελάνυδρος, μέροψ, οἰμωγή, πεινάω, σκιερός, τραφερός, ὑλακτέω, ὑψιπέτης—20.

Of these words *ἀγορητής* is found in the *Iliad* six, *ἐλίσσω* fifteen, and *μέροψ* (*μέροπες*) nine times. *ἀκάματος*, a word of frequent use in the *Iliad*, is found in the *Odyssey* in this book and in *φ* only.

φ. *ἀγκυλομήτης, ἀγκύλος, ἀεσίφρων, ἀμπερές, βράχω, γλυφίς, ἔλεγχος, ἐλέγχω, ἔντερον, ἐξεσίη, -εργάθω, εὐκλειής, ἰοδόκος, καρτερόθυμος, κουρότερος, κτυπέω, παλιντόνος, πελεμίζω, πιθέω, τάφρος*—20.

Of these words *ἀγκυλομήτης* is found in the *Iliad* eight, *βράχω* eleven, *ἔλεγχος* five, *ἔντερον* five, *κτυπέω* seven, *πιθέω* seven, *πελεμίζω* ten, and *τάφρος* thirty-seven times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἀκάματος υ*, *καμπύλος ι*.

χ. *αἰγιαλός, αἰγίς, αἱματόεις, αἰόλος, ἄκος, ἁμαρτῇ, ἀναιδείη, αὖλις, αὐτοσχεδόν* (*δά*), *-γράφω, δονέω, δυσηλεγής, -ερείπω, ἑτεραλκής, ἱπποδάσεια, ἵππουρις, καταθύμιος, κενεών, λαιμός, νεμεσσητός, ξύω, παλαιγενής, προπρηνής, σειρή, στεῖνος, τετραθέλυμνος, τρυφάλεια, φέβομαι, φθισίμβροτος, χάρμη, χολωτός*—31.

Of these words *αἰγίς* is used in the *Iliad* eleven, *αἱματόεις* eighteen, *αἰόλος* seven, *αὐτοσχεδόν* (*δά*) eight, *-γράφω* six, *ἐρείπω* thirty-nine, *ἱπποδάσεια* seven, *ἵππουρις* six, *νεμεσσητός* six, *τρυφάλεια* fourteen, *φέβομαι* eleven, and *χάρμη* twenty-two times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἄαπτος λ*, *ἀκοντίζω θ*, *ἐξεναρίζω λ*, *νίκη λ*.

ψ. *δαιδάλλω, ἐρέφω, ἔρμα, εὔπηκτος, καγχαλάω, καλλίζωνος, κάτω, μεγαλίζομαι, ὄψις, πῶλος, ποινή, ὑπάλυξις*—12.

Of these words *εὔπηκτος* is used in the *Iliad* five, *ποινή* ten times.

ω. *ἀκάκητα, ἀλαλητός, ἁπλοίς, ἀραβέω, ἀργυρόπεζα, βλωθρός, βρότος, γνωτός, δῆρις, δριμύς, εἰρήνη, Ἑλλήσποντος, ἐνίσσω, ἐπιτάρροθος, ἠνορέη, Θέτις, θρηνέω, θύνω, ἱππεύς, ἱππόσυνη, κεῦθος, κνημίς, μεγαλωστί, Μενοιτιάδης, μίγδα, οἰμάω, πολεμιστής, πολύδωρος, πρῶι, στροφάλιγξ, τρίζω, υἱωνός, ὑψιπετήεις, φλόξ, φόβος, φονεύς, χαλκοπάρῃος*—37.

Of these words *ἀλαλητός* is found in the *Iliad* seven, *ἀραβέω* ten, *ἀργυρόπεζα* twelve, *γνωτός* nine, *ἐπιτάρροθος* seven, *θύνω* twelve, *ἱππεύς* twenty-five, *ἱππόσυνη* six, *κνημίς* seven, *πολεμιστής* thirteen, *φλόξ* nineteen, and *φόβος* thirty-five times. Words frequent in the *Iliad*, rare in the *Odyssey*, but not restricted to this book are: *ἀγών θ*, *αὔω ζι*, *κόρυς τ*.

Because of a suggestion made to me by Miss F. Melian Stawell and also because of the argument, based on the previous paper, made by Professor Rothe in his recent book, *Die Ilias als Dichtung* (p. 346), I add for the *Iliad* this table which shows the frequency of the words given in relation to the number of verses in each book. The books are named in the order of the relative frequency of these words:

Books of the *Iliad*	Number of Words Found in the *Odyssey* and One Book of the *Iliad*	Verses in Book	Approximate Number of Verses to Each of These Odyssean Words
Σ	43	617	14
X	34	515	15
I	41	713	17
B	48	877	18
Ξ	28	522	18
Ω	42	804	19
Γ	24	461	19
T	20	424	21
Z	23	529	23
A	26	611	23
Λ	33	848	25
Π	33	867	26
Δ	20	544	27
Φ	22	611	28
Ψ	31	897	29
O	23	746	32
Υ	15	503	33
K	17	579	34
H	14	482	34
P	21	761	36
E	23	909	39
M	12	471	39
Θ	13	565	43
N	17	837	49

It will be observed that X is second in this list and that K, the *Doloneia*, is very close to the bottom.

A similar table for the *Odyssey* is as follows:

Books of the *Odyssey*	Number of Words Found in the *Iliad* and One Book of the *Odyssey*	Verses in the Book	Approximate Number of Verses to Each of These Words
λ	74	640	9
ι	46	566	12
ε	39	493	12
σ	34	428	13
θ	45	586	13
μ	34	453	13
γ	35	497	14
ξ	36	533	15
ω	37	548	15
ζ	22	331	15
τ	39	604	15
χ	31	501	16
δ	49	847	17
κ	32	574	18
υ	20	394	20
ν	21	440	21
φ	20	434	22
η	16	347	22
β	17	434	25
ρ	24	606	25
ο	21	557	26
α	16	444	28
π	17	481	28
ψ	12	372	31

These two tables emphasize the conclusions reached in the former paper and show how closely each book of the *Iliad* is knit with the *Odyssey*, each book of the *Odyssey* with the *Iliad*, and show also how vain are the arguments which have been used to prove the relationship of the *Odyssey* with single books of the *Iliad*.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

EROTIC TEACHING IN ROMAN ELEGY AND THE GREEK SOURCES. PART II

By Arthur Leslie Wheeler

The erotic system of antiquity appears already highly developed in the New Comedy. In elegy, as we have seen, the rôle of erotic expert was remodeled to suit the requirements of the genre, and in the same way many of the precepts were subjected to changed applications and new conditions. In comedy the τέχνη ἐρωτική was predominantly a feminine art; in elegy it became even more predominantly masculine. The shift involved many changes of omission, alteration, and addition, for when the system had once become established, new principles based on both literature and life were evolved. It is not my purpose to follow in detail the variations of each precept, especially in Roman elegy, but to compare the Roman with the Greek and determine, if possible, the Greek source of each precept.

A surprisingly large number of the precepts employed by Roman elegists can be closely paralleled in Greek literature. Without attempting absolute completeness I shall discuss a majority of these together with the Greek parallels—enough to show the extent of the phenomenon itself and to support, as I hope, the inferences which I shall draw. Since the purpose of this paper is to throw light on Roman elegy, it is fitting to begin in each case with the Roman form of the precept.

Propertius (ii. 14,19–20) states concisely the principle: Indifference begets love.

> hoc sensi prodesse magis! contemnite, amantes:
> sic hodie veniet, si qua negavit heri.

The principle is effective because it arouses jealousy—fear of a rival. Propertius merely hints this (v. 31, *culpa*), but it is emphasized in the related passages of Ovid (*A.* ii. 19; *A.A.* ii. 435 ff.; iii. 580 ff.). The Greek parallels follow.

Lucian, *Dial. meretr.* viii (Ampelis, an older *meretrix*, to the less sophisticated Chrysis): *Ὅστις δέ, ὦ Χρυσί, μήτε ζηλοτυπεῖ μήτε ὀργίζεται μήτε ἐρράπισέ ποτε ἢ περιέκειρεν ἢ τὰ ἱμάτια περιέσχισεν, ἔτι ἐραστὴς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν; . . . . τὸ δὲ πῦρ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς ζηλοτυπίας ἐστίν . . . . . ζηλότυποι γὰρ καὶ μάλιστα λυπηθήσονται . . . . . μεγάλοι ἔρωτες γίγνονται, εἰ πύθοιτο ἀμελεῖσθαι.*

Ampelis then tells how she once punished a lover on this principle, one of the details being the usual exclusion—*ἀπέκλεισα*, as she puts it. The Twelfth Dialogue should be compared, and the Fifteenth proves that the principle does not work out in all cases.

Alciphron, *Epp.* ii. 1, 6, (p. 61, Hercher): *διὸ καὶ μέγα τῶν ἑταιρουσῶν ἐστι σόφισμα, ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν τῆς ἀπολαύσεως ὑπερτιθεμένας ταῖς ἐλπίσι διακρατεῖν τοὺς ἐραστάς, κ. τ. λ.*—written by a *meretrix* to Demetrius.

Ibid. i. 37, 3 (Myrrhina excludes Diphilus, who has been untrue, in order to bring him to his senses): *εἴωθε γὰρ ἡ βαρύτης τῷ ἀμελεῖσθαι καταβάλλεσθαι*; cf. iii. 50, 1.

Aristaenetus *Epp.* ii. 1, 20 (p. 158. Hercher); Aelianus writes to Calyce on behalf of Charidemus, whom she is maltreating: *χαριέστατον οἶδα τὸ σμικρὸν ὑποκνίζειν τοὺς νέους· τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν ἀφροδισίων προαναστέλλει τὸν κόρον καὶ τὰς ἑταίρας ἀποδείκνυσιν ἀεὶ ποθεινὰς τοῖς ἐρασταῖς· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο πέρα τῆς χρείας, ἀποκάμνουσιν οἱ ποθοῦντες.*

Heliodorus (viii. 5) puts the same principle into the mouth of Arsace's nurse: *πεφύκασι γὰρ οἱ νέοι θεραπευόμενοι μὲν ὑπερφρονεῖν, βιαζόμενοι δ' ὑπείκειν.*

In comedy the principle appears several times:

Terence *Heauton.* 366 f.:

> haec arte tractabat virum
> ut illius animum cupidum inopia incenderet,
> eademque ut esset apud te hoc quam gratissimum.

Eunuch. 434 ff.:

> *Thraso.* Sed heus tu, purgon ego me de istac Thaidi,
> Quod eam me amare suspicatast? *Gn.* Nil minus.
> Immo auge magis suspicionem. *Th.* Quor? *Gn.* Rogas?
> Scin, si quando illa mentionem Phaedriae
> Facit aut si laudat, te ut male urat? *Th.* Sentio.
> *Gn.* Id ut ne fiat, haec res solast remedio:
> Ubi nominabit Phaedriam, tu Pamphilam
> Continuo; . . . . denique
> Par pro pari referto, quod eam mordeat.

Cf. 812–13.

In the *Truculentus* Phronesium works upon three lovers in the same way.

Turpilius *Demiurgus*, frag. I R.[3]:

> Ergo edepol docta dico: quae mulier volet
> Sibi suum amicum esse indulgentem et diutinum
> Modice atque parce eius serviat cupidines.

A survey of these passages shows that in the Greek the principle is an exclusively feminine one,[1] but in the Latin it has been adapted to masculine use. This is probably accident due to gaps in the sources, but it is decidedly significant that the whole process of transfer is evident within the limits of Roman elegy. In Propertius iv. 5, 29–32 and Ovid *A.* i. 8, 71–72 the *lena* speaks, i.e., the comic motif is transferred bodily to an elegiac setting; in Propertius ii. 14 the lover alone uses the principle; in Ovid *A.* ii. 19 both lover and *amica* use it. The second (Pr. ii. 14) is the truly elegiac form because the principle is there subjective-erotic. Ovid (*A.* ii. 19) represents that impudent and exaggerated frankness, that effort at piquancy, which so often marks his work in elegy as decadent.

The principle just discussed is closely connected with another: the anger—often violence—of the loved one indicates her (his) passion.[2] This appears in all three Romans, who glory in the violent attacks of the strenuous *amica*. Propertius devotes an entire elegy to the subject: iii. 8; cf. especially vss. 17–20.

> his ego tormentis animi sum verus aruspex,
> has didici certo saepe in amore notas.
> non est certa fides, quam non in iurgia vertas.
> hostibus eveniat lenta puella meis!

Cf. iii. 12, 15–16 and iv. 8 (here stress is laid on Cynthia's jealous violence, not on the love that may be inferred from it). Even the

[1] *Eunuch.* 434 ff. is original with Terence according to Donatus, but undoubtedly suggested by some writer of the νέα; cf. Legrand *op. cit.* 205.

[2] F. Wilhelm *Rh. M.* LVII (1902), 599–602, collects many of the following passages, but discusses them merely from the point of view of the violence, jealousy, etc., not distinguishing those in which there is didaxis.

"gentle Tibullus" expects such treatment if he proves false (i.6,69–73) although he deprecates extreme violence on the part of the lover (i. 10, 53–64; ii. 5, 101–4); cf. Ovid. *A.* i. 7; ii. 7; ii. 5 (her beauty disarms him); i. 8 (*lena's* advice); *A.A.* ii. 169 ff. (violence is not for the *impecunious* lover); ii. 447–69. Catullus (lxxxiii and xcii) states the same principle in epigrammatic form, with reference, however, to anger only.

Strenuous indeed was love in ancient times! From Aristophanes (*Plut.* 1013 ff.) down through comedy, epigram, bucolic poetry, Roman elegy, and the *erotici* there are frequent references to different aspects of this theme. Usually the pathetic situation of the much abused girl and the tardy remorse of the jealous lover are emphasized. Only in Roman elegy is there frequent stress on the didactic aspect, and the only good parallel for this is in Lucian *Dial. meretr.* viii, which has already been cited (p. 57). This dialogue presents the principle from the feminine standpoint exactly as Propertius (iii. 8) presents it from the masculine. In one or two other passages, e.g., Terence *Heauton.* 366 ff., 730 ff., Phronesium's treatment of Diniarchus in the *Truculentus*, Alciphron *Ep.* iii. 50, Lucian *Toxaris* 15–16, the narrator apparently perceives that the *meretrix* is arousing jealousy with conscious purpose, but there is no formal didaxis.[1]

Evidently the passages which picture the beauty and pathetic situation of the girl and the remorse of her jealous lover belong to a much wider field than comedy. On the other hand the exploitation of jealous anger and violence for didactic purposes was part of the τέχνη ἐρωτική of comedy, and it is probably not chance that the girl involved is always a *meretrix*, whereas in passages containing no didaxis she is more often of a higher station—a trait which enhances the pathos.

The inevitable lover's protestation of undying loyalty—loyalty unto death—is so often uttered by the elegists that illustrative

[1] Menander's Περικειρομένη and probably the Ῥαπιζομένη were the great dramatic treatments of the maltreated girl and her remorseful lover. These plays have echoes in epigram and the epistolographers; cf. especially *A.P.* v. 40, 42, 219, 247, and Philostratus *Ep.* lxi. The words περικείρω and ῥαπίζω occur in many of the passages; see Lucian *D.M.* viii (p. 57). On the influence of this motif in Roman elegy cf. Wilhelm *op. cit.*, and Buerger *De Ovid. carmm. inventione*, etc., p. 23.

passages may be confined to those which involve didaxis. Of these I find only two, both in Propertius:[1] i. 10, 29–30 (to Gallus):

> is poterit felix una remanere puella,
> qui numquam vacuo pectore liber erit;

i. 1, 35–36 (to lovers in general):

> hoc, moneo, vitate malum: sua quemque moretur
> cura, neque assueto mutet amore locum.

But although Propertius seems to have been the first to urge the principle didactically,[2] there are closely connected themes which may be traced back into the Greek. The first of these appears in the *foedus* or *syngraphus* with which lovers seek to bind each other fast by means of oaths in order that treachery may meet with divine vengeance. The regular declaration of the lover seems to have been *tu mihi sola places;* cf. Tib. iv. 13, 3; Prop. ii. 7, 19. and especially Ovid *A.A.* i. 42 where it is used as typical. Such a *foedus* may be offered before an "affair" has begun (Prop. iii. 20, 15 ff.) or after its beginning (Tib. iv. 13)—especially when a reconciliation occurs (Prop. iv. 8, 74 ff.) or is hoped for (Tib. i, 6, 69–70).[3]

In Lucian *Dial. Meretr.* viii, Ampelis tells how she extracted a *foedus* from Demophantus by arousing his jealousy. This *foedus*, therefore, resulted from a clever use of the τέχνη ἐρωτική. Crocale (*ibid.* xv) gets into trouble by attempting the same ruse with Deinomachus, the soldier. In these passages Lucian was certainly following the lead of comedy,[4] and comedy itself affords several good examples of the *foedus*. The most instructive of these is the comic parody

[1] Excluding Ovid.

[2] According to these passages a happy result ought to attend the loyal lover, but woman's fickleness and other causes usually interfere; cf. Prop. i. 15*b*, 29–32 (loyalty beautifully asserted), but 41–42: quis ego nunc pereo, similes moniturus amantes | "O nullis tutum credere blanditiis"—in which her faithlessness draws from the lover quite a different *sententia*. For assertions of loyalty in Greek see Philostratus *Epp.* 7 and 23; Aristaenetus *Epp.* ii, 9. These are not didactic, but the last passage is much like Tib. i. 9, 1–6, 31–38; cf. Gollnisch, pp. 60–61.

[3] Leo *Rh.M.* lv (1900), 604–11, has discussed the *foedus*, not, however, with reference to didaxis. He thinks that Hellenistic elegy had already adapted it from comedy.

[4] Cf. Legrand, p. 189.

of the *foedus* made for Diabolus and Philaenium (*As.* 746–809).[1] The various clauses of this contract are full of comic absurdities, but the whole is based on a real custom which was first turned to literary use by comedy. The loyalty which is urged upon lovers by Propertius is thus connected in both elegy and comedy with the *foedus*, and although it cannot be proved to have assumed a didactic form before Propertius, the evidence of Lucian that the *foedus* was often the goal of the wily *meretrix* renders it probable that loyalty, the chief principle of the *foedus*, was also part of her system.

The lover, in theory at least, believed in the power of his own loyalty to win his obdurate *amica*, but practically he knew that something more substantial was necessary, and so his assertions of loyalty are usually accompanied by references to past services. These services, which are termed collectively *obsequium*,[2] fall into fairly well-defined groups[3] which had become conventional in erotic literature and are decked out with such variations of detail as suited each poet's imagination. I shall consider only those which are offered as precepts.

The best statements of the general principle of *obsequium* are Prop. i. 10, 21–30 (to Gallus):

> tu cave ne tristi cupias pugnare puellae,
> neve superba loqui, neve tacere diu:
> neu si quid petiit, ingrata fronte negaris,
> . . . . . .
> at quo sis humilis magis et subiectus Amori,
> hoc magis effectu saepe fruare bono.

Tib. i. 4, 39–54, especially 40:

> obsequio plurima vincit amor.

Into this passage are crowded various details of such *obsequium:* 41–46, journey with the loved one; 47–50, work, hunt, fence with him. In both of these elegies the assertion of undying loyalty finds

[1] Cf. also *As.* 229–40; *Cist.* 460; *Bacch.* 575 f., frag. x (xvii); Terence, *Hec.* 86–87.

[2] Each particular form of service is also an *obsequium*.

[3] The most prominent are service to the sick *amica* (Tib. i. 5, 9–18; Prop. ii. 28, etc.); hardships endured in her behalf (Tib. i. 2, 29–32, etc.); toil of a journey with her (Prop. ii. 26*b*, 29 ff., etc.), or a hunt (Prop. ii. 19, 17–26; Tib. iv. 3; Ov. *A.A.* ii. 189 f., etc.); work in the country (Tib. ii. 3, 5–10; i. 4, 47–48, etc.).

a place: cf. Prop. vss. 29–30; Tib. 21–26. Ovid naturally makes much of the *obsequium*-motif (*A.A.* ii. 177–250).

Achilles Tatius, i. 9, 6: *εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἄγρια τῶν θηρίων συνηθείᾳ τιθασεύεται, πολὺ μᾶλλον ταύτῃ μαλαχθείη καὶ γύνη.*

This is part of the didaxis of Clinias, cf. Vol. V, p. 446.

The motif of toil in the country is often stated,[1] but is presented as didaxis only in Tibullus i. 4, 47–48:

> nec te paeniteat duros subiisse labores
> aut opera insuetas atteruisse manus;

and Ovid, *A.A.* ii. 239–42:

> Cynthius Admeti vaccas pavisse Pheraei
> fertur et in parva delituisse casa:
> quod Phoebum decuit, quem non decet? exue fastus,
> curam mansuri quisquis amoris habes!

Service in the hunt is closely connected with this. It is didactic in Tibullus i. 4, 49–50:

> nec, velit insidiis altas si claudere valles,
> dum placeas, umeri retia ferre negent.

Cf. Ovid, *A.A.* ii. 189 ff. (of Milanion), but Ovid thinks this type of service unlikely to be required (*ibid.* 193–96).

Plutarch: *Πῶς ἄν τις διακρίνειε τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου*, 7 p. 52 B: *θηρατικοῦ δὲ καὶ κυνηγετικοῦ λαβόμενος. . ἀναβοῶν ἕπεται 'πρὸς θεῶν ἔραμαι κυσὶ θωΰξαι βαλίαις ἐλάφοις ἐγχριπτόμενος'.*

So the *κόλαξ* wrestles and enters the race with the object of his wiles (*ibid.* p. 58E).[2]

The mythological *παραδείγματα* of the *obsequium*-motif in its various forms are the stories of Milanion, of Apollo and Admetus, and of Hercules and Omphale. The submissive toil by which Milanion won the love of Arcadian Atalanta is used by Propertius (i. 1, 13 ff.)

[1] Wilhelm *Rh.M.* LIX (1904), 279 ff. (on *Copia rara videndi*, Tib. ii. 3, 77) gives Tib. ii. 3, 5 ff.; i. 4, 47–48; Philostr. *Ep.* 59; *A.P.* xvi. 200. The other passages belong to the hunt (Prop. ii. 19) or other themes.

[2] Wilhelm (*Satura Viadrina*, p. 50) thinks that the writings *περὶ κολακείας* were sources of Plutarch and the Roman elegists, but he traces the system back to comedy and admits that the Romans may have used comedy directly. This latter possibility seems much more likely since there is good evidence that comedy was well known to the Romans and none that the obscure discussions *περὶ κολακείας* were known at all.

to illustrate the power of services in love and to serve as a contrast to his own hopeless state. In Ovid (*A.A.* ii. 185–92) Milanion again illustrates the *obsequium* which the poet is recommending:

> Quid fuit asperius Nonacrina Atalanta?
> subcubuit meritis trux tamen illa viri:
> saepe suos casus nec mitia facta puellae
> flesse sub arboribus Milaniona ferunt;
> saepe tulit iusso fallacia retia collo,
> saepe fera torvos cuspide fixit apros, etc.

The hunt is here specified as part of his service, for Atalanta was a huntress. The story of Apollo's service to Admetus, on the other hand, is idyllic and illustrates the motif of toil in the country. It is told at length by Tibullus (ii. 3, 11–32) and is one of the very few myths on which he dwells at any length—a fact which emphasizes the importance of the idyllic element in his elegies; cf. also Lygd. 4. 67; Ovid *A.A.* ii. 239 ff.[1] Ovid alone uses it didactically.[2]

The story of Hercules and Omphale is often used to illustrate the power of woman; cf. Prop. iii. 11, 17–20; Terence *Eun.* 1027; Achilles Tat. ii. 6, etc. Weak men—*homunciones*, to quote Terence—find in it a plea for their own errors.[3] But Ovid alone, as in the case of the myth of Apollo and Admetus, has given to this tale a decidedly didactic turn (*A.A.* ii. 217–22).[4]

Our extant evidence indicates that these myths were first used for didactic purposes by the Romans. Buerger and Wilhelm think that Ovid and Lygdamus drew on Tibullus (i. 4, 47–48) in their emphasis on the service (*obsequium*) of Apollo to Admetus, but in Tibullus i. 4 the myth is not even alluded to. There seems to be no justification, therefore, for this view, and still less for that of

[1] See p. 62.

[2] The myth appears in many erotic writers and in some versions Bacchus takes the place of Apollo. It is represented also in art; cf. Helbig *Campan. Wandmalerei*, p. 280. See Wilhelm *Rh.M.* LIX (1904), 279 ff., and Kalkmann *De Eurip. Hipp.*, p. 123 (cited by Wilhelm).

[3] Cf. *Anth. Pal.* v. 99; Achill. Tat. i. 5, 7. In both of these passages the gods are cited as *bad* examples!

[4] This story, like that of Apollo and Admetus, was a favorite subject in Campanian art; cf. Helbig *Campan. Wandmal.* 377, who thinks that Ovid's elaborate version (*Her.* ix. 53–118) is based on such pictures.

Wilhelm that the precept of service was inserted into the myths (Admetus-Apollo and Hercules-Omphale) by the Alexandrians. On the contrary the passages show that the two stories were originally used to illustrate the power of love over even the gods, and that only after the didactic tendency had become well established in elegy were they seized upon to illustrate the *obsequium*-motif. The process was not insertion of didaxis into the myths, but use of the myths to illustrate didaxis. The myths themselves may very possibly have appeared in Alexandrian elegy—this is just the content of that genre of which we are most certain—but nothing indicates that they were already connected in Alexandrian elegy with didaxis.[1]

When positive services are of no avail the lover may at least take refuge in complaisance, knowing the faithlessness of the *amica* but concealing his jealousy lest he lose even what standing he has or ruin his chance of winning her back. This attitude is stated by Catullus (lxviii. 135–48), Tibullus (iv. 14), and Ovid (*A.* iii. 14), who with the usual exaggeration urges the *amica* to hide her infidelity from the poet.[2] It is offered as a precept by Propertius ii. 18, 1–4:

> assiduae multis odium peperere querelae:
> frangitur in tacito femina saepe viro.
> si quid vidisti, semper vidisse negato:
> aut si quid doluit forte, dolere nega.

Cynthia is false (vs. 19), but the lover must be complaisant if he hopes to reconquer her. The situation in ii. 32 is the same (cf. especially 23–30), and Cynthia's conduct is palliated by that of many heroines and even of Lesbia (45) with reference probably to Catullus *loc. cit.*[3]

This is another bit of *lena*'s teaching adapted to masculine use; cf. Ovid, *A.* i. 8, 81–82 (*lena*'s precept), *A.A.* ii. 539 ff., and Lucian, *Dialog. meretr.* iii, *ad fin.*, in which Philinna's mother rebukes her for having gone too far in her harsh treatment of Diphilus. Her principle is like that of Propertius and Ovid (*A.A. loc cit.*): ὀργίζου

[1] Wilhelm even ventures the view that Ovid's *Ars amatoria* had predecessors in Alexandrian literature!

[2] The passages are collected by Wilhelm, *Rh.M.* LIX (1904), except Catullus, *loc. cit.*

[3] Cf. also Prop. ii. 20, 13 f. and ii. 16, 25 f.

μέν, μὴ ἀνθύβριζε, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ὑβριζόμενοι παύονται οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ ἐπιτιμῶσιν ἑαυτοῖς; The evidence clearly points to comedy as the ultimate source of this precept.[1]

The belief in the power of song over womankind appears very often in Roman elegy. It may aid the poet to win the object of his love (Prop. i. 7 and 9; ii. 34, 31 ff; iii. 2, 8; ii. 26*b*; Tib. i. 4, 61–72; Lygd. 4. 43 ff.; Ov. *A.* i. 3) or to retain her affections if she has already been won (Prop. i. 8*b*, 40; ii. 13. 7; ii. 26*b*, 25 f.; iii. 1, 40).[2] The didactic tone appears clearly in a number of these passages, e.g., Prop. i. 9, 13–14:

> i quaeso et tristis istos compone libellos,
> et cane quod quaevis nosse puella velit!

iii. 2, 9–10 (=iii. 1, 47–48):

> miremur nobis et Baccho et Apolline dextro,
> turba puellarum si mea verba colit?

cf. ii. 34, 31–46; ii. 26 (26*b*), 21–26.

The passages in Ovid also are strongly didactic. With his usual knowledge of feminine psychology Ovid is clever enough to recognize that the women who are really influenced by verse are few. In *A.A.* ii. 273 ff. he admits that *carmina* yield to *munera* and adds (281):

> Sunt tamen et doctae, rarissima turba, puellae,
> altera non doctae turba, sed esse volunt;

cf. *ibid.* iii. 551 f. Cynthia belonged to this *rarissima turba*, if we may believe Propertius, in spite of her *avaritia*.

This belief in the efficacy of song is, therefore, the professed masculine attitude—often sorrowfully admitted to be wrong, when affairs are not running smoothly.[3] The feminine principle, which stood in sharp opposition, was: Gold, not song. This is clearly stated by the *lena* (Prop. iv. 5. 47–56):

[1] Wilhelm, *loc. cit.*, correctly decides that the principle is Greek, but cites only Plato, *leg.* v. 731E, and Menander, fr. 48K, which have nothing to do with this kind of indulgence on the part of the lover.

[2] When all resources have failed, the poet's verse, narrating his own fate, serves to warn others (Prop. i. 1, 37 f.; i. 10, 13–20; i. 15*b*, 41; Ov. *A.* iii. 8, 25–29, etc.).

[3] In addition to the two passages of Ovid last cited cf. *Am.* i. 8, 49 ff.; i. 10; Tib. i. 9, 47–52; ii. 4, 13–20.

aurum spectato, non quae manus afferat aurum!
versibus auditis quid nisi verba feres?
'Quid iuvat ornato procedere, vita, capillo
et tenuis Coa veste movere sinus?'
qui versus, Coae dederit nec munera vestis,
ipsius tibi sit surda sine aere lyra.

Cf. Ovid *A.* i. 8 (*lena's* teaching), especially v. 61:

qui dabit, ille tibi magno sit maior Homero.

The masculine attitude is cleverly urged, with full allowance for feminine *avaritia, except* in the case of poets, by Ovid, *A.* i. 10, especially vss. 59–62:

Est quoque carminibus meritas celebrare puellas:
dos mea! quam volui, nota fit arte mea.
scindentur vestes, gemmae frangentur et aurum:
carmina quam tribuent, fama perennis erit.[1]

Both the masculine *blanditia* and its feminine rebuttal come from comedy. It is unnecessary to trace the *avaritia* of the meretrix to comedy, for the trait is too common in Plautus and Terence to call for proof,[2] but we need a passage in which the avaricious *meretrix* scouts the idea that mere *carmina* can win her favor. Such a passage[3] is Aristaen. *Epp.* i. 14 (partly transcribed above, V, 445). The theme of this letter is that music and song are of no avail without money: *οὔτε αὐλὸς ἑταίραν οἶδε οὔτε λύρᾳ τις ἐφέλκεται πόρνας ἀργυρίου χωρίς· κέρδει μόνον δουλεύομεν, οὐ θελγόμεθα μελῳδίαις*, etc. There is even a mocking interpretation of what the youths mean by their songs; cf. Prop. iv. 5, 54*ab*, which the *lena* quotes in mockery from i. 2, 1 f. The name of the *ἑταίρα* who is supposed

[1] Gollnisch compares Philostratus *Epp.* 29 (53): *τούτων δ' εἰ πάντων σὺ φάρμακον, ἴργου ἐφημέρου ποιήματα ἀθάνατα καὶ βραχείας σώματος ἡδονῆς μνήμην ἀντιλαβοῦσα ἀγήρω*—Boissonade's ed. 1842. I do not find this in Hercher's ed. 1873.

[2] The two opposed principles occur (in elegy) in Ovid, *A.A.* iii. 533–52; ii. 273–86; Tib. ii. 4, 13–20 (in which Tibullus accepts with sorrow the feminine argument). With the last passage cf. Ov. *A.* iii. 8, 1–8, 23–30. The *avaritia* gives rise to many an attack upon it (Prop. iii. 13; Tib. i. 4, 57–70; Ov. *A.* iii. 8; i. 10) and invectives against wealthy rivals (Prop. ii. 9; Tib. i. 5; i. 9; ii. 3), or to praises of the simple past (Prop. iii. 13, 25 ff.; Tib. ii. 3, 69 ff.), which often pass into descriptions of the Golden Age.

[3] In Ter. *Hec.* 58 ff. gain is opposed to masculine *blanditiae* in general, but not to song; cf. *Asin.* 525 ff.

to write the letter, Philematium, is taken from comedy—cf. the *Mostellaria*.[1]

The foregoing parallels prove that the themes of the power of song and the *avaritia* of the *amica* had not only appeared in comedy, the latter as one of the commonest of the *lena*'s precepts, but also that the two had appeared in the same relation as in Prop. iv. 5 and Ovid *A*. i. 8—two elegies which present another excellent instance of bodily transfer of a motive from comedy. Both motives appear separately in many other elegies, with or without didaxis. The power of song was peculiarly adapted to elegiac treatment, but life had remained the same and many of these passages are found in connection with evidence that the *lena*'s instruction was still effective with her pupils. It is natural, therefore, that the power of song should be presented as a principle worthy of acceptance only in those rare moments in which love is running smoothly or when the elegist is dealing with theory rather than practice.[2]

When all resources fail the desperate lover, various cures for his love (*remedia amoris*) suggest themselves or are suggested by his friend. But if he is really in love, as he is represented to be in Propertius and Tibullus, these cures are mere possibilities introduced to heighten the effect and proposed only to be rejected. The lover expects death unless his parlous state, which is thus effectively represented to the *amica*, softens her hard heart. Propertius and Tibullus do not, therefore, mention the *remedia amoris* as precepts which are

[1] In Plaut. *Merc*. 408 old Demipho gives as one of the reasons against lodging the fair girl in his house: impleantur elegeorum meae fores carbonibus | atque . . . . homines . . . . uxori meae | mihique obiectent lenocinium facere. Undoubtedly this is taken from the Greek original of Philemon, as the word *elegeorum* with the familiar early Latin shortening of the penult (cf. platĕa: πλατεῖα) indicates. It is the only reference in comedy, as Legrand (*op. cit.* 51) remarks, to *graffiti;* and it is interesting to note that the allusion is to distichs—a sort of parietal epigram. The custom would seem to have been a common one in the time of the νέα, as it was later at Pompeii. Legrand cites Lucian *D.M*. iv and x—also suggested by comedy.

[2] Gollnisch, pp. 39 ff., regards this principle as part of the motif of the *pauper amator*. Under the same head he classifies a number of other themes—detestation of greed, attacks on avaricious *amicae*, complaints of the success of wealthy rivals, precepts of the elegists to poor lovers and of *lenae* to girls—but aside from his omission of passages in which the power of song is not subordinated to the motif of the *pauper amator* (Prop. ii. 34; i. 9; iii. 2, etc.), he elevates to an inclusive category what is really a mere detail. The *paupertas* of the elegists was a convention necessary to the treatment of many a theme, but it is hardly the source of those themes.

of any use to themselves or others—the didaxis was reserved for the flippant Ovid (*Remedia amoris*)—but many cures which Ovid puts into didactic form appear in the work of his two predecessors,[1] e.g. Prop. iii. 17 (wine); cf. Tib. i. 5, 37 (tried without success!); *ibid.* i. 2, 1 ff.; Ovid *R.A.* 132, 146, 803–10 (a dangerous remedy!); Prop. iii, 21 (the journey to cure love); cf. Ovid *R.A.* 213–24 (*dura praecepta*![2]); Prop. ii. 4, 1 = ii. 3, 45; cf. *ibid.* ii. 25, 39 ff. (drive out the old love with the new); cf. Tib. i. 5, 39–42 (tried in vain!) and Ovid *R.A.* 441 ff.

For Propertius and Tibullus, therefore, no cures for love exist. Their precept is a negation: there is no cure, no escape. This is clearly stated by Propertius (ii. 4, 11–12):

> Non eget hic medicis, non lectis mollibus aeger,
> . . . . . .
> ambulat et subito mirantur funus amici!

cf. ii. 1, 57–58:

> omnis humanos sanat medicina dolores
> solus Amor morbi non amat artificem.[3]

The conception of love as a disease is familiar enough in Greek and is a part of the τέχνη ἐρωτική of comedy. Plautus (*Cist.* 71–74) represents the two *meretrices*, Selenium and Gymnasium, discussing the nature of Amor:

> *Sel.* ad istam faciem est morbus qui me . . macerat.
> *Gy.* perfidiosus est Amor. *Sel.* ergo in me peculatum facit.
> *Gy.* bono animo es, erit isti morbo melius. *Sel.* confidam fore,
> si medicus veniat qui huic morbo facere medicinam potest.

Longus (ii. 7, 7), in a discussion by old Philetas on the nature of love, gives utterance to the same precept that we have just noted in Roman elegy: ἔρωτος γὰρ οὐδὲν φάρμακον. Both Plautus and Longus hint that the only relief is that which comes from the loved one.

[1] Cf. Leo *Pl.F.* 133 Anm. 2, who mentions a number of the following passages.

[2] The lover in Aristaenetus i. 12 finds that "absence makes the heart grow fonder."

[3] Cf. i. 1, 25 ff. (frantic appeal to friends for relief); i. 5, 28 (no cure—didaxis in his own interest); ii. 30, 1 (a denial of the journey-motif, suggested in iii. 21); Tib. ii. 3, 13 (Apollo's herbs are useless). Ovid says, with his usual exaggerated frankness, that he will accept no cure (*A.* ii, 9b).

The precept that there is no cure for love is naturally connected with descriptions of the desperate plight of the lover. All the passages in which cures are rejected as useless are coupled with such descriptions,[1] but Propertius i. 1 is especially significant because this elegy was intended as a general introduction to Book I, if not a larger part of the elegies, and therefore presents the typical condition of the lover-poet. Both this elegy and ii. 4 are warnings to others to avoid the evils of such a state.[2] It matters not what is the cause of her obduracy. The lover suffers in any case, but his woe is expected to arouse her pity.

The same desperate plight is pictured in Longus and in the *Cistellaria*, although in the former the lovers are still *rudes*, in the latter external circumstances have caused the trouble. The *Cistellaria* is indeed filled with elegiac sentiment and there are passages which recall more than one elegiac motif. Note the anguish of Alcesimarchus (203–30):

> qui omnis homines . . antideo cruciabilitatibus animi
> iactor, crucior, agitor,
> stimulor, vorsor
> in amoris rota, etc.

Selenium is heartbroken in her fear that the youth, who has been ordered to marry another, will desert her in spite of his promises—apparently a *foedus*. Alcesimarchus, equally despondent, tries by means of oaths and protestations to secure Selenium, but is rebuffed by her supposed mother, the *meretrix* Melaenis. All these details may be paralleled in Roman elegy, but the happy ending of the play is ill adapted to elegiac treatment. The difficulties of your true elegist are never solved with such finality.

Another detail of the despairing lover's situation which is an echo of comedy is his involuntary return to the door of her who has rejected him (Prop. ii. 4, 4: dubio . . . . pede; ii. 25, 30; invitis ipse redit pedibus; Tib. ii. 5, 13: pes tamen ipse redit); cf. Terence, *Eunuch.* 46 ff. paraphrased by Horace (*Sat.* ii. 3, 260 ff.—here also love is a *morbus*, in the Stoic sense). It seems, therefore, that both

[1] Cf. Tib. ii. 3, 78; ii. 4, 1 ff.

[2] ii. 4 is counter-didaxis to certain friends who had suggested remedies.

the figure of the despairing lover and his hopeless precept, the incurability of love, were developed in comedy.[1]

So much has been written on the possible sources of Propertius i. 2 that I hesitate to enter the discussion.[2] Some points, however, may be urged. The thought of this graceful little elegy is in outline: Why seek adornment, my love? Your natural beauty needs no adornment (1–8). Behold the beauties of nature (9–14), and consider the heroines of old who, though seeking no adornment, won and were true to a single lover (15–24). Your charms will always hold me in thrall without any external aid (25–32).[3] The doctrine "beauty unadorned" is not preached sincerely by Propertius, for he realizes the girl's purpose in adorning herself; cf. vss. 23–26 and the emphasis on *illis*, i.e., *they* did not seek crowds of lovers, but *you* do. This proves that the description is that of a *meretrix*, a fact which is enforced by iv. 5, 55-56 (*lena's* precepts) which repeat the two opening lines of this elegy as typical of the stuff poured into a girl's ears by the self-seeking lover). The girl is, therefore, practicing that attention to personal adornment which was taught by the *lenae* in comedy, and the closest parallels to the elegy are found in comedy or in literature which received the motif directly or indirectly from comedy, e.g., Plautus, *Most.* i. 3, the famous toilet scene, in which the old *meretrix*-servant, Scapha, at first urges upon the loyal Philematium that very pursuit of "crowds of lovers" against which Propertius is covertly preaching: cf. *Most.* 188–90 (matronae non meretricium est unum inservire amantem), 195–203, etc., but at last, finding the girl true to Philolaches, to save herself and to flatter her mistress, she preaches the doctrine of beauty unadorned; cf. 250–92. She closes this part of her advice

[1] I have not dealt with other *remedia*—philters, magic, etc.—because they are not presented didactically except by Ovid. The sources of the *Remedia amoris* offer an interesting field of investigation. On the use of magic cf. Wilhelm *Ph.* LX (1901), 579 ff.

[2] Cf. Leo *Gött. Gelehrt. Anz.* (1898), p. 726; Gollnisch *Quaestt. elegiac.*, pp. 26–31; Wilhelm *Phil.* LX (1901), 579 ff. (on Tib. i. 8); Legrand *Rev. des ét. grec.*, p. 202; Hoelzer *op. cit.*

[3] Prop. ii. 18*b* has the same thought without, however, the implication of jealousy; cf. Tib. i. 8, 15 f. and the beautiful iv. 2 (not of a *meretrix*). Ovid *A.A.* iii. 257 ff. proceeds from the same thought—*cultus* is not necessary for the real beauties, though (*ibid.* 101–250) it is a very valuable aid to most *meretrices*, cf. *medicamina faciei.*

with a perfect broadside of *sententiae* (288–92) epitomizing the whole: purpura aetati occultandaest, aurum turpi mulieri . . . . pulcra mulier nuda erit quam purpurata pulcrior . . . . poste nequiquam exornata est bene, si morata est male. . . . . nam si pulcra est nimis ornatast; cf. *Poen.* 301–8.

These striking agreements between Plautus and Propertius clearly indicate that the motif came to Roman elegy from comedy, whether directly or indirectly. In Philostratus *Epp.* 22 (40) we have a letter which has the same thought as Propertius i. 2—except that there is no clear hint of jealousy—cf. especially ἡ δὲ καλὴ οὐδενὸς δεῖται τῶν ἐπικτήτων . . . . τὸ δ'ἀκόσμητον ἀληθῶς καλόν. The letter emphasizes the point—found alike in the *Mostellaria* and Ovid—that adornment serves especially to hide blemishes; cf. 36 (67). In Lucian, *Dialog. meretr.* vi. 3 Crobyle, a *lena*, telling how Lyra, a model *meretrix*, has succeeded so well, gives as one of the items: κατακοσμοῦσα ἑαυτὴν εὐπρεπῶς. Again in the Ἔρωτες (39–42) Lucian penetrates, like a second Ovid, into all the secrets of the feminine toilet, and the purpose of all this beautification is the same that is briefly hinted by Propertius. Lastly in Plautus, *Poen.* 210 ff., there is a long discussion of the same theme by Adelphasium and Anterastilis, who are about to go in search of lovers. A few quotations from this will suffice. Adelphasium professes to think that the toilet may be overdone and Anterastilis rejoins (233–35): miror equidem, soror, te istaec sic fabulari | quae tam callida et docta sis et faceta. | nam quom sedulo munditer nos habemus, | vix aegreque amatorculos invenimus, i.e., adornment is a necessary part of the art. Adelphasium agrees on the main point, but thinks that everything should have a limit: excess annoys men.[1] This last recalls Scapha's remarks (*Most.* 168–70). Stephanium's soliloquy (*Stich.* 744–47) is briefer, but to the same effect.[2]

The theme of adornment is presented didactically by Tibullus i. 8, 9–16, but the application is different. The passage is addressed to a youth who is vainly trying to win the favor of a girl whose

[1] Cf. Horace's *simplex munditiis* (i. 5).

[2] Comedy naturally poked much fun at the feminine propensity for adornment; cf. Aristoph. fr. 320K; Antiphanes, 148; Alexis, 98; Euboulus, 98; Plautus *Aulul.* 507 ff.; *Epid.* 222 ff., etc.

fancy is directed elsewhere, and Tibullus asserts that all his care is useless, although *she* pleases even without adornment. The same application may be found in *Anth. Pal.* v. 298, and the simple thought of the effect produced by beauty unadorned (of a girl), *ibid.* v. 25 and 259; cf. also 298, 299, and Ovid *A.A.* iii. 433–38 (a warning to girls to beware of the malé flirt with his fine toilets).

The evidence presented indicates at least that the ultimate sources of Propertius i. 2 are to be sought in comedy. In comedy we have found both the precept that adornment is essential to win lovers for the *meretrix* (this is the typical form) and also that real beauty accomplishes the same result without adornment. Both these principles appear in Ovid's *Handbook* and (also from comedy) the additional teaching that adornment is really meant for those who have some blemish to conceal. The epigrams of the *Anthology* contain the motif of beauty unadorned, but they do not combine it with its obvious purpose as we find it in comedy and in Propertius. In fact the epigrams have much closer connection with Tibullus i. 8 than with Propertius. Nowhere are the two motives connected with jealousy on the part of the writer as in Propertius. This is the chief elegiac touch—together with the assertion of devotion at the end of the poem. The list of heroines also (15–22) is a trait belonging rather to elegy. From the structural point of view the poem might very well be an expanded epigram. The first eight verses make a very pretty epigram as they stand, and the rest of the poem could very easily have grown out of such an epigrammatic suggestion.[1] But although many a poem of Catullus, Propertius, and Ovid can be readily explained as a padded epigram, we ought not to adopt the explanation in a case which presents such striking agreements with another genre.[2]

[1] This is the view of Leo *Pl.F.*, pp. 129 ff.; *G.G.A.* (1898), p. 726, and of Jacoby *op. cit.*

[2] Gollnisch (p. 31), while proving that Prop. i. 2 does not agree with epigram, nevertheless goes astray in pointing to Alexandrian elegy as the source. He compares Nonnus *Dionys.* 42, 74–88 (on Beroe who had a beauty ὑπερ φύσιν εὖρε and who rejects cosmetics). Since the rejection of cosmetics is a trait that does not fit the daughter of Venus, Nonnus must be following a poet who described a mortal in this way, i.e., expressed his own feeling; and the agreement with Prop. i. 2 and *Most.* i. 3 points to Alexandrian elegy. This is a characteristic argument and it can hardly be accepted unless it is proved that Nonnus never used the New Comedy—an assumption

Limits of space forbid the extension of this investigation to other cases in which the material is less full, but the evidence presented is sufficient to establish certain results which could hardly be modified in any essential way by the study of precepts for which few Greek parallels exist. Wherever the evidence is adequate it points to New Comedy as the ultimate source of the erotic teaching which appears in Roman elegy. Furthermore, there was often direct use of the New Comedy. The elegist assumes the rôle assigned in comedy to the *lena*, the *meretrix*, or the *adulescens*, and even the comic form of the rôle survives in Roman elegy (Prop. iv. 5; Ov. *A.* i. 8), where it is so presented that the poet represents the eavesdropping youth of the stage. The rôle therefore has two forms, of which one is merely the transfer of the comic form to an elegiac setting. The precepts also appear in two forms according as they represent the feminine attitude—the original form of comedy—or the masculine, in which they are adapted more completely to elegiac requirements. The erotic teaching of the elegists is thus a system in process of adaptation. This indicates a direct use of comedy by the Romans, and the influence is strengthened in several instances by the closer agreement of Roman elegy with New Comedy than with other Greek parallels.

The same form of argument may be used with reference to the relation of the later Greek parallels to the New Comedy. It is certain, for example, that Lucian used the New Comedy directly; it is not certain in any case (Aristaenetus, Alciphron, Philostratus, etc.) that the influence of comedy came indirectly through the medium of Alexandrian elegy. In short the interposition of Alexandrian elegy is not only unnecessary in order to explain the influence of comedy but is often an improbable explanation.[1]

The evidence derived from a study of the parallels is strengthened by some facts of literary history and by certain general considerations. From the very beginnings of Roman attempts to naturalize

which lies at the basis of the argument. Gollnisch refers to F. Mallet, *Quaestt. Propert.*, p. 86, Adn. 1, who infers from certain agreements between Nonnus and the epigrammatists that the former was a *sectator* of the Alexandrians. More proof is necessary.

[1] Careful investigation will establish this, I believe, for Philostratus and Aristaenetus at least.

Greek literature the influence of the Alexandrians went hand in hand with that of the early Greeks. No clearer example of this can be found than the work of Catullus. We think of him, and quite properly, as one of the *νεώτεροι*, but there was room in the receptive mind of Catullus—and this applies to most cultured Romans—for all that impressed him as excellent in any period of Greek literature. Although he adopted some of the literary tenets of Callimachus, he was no narrow sectarian, and we find him translating and adapting both Sappho and Callimachus. The same eclectic spirit characterizes the Augustan elegists and even Horace, and after all it was the Alexandrian insistence on niceties, not to say over-niceties, of form that distinguished the *νεώτεροι* rather than anything peculiar in the themes and content of their work. The close connection between Callimachus and Catullus allows us to detect no strain of erotodidaxis in the former.[1] The subjective-erotic note of Callimachus is confined to his epigrams and small lyrics. The same is true in general of Catullus.[2] Like Callimachus he chose the epigram and small lyric as the chief vehicles of his own passion, and the meagerness of his work in elegy and of the subjective-erotic element in these elegies (lxviii, lxxvi) together with the total lack of erotodidaxis have all the marks that should characterize the work of a pioneer who is attempting some advance over his model. Moreover, the theme of lxxvi, the Catullian elegy which is more nearly in the style of the Augustans than any other, is treated epigrammatically in lxxv and lxxii. Thus Catullus illustrates within his own work that relation between epigram and elegy—the former being the germ of the latter—which was later to assume such importance in the Augustans. This also marks his work as that of a pioneer.

The work of Parthenius in elegy and his connection with Gallus supply an additional argument of the same character. The *Ἀρήτη*

[1] This is true also of the fragments of Alexandrian elegy in general. Jacoby *op. cit.* has emphasized the same point in speaking of the subjective-erotic note. In the following paragraph I have used other arguments well expressed by Jacoby.

[2] Not, as Jacoby argues, completely true; for lxviii and lxxvi are subjective-erotic and the latter is an elegy rather than an epigram. The fact that it "stands among epigrams" (Jacoby) is of no importance since Catullus did not arrange the poems as we have them. Jacoby does not satisfactorily define the position of Catullus in elegy.

of Parthenius was, as Suidas tells us, an ἐπικήδειον in three books. It continued, therefore, the tradition which began with the Λύδη of Antimachus, so that as late as the time of Gallus the Greek poets were still writing a type of elegy quite different from that of the Augustans, and if they developed the Augustan type also we have no direct testimony of the fact. As Callimachus stands behind Catullus, so Parthenius stands behind Gallus, and there is no testimony that Gallus was didactic. In fact Ovid, *Tr.* ii. 445–68, seems to exclude Gallus from the rôle of erotic teacher which he assigns to both Tibullus and Propertius. Thus the gradual growth of this element in Roman elegy supplies us with an argument. There is no erotodidaxis in Catullian elegy, there was probably none in Gallus, it begins in Tibullus and Propertius, and is developed into a complete system by Ovid. Just as Ovid found the suggestions from which he developed the *Heroides* and the *Fasti* in his Roman predecessors, so he found there the elements of his great *Handbook of Love*—elements which he also had partly sketched in a tentative way in the *Amores*. But Ovid, as we have seen, reverted also to the didactic system of New Comedy. In this way the frequent references of Ovid and Propertius to Menander—especially to the *Thais*—find their natural explanation, and to that explanation I think that we must now return.[1]

Roman life and Roman character afford arguments which serve to strengthen the belief that the Roman elegists used the New Comedy directly. Menander was more familiar to the cultured Roman of the Augustan age and succeeding ages than any other Greek writer save Homer; cf. Quintil. i. 8, 5. The same authority would lead us to infer that Greek elegy was rarely taught in the schools. Ovid (*Tr.* ii. 369–70) substantiates the popularity of Menander:

> fabula iucundi nulla est sine amore Menandri,
> et solet hic pueris virginibusque legi.

The authors read in schools[2] were studied with great thoroughness, passages being learned by heart. The students thus became thor-

[1] Prop. ii. 6, 1 ff.; iii. 21, 27 ff.; iv. 5, 41 ff.; Ovid *A.* i. 15, 17 f.; *A.A.* iii. 331 ff., 604; *R.A.* 382 ff.; *Tr.* 639 f. Most of these passages are directly connected with some detail of the comic system of erotic teaching.

[2] On this subject cf. Friedlaender *Sittengesch.*[6] III, pp. 377 ff.

oughly familiar with the originals, but in addition the subject-matter of comedy and its stock characters, *leno*, *parasitus*, etc., were used to supply themes for rhetorical exercises (*suasoriae*) and poetic composition. Teachers were often poets, and poetic improvisation on the part of the students was encouraged. Such a system turned out many precocious poets: Catullus, Propertius, Ovid, and others. The case of Ovid is particularly enlightening because we have not only his own testimony (*Tr.* iv. 10) to his own precocity, but that of Seneca (*Controv.* ii. 2; ii. 10) that he was a *bonus declamator* whose rhetorical exercises were prose poems and that he borrowed from one of his teachers, Porcius Latro, many a sentence for his poetic compositions. Thus the characters and motives of comedy were bred into the very fiber of the Roman boy, and when he turned to elegiac composition, as he often did before he had finished his rhetorical training, it is highly improbable that he should have drawn the material of comedy only from Alexandrian elegy and not from the source with which he was most familiar. Even if he found that material in part already adapted to elegiac use by the Alexandrians, he could not have avoided making further adaptations and extensions.

That Roman tendency towards realism which is so marked in Propertius and Ovid and is not lacking in Tibullus has closer affinity with Menander than with Alexandrian elegy—at least as we know the latter. The truth with which Menander represented life even more than his perfection of style commended him to Roman taste. Why should they have contented themselves with those more or less diluted Menandrian motives, which they knew at least in epigram, when they were more familiar with the graphic originals? The "gilded youth" of Rome in the days of Catullus or Propertius lived much the same life as the indolent Greek of the Hellenistic Age. His erotic experience, as depicted by Propertius, Tibullus, and Ovid had already been recorded from life by the writers of comedy. When he attempted to record them over again, he found those writers more suggestive than all others. The result was a blend of literature and life. In our efforts to separate these elements today we can rarely attain sharpness of detail, and even in passages which are undoubtedly bookish probably the elegists themselves could not have traced every detail to its exact source among the many in

which they were steeped. When sources are so familiar, literary influence does not always operate consciously. At least their deference to woman is Roman, and the relatively high plane to which they elevate the love of woman has done more than anything else to ennoble that elegy in which, as Quintilian says, they "challenged the Greeks."

Thus by a combination of many things arose—more truly even than in Roman comedy—a genre that had not existed before, although nearly all the elements were to be found in Greek. In the combination, which is Roman, I have been led to the study of erotic teaching because in the developed elegiac form it is identical with the subjective-erotic element. If this brief outline adds any weight to the view that the Roman elegists took over the material of New Comedy directly and that an earlier adaptation of the same material by the Alexandrian elegists is improbable, I shall be content. Certainly erotic teaching is a striking characteristic of Augustan elegy and served, as I believe, to distinguish that elegy from the work of the Alexandrians as well as from that of Catullus and his contemporaries.

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THE IDENTITY OF THE CHILD IN VIRGIL'S *POLLIO:* AN AFTERWORD

By J. E. Church, Jr.

Under the title *The Identity of the Child in Virgil's Pollio*, which appeared in a recent number of the *University of Nevada Studies* (I, No. 2), the writer presented evidence to show that the Romans did not consider it contrary to their canon of taste to "prophesy" the sex of an unborn child.

Additional evidence, since gathered, not only supports the conclusion then reached but even indicates a deeply rooted tendency on the part of the Romans to discuss things prenatal.

The more important part of this evidence is furnished by Valerius Flaccus. In his *Argonautica*, Jason, while on his voyage to Colchis, tarries at Lemnos in wedlock with Hypsipyle, the youthful queen of a female people. The narrative in large essentials agrees with that of Apollonius Rhodius. But in the scene of parting, inspired evidently by the narrative of Apollonius, Valerius has deviated from his model so radically as to indicate a complete divergence of feeling.

This scene and the variations in its presentation can be indicated best by quoting from the authors themselves. Reference is made by both to an unborn child, but here the similarity ends.

The narrative of Apollonius is naturally Greek in spirit, but the manner of reference to the possible sex of the child is also modern:

Argonaut. A, 886–909:

ὣς δὲ καὶ Ὑψιπύλη ἠρήσατο χεῖρας ἐλοῦσα
Αἰσονίδεω, τὰ δέ οἱ ῥέε δάκρυα χήτει ἰόντος·
. . . . . .
μνώεο μὴν ἀπεών περ ὁμῶς καὶ νόστιμος ἦδη
Ὑψιπύλης· λίπε δ' ἥμιν ἔπος, τό κεν ἐξανύσαιμι
πρόφρων, ἦν ἄρα δή με θεοὶ δώωσι τεκέσθαι.'
Τὴν δ' αὖτ' Αἴσονος υἱὸς ἀγαιόμενος προσέειπεν·
'Ὑψιπύλη, τὰ μὲν οὕτω ἐναίσιμα πάντα γένοιτο
ἐκ μακάρων· τύνη δ' ἐμέθεν πέρι θυμὸν ἀρείω

ἴσχαν', ἐπεὶ πάτρην μοι ἄλις Πελίαο ἐκητι
ναιετάειν· μοῦνόν με θεοὶ λύσειαν ἀέθλων.
εἰ δ' οὔ μοι πέπρωται ἐς Ἑλλάδα γαῖαν ἱκέσθαι
τηλοῦ ἀναπλώοντι, σὺ δ' ἄρσενα παῖδα τέκηαι,
πέμπε μιν ἡβήσαντα Πελασγίδος ἔνδον Ἰωλκοῦ
πατρί τ' ἐμῷ καὶ μητρὶ δύης ἄκος, ἦν ἄρα τούσγε
τέτμῃ ἔτι ζώοντας, ἵν' ἄνδιχα τοῖο ἄνακτος
σφοῖσιν πορσύνωνται ἐφέστιοι ἐν μεγάροισιν.'

Delicacy of statement on the part of Hypsipyle regarding the possible birth of a child (898) and Jason's preference for a son (904 ff.) are the features of the passage.

However, in the version of Valerius the sex of the unborn child is assumed despite the natural uncertainty that pervades the narrative of Apollonius; for the Roman author represents Hypsipyle as pleading for the return of Jason in behalf of their unborn son, a second Jason:

Argonaut. ii, 422–25:

'I, memor, i, terrae, quae vos amplexa quieto
prima sinu; refer et domitis a Colchidos oris
vela per hunc utero quem linquis Iasona nostro.'
Sic ait, Haemonii labens in colla mariti.

Since Valerius was a contemporary of Martial, the latter is thereby cleared of the charge that he was "audax omnia perpeti" in writing his epigram to Domitian on an expected royal heir, for Valerius would scarcely have employed sex-prophesying even in a mythological poem, if general sentiment had been strongly opposed to such usage. Certainly no affront on the part of Martial was intended and it is probable that none was felt by Domitian.

Further evidence is furnished by Ovid, a contemporary, approximately, of Virgil himself. In the *Aeneid* (iv, 327–30) Virgil represents Dido as childless and regretful that she has borne no little Aeneas to recall his father's visage. But in the *Heroides* Ovid raises the story of the desertion of Dido to higher pathos by representing Dido as appealing to Aeneas to remain in behalf of her possible motherhood and the little unborn brother of Iulus:

vii, Dido Aeneae, 133–38:

> Forsitan et gravidam Didon, scelerate, relinquas,
> parsque tui lateat corpore clausa meo.
> Accedet fatis matris miserabilis infans
> et nondum nati funeris auctor eris,
> cumque parente sua frater morietur Iuli,
> poenaque conexos auferet una duos. . . . .

The sentiment of her plea resembles that of Hypsipyle's parting injunction to Jason as portrayed by Valerius.

The word *forsitan* (133) applies only to Dido's motherhood. Regarding the sex of the child, if born, no doubt (135–38) whatever is expressed by the poet.

In all of the evidence found thus far, a son, not a daughter, was the subject of prophecy. Does this mean that only sons were prophesied or that in the literary evidence extant only males and not females would suit the dramatic requirements in each instance? In the poems saluting royal heirs, such as the *Pollio*, and Martial's epigram, only male children could satisfy the political requirements; and in lyric as well as in epic poetry the human tendency to favor the male rather than the female would be strongly manifested.[1] But if we may draw an analogy from modern usage, despite the leading place that the male child held in the esteem of the Roman parents—

> Est tibi sitque, precor, natus, qui mollibus annis
> in patrias artes erudiendus erat[2]—

the hope that the unborn babe might be a girl to refine the ruggedness of the boys must have found utterance in many a household. Yet such utterance would rarely find a place in verse.[3] Since, therefore, the exigencies of the situation—literary or political or personal—caused the writer to prophesy the male sex in every instance recorded, this so-called prophesying was practically a stereotyped form, void of all the hazard associated with the genuine act.

[1] For this reason it is safe to assume that the word *quartum* employed in the epitaph by Trebius Basileus to his deceased wife (quoted in the original paper) is a substantive rather than an adverb and in gender masculine, not common, and refers to a fourth son rather than to a fourth child. This view is still further confirmed by Apuleius' treatment of the *Cupid and Psyche* myth (see pp. 82 ff.).

[2] *Heroides* i, Penelope Ulixi, 111–12.

[3] The father's love for his daughter and his ambition to possess a son to perpetuate

That, however, Valerius did not prophesy twins in accordance with the variant tradition adopted by Ovid (*Heroides* vi, Hypsipyle Iasoni, 119 ff.) and by Statius (*Thebaid* v, 608, 712 ff.) possibly shows the bounds which the poet might not overstep without exposing himself to the charge of lacking a sense of humor even by his fellow Romans. To prophesy one male child was evidently permissible, but to predict the unusual twins would invite derision.

Valerius may, however, have preferred the older tradition of one son, as may also Apollonius, irrespective of the constraint imposed by the nature of his narrative. Be this as it may, Ovid chose the variant tradition of twin offspring, but he postponed until after the birth the announcement of its dual nature with evident heightening of the power of Hypsipyle's appeal and increase in the dramatic effectiveness of the poem. Whether he was primarily constrained to abandon his previous method of prophesying the nature of the offspring by his sense of its absurdity or by his innate feeling for dramatic adaptation is uncertain.

Hypsipyle's appeal is represented as being made after news has reached her of Jason's safe return to Thessaly and evident abandonment of herself. She recalls the scene of their parting at Lemnos and of his promise to her. In this parting scene he, not she, refers to the coming offspring, but his thought is couched in general terms:

Heroides vi, Hypsipyle Iasoni, 60–62—

> 'Vir tuus hinc abeo, vir tibi semper ero;
> quod tamen e nobis gravida celatur in alvo,
> vivat, et eiusdem simus uterque parens!'

The great good fortune of bearing twins is reserved for the mother to offer Jason as additional dower to regain his favor:

his name appear side by side in the following epitaph. The widow addresses the dead, and the dead replies.

Bücheler, *Carmina Latina Epigraphica* 92, 4 ff.:

> Moschis tua te salutat et D[iodorus tuus
> et blanda dulcis pupa, delic[ium tuum
> et quem tu tuis manibus nu[per sustuleras puer.
> . . . . . .
> 'Have casta coniunx et m[ei serva memoriam,
> have mi Diodore amice fra[terque et parens,
> . . . . . .
> have pupa blanda, anima m[ea, tuque have puer
> quem nuper pararam ut hab[erem heredem nominis.'

vss. 119–22—

Nunc etiam peperi: gratare ambobus, Iason!
Dulce mihi gravidae fecerat auctor onus.
Felix in numero quoque sum prolemque gemellam
pignora Lucina bina favente dedi.

And for her rival, Medea, Hypsipyle also wishes sons—as many as she herself has borne—that Medea's woe, which she now pronounces against her, may resemble her own:

vss. 155–56—

utque ego destituor coniunx materque duorum,
a totidem natis orba sit illa viro.

The attainment of this climax may have allured Ovid to choose the tradition which he has handled so skilfully. In the pseudo-prophecy of two sons for Medea—the traditional number—appears again the easy attitude of the Romans toward the prediction of future offspring.

From the above evidence and that presented in the original paper is derived the second fact, which bears upon the date of the publication of the *Pollio*, viz., that the leading authors of Rome freely wrote of unborn sons, not alone in the ideal situations of epic poetry but in national and society verse. Catullus, Virgil, Ovid, Martial, Valerius Flaccus, and probably Trebius Basileus represent a period of possibly two centuries during which this tendency remained unchanged. The long continuance of this tendency—offensive though the tendency be to Anglo-Saxon taste—draws one inevitably to the conclusion that this reference to unborn children was merely the out-cropping into literature of a usage which had its foundation in the common people.

The existence of such a folk usage is verified and its characteristics are illustrated in Apuleius' romance of *Cupid and Psyche*, which has been suggested by Professor E. W. Martin as furnishing a striking parallel to the *Pollio* itself. The tale is Greek, but some of its features are Roman, as is likewise the language in which it is expressed. In this tale the hopes of parents are embodied in the ideals of Cupid and Psyche, and the congratulations of kinsmen in the pretended adulation of Psyche's sisters.

Cupid plans and Psyche wonders in her heart:

Metamorphoses v, 11: Nam et familiam nostram propagabimus, et hic adhuc infantilis uterus gestat nobis infantem alium, si texeris nostra secreta silentio, divinum, si profanaveris, mortalem.

That this child is regarded as a son seems evident from Psyche's expressed hope that it may resemble its father: v, 13—"sic in hoc saltem parvulo cognoscam faciem tuam . . . .",[1] and particularly from the flattery of the sisters that two such beautiful parents must needs produce a Cupid, as shown in the passage quoted below. Family pride and interest are realistically portrayed:

v, 14: Psyche, non ita ut pridem parvula, et ipsa iam mater es. Quantum, putas, boni nobis in ista geris perula; quantis gaudiis totam domum nostram hilarabis? O nos beatas, quas infantis aurei nutrimenta laetabunt! qui si parentum, ut oportet, pulchritudini responderit, prorsus Cupido nascetur.

But notwithstanding the fond hopes of the parents, in the fulness of time there was born to Cupid and Psyche, not the son desired, but a daughter, whom, says Apuleius, people call Voluptas:

vi, 24: et nascitur illis maturo partu filia, quam Voluptatem nominamus.

The unexpected conclusion of the romance is probably due to the fact that the author was expanding an earlier myth in which the Roman deity Voluptas[2] was associated as daughter with the Greek

[1] On this point see also Catullus' *Epithalamium of Vinia and Manlius*—

Sit suo similis patri
Manlio et facile insciels
noscitetur ab omnibus
et pudicitiam suae
matris indicet ore.
—lxi, 217-21—

in which the wish is expressed that the child may be his father's counterpart and bear in his face his mother's purity.

Though such evidence is not conclusive, for facial resemblance is not necessarily confined to similar sexes, nor did the Romans so judge (see Büch. *Carm. Lat. Epigr.* 42, v. 1: "Mulier ferebat filium similem sui," and Apuleius' reference to inherited beauty, *Met.* v. 14, quoted below) yet the reference to the unborn child as a Cupid removes any doubt on the subject, for Cupids have ever been regarded as males from the Alexandrian period, when the Cupid *motif* attained its prime, until the present day—Chaucer *House of Fame* I, 137:

Hir dowves, and daun Cupido,
Hir blynde sone . . . .

Dickens *Dombey and Son* V: "Is he not a Cupid, Sir?"

The term seems never to have represented a type of beauty regardless of sex, as do apparently the epithets "cherub" and "angel."

[2] Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 23: Cupidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinae Veneris vocabula consecrata sunt. . . . .

divinities Cupid and Psyche, and felt himself constrained to accept the tradition without essential variation. However, the ambition to possess a son, which forms one of the elements of human interest in the romance, is the author's own,[1] and to judge from the naïveté with which he inserts it, no incongruity was felt to exist in the combination.

The persistence of this folk usage into modern times has been verified by Professor S. B. Doten, who recalls a conversation with Luigi della Piazza, formerly an Italian peasant, in which American prudery was the subject of criticism by the latter. He declared that not only was the promise of a child followed by congratulations to the mother on the part of her acquaintances, both male and female, but that accompanying the congratulations was the hope expressed that the child would be a boy.

It seems safe, therefore, to assume that the *Pollio* was in full harmony with the national spirit; that its anticipation was the nation's anticipation, its preference for a male child the nation's preference, and its prediction the nation's prediction also; and that, therefore, the collapse of the hopes voiced in the *Pollio* brought the nation a sense of disappointment rather than a sense of the ludicrous at the poet's failure. In short, the shock caused the Romans was no greater than that recently caused their lineal descendants, the Italians, who had set their hearts upon having a *bambino* as heir apparent to their throne, but whose hopes were dashed by the announcement that their keenly anticipated prince was a princess. Since Virgil wrote the *Pollio* before the birth of Julia, I can see no reason why he should have withheld the publication of the poem until the birth and then finally, when the memory of the event had faded, have brought it forth quietly as an expression of the ideal. It seems rather to have been a salutatory poem quite in keeping with the times.

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[1] No other child than Voluptas is mentioned in literature, nor probably does any appear in art. The representation of Psyche holding a small Eros child like a baby to her bosom and apparently nursing it (Brit. Mus., *Cat.* No. 825; Furtwängler, *Ant. Gem.* Bd. III, 281) is probably a fanciful variation of the Cupid and Psyche *motif*. At least, regarding a similar representation (in the Kestner Collection at Hannover, Furtwängler, Taf. XLII, 36) of Psyche holding a sleeping Eros child to her bosom no question can be raised, since the quiver and bow are hanging from a tree near by.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A POSSIBLE OCCURRENCE OF THE NAME ALEXANDER IN THE BOGHAZ-KEUI TABLETS

Scholars are awaiting with great expectancy the publication of the Hittite tablets found by Professor Winckler in his excavations at Boghaz-Keui. A preliminary report has been given in *Mitteilungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft* (1907), No. 35. The writer was especially interested in the new personal names furnished by these tablets; see a paper on "Some Hittite and Mitannian Personal Names," *The American Journal of Semitic Languages* XXVI (January, 1910). At the time this article was written it did not seem to him that the new names offered any additional points of contact between Hittite-Mitannian names and those "pre-Greek" names collected and discussed by Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache*, but further study has convinced him that this conclusion was due to a too hasty examination of the material. Names like Akissi, Sissi, Sizzi, Kanissi, Papassi, Kirbassi (*AJSL* XXVI, 97), certainly show the same ending as the names with the *s*-suffix in Kretschmer, *op. cit.*, 311 f. So the name of Arnuanta, "the great king, son of Dudḫalia," Winckler *MDOG*, No. 35, 29, is clearly made up of the element *arnu-*, cf. Kretschmer *op. cit.*, 406, and the well-known ending *nt* or *nd*. For this ending in personal names see especially pp. 304, 364 of Kretschmer's work.

Of peculiar interest is the name of Alakshandu, king of Arzawa, contemporary of King Ḫattusil of the Hittite state (*ca.* 1300 B.C.). This name has the common *nd* ending, but the element *Alaksh* is, so far as the writer can discover, without any parallel either among the large number of names Kretschmer has published or among the Hittite-Mitannian names now known. Is it perhaps the well-known Greek name Alexander as written in cuneiform by a scribe who was familiar with names ending in *nd*?

Alaksh would be a good cuneiform rendering of Ἀλεξ; cf. the cuneiform of Ἀρταξέρξης, Ar-taḫ-sha-as-su or Ar-tak-sha-as-su, Hilprecht and Clay, Vol. IX, *Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, 50–51. It is true the Babylonian scribes who lived a thousand years later, and who probably had come in contact with Greek names more or less frequently, rendered Alexander by A-lik-sa-an-dar (cf. Tallqvist *Neubabylonisches Namenbuch* 5), which is a more accurate rendering. This form does not, however, make it improbable that *Alaksh* may have been a rendering of Ἀλεξ, as anyone acquainted with cuneiform knows.

It is only natural that a scribe who was familiar with names in *nd*

should have written Ἀλέξανδρος as Alakshandu. The reverse process is not uncommon later when the Greeks changed the ending *nd* into *-ανδρος*. A few instances cited from Kretschmer, *op. cit.*, will illustrate this: Μυρίανδος, later form Μυρίανδρος, p. 309; Telendus, Telandrus, Τύμανδος, Τύμανδρος, p. 308; Ὀρόμανδ(ρ)ος, p. 309. This raises the question at once whether many of the place-names in Asia Minor, as well as the personal names, which later ended in *-ανδρος*, did not originally end in *nd*. So Μαίανδρος, Σκάμανδρος, Ἄντανδρος, Ἄλκανδρος, etc., may perhaps originally have been Μαίανδος, etc. That Alexander is not, however, to be put among these is evident from the fact that the name is composed of good Greek elements. We know that the dynasty ruling the Mitannians from *ca.* 1450–1350 B.C. was Aryan; cf. the names Saushshatar, Artatama, Artashumara, Shutarna, etc. (Meyer "Das erste Auftreten der Arier in der Geschichte," *Sitzungsberichte d. kgl. preuss. Akad.* [1908] 14 f.).

If this suggested interpretation of the name is correct, we now have the name Alexander attested for the date *ca.* 1300 B.C., which cannot be far from the time when Paris was called the "defending man" at Troy.

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NOTE ON [PLUTARCH] *STROMAT.* 2

ἀπεφήνατο δὲ (Ἀναξίμανδρος) τὴν φθορὰν γίνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν γένεσιν ἐξ ἀπείρου αἰῶνος ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων αὐτῶν.

Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*[2] 62, n. 2) refers to the words ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων αὐτῶν as possibly supporting his view of Anaximander's innumerable worlds as coexistent, saying "It would be a very strange phrase to use of a succesession of single worlds." With the question which Burnet is there debating I am not now concerned; but I quite agree with him that the phrase is strange—equally strange, I should say, on either view. In a word, I believe that πάντων αὐτῶν is impossible, being in fact a conflate text, where the choice lies between πάντων and αὐτῶν. If we read ἀνακυκλουμένων αὐτῶν the text is clear: it means that at stated intervals from eternity φθορά succeeds γένεσις, and vice versa. This is the familiar κύκλος γενέσεως, in the laxer sense, which is common to almost all Greek philosophers. But by certain schools, notably the Pythagoreans and the Stoics, a stricter κύκλος γενέσεως was taught, according to which all things come round again after the expiration of a cosmic year *in statum quo ante*, even down to trivial and seemingly accidental details. This was variously called ἀνακύκλησις, ἀποκατάστασις, or παλιγγενεσία. It seems obvious that the reading ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων alludes to this doctrine, and is due to someone who attributed it to Anaximander, doubtless having in mind the passage quoted from him by Simplicius *in Phys.* 24, 18: (ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς

οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι) κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Since we know that Simplicius owed this quotation to Theophrastus, to whom our passage also is to be referred, we must raise the question whether Theophrastus wrote *πάντων* or *αὐτῶν*. What we know of the manner of Theophrastus, who proceeded in the spirit of Aristotle, might well incline us to the view that he would have interpreted *τὸ χρεών* and *τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν* as implying *ἀνακύκλησις* and that he might consequently have written *ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων*. This view might be supported by another statement which goes back to Theophrastus, Hippol. *Ref.* i, 6, 1: *λέγει δὲ χρόνον ὡς ὡρισμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς.* Here we should perhaps read *ὡρισμένον* for *ὡρισμένης;* cf. Simplicius *in Phys.* 24.4 (speaking of Heraclitus) *ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τάξιν τινὰ καὶ χρόνον ὡρισμένον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μεταβολῆς κατά τινα εἱμαρμένην ἀνάγκην.* Since this also comes from Theophrastus, commenting on expressions of Heraclitus very similar to those of Anaximander, we have ample reason for holding that he might have written *πάντων*, meaning to attribute to Anaximander the doctrine of *ἀνακύκλησις;* but we cannot close our eyes to the possibility that, while Theophrastus might have done so, the substitution of *πάντων*, assuming that the original reading was *αὐτῶν*, might equally well have been made by someone else who interpreted Anaximander in the same way. And it is to this latter possibility that I incline, because, waiving the general considerations which have been above set forth, *αὐτῶν* seems better suited to the specific context. I should therefore bracket *πάντων*. To the larger question as to the proper interpretation of Anaximander I hope soon to return in another connection.

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XENOPHON'S *Memorabilia* IV. 2. 10: *γνωμονικός*

Σω.: Ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι; γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ.

The use of this rather peculiar word here—so peculiar indeed as sometimes to have been questioned—seems to have been understood only from one point of view, the more serious-minded, of course. Its choice was really determined by a pun so frank and obvious that it would seem it could not have been overlooked, and yet an examination of some two score commentaries, translations, special and general lexicons, etc., does not show any hint of it, and if it has been remarked anywhere, it certainly does not belong as yet to the commonplaces of Xenophontean interpretation.

Everyone has seen that the serious meaning of the word has reference to the *σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας* of § 9, which Euthydemos has been engaged in collecting, and it has been translated accordingly, most commonly

with the phrase "magno iudicio hominem," or its equivalent. The adjective γνωμονικὸς may however also be derived from γνώμων in its senses *norma* or carpenter's square, or index or style of a sundial, common enough usages, as the lexicons show. The humor consists in the selection of just such a word as in this special connection (speaking of master-builders) means both "a wise man" and "a man of rule and square," and such a playful conceit is peculiarly appropriate to the tone of gentle irony in which Socrates handles Euthydemos. The sentence might then be roughly paraphrased (though the pun in English sounds rather far-fetched), if γνώμας in § 9 be translated somewhat familiarly "saws": "You're not thinking of becoming a master-builder are you? for a knowledge of *saws* would come in handy in this profession too."

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NOTE ON XENOPHANES FR. 18 (DIELS) AND ISOCRATES *PANEGYRICUS* 32

οὗτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.

These lines are quoted by Stobaeus (*Eclog.* 1. 8. 2) with many others to the same purport in illustration of the commonplace that Time is the great discoverer—"all precious things discovered late to those that seek them issue forth." That is probably all that they mean. As the Greek stands, there seems to be no emphasis on θεοὶ and no rationalistic intention of opposing the *gifts* of the gods to the independent search of men. To Greek feeling the gods give us also what we find. The extreme statement of this view appears in the (presumably spurious) line from Epicharmus' Χρυσογόνου Πολιτεία (Diels fr. 57. 7):

οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τέχναν τιν' εὗρεν,
ὁ δὲ θεὸς τοπάν.

Jebb in his *Bologna Ode* has expressed the Greek feeling precisely:

'Ασκληπιὸς . . . .
κλέος ἄλλοις μὲν πορών,
αὐτόματον δ' ἑτέρῳ (Galvani)
συνέμεν νεύρων φύσιν,
τὰν θεοὶ κρύψαν πάρος·

Isocrates, it is true, in a passage not to my knowledge cited in this connection leaves the door open for either hypothesis, *Panegyr.* 32: ἦν . . . . ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς σκοπῶμεν εὑρήσομεν ὅτι τὸν βίον οἱ πρῶτοι φανέντες ἐπὶ γῆς

οὐκ εὐθὺς οὕτως ὥσπερ νῦν ἔχοντα κατέλαβον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρὸν αὐτοὶ συνεπορίσαντο. τίνας οὖν χρὴ μᾶλλον νομίζειν ἢ δωρεὰν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν λαβεῖν ἢ ζητοῦντας αὐτοὺς λαβεῖν; κ.τ.λ.

It is possible that Isocrates had Xenophanes in mind. But even in Isocrates there is no probability of rationalistic polemic. The alternative is merely one of his devices for amplification—*περιβολή*—of style. He goes on to say that on either supposition those most likely to succeed are *τοὺς . . . . πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐσεβέστατα διακειμένους*. In the Epicureans and in the fifth book of Lucretius we do find this rationalistic opposition of unaided human discovery to divine bestowal. But the presumptions are strongly against attributing it to an early Greek writer. Professor Gomperz, then, is I think misled by his well-known partiality for the pre-Socratics when he says of our passage (*Greek Thinkers* I, 162): "Here a note of strict scientific reason is unmistakably struck; and it invests the sage of Colophon with a new and by no means insignificant feature." And as often happens, the fanciful interpretation is supported by a slight infidelity in the translation. He is so intent upon the desired meaning that he unconsciously translates as if Isocrates' *αὐτοί* or *αὐτόνς* were in the text (the English translation substantially reproduces his German; italics mine): "Never the Gods showed mortals everything from the beginning, But they search *for themselves* until they discover the better."

I make the point with no captious intention. The temptation to read into the pre-Socratics just a little more than the evidence warrants is very strong. Yet we must resist it if we are to have not only interesting and "suggestive" but true histories of early Greek thought. Professor Gomperz seems to me to yield to the temptation again when on p. 164 he makes Xenophanes say (fr. 34 Diels; italics mine): "No one has attained complete certainty in respect to the gods and *to that which I call universal nature*, nor will anyone ever attain it. Nay, even if a man happened to light on the truth, he would not know that he did so, for appearance is spread over all things."

The attempt to represent the pre-Socratics as systematic skeptics was long ago disposed of in the sensible words of Cicero's *Academica* ii. 14 (Reid): "isti physici raro admodum cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente incitati . . . . abstrusa esse omnia." There is still less warrant I think for trying to make out that Xenophanes was a conscious precursor of positivism and that he anticipated the modern scientists' insistence on "verification." Professor Gomperz, however, salutes Xenophanes' skeptical ejaculation as an "immortal maxim," and later (p. 305) compares it as a "treasure of science" with the attack on hypotheses in the Hippocratic treatise on *Ancient Medicine* ii. 1. 3, finding in both an emphasis on the "significance of verification" which I cannnot discover in either.

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APULEIUS *METAMORPHOSES* II. 29

In the course of Thelyphron's story the narrator describes the return to life of a corpse: ". . . . cuncta curiosis oculis arbitrabar, iam tumore pectus extolli, iam salubris vena pulsari, iam spiritu corpus impleri" (p. 48. 25 Helm). The commentators offer no parallels to the phrase *salubris vena*, but Oudendorp explains it as "'arteria,' quod eius pulsu totius corporis *salubris* vel *insalubris* dispositio exploretur." Elsewhere (x. 2=p. 237. 25 H.) Apuleius is content to say: "heu medicorum ignarae mentes, quid *venae pulsus*, quid coloris intemperantia," etc. To anybody who is familiar with the author's excessive fondness for symmetry it will seem strange that a rather obvious correction has not, so far as I can discover, been suggested. Should not the passage read: "iam tumore pectus extolli, iam *salebris*[1] vena pulsari, iam spiritu corpus impleri"? For *salebra* in Apuleius, cf. *Metam.* i. 26 ("incerta verborum salebra balbuttire," p. 24. 11 H.), *Flor.* 21 ("salebras orbitarum," p. 42.4 H.). For the phrase *salebris vena pulsari* cf. Ovid, *Metam.* x. 289 (the story of Pygmalion's animated statue): "corpus erat! *saliunt* temptatae pollice *venae*."

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[1] Salebris > sala*b*ris > salubris may indicate the process of corruption; cf. Helm's edition of the *Florida*, praefatio, p. xliii. The infinitives are interpreted by Helm as "historical"; earlier editors indicate this more clearly by printing a period after *arbitrabar*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ammiani Marcellini Rerum Gestarum Libri Qui Supersunt. Recensuit rhythmiceque distinxit CAROLUS U. CLARK. Vol. I, Libri XIX–XXV. Accedunt tabulae quinque. Berolini apud Weidmannos 1910. Pp. xi+387.

Eduard Norden in his well-known book *Die antike Kunstprosa* (II, 650) calls for *eine genaue statistische Würdigung des Ammian, die ebenso wie eine gute Ausgabe ein dringendes Bedürfnis ist.* The second of these *desiderata* is surely fulfilled in the present edition. Professor Clark has devoted some ten years to the task. His original plans so interested Traube and Mommsen that these scholars induced the Royal Academy of Berlin to grant a subsidy for the preparation of the edition. Traube, and after the latter's lamented death, Heraeus, assisted the editor in his work, and Mommsen, Novák, Petschenig, and others have contributed emendations, but the credit for the inception of the plan and its execution belongs to Professor Clark.

Professor Clark has studied the sixteen MSS of Ammianus known to exist, collated the most important entirely and the less important in part; the all-essential Codex Fuldensis (Vatican 1873 *s.* ix=V) he collated twice and in some places several times, and photographed it entire. The problem of the relation of the MSS, a subject with which he dealt in his dissertation, *The Text-Tradition of Ammianus Marcellinus* (New Haven, 1904), is briefly sketched here, and will be set completely forth in Vol. II. Next to V, the oldest MS is, or rather was, the Hersfeldensis (=M) of which six sheets were found and published in 1876. It was not a copy of V, as some have thought, but descended independently from the one ancient MS of Ammianus which came down to the Middle Ages and which was transcribed in Germany, by a writer using the *scriptura Scottica.* From this latter MS, V and M were copied. A copy of M was used by Gelenius for his edition in 1533, but this copy is lost and, unfortunately, no other exists. As all the later MSS are descended directly from V, the editor rightly bases his text on V alone, except where the evidence of M may be inferred from Gelenius. After Clark's discussion, there can be no doubt that this is the correct method of procedure, or that the material on which a critical judgment must be based is accurately assembled in the present edition.

This critical method is simple to describe, most difficult to apply. Restricted to only one sure MS source, and that disfigured by gaps and monstrous errors, an editor of Ammianus is driven to conjectural emendation

if he would make a readable text. Here he must reckon with the many emendations in the later MSS and those of scholars from the Renaissance to the present day. Clark has followed the course prescribed by Gelenius, midway between the Scylla of rash alteration and the Charybdis of excessive conservatism, only with greater conscientiousness and skill and with a complete possession of the facts. Some 500 new emendations, nearly two-fifths proposed by the editor himself, the rest by the scholars who assisted him, have been introduced into the text, and double the number appear in the apparatus. The apparatus is conveniently divided into two parts, the upper part giving the variants in the one real source, V, the lower part giving the variants in the inferior MSS and conjectures. The reader is warned by italics in the text when conjectures depart considerably from the evidence of V, but the page is not cluttered with these and other symbols of scrupulousness.

Opinions are found to differ as to readings adopted in this passage or that, but the general excellence and uniformity of the text are obvious. Among notable conjectures introduced a very few may be mentioned:

xiiii 6, 6: "per omnes tamen †quotque sunt partesque terrarum ut domina [i.e., Roma] suscipitur." So V. Miss Seguine, a pupil of Professor Clark's, emended the unintelligible *quotque* for excellent paleographical reasons to *quot orae*, and thereby restored a phrase of Cicero's: "quot orae sunt partesque terrarum" (*Balb.*9). This admirable emendation appears on p. xi with the errata.

xiiii 9, 3: "Gallus is prodded *stimulis reginae* [who was behind the curtain] *exertantis ora*" [Novák and Heraeus; cf. *Aen.* III 425 *ora exsertantem; aura V, aurem vulg.*, which latter is certainly ridiculous in the situation].

xiiii 11, 11: "adulabili sermone periuriis admixto" (*Clark*, periis *V*, seriis *vulg.*).

xv 4, 9: "Alamanni . . . . ferocius incedentes [*vulg.*, incidentes V] secuto die [*Clark*, se cotidie V, cotidie *vulg.*] adimente matutina nebula lucem . . . . discurrebant."

xx 4, 17: "maximoque contentionis fragore probrosis [*Clark*; probro, ro *added in erasure by sec. hand*, s *being there before;* probro ⟨et⟩ *vulg.*] conuiciis Caesar adsentire coactus est." Here is one of many instances where we learn for the first time what the evidence of V really is; the first hand, apparently, had *probos*.

A decidedly new feature of the edition is the punctuation, commas indicating not pauses in the sense but rhythmical cadences. The rhythmical principles of Ammianus are, according to Professor Clark, very simple. His system, which is observed not only in the sentence but in the clause, is entirely accentual, does not reckon elision, and tallies essentially with the mediaeval *cursus planus, tardus,* and *velox*. This account differs from the statement of Norden (*op. cit.* II, 649) who evidently gives quantity consideration and assumes the *ditrochaeus* as a possible ending, and from the state-

ment of A. C. Clark (*The Cursus in Mediaeval and Vulgar Latin*, Oxford, 1910, p. 11) who speaks of the "mixture of metre and rhythm" in Ammianus, though he finds his cadences more accentual than those of St. Jerome. Further proof of the editor's views would be interesting. One who is heartily converted to the method might push it farther still. Thus in xiiii 9, 3: "Proinde die funestis interrogationibus praestituto, imaginarius iudex equitum resedit magister," a comma after *iudex* seems possible, and is indeed an aid to the sense. The editor puts his theory into practice by emending certain final words *cursus causa*. Many of these changes are unnecessary if the *ditrochaeus* is permitted as an ending in itself besides its frequent appearance at the end of the *cursus velox*. And why should not Ammianus be allowed a bit of license here and there? In xx. 4, 22 after *super salute principis* Clark adds *novi* (= ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ –). But just above, § 21, he puts a comma after *minitantes nudatis gladiis*, which surely ends a clause and surely is rhythmically the same as *super salute principis*. To be sure, in the list of errata (p. xi) the sign of corruption, †, is added after *gladiis*, but that will not checkmate a determined opponent of the theory. Both phrases might even be conformed to one of the varieties of the *cursus velox* which Professor Clark allows (⏑ – – ⏑ – ⏑ – –), if the accents of *nudatis* and *salute* are not too strong. On the next page (xx. 5, 7) a *ditrochaeus* is apparently recognized—*neque civilis quisquam iudex*—but here as in other places the editor would presumably take the second *u* in *quisquam* as vocalic (see p. VII), a solution that does not tally with the ordinarily accepted views of the development of *qu* in later Latin. Greek names are sometimes accented in the Latin way (*transmissis sollemniter Tigride*, xx. 6, 1) but almost always, says the editor, in the Greek way (e.g., parta regna Persidis, xxiiii. 7.3). Still, one might class with the variety of the *cursus velox* already noticed xxiii, 6.73: *in* penitissima parte Persidos, and if so, find the latter part of this rhythm in *regna Persidis*. Nor is it difficult to discover appropriate *clausulae*, not recognized in the edition, which end in the *ditrochaeus* or in ⏑ – ⏑ – –. Cf. xx, 6.6: *ad quam conversa plebe dimicabatur artissime*. Many ablative absolutes as short as this one are reckoned as *clausulae* in the text, or if a longer one is desired, cf. xxiiii, 7.4: *et tamquam funesta face Bellonae subiectis ignibus exuri cunctas iusserat naves*. The reviewer will be pardoned for expressing skepticism on a subject about which we really know very little as yet, and for hoping that even a writer of the decadence may be credited with the rhythmic principles which Cicero professed (*Or.* 220): "nec tamen haec ita sunt arta et constricta ut ea cum velimus laxare nequeamus." But this is a question of details, which it is premature to consider now; the subject as a whole will be presented soon in the dissertation of Professor Clark's pupil, Mr. A. M. Harmon. At all events, future editors of rhythmical prose will have to give good reasons for not following the method adopted here. The new use of the comma does not interfere

with the sense, and helps rather than hinders the reader. Only a few markings really disturb, as xv. 8.5: *Adsistimus apud vos—optimi rei publicae defensores,—causae*, etc. Perhaps parentheses would be better here, and throughout the text the comma might well be placed after rather than within the parenthesis.

The second volume, which the editor promises shortly, will contain elaborate indices, a discussion of the MSS and their interrelation, and a section on paleography. It will complete a truly monumental work. No American before has published an edition of the entire remains of an ancient author, based on a first-hand knowledge of all the MS evidence available and presenting this evidence in a commodious and final form.

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Die Ilias und Ihre Quellen. Von DIETRICH MÜLDER. Berlin: Weidmann, 1910. x+372 pp. M. 10.

Here is another book on Homer, a book of nearly four hundred pages of absolutely new and original matter. Indeed the author is so original that he does not quote a single modern scholar, except himself. The results of Homeric scholarship from Wolf to Fick are cast aside. *Kleine Lieder, Urilias, Flickpoet, Bearbeiter*, and the *Aeolic Homer* are summarily dismissed and the reader is invited "sich frei zu machen von der ungeheuren Last der Tradition und vorläufig die wirklichen oder vermeintlichen Errungenschaften unserer Homerforschung mit mir prinzipiell und konsequent zu negieren" (p. 4).

The author seeks to establish the following eight theses:

1. The *Iliad* is a unity, composed according to a single plan.

2. The undoubted difficulties connected with the theory of unity are due to the material in which the poet worked.

3. The *Iliad* belongs, not at the beginning, but at the end of a period of rich literary development.

4. The literature of this period forms the sources (*Quellen*) of the *Iliad*.

5. These sources are not songs (*Lieder*) in the sense of Lachmann, nor indeed songs in any other sense.

6. These sources belong in but small part to the Trojan cycle.

7. A large part of the work of Homer consisted in connecting the non-Trojan with the Trojan cycle.

8. Such a task could not have been performed by chance, by organic development, nor by a compiler (*Bearbeiter*), but demanded the creative poet.

Mülder then undertakes to arrive at the sources of the *Iliad* by a careful study of the *Iliad* itself:

Homer set for himself the task of creating an epic on a universal basis, an epic in which all the Greek world should take a common part, in which all should have a share in the hearer's sympathies, hence the conception of a foreign war.

The sources for his knowledge and for the traditions of that early age were poems dealing with single tribes or divisions of the Greeks. The Theban-Argive epic which told of an attack on a walled city furnished the conception and the basis for the attack on Troy; a poem dealing with Thessalian raids on the shores of Asia Minor gave the conception of an oversea expedition and furnished the details for the forays of the *Iliad;* an expedition for plunder could not make the necessary appeal to the sense of justice, so another poem dealing with the rape of a beautiful woman supplied the moral pretext for the war; this motive was too slight to call on the services of such remote chieftains as Achilles and Odysseus, so its cogency is only vaguely assumed. A Rhodian-Lycian epic told of Tlepolemus, the Rhodians, Sarpedon, Glaucus, and the Lycians; a Pylian-Epeian epic told of Nestor and the funeral games held in honor of Amarynkeus, the pattern for the games in honor of Patroclus; the story of Niobe and the loss of her children furnished the hint for the description of Priam in the tent of Achilles; the epic concerning Heracles furnished the background for the anger of Hera, since the anger of Hera has no pretext in A, also for the deception of Zeus, and the part taken by the god Sleep; Meleager and his anger, as told in I, is the model for the anger of Achilles.

Whatever the traditions or fate of Troy may have been, it is the genius of Homer and not history that brought Nestor, Ajax, Diomede, and most of the other heroes before its walls. The material of these epics furnished the poet no basis for his grand conception of the universal idea.

Homer's relation to his sources is well shown in the Meleager parallel, a parallel given I, 529 ff.:

In the story of Meleager anger and abandonment of the battle occupy the same position as in the "wrath" of Achilles; in each the first phase is joined to defeat, the second to victory. In adversity the countrymen of Meleager send supplications to him in vain. The anger, the entreaties, the refusal are the same in each. Which is the original? The unusual anger of each presupposes some extraordinary cause. In the case of Meleager the cause is sufficient; the cursing of a son by his own mother because of his success in battle is something so terrible and unusual that it must rouse the anger of the son and force his withdrawal from battle, while the anger of Achilles is less rational and out of all proportion to the assumed cause. When Meleager abandoned the battle he of necessity remained at the scene of action, in his own city and with his own wife, but when Achilles renounced the war there was no reasonable alternative except to return home, yet he remained, full of the desire for war, hoping that he would be recalled into battle. The poet felt the weakness of the motive for holding Achilles, so invented the "plan" of Zeus and the advice of Thetis. Even in the petitions and the petitioners the *Iliad* stands on a weaker footing than in the story of Meleager. Real friendship fails the ambassadors, the guilty mother is lacking, the place of the father Oineus is taken by the foster-father Phoenix, while Patroclus plays the part of the wife Cleopatra. The tears of Cleopatra move Meleager to immediate and personal action, while the weaker tears of Patroclus exert

a weaker force. Meleager yields entirely, Achilles but half; he will not go himself, yet sends Patroclus. In the *Iliad* there is but a single embassy to Achilles, yet in three parts; in the epic of Meleager there are three groups, first the official embassy of elders and priests, then the relatives, finally his youthful friends. In Homer the details are varied, but the idea of three is maintained. Odysseus represents the officials, Ajax the friends, and Phoenix the father. Phoenix then is simply a substitute for Oineus. As the foster-father of Achilles he should properly be in the tent with him, yet the force of the pattern was such that it is necessary he should come to Achilles to plead, a thing so unnatural that the poet does not attempt to explain it or give it a motive, but simply assumes it as a fact; however, when he has filled the rôle of a pleader, as substitute for Oineus, the force of the pattern fails and Phoenix remains with Achilles.

His relation with the Theban-Argive epic is as follows: Troy is another Thebes, but instead of the pretext for war as given in the Seven against Thebes Homer adopted and adapted the Rape of Helen. The united action of several Greek heroes against Thebes is the basis of the idea of a union of all the Greeks against Troy. It is the Argives before Thebes which suggested the Argives at Troy, and the leader of the Argives is the leader in each. Tydeus at Thebes reappears in his son Diomede at Troy, while Adrastus reappears in the commander Agamemnon, king of Argos; and Hector is substituted for the defender of Thebes. Evidently the Theban epic was written from the side of the defenders, and when the champion goes to meet the invader he knows the combat is to be decisive, so bids a bitter farewell to wife and family. This exactly suits the conditions of the Parting of Hector and Andromache, and it is because the defender of Thebes reappears in Hector that Homer paints him not as a barbarian but as a Greek. In this part of the poem Trojan names and Trojan customs hardly appear; here we find such a thoroughly Greek divinity as Athena, a Greek priestress, Theano, and such Hellenic customs as a procession of women to the temple and the gift of an embroidered robe. In the present connection Andromache's pleading for the defensive is pointless, as well as her description of attacks and methods of defense; there was no attack on the walls of Troy, while the presence of warriors mounted on chariots, so necessary a part of the Theban story, seems out of place in an oversea war.

The charge made against Homer that he was unpatriotic, because he painted Hector in too sympathetic a manner, is to be explained as due to the material from which he created Hector, since he took a Greek hero from defending Thebes, renamed him and transferred him to Troy.

These two illustrations give a faint impression of the wealth of the book and show that in Mülder's view Homer took small suggestions, connected them, and filled them with life, pathos, and poetry. The few lines in which the story of Meleager is told show how slight the pattern is in comparison with the finished whole. Mülder says, p. 338,

> The sources gave merely the simple, the objective, the direct, the actual from which the creator of the *Iliad* with rich fancy and consummate art created the complicated, the subjective, and the emotional. . . . [p. 342]. The poet of the *Iliad* must have a place among the most original and inventive of all lands and of all ages.

No one can doubt that Homer must have drawn on preceding tradition and literature for his knowledge of the age described, but just because we have no independent knowledge of this literature or tradition it is impossible to decide what is due to the source and what is due to Homer. Even when we do have the source it is difficult to judge which is the source and which the imitation; Mülder is certain that the speech of Priam in *Iliad* xxiv is modeled after a poem of Tyrtaeus, while to most scholars the imitation seems just the reverse. Here we do have the original and the copy, yet cannot agree; but when one attempts to reconstruct an assumed original with no clue except that furnished by the copy there is no check on the most rash hypotheses. Where I have the material from which to form a judgment I cannot accept Mülder's theories in regard to original and copy, as in the assumed imitation of Tyrtaeus by Homer and the assumption that the anger of Poseidon in the *Odyssey* is copied from the anger of Achilles in the *Iliad*.

While the arguments in regard to the sources are built upon too small a basis, the book is still one of unusual merit and every page is full of the most original and brilliant observations.

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Aristotle on the Art of Poetry. By INGRAM BYWATER. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. Pp. xlvii+387. 16*s*. net.

The peculiar value of the book lies in the wealth of illustration by which Professor Bywater endeavors to make Aristotle explain himself. A very striking use is also made of Isocrates. Add to this the scientific spirit, the fine sobriety, and textual acumen of Professor Bywater, and we have an edition which was much needed and which pretty well exhausts what antiquity can do to explain its own remains. It is a noble edition of the *Poetics* and in its way complete. But whether this famous book can be explained without venturing into a field from which Professor Bywater expressly excludes himself is another question.

It is no doubt true that Aristotle "would be surprised to find how large a meaning we are able to read into some of his more incidental utterances." But if the appeal is to Aristotle *redivivus*, would he not be still more surprised at the enormous energy expended upon determining his *ipsissima verba*? Would he not find the scholarship more congenial which argued with him upon first principles?

Of course what Aristotle really did mean is what we want to know, whether or not we like it or him for saying it, and everything depends upon how the metaphor of *κάθαρσις* originally suggested itself to him. All may agree that his first intention was a criticism of Plato. Does he not indeed consciously take up the mocking challenge which Plato makes to the champions of tragedy? Reducing to its simplest dimensions

Professor Bywater's fine summary and justification of the doctrine of Weil and Bernays, we are to make Aristotle say that tragedy, instead of nourishing certain normal though disturbing human emotions, affords a safe and pleasurable discharge of their overplus. To this pleasant cure, as to drugs in general, we should resort only occasionally. Here lies the healing power of poetry. If not an anodyne or narcotic, it is a cathartic.

But there is after all more assumption in this argument than at first sight appears. Are we to believe that the *why* was not as present to the eager mind of Aristotle as the *how*? *Why* do we take a noble delight in what excites pain in ordinary life? Is it not more than possible that this mysterious power of art was the very thing that suggested the metaphor to our pioneer in the theory of art? In short, are we not justified in assuming that Aristotle is making the first fumbling attempt in history to detach a first principle of art? Professor Bywater is not so happy in his summary of opposing views. They can neither be comprehended under the one head of the lustratory use of *κάθαρσις*, nor are they all allowed for. They do not include, for example, the most interesting argument of Knoke, Milton is hoplessly misplaced, and Browning ignored. But creative instinct counts for something. There is, moreover, a sort of naïve petulance in the way he concludes his defense of the interpretation of Weil and Bernays as "more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true *raison d'être* of the theatre"—as though this were the only alternative.

One could have wished that Professor Bywater had stopped to consider the possibilities of the suggestion *πρακτικὰ* for *καθαρτικὰ* in the last sentence of the famous passage of the *Politics*, which he appends to his text. It has a very important bearing. Aristotle shares the belief of all Greece in the importance of *ethical* music, admits the music of *πρᾶξις* into his state as furnishing harmless pleasure to the man in the street or pastime and relaxation for all, and justifies what is evidently the faint dawn of the splendid art of today, as affording not "harmless pleasure," but a high employment of leisure (cf. *Pol.* v. [viii.] 5. 1339*a*. 25–31).

Now whether we have lost Aristotle's development of *κάθαρσις*, or he has failed, as often, to keep a promise, he has none the less done something in the *Poetics* to explain the *why*, and, as we should anticipate, Professor Bywater is weak at such points. First of all, had Aristotle done nothing more than touch for the first time upon the generalizing power of poetry, it would have been a sufficient achievement. Has this no bearing upon *κάθαρσις*? Professor Bywater, it is true, quotes Diderot (p. 188) on the novelist Richardson with exquisite appositeness, but one regrets, without being able to explain, his Olympian silence as to Butcher's development of this context—surely one of the finest things in modern English scholarship. Again, the significance of *δι' ἁμαρτίαν* is

found to lie in that we are thus enabled to forgive or pity the hero! In the same connection, Twining's interpretation of φιλάνθρωπον (1452. *b*. 38) is dismissed, a consideration which perhaps decided the retention of στοχάζονται (1456. *a*. 21) and certainly accounts for the venturesome note on p. 254. But Aristotle says καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ, not καὶ ὁ ἄδικος μὲν ἀνδρεῖος δὲ. And, finally, there is no note on τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ . . . . (1453 *a*. 10–11; though he stops to note the apparent contradiction in ἢ βελτίονος 1453 *a*. 16). But is there no significance in the doctrine that tragedy must be the "fall of something great"?

But when Professor Bywater deals with the text, and in the main body of the commentary, one can feel nothing but admiration for his refined, if hard-headed, sobriety. No one has so well pointed out or so carefully collected the lapses and contradictions in the *Poetics*, or so clearly shown the apparent waning of Aristotle's interest in his subject as the book goes on.

Professor Bywater frankly undertakes at the start to prove that the Arabic version is of little or no value as against the final authority of A^c. The notes on 1447. *a*. 17 τῷ γένει ἑτέροις and 1448. *a*. 10–11, τῷ περί τοὺς λόγους are good examples of the well-known judgment which appears on nearly every page. One observes casually that Vahlen's insertion of εἰ before ἔτυχεν in 1460. *b*. 36, is silently passed by, and, strangely, the commentary contains no note on the singular passage ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνειν εἰς εὐτυχίαν . . . . (1455. *b*. 28).

We heartily accept his position that a translation of Aristotle should lean toward paraphrase. If somewhat bold, his version is very sure-footed where others stumble, as e.g. 1455. *a*. 30–31, πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως, where Butcher goes wrong. But one must object to "as having magnitude" in the definition of a tragedy, where the note also is defective, for the principle involved might have been illustrated at great length from Aristotle. Finally ἁρμονία may be equivalent to μέλος in 1449. *b*. 29, though this is doubtful, and to τόνος in 1449. *a*. 27, but it is never our English "harmony."

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Four Plays of Menander: The Hero, Epitrepontes, Perceiromene, and Samia. Edited with Introductions, Explanatory Notes, Critical Appendix, and Bibliography, by EDWARD CAPPS. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1910. x + 329 pp.

Mr. Capps's edition of the four plays in the Cairo papyrus has a distinct individuality: the editor's liberal employment of his own supplements in the filling of lacunae, his independence in the distribution of

the dialogue and in the interpretation of the plots, the considerable increase in illustrative material in the commentary, sharply differentiate this edition from its French and German predecessors. In richness of information and suggestion it is easily superior to anything that has appeared hitherto.

The introductions are clear expositions of the action with ingenious solutions of the difficulties, suggestive sketches of the character treatment, and careful accounts of the interrelation of the fragments. Space does not permit a discussion of Mr. Capps's efforts to disentangle the plots; his ingenuity is ever of the better sort: it starts from a basis of fact; he discriminates between plausible conjecture and sound conviction.

The deviations from the papyrus, when it is legible, are fewer than in Körte's text. To be sure, the inclusion of the *recto* of the St. Petersburg fragment, in accord with the editor's theory, is an innovation, but in this case, however one may sympathize with Körte's skepticism (*Menandrea*, p. xviii), one cannot deny that Mr. Capps has sufficient warrant for incorporating the fragment in his own constitution of the text. In some of the departures from the papyrus we doubt the wisdom of the changes. In E. 53 Σύρισκ' becomes σὺ ταῦτ' on the ground that Smicrines could not have known the slave's name; but we recall the shrewdness of Gripus in the *Rudens* in accepting his master as arbitrator, and wonder if Syriscus was not equally clever in choosing an acquaintance; the first act may have provided all that the audience needed to understand the situation. In E. 261 αὕτη . . . . ⟨συ⟩νέπαιζ⟨ε⟩ν spoils the force of the passage; any necessary "reference to the girl in the case" (cf. the note) is sufficiently contained in τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (259); and what point is there in Habrotonon's mentioning her virginity (262) except to explain why *she herself* (αὐτή) in spite of her present condition could properly join in the frolic of the freeborn girls (συνέπαιζον)? This view, of course, involves supplying with οὐδ' ἐγὼ τότε a thought equivalent to that expressed in 262: she stammers, naturally enough, in stating the matter to Onesimus. Even in such a small matter as γεγον⟨ν⟩ημένον (S. 398) we wish the editor had followed the papyrus rather than Van Leeuwen. In E. 4–5, the interpretation of δύσκολα δὲ πάσχω as a question will startle any reader who is following the Greek and the situation; whoever expects a γάρ, in place of δέ, in the affirmative statement seems to us to be intruding the idiom of his own language. We are especially grateful for Mr. Capps's conservatism in retaining τὸ γ' ἀστικόν of the papyrus (E. 340) as hardly anybody has done since the appearance of the *princeps;* but what virtue has Croiset's punctuation? Must we avoid τὸ γ' ἀστικὸν τὸ γύναιον because of the two articles? But the meaning is not "the clever creature!" τὸ γ' ἀστικόν is in the predicate, and the two articles and the meaning are sufficiently defended by τὸ

χρῆμα σοφώτερον ἁ θήλεια (Theocr. xv. 145). In E. 850 ff., as in P. 279 ff., Mr. Capps accepts a theory that the monologue reports an imaginary conversation; this is a matter of technique, but the mass of evidence in the monologues of Latin comedy is not drawn upon by the editor to confirm or to refute the theory. In the filling of lacunae Mr. Capps has been lavish: the college student will find his reading of the plays more interesting, and the teacher will be grateful. Nor are we disposed to object to the editor's very frequent preference for his own stopgaps; the preference is often justified, and in the larger gaps the supplements are sometimes ingenious, seldom (P. 885) ill-advised. In E. 122 the choice of αὑτοῦ is hardly supported by the reference to Kühner-Gerth, for all the examples there quoted show the possessive pronoun following the attributive modifier; if the position of the editor's αὑτοῦ must be defended, such Hellenistic examples as Theocr. v. 2; Herond. v. 7, vi. 41; Callim. *Hymns*, iii. 139, would serve the purpose better.

In the commentary Mr. Capps has drawn freely on Latin as well as Greek comedy for illustration, and thereby reveals not only the meaning of Menander, but the background of situation and phraseology in Plautus and Terence. We regret the frequent comment on metrical detail; Mr. White's article makes unnecessary the space devoted to this theme; if such material were condensed, Menander's style—his freedom in the collocation of words, his peculiar sentence structure—and special phases of Hellenistic usage might receive more convincing treatment. In H. 20 the interpretation of ἡσυχῇ is more easily understood by a comparison of Theocr. xiv, 27 (cf. 10) and other Greek examples than by the quotation of the Latin phrase in the note. In H. 31 does not ἀπεδίδου in the sense of "give," not "pay," need comment (cf. E. 337, S. 12–13)? On E. 60 a reference to Wackernagel *Hellenistica*, p. 23, on οὐθέν would be helpful. In E. 177 does θές mean "put down"? Does not τὸν ἡμέτερόν σοι θεῶ; in the next verse suggest that θές is hardly more than δός? And if θές does = κατάθες, as Mr. Capps thinks, where is the evidence that the omission of κατά "gives to the command a peremptory tone"? Such examples as Theoc. v. 21; viii. 13, 14 (cf. 11, 12) suggest no peremptory tone. On E. 287 the editor notes: "ὑπόθημα: *pledge, security*, here only in this meaning, instead of ὑποθήκη"; but a Theran inscription of the second century B.C. (*IG.* xii. 3. 329) is worth noting (ἐπ' ὑ[ποθέμα]τι ἀξιόχρεωι). These nouns in -μα are an interesting feature of Menander's vocabulary: in E. 870 on ἅρπασμα Mr. Capps notes that ἁρπαγή is the regular word; it is well to remember that there are vestiges of ἅρπασμα in Plato *Legg.* 906 D (where Burnet follows AO rather than L) and in Plutarch *Cato Maior*, xiii, where CV, according to Sintenis, read ἅρπαγμα, but other documents ἅρπασμα. This passage of Plutarch, also, would supply Mr. Capps with support for the meaning "kidnaping expedition," which seems better than Wilamowitz' suggestion (Körte, *Menandrea*,

p. xxv, n. 1). In E. 686 (and cf. P. 232) *αὐός . . . . τῷ δέει* recalls *ξηρὸν ἕρπει δείους . . . . Ἰφικλῆα* (Theocr. xxiv. 61). In P. 673 *κειμένην* is supported not only by *τιθείς* (678) but by *ἔκειτο* (663).

Considering the enormous amount of detail the mechanical part of the book is remarkably well done. The use of "angles" to indicate the supplementary readings is a happy device for preserving an attractive page. Misprints are rare: p. 28, n. 2, "Geffken"; p. 53, n. on 29; p. 68, n. on 171, "*σήμεια*"; p. 72, text of 206, "*ἐπικῶς*"; p. 75, text of 224, "*ἐστιν*"; p. 155, n. on 38, "*εὕροιτο*"; p. 169, n. on 201, "*ἐν καλῷς*"; "complaisance" (p. 136) and "complacence" (p. 138) are waging a Franco-Roman war.

Mr. Capps has very appreciably added to his achievements in the field of the New Comedy. Sound scholarship and the teacher's practical sense have combined to make an edition of Menander that presents material of great value to scholars without impairing the usefulness of the book in the classroom. To somebody—we hardly know to whom—we are indebted for the fact that so much space has been given to the editor for the interpretation of a small amount of text; even the high price of the book can hardly cover the outlay involved. Under these circumstances the undertaking is very gratifying to all who are interested in the encouragement of such intelligent research.

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The Sea Kings of Crete. By JAMES BAIKIE. New York: Macmillan, 1910. Pp. 259; 32 illustrations and a map. $2.00.

This admirable summary of recent discoveries in Crete will doubtless prove the most popular handbook on the subject. It is better written and is considerably cheaper than Professor Mosso's *The Palaces of Crete*, and its abundant illustrations render it more attractive to the layman than either of the other recent handbooks, viz., Professor Burrows' *The Discoveries in Crete* and Mr. and Mrs. Hawes's *Crete the Forerunner of Greece*. It is, moreover, written with an enthusiasm and rapidity of style that compel the reader's interest.

The first three chapters are entitled "The Legends," "The Homeric Civilization," and "Schliemann and His Work." They are very readable but occupy more space, perhaps, than can well be spared in a book on Crete which contains altogether but eleven chapters. The next two chapters on the Knossos palace describe the results of the excavations as they were obtained year by year. This chronological method together with the author's frequent quotations from Mr. Evans' narratives give to these chapters a really dramatic interest. The writer's enjoyment of the romantic side of Minoan discoveries leads him, however, to champion doubtful theories,

as when (p. 107) he marvels that the cross should have served at so remote an epoch as a religious symbol, adding "the fact of the equal-limbed cross having at so early a date been the object of worship also suggests the reason why the Eastern church has always preferred the Greek form of cross." But the evidence is scarcely sufficient to prove that the cross was a religious symbol, to say nothing of its being an object of worship. The chapter on "Phaistos and Eastern Crete" gives a summary of the excavations at other sites than Knossos. The treatment is very brief, and much of importance is omitted, especially the results of the more recent excavations. Thus Pseira is not even mentioned, nor is the name found on the map. Yet the town laid bare by Mr. Seager on this island is the most picturesque Minoan town found and the results obtained here though published only this summer have several times been summarized in periodicals. Similarly, the work of Mr. Xanthoudides in the Messara plain is not included. A résumé of these more recent discoveries would have been particularly appropriate to a new book on Crete inasmuch as the results of the other excavations have been now so often summarized.

The seventh chapter, on "Crete and Egypt," which profits by the author's familiarity with Egyptian antiquities, gives in concise form the evidence for Egyptian and Cretan synchronisms. The Pulosathu mentioned in the inscriptions of Rameses III are, at the end of the chapter, identified with the Philistines, and since Hebrew tradition brought the Philistines from Kaphtor (Keftiu), Goliath thus appears as the last of the Minoans. The author does not entirely reject Professor Petrie's system of dating, but gives his dates in parallel columns with those of the German school, which seems somewhat over-cautious in view of the ceramic evidence from Crete which cannot be made to fit with any system of extended dates. The depth of the neolithic deposit at Knossos is doubtful evidence for putting the beginning of the neolithic era as early as 10,000 B.C., as the author, following the early suggestions of the excavators, implies. Twice the words "three feet per millennium" occur, but surely when people lived in wattled mud huts, any one of which, overthrown in a storm, might leave several inches of mud behind, an accumulation of three feet might be expected in less than a thousand years.

The next chapter, on the Minoan period, is a clear statement of the chronological system which has been worked out by Mr. Evans. It is perhaps time, however, that some changes in these divisions were made. At any rate it might well be suggested first, that very little is known about the Early Minoan I period; that no Middle Minoan II pottery appears in eastern Crete, making it probable that "Kamares" ware is technically not chronologically distinct from that of the preceding period; and lastly that there is little evidence in eastern Crete for distinguishing the Late Minoan I and the Late Minoan II periods.

The last two chapters treat of "Life under the Sea Kings" and "Letters

and Religion," and both give delightful pictures of Minoan life. Flaws may be detected, as e.g., the inconsistency of accepting Mrs. Hawes's theory that the shrine at Gournia was a town shrine when the author holds with Mr. Mackenzie, and rightly I think, that Minoan shrines were private and secluded. But in spite of such ready acceptance of doubtful theories the author accomplishes well his purpose of "offering to the general reader a plain account" of the Cretan discoveries.

EDITH H. HALL

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Aus dem griechischen Schulwesen Eudemos von Miletus und Verwandtes. Von ERICH ZIEBARTH. Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1909.

The basis of this extremely interesting and instructive study is a Milesian public document of the end of the third or the beginning of the second century B.C., which Ziebarth was permitted by those in charge of the excavations to publish in advance. Eudemos, a citizen of Miletus, had offered to the city in behalf of himself and his two brothers 10 talents for the education of "free boys," and the document in question is a decree of the people accepting the gift and providing for the expenditure of the income. The fund was to be deposited in the state bank and the income of 6,000 drachmas (interest 10 per cent) was to be expended by the educational authorities in paying the salaries of 8 teachers of whom 4 were to be instructors in athletics, and in providing an annual sacrifice. Thus the fund supplemented the sums that the city no doubt spent on the education of the ephebi and enabled them to institute a system of elementary instruction. One of the three gymnasia uncovered in the course of the excavations has with considerable probability been identified as the building used for the purpose. Appropriate provision was made for honoring the donor by allowing him and his descendants to participate in the religious rites, and a monthly holiday served to keep his memory alive among the boys who profited by his bounty. The teachers were to be selected by the assembly annually. Salaries—30 drachmas for athletic instructors and 40 for the others—were to be paid monthly.

Instructors who wished to accompany their pupils to the games at which they competed were required to obtain permission from the educational authorities and to provide substitutes. The decree which supplements the existing education law (παιδονομικὸς νόμος) is in all probability the work of a special committee of the senate as Ziebarth argues, though the evidence adduced is not entirely conclusive. One is reminded of the frequent use of commissions at Athens for various purposes (cf. Foucart *Bullet. de Corresp. Hellen.* [1880] 225 ff.).

In order to fill out from other sources the picture of the school system of Miletus the author adds three excellent chapters entitled, "Staat und

Schule," "Schulstiftungen und Stiftungsschule," "Aus griechischen Schulen." In these chapters, particularly in the second, where the school law of Teos is given, full use is made of the most recently discovered epigraphical material, of which the author has complete command. On the whole the book offers welcome additions to our knowledge of ancient Greek education. One could wish that the commentary had included some of the matter reserved for the general chapters on education, for a number of questions arise in the mind of the reader that could most effectively be answered in the commentary.

ROBERT J. BONNER

Ithaque, la Grande. By A. E. H. GOEKOOP. Athens: Beck & Barth, 1908. Pp. 38.

To M. Goekoop, as to many others in these days, the Homeric poems are textbooks of geography and history; and following Homer literally, as Dörpfeld did when he found the beehive tombs of Triphylia and identified old Nestor's Pylos at Kakovatos, he finds that Ithaca is Cephallenia. There were, according to his view, two Cephallenias—the great (the Mycenaean Ithaca) and the small (the classical Ithaca). The palace of Odysseus he places at the foot of Mt. St. George. Furthermore, Odysseus' Ithaca was not the whole Cephallenia but only the southern province of the island; the rest of Cephallenia was taken up by the provinces of Dulichium and Same. The other points mentioned in the *Odyssey* M. Goekoop attempts to identify along the southern shore of Cephallenia. His principal argument for this thesis is that in Δ 329 ff. Odysseus' men are called Cephallenians; but he fails to note that the Cephallenians under Odysseus came from the mainland opposite Ithaca!

The author of this pamphlet is the same Goekoop who so generously put his wealth at the disposal of Dörpfeld for the first campaigns in his magnificent work on the island of Leucas-Ithaca. That he of all men should be one of the few unconvinced and so far from conviction that he should attempt to carry the controversy away over to the utterly impossible Cephallenia!

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Μαρκέλλου Σιδήτου περὶ Σφυγμῶν. By Σκεγος Γ. Ζερβος. Athens: Sakellarios, 1907. Pp. 61.

Dr. Zervos, of the medical faculty of the National University, is performing the welcome task of publishing in a series of monographs the unedited fragments of ancient Greek physicians. This, the third in the series, deals with Marcellus of Side. Marcellus was a contemporary of Galen and wrote a work on medicine in forty-two books in hexameter verse. Only a few pages are preserved to us in two codices, discovered recently in prose

version in Vienna. These, containing Marcellus' discussion of pulse-beats, normal and abnormal, are given to us now in twenty-one carefully edited pages of this pamphlet.

Not the least interesting feature of Marcellus' work is found in his quotations from the medical works of older authorities—Chrysippus, Erasistratus, Herophilus, Asclepiades, Hippocrates, etc.

An index of words, almost full enough to be a concordance, completes this issue of Dr. Zervos' series. Another, in which he will take up the detailed explanation of the text and of all the technical words and phrases in it, is promised.

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Dead Language and Dead Languages. By J. P. POSTGATE. London: John Murray, 1910. Pp. 32. 1*s.*=30 cents.

The inaugural lecture for the academic year of 1909–10 at the University of Liverpool was given by Professor Postgate under the above lugubrious caption. But the address itself is full of life and vigor. It is a new and novel presentation of the claims of classical education for its time-honored place in the training of modern men. In these days our ears are continually dinned with opprobrious remarks about the "dead languages." Long ago Clarence King, at that time director of the United States Geological Survey, declared that "only dolts can refer to Greek as a dead language." And he was right. So Professor Postgate in his address takes up the case of Latin and proves that Latin is just as much alive as English, or French, or German. There is a world of difference, he shows, between a dead language and a language of people that are dead. Even so, "if a great and world-wide Church uses Latin every day in its ritual and in the converse of its colleges and religious houses, and if newspapers are published in Latin in more than one civilized community, then to call Latin dead is perhaps a little premature."

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Herausgegeben von PAUL HINNEBERG. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Des Gesamtwerkes Teil I, Abteilung V. Berlin und Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909. M. 12.

The method of collaboration employed in the Cambridge *English Literature*, in Lord Acton's *Cambridge Modern History*, and in Petit de Julleville's *History of French Literature* is here applied to the general history of philosophy. From the artistic point of view, there is some loss of unity. But it is the

only method that will satisfy the scientific conscience of an age of specialization. A Zeller or a Windelband may write almost equally well on Greek and on modern German philosophy, but no single scholar could do this and at the same time produce the admirable summary of mediaeval philosophy which Baeumker contributes to this volume, or write of prehistoric thought with the competence of Wundt, of Hindoo philosophy with that of Oldenberg, of the philosophy of Islam with that of Goldziher, of Chinese philosophy with that of Grube, of Japanese philosophy with that of Tetsujiro Inouye.

The publishers' prospectus promises an "allgemein verständliche Sprache," and accordingly technical terms and quotations from the original texts are eschewed. But in the endeavor to say as much as possible in brief compass, the writers employ a generalized, abstract style which presupposes in the German reading public which they address a singularly high culture. This is especially noticeable in Windelband's sketch of modern philosophy. His comment is full of interest and suggestion to those who already know the story. But its rapid comparisons and combinations of historical movements and tendencies in "-mus" from "humanismus," "Paracelsismus," and "Augustinismus," to "criticismus," "positivismus," and "pragmatismus" will baffle the uninitiated.

Further criticism must be confined to the section which falls within the scope of this journal, von Arnim's history of the philosophy of classical antiquity. It is no paradox to say that its chief merit is due to the fact that the writer is not primarily a philosopher, but a philologist and student of literature. He does not attempt to probe to the bottom of metaphysical problems, and rarely loses himself in the *cul de sac* of epistemology. But he gives on the whole the most lucid and intelligible description of the general movement of philosophic ideas from Thales to Plotinus with which I am acquainted. His conception of the pre-Socratics, I am pleased to note, is that emphasized by my pupil, Dr. Clara Millerd, in her dissertation, *On the Interpretation of Empedocles*. He says (p. 119) "Indem man eine Geschichte erzählt, wie aus dem Urstoff die Welt entstand, gibt man nicht nur eine genetische Erklärung des gegenwärtigen Weltzustandes, sondern glaubt auch etwas auszusagen über das wahrhaft Seiende." He rightly affirms the practical identity of Anaxagoras' "Urgemenge" with the "Urstoff" of Anaximander. The omission of all reference to the λόγος in connection with Heraclitus seems strange. He does not find two distinct cycles of creation in Empedocles, but blends them in one, to which he refers all four descriptions of the development of organic life. There seem to be some traces here of the confusion of Zeller first clearly explained in Dr. Millerd's dissertation (p. 50). Unless we are to take Empedocles' words vaguely and symbolically of a general evolution from chaos, we must admit (1) that there are two world creations, (2) that the cycle in which we live is that in which strife is on the increase, (3) and that Zeller's interpretation confounds the two in hopeless ambiguity.

The account of the sophists is excellent, as we should expect from the author of the first chapter of the *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*. At the most I should query whether too much of the *Theaetetus* is not attributed to Protagoras, and too much of Xenophon to Socrates. The *homo mensura* is said to mean the individual man—rightly, so far as we may suppose Protagoras to have raised the question at all.

The treatment of Plato is admirable in lucidity, directness, and warmth of appreciation. The ethical, religious, and social aspects of Plato's thought are properly emphasized. A specialist may take exception to some things said of the metaphysics. But as it is in any case impossible to make this intelligible to the general public even of philologists such criticism would be captious. There is real insight in the statement (p. 151) "Die Tatsache, dass ein Ding viele Eigenschaften hat, stellte sich für den Griechen aus sprachlichen Gründen in der Form dar, dass Ein Ding vieles ist." He is right in denying that the Ideas are thoughts of God, that matter is μὴ ὄν, and that Plato changed his terminology in regard to μέθεξις. But he misses the psychological or epistemological necessity for affirming ideas of everything, and he errs in tracing a development of the idea of immortality from the *Symposium* to the *Phaedrus* and the *Phaedrus* to the *Phaedo;* in affirming that the αὐτὸ ζῷον of the *Timaeus* is God; and, as was to be expected, in his interpretation of the Idea of Good. With many other critics, he fails to see that the Idea of Good may be the *highest* idea for the ethics and sociology of the *Republic* and the teleological nature philosophy of the *Timaeus*, without being the most *comprehensive* idea in logical extension for the purposes of the dialectical and ontological dialogues.

The only exceptions that I have to take to the clear and helpful summary of Aristotelianism are (1) the distinction between ἀρχαί=axioms and ἀρχαί=concepts is not sufficiently brought out; (2) the fundamental ambiguity of οὐσία in Aristotle, of which Gomperz makes so much, is ignored or evaded; (3) the statement (p. 183) that a plant has no sensation because "es fehlt ihr an einem seelischen Zentralorgan," repeats, I think, an old error of Zeller's to which I have elsewhere called attention. The μεσότης does not mean a central organ of the soul, but as Themistius, says, (p. 144.5) τὸ σῶμα ἐν μεσότητι κεκραμένον τῶν ἀπτῶν ἐναντιώσεων.

The Epicurean πρόληψις, von Arnim says, cannot be an innate idea. He explains it, if I may borrow the terminology of Romanes, as an infallible "recept" from sense experience. He does not attempt to reconcile this view with the fact that there is a πρόληψις or natural anticipation that the gods are eternal. Nothing is said of the beginnings of the development of an empirical logic of induction in the later Epicureans. There is a good account of Stoicism, and an admirable chapter on Plotinus, with which the sketch closes. The last two centuries of neo-Platonism are judiciously omitted. Little worth while could be said of them in the space available.

PAUL SHOREY

Ethos. Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik. Von DR. WILHELM SÜSS. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910. Pp. v+273. M. 8.

In the broader sense of the word, Dr. Süss identifies the doctrine of *ethos* with the psychological theory of rhetoric in general. The old Sicilian rhetoric of Corax, Tisias, Antiphon, and Lysias dealt, he tells us, objectively with the facts by arguments based on abstract probability, τὰ εἰκότα. Its method of teaching was the memorizing of τόποι. The rhetoric of Gorgias, followed, he thinks, by Plato, Isocrates, and Alcidamas, applied psychological insight to the influencing of the subjectivity of the hearer or judge. It thus came to attribute more importance to ornamental diction, order, and disposition, as also to the καιρός, or fit occasion, and to the faculty of extempore speech which enables a speaker to adjust himself to καιρός. In the working out of these ideas, Dr. Süss rehandles the old problem of the historical relation of Plato, Isocrates, and Alcidamas, and concludes that we must attribute to Gorgias not only nearly everything which these writers have in common but everything in the context of his parallel passages for which he can find any conceivable association with real or conjectured words and ideas of the Leontine rhetor.

The remainder of the book follows the doctrine of *ethos* in the more specific sense through the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, and Aristotle, and analyzes the later authorities in the course of an investigation of the sources of Aristotle's third book. This study of the theory is followed by a chapter on the practice, supplemented by a *Topik* of *Beschelтung*, or billingsgate, extending from Eupolis to Claudian. No student of Greek rhetoric can fail to derive much stimulus and instruction from this work. If I proceed to indicate some reserves, they are only such as cautious minds must feel with regard to a large part of present-day philological inquiry. The desire to get new results, to make a point, to establish a system, the endeavor to extract more from defective evidence than it contains, constantly confuses both the logic and the critical judgment of excellent scholars. Dr. Süss's previous book, *De personarum antiquae comoediae Atticae usu atque origine*, showed that he had not escaped this tendency, of which Dümmler was the most conspicuous representative. He there (p. 38) actually cites Lucian *Nigrinus* 2 to illustrate the combination of oculist and Platonic philosopher in the same person!

As regards the present work, it is entirely conceivable that Plato and Isocrates owed more to Gorgias than we can now perceive, and it is certain that there must have been some personal and historical connection between Plato's *Phaedrus*, Isocrates' tract against the Sophists, and Alcidamas' polemic against written speeches. But on neither of these points is the certainty which Dr. Süss aims at to be attained by the method of reasoning which he

employs. I must limit myself to a few illustrations. On p. 81, he says "Die φύσις stellen alle drei in Gegensatz zu der Memoriertechne an die Spitze des Systems." It is impossible to reconcile Isocrates and Alcidamas in this fashion, or to dispose of the fact that Alcidamas' essay is mainly directed against Isocrates. Isocrates and Plato emphasize φύσις in protest against the exaggerated professions of those who claim for teaching more than it can accomplish, while Alcidamas merely affirms that it requires more natural ability, φύσις, to speak extempore than to write an elaborate speech. On p. 20, Dr. Süss explains the resemblance of Isocrates' phrase, ψυχῆς . . . . δοξαστικῆς ἔργον, and Plato *Gorgias* 463A, ψυχῆς . . . . στοχαστικῆς by the assumption that the definition goes back to Gorgias, who, he thinks, employs both synonyms. The simple explanation, as I have elsewhere shown, is that Plato in answer to Isocrates' frequent opposition of δόξα to the Platonic ἐπιστήμη wickedly substitutes στοχαστικῆς in parody.

The defense of the reading πραγμάτων for γραμμάτων in Isoc. 13. 10 is unsuccessful. The entire context absolutely requires γραμμάτων. Sec. 11 is merely a personal digression, and the argument against the justice of the comparison of the teaching of rhetoric to the teaching of γράμματα is continued and elaborated in sec. 12. As a final and typical example I may take the arguments used to transfer to Gorgias the Platonic definition of rhetoric as a ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων. This is proved by a citation of the ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαὶ ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς from Gorgias *Helena* 10, and by reference to Isocrates 2. 49 and 9. 10. Now it is of course possible that Gorgias may have used the word ψυχαγωγία somewhere. The weakness of the argument is that it totally overlooks the fundamental distinction between Isocrates' and Plato's use of the word. In 2. 49 Isocrates is not speaking as a rhetorician, but as a moralist. The multitude prefer *entertainment* to profit, hence poets (and epideictic rhetors) seek to *entertain* (ψυχαγωγεῖν) rather than to admonish. So in *Evag.* 10 the point is merely that poetry possesses in rhythm and other ornaments means of *entertaining* and moving the feelings which prose lacks. Plato on the other hand is thinking of the art of persuasion, and with a characteristic recurrence to etymology defines rhetoric as a *guidance* of the soul by discourses. This appears in the later statement that some souls are easily persuaded, that is, led, by one type of argument, and others by another. There is no real connection between the Isocratean and the Platonic passages, and Dr. Süss's insistence on the mere word is as uncritical as is Dümmler's argument that the Isocratean passage is an intentional sneer at Plato. It would require a volume to test all of Dr. Süss's hypotheses in this way. I can only repeat in conclusion that, despite my distrust of much of the conjectural reasoning, the book is one which no student of the history of Greek rhetoric can afford to neglect.

PAUL SHOREY

Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens. By MAURICE CROISET. Translated by JAMES LOEB. London: Macmillan, 1909. Pp. xx+192.

"A proper political history of Athenian comedy," which will neglect neither the viewpoint of the historian nor that of the littérateur, has yet to be written. M. Croiset proposes to fill this want in some degree in the case of Aristophanes, for whom alone of the comic poets the evidence is at all satisfactory. In the course of the work he hopes to answer some of the questions which arise in regard to the political affiliations of Aristophanes and the poet's attitude toward the Athenian democracy.

In his introduction, the author sets forth at once a striking thesis. Prior to the Peloponnesian war, the "rural democracy" constituted an actual majority of the citizen body. The radical "city democracy" of Athens proper and the Piraeus prevailed in the assembly, which the country folk seldom attended; but in the theater the rural party were in the majority. In comedy the latter found their true spokesman, and they "used it to take revenge on the city and on those whom the city admired." This relation between comedy and the rural democracy would probably appear much more clearly did we possess the lost literature of the fifth-century comedy.

Aristophanes, by birth and education, entertained a natural predilection for this rural party. In common with the other poets of comedy, he gleaned much of his material from the gossip of the clubs, but was not in sympathy with the extreme oligarchs. This combination of influences resulted in no fixed policy, but in an unstable and essentially personal point of view. To Cleon, however, and extremists of his type the poet was unalterably opposed, and the change in the Athenian democracy to which the demagogues contributed he viewed with profound regret. Properly speaking he belonged to no party, but in him we find the champion of the country and of Athenian tradition, and the opponent of those whom he regards as the corruptors of the Athenian spirit.

The plays fall into three main groups, representative of three periods of time, and illustrating the poet's changing policy. The *Babylonians*, the *Acharnians*, the *Knights*, and the *Wasps* form a "sort of satirical tetralogy" aimed at the demagogues, as typified in Cleon. The *Clouds* expresses popular, not aristocratic, thought, and shows ignorance on the part of Aristophanes of the true values of the Socratic teaching. In the *Peace*, the poet celebrates the ending of the war, recapitulates the reasons for his policy, and reviews his fight against the demagogues. Throughout this period, he is aggressive, even violent, but nowhere does he appear as a "party man" or as an opponent of true democracy.

The plays of the second period show a marked change. They are less bitter in tone, and exhibit no well-defined program. The *Birds* con-

tains only scattered allusions and little trace of a settled purpose; the *Thesmophoriazusae* cannot be regarded as having a serious political meaning. The *Lysistrata*, while a plea for peace and harmony, and an expression of the awakening Pan-Hellenic spirit, is too fanciful to be a serious program of peace. The *Frogs* is ethical and social, rather than political, and seems to be aimed at the growing tendency toward individualism, while the parabasis contains a playful warning against intolerance on the part of the restored democracy. Throughout this second period, Aristophanes shows himself as frankly democratic, but favoring a moderate democracy in which harmony and sincere reconciliation are to prevail.

The two plays of the last period are of slight importance politically. The *Ecclesiazusae* in its first part satirizes conditions at Athens, the second part is merely a "series of mad conceits." The *Plutus* contains little worthy of comment. The conclusions reached in the course of these discussions are summed up by the author in the following words: "The essential point is not to regard him (Aristophanes) as a party man. The substance of his political attitude was rather a sentiment, in part instinctive, than a conviction."

M. Croiset's interesting theory in regard to the alliance between comedy and the rural democracy can scarcely be accepted without reserve.[1] It is difficult to believe that the political complexion of the audiences in the theater differed so materially from that of the popular assemblies as a literal interpretation of the passages cited might indicate. It is more reasonable to find an explanation of the tolerance with which the comic attacks on democracy were received in a general recognition of their playful character and in the license which has always been the privilege of the comic poet. Comedy is by nature conservative, and finds its best material in extremes and innovation. The statement of the Pseudo-Xenophon (*Pol. Ath.* II. 18), that the comedy of the fifth century attacked, not so much the poor or the δημοτικοί as the rich, the nobly born, or the influential, and that attacks upon the δῆμος as a whole were not permitted, would seem to require explanation, since it involves a partial contradiction of the author's thesis.

Some few inaccuracies appear. ἄγροικος ὀργήν can hardly be taken as evidence that Demos is depicted as a "rustic," representing the peasantry (p. 84), since the word ἄγροικος is here used in its derived meaning, with regard to the temper of Demos, and is not a reference to the country. The statement on p. 91 that Aristophanes, in the event of his conviction on the charge ξενίας brought by Cleon, "would probably have been subjected to a ruinous fine, expelled from the city, and thus deprived of the right further to occupy himself with public affairs,"

[1] Mr. Rennie (*The Acharnians of Aristophanes*, London, 1909) discusses this thesis at greater length in his introduction (pp. 8ff.) and finds it overstated.

is incorrect. He would have been sold as a slave, and his entire property confiscated. On p. 101, Aristotle, *Cons. Ath.* 63, should not be cited for the jury system of the fifth century, since the passage describes the courts of the late fourth century. It is difficult to believe that *Birds* 40–41 (p. 122) is a specific allusion to the prosecutions which followed the affair of the Hermae. It is merely a commonplace in regard to Athens which twice finds a place in the earlier plays of Aristophanes (*Peace* 503–5, *Clouds* 207–8) and is elaborated in the Pseudo-Xenophontic treatise already referred to (III. 2). The references in the footnotes are sometimes wanting in accuracy (e.g., p. 6, n. 1, Xenophon *Memor.* vii. 6 should be III. vii. 6). A number of the references to the Pseudo-Xenophon lack the chapter (e.g., pp. 67–68).

None of the slight inaccuracies pointed out mars the charm or impairs the usefulness of the book. M. Croiset's enthusiasm and keen appreciation of the poet make every page vivid and interesting. The reader who cannot agree with all of his theories or accept all of his explanations will none the less be the first to recognize the value of his work.

Mr. Loeb offers a translation which affords slight occasion for adverse criticism. It is clear, smooth, and idiomatic, and, best of all, preserves in large measure the charm and spirit of the original. The English edition is enriched by an introduction from Professor John Williams White, and is made especially valuable by the addition of a satisfactory index—a feature which should be found in every philological work.

GEORGE M. CALHOUN

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive: A Quest. By EDWARD A. SONNENSCHEIN. London: John Murray, 1910.

In a brief preliminary discussion touching original modal conditions in Indo-European, the author of this paper rejects the commonly accepted view that Indo-European was equipped with a series of complete and uniform modal systems, to each of which (e.g. the subjunctive) was attached a single root idea from which may be derived all the specific applications of a given mood as shown by Latin, Greek, etc.; he inclines rather to the not yet very popular theory that the meanings attached to the moods in Indo-European were miscellaneous and shifting, and that the well-differentiated modal uses of the historical period are the result of a long and gradual process of specialization and delimitation. In the course of this preliminary discussion he reviews the monograph of Oertel and Morris on *The Nature and Origin of Indo-European Inflection*, giving to it an interpretation which I think the authors hardly expected.

In the present article, however, Sonnenschein is not primarily concerned with the problem of original Indo-European modal uses; for he believes that, quite aside from the question of original modal conditions, there still

can be found running through the uses of the Latin subjunctive a common strain that gives unity to the various functions of the mood. To discover this common strain is the object of the "quest," an investigation which proceeds along rather unusual lines. To put in a clear light the method followed, it is necessary to review briefly certain principles of the psychology of language.

Roughly speaking, three mental processes are associated with verbal communication between two persons, namely (1) the birth of the thought in the mind of the speaker, (2) the process by which the thought is clothed in words, and (3) the steps by which the hearer (through the words) discerns the speaker's thought. Unfortunately, the nomenclature of psychological syntax is sometimes applied in such a way as to obscure the difference between processes (1) and (2). As a matter of fact, of course, the two things may be absolutely distinct; for a speaker's thought may be quite clear to himself (i.e. he may know exactly "what he wants to say") before he begins to choose a form of words by which to unfold the idea to the hearer.

The birth of the thought in the mind of the speaker (process 1) we may well leave to the professed psychologist; but the student of syntax is vitally interested in processes (2) and (3), which have to do with the transmission of thought from speaker to hearer; and the value to syntax of study along these lines is abundantly demonstrated by the discovery of such illuminating principles as that of defining parataxis, a doctrine upon which Sonnenschein places much dependence in the present paper.

It was probably through a study of the process by which the speaker's thought is clothed in words that the principle of defining parataxis was discovered. The workings of this principle can well be illustrated in connection with the words "Be gone," a phrase which (according to circumstance) may express entreaty, imperative demand, or permission. Ordinarily the tone of a speaker using these words would sufficiently indicate the color of the thought, yet there are often added co-ordinate defining phrases which put the matter beyond the peradventure of a doubt. The addition of such supplementary defining phrases is particularly common in colloquial speech, and in written documents (where the tone of voice is lost) they are specially helpful in determining the meaning; for example: (1) Be gone at once, I pray you (entreaty); (2) Be gone at once. I'll brook no delay (imperative demand); (3) Be gone at once. None shall hinder you (permission). From the point of view of the process by which thought is clothed in words (process 2), it would seem natural to say that the central phrase in the above examples illustrates three distinct uses of the imperative mood, and that the defining parataxis in each case simply helps to make more explicit the meaning which the writer or speaker means the central phrase to convey. But Sonnenschein, who apparently is working from the point of view of the steps by which the hearer arrives at the writer's or

speaker's thought (process 3), evolves an argument which gives a very different turn to the doctrine of defining parataxis.

Thus, of the above illustrative sentences he would say that, since in each case it is the speaker's *tone of voice* and the *defining phrase* that make clear to the hearer the notion of entreaty, imperative demand, or permission, it follows that the imperative mood ("Be gone") does not *per se* express any one of these notions; rather, it is the expression of a more general idea which lies at the root of each of these particular notions, and thus binds together all the uses of the mood into a unity.

Applying this method of argument to the subjunctive, Sonnenschein examines the standard categories of subjunctive meaning (prospective, volitive, etc.), endeavoring to strip from each any accessory notion that might in any concrete case be gathered by the hearer from the tone of the speaker, defining phrases, or any other auxiliary source. In this way he hopes to discover, so to speak, a core of pure subjunctive meaning underlying all the specific uses of that mood and establishing its unity. Such a common element he believes is found in the notion of obligation, and devotes the latter part of the paper to showing how this idea underlies the uses of the subjunctive even in dependent clauses.

Many will question the validity of the assumption that we can reach a core of modal meaning by subtracting all the defining elements which involve the particular instances of the use of a given mood. For, even looking at the matter from the point of view of the process by which the hearer arrives at the speaker's or writer's thought, it might very well be argued that a given mood stands in general for several distinct meanings, and that the defining elements in a concrete case simply help the hearer to decide which of the different meanings the speaker or writer intends the mood form to convey; just as when a Latin sentence opens with an adjective with the termination *-a*, the hearer or reader realizes at once that the word stands in some particular case, but what that case is he cannot determine until the context sheds its light on the situation. (The force of this argument will be the more manifest if *written* examples are used, thus excluding the defining elements of a speaker's tone and manner.)

Aside from the question of method, it will perhaps also be said that if obligation is a conception that pervades all uses of the subjunctive, it is strange that we have been so slow to realize that dominating note of the mood; and many will object to certain interpretations in particular, such as that by which *putes*, *videas*, etc., are made to appear as "shall" subjunctives.

But such considerations do not determine the value of Sonnenschein's monograph, which, as recording the impressions of a mature and sympathetic student of Latin, may be read with interest and profit by all. The interpretations are often illuminating, and the whole is pervaded by a literary atmosphere as pleasing as it is rare in treatises on syntax.

H. C. NUTTING

Die Buchrolle in der Kunst: archäologischantiquarische Untersuchungen zum antiken Buchwesen. Von THEODOR BIRT. Mit 190 [191] Abbildungen. Pp. ix+352. Leipzig: Teubner, 1907.

Just twenty-five years have elapsed between the appearance of Theodor Birt's *Antikes Buchwesen* and the present work. Although, perhaps, it is less important in scope and subject-matter than the earlier book, this elaborate study of the scroll as it appears in art is a useful contribution, exhibiting the same qualities of untiring search for all possible material bearing on the theme, fresh judgments on that material, careful exposition of fact, often enlivened by a pertinent comparison with modern practice, and a genius for classification which in combined comprehensiveness and attention to detail is admirable, even for a German. After treating the Egyptian use of the scroll, Birt proceeds to distinguish and characterize seven types of gesture and posture assumed in holding the papyrus roll. Five are observed when the book is still unrolled; one belongs to the actual reading, and one attitude is typical of the interruption or ending of the reading.

The last quarter-century since *Das antike Buchwesen* was published has been notable for its advances in the field of papyrology, and one section is accordingly devoted to a reconsideration of the Greek and Roman book in the light of this later information. Birt takes up again such topics as the rise of the book among the Greeks, its material and form, the arrangement of the writing, titles, seals, and libraries, with the various sorts of repositories for storing books. This is perhaps the most important section for the student of literature. Besides a mastering of the literary evidence, we have here all the testimony that vase-paintings, statues, and reliefs on stelae and sarcophagi can afford. This portion of the book is a welcome supplement to the more concise expositions of Dziatzko and Kenyon.

There follows a noteworthy section on the Column of Trajan, conceived of as a monumental picture-book, set up in the central court of Trajan's library to publish his exploits. The author ingeniously compares the Spartan *skytale:* the scenes in the Trajanic wars are in like fashion wound round a shaft to make an ἄγγελος ὀρθός, ἡνίκ' ὁμῶν σκυτάλα Μοισᾶν. The discussion closes with an account of the survival of the ancient book-form and attitude assumed in reading it in the Middle Ages, and with a classified table of the monuments cited throughout the work. The illustrations are uneven in scale and execution, but one leaves the reading of this lucid and well-printed book with the feeling that here, at least, archaeology and philology have been combined with fruitful results.

CHARLES BURTON GULICK

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Manuel de paléographie latine et française. Par MAURICE PROU. 3e Édition, entièrement refondue. Accompagnée d' un album de 24 planches. Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1910. 8vo, pp. 509.

The extensive changes in this new edition of Prou's manual make it a much more useful handbook on Latin paleography, especially for classical students, by whom the former editions were consulted chiefly on account of the "Dictionnaire des Abbréviations." The present edition is not merely a revision of the second edition of 1892, but is in many respects practically a new work. A thoroughgoing rearrangement of the material has been made in the direction of a more systematic treatment. The order of the chapters has been considerably changed, and new chapters and sections have been added to fill up the manifest lacunae in the older work, and to bring the new edition abreast of recent developments. The increase in the number of pages from 403 to 509 does not fully represent the increase in the scope of the work, for the reason that the facsimiles, which were formerly printed in the body of the work, have been consigned to a separate album of 24 plates, and further space has been saved by the transfer to footnotes of much of the detailed information which in the former edition broke the continuity of the text.

Chap. vi, which, in the older edition, dealt with the writing materials and writing instruments of the Middle Ages only, has been rewritten to include the imperial period of Rome as well, and now forms chap. i of the new edition. The section on papyrus, in particular, has been greatly augmented in the light of the papyri discovered in Egypt in recent years by Petrie and by Grenfell and Hunt, and has been furnished, in the footnotes, with an extensive special bibliography of the recent literature. The pre-Carolingian period (chap. i of the second edition) is now divided into two chapters (ii and iii of the new edition), the first dealing with the Roman scripts, and the second with the national hands. The chapter on the Roman scripts has now prefixed to it a brief account of the Latin alphabet, and the arrangement of the scripts under majuscule and minuscule is much more rational than that of the previous edition. The capital cursive now precedes the uncial script, and receives a much more extensive treatment, which takes full account of the additional examples of the older Roman cursive found in the papyri of Egypt. Its historical development is illustrated by a chronological table tracing the growth of the cursive characters in Egypt from 41 to 247 A.D. The later cursive of the Ravenna documents is now treated as a minuscule cursive, and the semi-uncial script as a pre-Caroline minuscule. The section which dealt with the national hands has now been expanded into a chapter, and gives a fuller and more rational treatment of their development. The relationship of the Lombardic, Merovingian, and Visigothic hands

to the minuscule cursive, concerning which nothing is said in the older edition, is now clearly set forth, and the arrangement of the chapter is improved by waiving claims of patriotism and giving the Lombardic hand precedence over the Merovingian. The chapter on Abbreviations has been expanded in two directions, (1) by a much fuller discussion of the contractions of *Nomina Sacra*, and their origin, in the light of the recent work of Ludwig Traube (1907), and (2) by the addition of a section of seventeen pages, written by Maurice Jusselin, on *Notae Tironianae* and their relationship to the abbreviations of the Middle Ages. In the chapters on the Carolingian and post-Carolingian periods alterations are relatively fewer. The author has neglected the opportunity to remedy a manifest defect of the previous edition in connection with the latter of these two periods, and particularly the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He has again made the mistake of confining himself too closely in his treatment of the book hands to the MSS of France, to the neglect of the rest of Europe, and Italy in particular, which at this time is, to the Latinist at least, quite as important as France. The "Dictionnaire des Abbréviations" has undergone no change except that to it is now prefixed a brief historical account of previous collections of a similar nature.

To sum up, the value of a very useful book has been greatly increased by the addition of much new material, and a more systematic arrangement of the old.

F. W. SHIPLEY

Kosmas und Damian. Texte und Einleitung. Von LUDWIG DEUBNER. Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1907. Pp. 1–240.

In his book *De Incubatione* (Leipzig, 1900) Deubner devoted a section of his chapter on incubation in the Christian church to the miracle-working saints, Cosmas and Damian. His present work gives us a series of critical texts with an elaborate introduction and full indices.

The Greek church recognized three pairs of saints by the name of Cosmas and Damian: one of Asiatic origin, the second Roman, the third Arabian. Their festivals, as recorded in the *Synaxarium* of the church, fall respectively on November 1, July 1, and October 17. It has, however, long been recognized that only one of these pairs can be original, from which the other two have been derived. That the original was in all probability the Asiatic pair Deubner shows conclusively. Their cult and the legends of their lives and marvelous works began in Constantinople, where the two saints were the Christian successors of the Dioscuroi, whose shrine of healing was founded by the eponymous Byzas, according to the legend preserved in a fragment of Hesychius of Miletus. Although Deubner makes the succession

of the Christians to the pagans apparent, he is unable to discover the source whence the names Cosmas and Damian were derived.[1]

The original Asiatic pair were saintly physicians who, after a life of beneficent works for which they refused pay, met death in peace; but in the course of time the tendency to give saints the crown of martyrdom led to the formation of the other two pairs, of which the Roman were said to have suffered under the emperor Carinus, the Arabian under Diocletian and Maximian. The three pairs, however, did not enjoy equal honor in all parts of the Christian world. In the Greek church the Asiatic and Roman pairs were especially revered; in the west the Arabian martyrs were the favorites. To them was dedicated by Pope Felix IV (526–30) the old basilica on the Roman forum, which was held in high esteem in later centuries. Their martyrium was apparently invented in Rome.

The texts, which occupy pp. 87–225, give first the lives and miracles of the Asiatic saints and then the martyria of the other two pairs. These texts depend on a complicated tradition in which thirty-six manuscripts are represented, dating from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries inclusive. No manuscript contains more than a fraction of the whole. The task of bringing order to this entangled mass of material required no little skill, but Deubner seems to have accomplished the work with a high degree of success. He has increased the number of miracles known from twenty-six to forty-eight, and in every way has enlarged our knowledge of these important saints. The words of Tillemont which Deubner prefixes to his work, "L'histoire de S. Cosme et S. Damien se peut dire entièrement incertaine et inconnue," are happily no longer true. The book is in every way worthy of the man to whose memory it is dedicated—Hermann Usener.

CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE

Hans Blaufuss: Römische Feste und Feiertage nach den Tractaten über fremden Dienst (Aboda zara) in Mischna, Tosefta, Jerusalemer und babylonischem Talmud. Beilage zum Jahresberichte des Königl. Neuen Gymnasiums in Nürnberg. Nürnberg, 1909.

In the Mishna, Aboda zara, 1, 3, we read: "'These are the festivals of foreign religion, the Calends, the Saturnalia, the Q.ratisim, the Genusia of the kings—day of birth and day of death,' says Rabbi Meir; but the learned say: 'Every case of death, when the body is burned, is connected with foreign religion. If the body is not burned, it is not connected with foreign religion. The day on which the beard is cut, the day on which the hair is cut, the day of landing, the day on which one was freed from prison,

[1] In his review of Weyh *Die syrische Kosmas- und Damian Legende* (Schweinfurt, 1910) in the *Berl. phil. Wochenschrift*, No. 41 (1910), col. 1286, Deubner now abandons his view that the Christian saints were directly concerned with the Dioscuroi.

the day on which one made a feast for his son—here only the day and only the individual are forbidden.'"

It is evident at a glance that certain of the festivals here named are of familiar Roman origin; others are not so easily recognized. Blaufuss devotes his program to the elucidation of the entire passage and to the identification of the festivals whose character is not evident to the classical philologist. In this notice we will give briefly his results.

From the Jerusalem Talmud 1, 2 it appears that by the Calends is meant the Roman festival of the new year which fell on January 1 and 3, January 2 being a *dies ater;* the Jewish interdict against dealings with the Gentiles on the Saturnalia was limited to the day of the public sacrifice and *convivium*, December 17. The group of festivals indicated by the Q.ratisim is not so apparent, but passages in the Tosephta, the Jerusalem and Babylonian Gemaras, show that the *dies imperii* (*natalis imperii*) of Augustus, April 16, and the *dies imperii* of his successors are meant. The name Q.ratisim Blaufuss connects with the Greek *κράτησις* = *imperium*. Genusia is easily recognized as *γενέσια*, i.e., the birthdays of the emperors and also the days on which the *divi* received their consecrationes. Here not the day only, but the three days preceding the festival were forbidden. Furthermore we should note that after the *γενέσια* the Tosephta names as interdicted also the day of the emperor's marriage, the days on which he assumed new offices, as for example March 6, on which Augustus in 12 B.C. became pontifex maximus, and the day on which he recovered from a sickness. All the above are public festivals, *feriae publicae*, and as such were celebrated throughout the empire. The remaining are *feriae singulorum*, on which the prohibition extended only to the individual celebrant. It is well known that the dedication of the beard and hair when first cut was a Greek custom adopted by the Romans, and that such a dedication was made the occasion of a family festival. (*Vide* Statius *Silv.* 3, 4 and Vollmer's commentary thereto; also Martial 9, 16. 17. 36.) The successful completion of a voyage was celebrated with a sacrifice known as *ἐκβατήρια*, and the day on which this was offered must be the "day of landing" named in the Mishna. Likewise a sacrifice, *κατιτήρια* according to Hesychius, was made on release from prison. Finally "the day on which one made a feast for his son" is shown by the Jerusalem Talmud, Aboda zara 1, 3, to be the day of the son's marriage.

Thus the passage in the Mishna bears testimony to the influence of imperial Rome on the exclusive people. So far as one can judge who is not a Semitic scholar, Blaufuss has correctly interpreted his material, and so has made a contribution to our knowledge of the civilization of the Roman Empire. It is to be regretted that he did not touch some of the larger questions suggested by his work, but possibly the limitations of a program forbade that.

CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE

Dares-Studien. By OTMAR SCHISSEL VON FLESCHENBERG. Halle a. S.: Niemeyer, 1908. Pp. 171.

The work of Dares falls into two parts: an introduction, comprising chaps. i–xi, and the historia proper, which opens with the gallery of heroes and heroines in chaps. xii and xiii. It is with these portraits that Schissel begins his studies. Similar portraits are found in the works of the Byzantines Malalas and Isaac Porphyrogennetus; but the latter's heroic gallery was long ago shown to be directly borrowed from that of the former. By an elaborate study of Dares' descriptions and by an extended comparison of them with those of Malalas—a task which occupies more than half his book—Schissel comes to the conclusion that the Latin writer was unquestionably using freely a Greek original, and that this was identical with the source employed by Malalas. He then passes on to a discussion of Dares, chap. xiv, which, against Wagener in *Phil.*, 38, 103 ff., he maintains was drawn directly from *Il.* ii. 494–760; he further holds that *Il.* ii. 816–77 was likewise the immediate source of the list of Trojans in chap. xviii, although this last has been influenced also by the *Ilias Latina* 233–35. From this relation Schissel somewhat illogically draws the bold conclusion that the entire list was not found in the Greek original, but was added by the Latin adapter from a Latin source. He closes his discussion of the second part of Dares' work with a review of the evidence in favor of a Greek original, laying stress especially on the words of Aelian, *Var. Hist.* xi. 2, *καὶ τὸν Φρύγα δὲ Δάρητα, οὗ Φρυγίαν Ἰλιάδα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀποσωξομένην οἶδα.* That a Greek original once existed no one will today be bold enough to deny, since Egypt has given back to us a portion of the Greek version of Dictys. The Greek Dares Schissel dates in the first century of our era, classing it with those other products of the imagination in which the later Greeks delighted. Athens he regards as the place of its origin, and he would hold that it was independent of the Greek Dictys as well as of the *Ilias Latina*, with the exception in the Latin version which has just been noticed.

A study of the first eleven chapters of Dares' history occupies the last third of Schissel's work. These chapters he seeks to prove were drawn in large measure from Dracontius' *Carm. prof.* viii, *De Raptu Helenae.* From this dependence he coins a *terminus post quem* of *ca.* 510 A.D. for the date of the Latin Dares; a *terminus ante quem* of *ca.* 530 A.D. he finds in the date of the Mythographus Vaticanus primus, 24, which he shows to his own satisfaction was derived from Dares, chaps. i–iii. The Latin version naturally drove the Greek original out in the West; in the East also the Greek seems to have disappeared soon after Malalas, for the partisanship which Dares shows for the Trojans was naturally offensive to Greek pride.

Schissel's work is an important contribution to the solution of the complex questions which are connected with the invention of Dares, although the author will hardly win assent to all his conclusions. The dependence

of Dares on Dracontius, for example, seems to the present reviewer hardly proved.

Finally be it said that the strictures passed by a German reviewer give a foreigner courage to echo a protest against the intolerable style in which this study is written. Sentences hopelessly and needlessly complex effectively prevent the work from being interesting, and impose undue labor on the reader.

CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE

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The Classical Association of England and Wales, Manchester and District Branch, Second Annual Report: The Roman Fort at Manchester. Edited by F. A. BRUTON. Manchester: The University Press, 1909. Pp. xvi+194+159. 6s.

An indication of the increasing activity in England in the excavation and study of Roman sites is afforded by this interesting book. Its publication under the auspices of the Classical Association of England and Wales is also significant. In brief the volume, which is copiously illustrated with photographs and plans, is a scholarly treatment of all the available evidence, literary and monumental, for the reconstruction of the Roman fort at Manchester and of the site on which the modern city is built.

The fort was oblong in shape and occupied a rising ground situated in a loop of the little river Medlock; a large part of this space is now covered by railroad tracks and the southeast corner of the fort is crossed by a canal. The dimensions of the fort were: length about 175 yards, width 140 yards, the area inclosed being a little more than five acres; this was, therefore, one of the largest Roman forts in Britain. The name of this military post is not known with certainty. In the Antonine Itinerary it appears in one form as *Mancunium*, but the manuscript transmission varies considerably, and no Roman inscription preserves the name.

A chapter on Mithras worship in Roman Manchester is suggested by the discovery in 1821 of a portion of a Mithraic relief a short distance southwest of the fort. The writer of the chapter, Canon Hicks of Manchester, takes the opportunity to describe at some length the character of Mithraism and develops the theory that the worship of Mithras was officially encouraged by the Roman government as a rival of Christianity.

The surviving fragment of the rampart-wall visible before the excavations of 1906–7 is on the eastern side. It measures 17 feet in length by 6 feet in breadth and consists of sandstone block laid in a white mortar which is still very hard. The facing stones have apparently been

removed. Even this small fragment suggests that the rampart surrounding the fort was very strong. Nothing is known about the position of the gates. In 1906–7 rather extensive excavations were made in search of the west wall of the rampart, a section of which, 44 feet long and about 7 feet wide, was finally disclosed, the essential part being a thick layer of bowlders packed in a light-colored clay. Running close to the inner face of the wall was a cobblestone pavement, two feet nine inches wide, which was probably earlier than the wall itself. The existence of a trench (*fossa*) on the outside of the wall cannot be determined. Near by were found coins of Hadrian, of the Antonines, and of Julia Domna. A tile stamped with C I I I B R was discovered in the course of the excavations, as well as millstones, fragments of Samian ware, *fibulae*, and a few architectural fragments. Extensive remains of a red sandstone flooring also were laid bare within the area of the fort not far from the wall; possibly it belonged to a street. This section of the book, written by Mr. Bruton, is made clear by three large folding plans and several good photographs. The chapter concludes with a detailed description, accompanied by measurements and photographs or drawings, of the objects found, all of which are later than the first century A.D.

The objects in the Ellesmere collection of Roman antiquities, found on or near the site of the fort between 1828 and 1832, are next described. They comprise an altar and interesting pieces of bronze, lead, and earthenware, including a bronze *phalera* and two circular brooches. In an appendix to the volume is a full description of the more than two thousand Roman coins found at various times at Manchester. They date from Augustus to the end of the fourth century, those of the first half of the fourth century being most numerous.

WALTER DENNISON

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Der Zeuge im attischen Recht. By ERNST LEISI. Frauenfeld, 1908. Pp. vii+167.

The important and difficult subject of the Attic law of evidence, after remaining practically untouched for many years, has recently been illuminated by two works published in 1905 and 1908. The latter, however, was in the main complete when the former appeared, and we have thus another instance of the curious yet frequent coincidence by which two scholars take up independently the study of some long-neglected subject. I may therefore be permitted to mention that I had myself blocked out a treatise on the Attic law of evidence in 1904, which was intended to take the form of a comparison with the rules in English law; but when Dr. Bonner's work[1] appeared, I determined not to pro-

[1] Robert J. Bonner, *Evidence in Athenian Courts*, Chicago, 1905.

ceed with this plan, for the time being at any rate. Both Dr. Bonner and Dr. Leisi intend a comparison with modern systems of evidence, though in neither case is this fully carried out; and Mr. Wyse[1] implies that no such comparison is possible, because the Athenians did not in reality possess any system at all. This is not the impression made upon my mind: on the contrary, I should be inclined to go to what is perhaps the opposite extreme, and describe the Athenian system as displaying common-sense to a far more uncommon degree than our own. It is true that in practice the results were probably no better than our own, but that was because the rules were not enforced; and the license thus allowed to litigants in the lawcourts was the natural concomitant and one of the inevitable penalties of the most perfectly logical, and therefore most entirely absurd, democracy known to history.

Mr. Wyse declared (p. 57) that "Dr. Bonner's survey of the subject is the best in existence, and should be read by all who are interested in Greek law." It was, indeed, up to the present, the sole work which the student need trouble to consult; but, while it still remains indispensable, room must be found beside it on the shelves for Dr. Leisi's book, the nature of which I now proceed to describe.

In the first of the two parts into which the author has divided his work, he deals with the various questions connected with the witness as a person bearing testimony to facts within his experience. Competent and incompetent witnesses, refusal to testify, compellability, the oath, the procedure, admissibility of evidence, the punishment of perjury—all these matters are treated with lucidity, acuteness, and learning, and with constant references both to the ancient authorities and to the more or less valuable discussions of modern students. The second part treats of the persons called in to act as witnesses of any important step, should the necessity ever arise. Dr. Leisi calls such a person a *Solemnitätszeuge*, and the opening paragraph of this part may be quoted to show his excellent qualities as a writer:

Solemnitätszeugen nennen wir diejenigen Personen, die zu Rechtsgeschäften oder zu prozessualisch wichtigen Akten beigezogen werden, um ihnen durch ihre Gegenwart grösseren Nachdruck oder überhaupt erst die Rechtsgültigkeit zu verschaffen und eventuell später vor Gericht das Wahrgenommene zu bezeugen. Sie finden im attischen Recht eine überaus häufige Anwendung. Die Gründe dazu liegen teils in der geringen Ehrlichkeit der Athener, teils in dem Umstande, dass die Athener die handschriftliche Unterschrift als Gewähr für die Echtheit einer Urkunde viel weniger verwenden, als wir. Deshalb müssen sie die Integrität der Dokumente sichern durch Beiziehung von Solemnitätszeugen bei ihrer Abfassung und Eröffnung.

When the reviewer of such a book as this turns from general description to the consideration of details, he is at once met by the difficulty

[1] In his notice of Dr. Bonner's book, *Classical Review* XX, 56.

known as an *embarras de richesse*. Every page yields points of interest upon which he would willingly dilate, either in the way of bringing additional arguments to support the author's view, or else in way of refutation. As this is manifestly impossible in a brief review, I defer to another occasion the discussion of some points of interest connected with this subject; in the meantime I would conclude this article by saying that Dr. Leisi has produced a book of very great value, displaying both erudition and acuteness, and forming a really serious contribution to the study of Greek law. I have noted a number of incorrect references, but the great defect of the book is that it possesses no index.

W. A. GOLIGHER

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Commentaire anonyme sur Prudence d'après le manuscrit 413 de Valenciennes. Par JOHN M. BURNAM. Paris: A. Picard et Fils, 1910. Pp. 300.

In this work Professor Burnam, whose interest in the glosses on Prudentius has already been shown by his *Glossemata de Prudentio* (1905), prints a hitherto unpublished commentary on that author from a MS in the municipal library at Valenciennes. A brief preface states that the transcription was made in part by the editor and in part by M. Hénault, assistant librarian at Valenciennes. A detailed description of the MS is reserved for another occasion, but the announcement is made that it was copied by a Low German or Netherlandish scribe, and that the work itself is to be assigned to Remi d'Auxerre (the commentator on Donatus, Martianus Capella, and other authors). It may here be stated that two references in the glosses to Johannes Scotus furnish a *terminus post quem*.

The glosses contain little original information, but much second-hand learning, the sources of which Professor Burnam has carefully traced, line by line, in a long appendix. The author was acquainted with the Greek language and many of his glosses are but translations of Greek words, but the limits of his knowledge of Greek history and literature may be seen, for example, in the passage on p. 69, l. 233, where it is not Socrates but Pythagoras who is forced by the Athenians to drink hemlock, or on p. 220, l. 1113, where he says: "Tragoediae sunt carmina quae privatorum hominum miserias continent." (Contrast Arist. *Poet.* xiii, and see note on the passage in Burnam's appendix.) His knowledge of the city of Rome is hardly based upon personal observation, for he says (p. 53, l. 508): "Tarpeius mons est Romae in quo Capitolium et Pantheon." It would be of interest to know the source of his limitation (p. 125, l. 188) of the number of the Cyclades to nine; Strabo, Mela, and Pliny the Elder enumerate from twelve to fifteen of them.

Professor Burnam has in his text made certain duly indicated corrections of the MS. These in general seem justified, but it may be questioned whether two glosses dealing with the much-disputed title *Dittocheum* have received consistent treatment. The first of these, prefixed to the commentary on the poems, is a gloss upon Gennadius' life of Prudentius (Gennad., *De Viris Illust.* xiii), and reads (p. 11): "DIROCHEU dicitur duplex refectio et ideo sic praetitulatur quia de veteri et novo testamento compositus habetur." *Dirocheu* has here been emended by Burnam to *Dittocheum*, but in view of the fact that in the second passage (p. 185) he himself retains in the glosses the form *Dirocheum* and of the additional fact that in the passage of Gennadius which is here glossed the form *Dittocheum* rests upon conjecture (cf. Richardson's edition of Gennadius, app. crit.), and that the title is by some scholars regarded as corrupt (Schanz, *Gesch. d. röm. Litt.*, iv, 1, 229), the change from the consistent even though hardly intelligible form *Dirocheu(m)* seems unwise.

Several misprints have been noted, of which but two need mention. On p. 130, l. 347, the *ori* of the MS should be transliterated as ὄρη, not ὄρα. On p. 281 the spelling *idoliothitum* is inconsistent with *idoliotitum* on p. 43 and *idolotitum* on p. 139. Which one or which two of these spellings should be cited ought to be stated, if the word is to be placed, as Professor Burnam has done, in a list of *Addenda Lexicis Latinis* at the end of his volume. The book closes with a list of rare words, one of Greek words, and a general index.

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Galeni de Usu Partium Libri XVII. Ad codicum fidem recensuit. GEORGIUS HELMREICH. Leipzig: Teubner, 1907. Vol. I, pp. xiv + 496; Vol. II, pp. v + 484. M. 16.

In a brief preface the editor gives account of the relation of his edition to manuscripts and previous editions. Since the few who deign to read Galen resort to the edition of Kühn, it is well to know that it has no critical value. Our present editor, who has previously given evidence of sound method and critical insight, makes it possible to dispense with Kühn in another work and thereby adds to our obligations; but while it may be said, as Helmreich says of himself (I. xii), that even he has not considered the claims of all known manuscripts, we cannot assume to have even approximately a definitive text.

This particular work of Galen possesses considerable interest for the historian of Greek thought. Its aim is to apply thoroughly and consistently the teleological principle in explanation of the structure and functions of the human body, since, as Galen complains, Hippocrates, Plato,

and even Aristotle have failed to do so. Throughout the work there is a constant contrast drawn between those who explain structure and function as due to natural law (*ἀνάγκη*) and those who find in them an expression of an ideal or a beneficent end. Galen says (I. 8) that earlier thinkers were untrained in the teleological method (*ἀγυμνάστους δ' ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῆς τῶν χρειῶν εὑρέσεως γενομένους*), and even Hippocrates was unsatisfactory (*ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ Ἱπποκράτους ἦν ἱκανά, τὰ μὲν ἀσαφῶς εἰπόντος, τὰ δ' ὅλως παραλιπόντος*). But the words of Hippocrates, as the voice of a god, must form the text (I. 9); nevertheless, when he seeks a suitable text of Scripture to prove his point that Hippocrates employed the teleological method, he finds nothing more conclusive than a vague reference (almost Stoic in tone) to *συμπάθεια* in the (probably late) Hippocratean treatise, Π. *τροφῆς* c. 23 (I. 8, p. 12, 23 ff. Helmreich) and to the distributive justice of *φύσις* (II. 16, p. 116, 9 ff. Helmreich *et passim*). It is evident that Galen, who knew his Hippocrates by heart, was hard put to it to prove that his hero was a teleologist. This is just what the critical student of Greek thought would have expected, since teleology as a method is the result and fruit of the Socratic movement. Yet eminent writers on Greek philosophy are constantly assuming that the teleological point of view was a thing to be reckoned with in pre-Socratic times. Thus Bernays said that Heraclitus employed the metaphor of the dice-playing boy (fr. 52 Diels) to forestall a teleological interpretation of nature, while Otto Gilbert boldly claims ("Heraklits Schrift Περὶ Φύσεως," *Neue Jahrbücher für kl. Altertum*, etc. [1909], 168 ff.) that the *κόσμος* in the system of Heraclitus is the product of the divine reason operating to beneficent ends. Both are equally in error. Here, as elsewhere, the historian of Greek thought will do well to check his conclusions by reference to the priceless body of medical literature, which has been so much neglected but nevertheless constitutes perhaps the best means of tracing the growth of ideas.

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Θεσσαλικὰ Μνημεῖα, I. *Περιγραφὴ τῶν γραπτῶν στηλῶν Παγασῶν*. Ὑπὸ Α. Σ. Ἀρβανιτοπούλλου. Ἐν Ἀθήναις, 1909. Pp. 464.

In the course of the years 1907–8 Dr. Arvanitopoullos discovered on the site of ancient Pagasae in Thessaly a large number of grave-stelae, dating from the third century B.C. and later, and bearing painted designs more or less well preserved. These are now in the newly built Museum of Volo. The present volume contains, besides some prefatory matter, a detailed catalogue of these stelae.

In view of the scantiness of the remains of Greek painting, much interest has been aroused by the announcement of this accession to our

store. It is gratifying to know that copies of the best specimens have been made by the practiced hand of M. Gilliéron and will be published in color by the Greek Archaeological Society (p. 188). Meanwhile the student at a distance who would learn something of the artistic qualities of these paintings is dependent chiefly upon seven reproductions in black and white given in the Ἐφημερὶς Ἀρχαιολογική for 1908. So far as one can judge from these, Dr. Arvanitopoullos is somewhat extravagant in putting the best stele on a level with the work of Raphael (p. 102). In fact it seems impossible that these paintings, whatever their interest from the point of view of technique, can compete in artistic merit with the best designs upon Attic vases or with the exquisite Greek drawings on ivory from Koul-Oba, now in St. Petersburg.

F. B. TARBELL

Priene. Nach den Ergebnissen der Ausgrabungen der kgl. preuss. Museen 1895–1898. Rekonstruiert von A. ZIPPELIUS. Aquarelliert von E. WOLFSFELD. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. M. 7.

This is a colored lithograph, about 36 in. × 33 in., intended for use in schools. It shows, in bird's-eye view, the city of Priene, as it looked about 150 B.C. Being the first trustworthy picture of an ancient Greek city in its entirety, it possesses an extraordinary interest. Accompanying it is an essay by Dr. Th. Wiegand, reprinted from the *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*. This summarizes in an interesting way the main points to which a teacher should call the attention of students. It will be especially valuable to those who do not have access to the volume on Priene by Wiegand and Schrader.

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SATURA—THE GENESIS OF A LITERARY FORM

BY G. L. HENDRICKSON

It is a familiar observation of the commentators on Horace that the word *satura*, with which the second book of the *Sermones* opens—"sunt quibus *in satura*"—is there found for the first time in extant Roman literature as the designation of a literary form. That the non-occurrence of the word before this time is merely a matter of accident, a caprice of fortune in the preservation of literary monuments, has been, I presume, the general opinion of those whose studies have led them to take cognizance of the matter. Apart from the general assumption that Lucilius used the word either as a title or as a generic designation for his caustic poems, it has been the accepted opinion that it was similarly used by Ennius, not to mention the pre-literary dramatic *satura* of Livy's narrative. Since Kiessling's time we have become familiar with the suggestion that Ennius was the "inventor" of the name as a literary title. But this confidence in the early occurrence of the word rests upon an insecure foundation of assumption and inference, to which Marx has called attention in the Prolegomena to his edition of Lucilius. His brief observations give a most important hint for the history of the beginnings of Roman satire and they contain implications which neither Marx himself nor any who have since discussed the subject have followed out. Throughout the following discussion I would profess the fullest indebtedness to Marx, which will be recognized by those familiar with his learned and brilliant work.

As regards the occurrence of the word, we have then the two well-known passages in Horace (*Serm.* ii. 1 and 6) and the reference in Livy vii. 2 to the early dramatic performances which he designates as *saturae*. After this time the word is not found until the latter part of the first century A.D. But with this statement of the facts of occurrence the significant features of the matter are by no means exhausted. Marx himself has called attention to one noteworthy passage in which the word is not used where it might have been expected. It is Varro's allusion (*R. R.* iii. 2, 17) to "L. Abuccius homo ut scitis adprime doctus, cuius *Luciliano charactere* sunt *libelli*," and it may be added that the context of Varro indicates that the writings of Abuccius had to do with a censure of Roman luxury, a Lucilian theme. Similarly in Trebatius' account of a Lucilian invective in verses of his own composition contained in *Ad fam.* xii. 16. 3 (also cited by Marx), the absence of the word *satura* may well be significant. But these are no more than hints and indications: to have weight and meaning the number of such observations must be increased, and the character of each passage carefully weighed.

First then it is to be noted that Cicero nowhere alludes to Lucilius as a writer of any specific literary form or genus, in spite of a good many references to him. For Cicero apparently his work is as individual as the man himself, and in alluding to it he is content with general descriptive words, as in *De or.* ii. 25: "C. Lucilius homo doctus et *perurbanus* dicere solebat *ea quae scribebat* neque se ab indoctissimis," etc., or again in *De fin.* i. 7: "et sunt *illius scripta leviora*, ut *urbanitas* summa adpareat," etc. As here, so generally elsewhere, the mention of Lucilius is attended by descriptive words or allusions which convey the idea of humorous or satirical writing, and it is at least noteworthy that nowhere the more precise and compact technical term should have been used for this purpose if it was available. It may be questioned whether any other literary name of equal prominence figures in the works of Cicero so vaguely. But whether this vagueness is in defect of a defined category and a name, or is a matter of chance, we may for the moment leave undetermined.

Far more significant than the absence of the word *satura*, or of

any other technical designation of Lucilius' work, from the pages of Cicero is its absence from contexts which seem fairly to clamor for it in Horace's first book of *Sermones*. The fourth satire is a document—but one of many we must believe—of the debate which was going on at Rome in Horace's time concerning the style and spirit of Lucilius' writings and the method of reproducing them for uses of the present. There were typical as well as individual differences in this effort; but probably Horace was at the opposite end of the scale from those who fancied themselves the most legitimate inheritors of the mantle of Lucilius, and who strove most faithfully to reproduce his manner. Horace begins, probably with reference to other contemporary discussions, with a definition of the *character Lucilianus* by pointing out his dependence upon the old Attic comedy. Both Crispinus[1] and Fannius, who follow, must be understood as imitators of the Lucilian style; the former, like Persius and Juvenal at a later time, a declaimer in hexameter verse against vice from the ethical standpoint of Stoicism, the latter, on the evidence at least of the pseudo-Acronian scholia, the author of satires. In contrast with the self-complacent assurance of Fannius, Horace vaunts his own reserve: "cum *mea* nemo *scripta* legat . . . . quod sunt quos *genus hoc* minime iuvat." Then, after defining the classes against which the satirist directs his attacks, "omnes hi metuunt *versus*, odere poetas." The vagueness of *versus* has often been commented upon by editors and critics and variously justified, but a more simple explanation of the colorless general term, namely the lack of a specific word, has not, I think, been entertained. Again in 56 the style and manner which Horace is cultivating are characterized not by reference to a generic name, but by reference to Lucilius: "his ego quae nunc, olim quae scripsit Lucilius," and once more in 64, *genus hoc* takes the place of a fuller periphrasis. Throughout the whole of the satire it is plain that the poet is dealing with a literary genus which is for him the *character Lucilianus*, but for which he has at

[1] Concerning Crispinus the scholia contain certain items of information which cannot reasonably be looked upon as manufactured to fit the text of Horace: "Hic Crispinus poeta fuit, qui sectam Stoicam *versibus* scripsit" (ad *Serm.* i. 120). In the same place they report that the epithet *aretalogus* was applied to him, a name which implies not so much loquacity as a certain bizarre and fantastic treatment of satirical matter for which we should find better analogues in Lucilius and Juvenal than in Horace (v. Reitzenstein *Hell. Wundererzählungen*, pp. 8 ff.).

disposal apparently no single or comprehensive designation. As in Varro's allusion to Abuccius, so in this satire of Horace his own writings and those of others in the same style are *libelli charactere Luciliano*.[1] Nor can it be urged that a technical designation is something which we might expect to find avoided. At all events Horace does not hesitate to refer to *comoedia* here (45) as he does to *mimos* in the tenth satire (6) in making comparisons with the style which he is defining.

Again in the discussion of the tenth satire, the word *satura*, comprehending briefly the literary type under consideration, might advantageously have found a place, though no single passages which point to its need so definitely as *genus hoc* and *versus* in the fourth can perhaps be indicated. But in such a transition as is made in vs. 7 from the characterization of Lucilius to the universal demands of satirical writing ("ergo non satis est . . . . est brevitate opus"), a vagueness results which I cannot but suspect was due to Horace's inability to use a technical designation for the literary form which he proceeds to define in respect to its spirit and style. The lack of some such specific word of definition gives to the injunctions which follow a universality of application which is obviously not the poet's intention. I have spoken of Horace's inability to use a specific name, but it will of course be clear that its absence might equally well be due to the purist's aversion to a new word.

Concerning this composition in general the observation should be made that the warmth of Horace's criticism of Lucilius has to do only secondarily or even remotely with Lucilius himself. It has to do with a problem of the present, viz., the definition of the *character Lucilianus*, not as a matter of historical criticism, but as a norm or standard for present practice. The opponents of Horace had according to the letter a very good case in urging that the revived Lucilian style should follow the example of its inventor: should indulge itself in coarse wit, should admit of the prolixity of affected extemporization, should aim primarily at the biting and the caustic, should intermix Greek words with a colloquial freedom which rhetorical prose had long since forbidden. Against all this Horace raised his protest, and urged that, if the *character Lucilianus* was to take its

[1] Cf. also vs. 71: "neque pila *libellos*," and vs. 101: "afore *chartis*."

place as a literary form in the present, its founder should not be looked upon as faultless: a genius, to be sure, and originator of a form and style untouched by Greek influence, but not a model for a more finished age; nor would Lucilius himself in their own age have written as he had done in the time which fate had allotted to him.

We see here very concretely and definitely the efforts of Horace, as against the theoretical demands and the practice of some of his contemporaries, to pass beyond the personality of Lucilius; to generalize a type of literature which, taking its origin from Lucilius, shall no longer be defined by traits which represented merely his faults and the limitations of his time; in short, to create out of the *character Lucilianus* a Roman satire. But as yet a recognized and current name for this revived Lucilianism was lacking. For all the efforts of his own circle of literary friends and associates toward the re-creation of older literary forms Horace finds some characterizing words suggestive of their distinctive labors—the *comes libelli* of Fundanius, the *facta regum pede ter percusso* of Pollio, the *forte epos* of Varius, the *Camenae gaudentes rure* of Virgil—but for himself he says, with the same looseness of allusion which we noted in the fourth satire, "*hoc* erat melius quod scribere possem," only suggesting as before a definition of his field by reference to Lucilius —"inventore minor." In fine, the character of Horace's references to his literary form throughout Book i bears the mark either of vagueness, or of definition merely by reference to the manner of his great predecessor. This phenomenon so often recurring does not seem merely a matter of chance or of taste in the choice of expressions.[1]

[1] It is worth noting at this point that in two places Horace alludes to his satirical writing with *ludo* ("haec ego ludo") and *inludo* ("ubi quid datur oti inludo chartis"). The only fragment of Lucilius which bears any trace of allusion to his work by title employs the words *ludus ac sermones* (1039, and Marx's comment). The inferior MSS of Seneca give to the satire on the death of Claudius the title *ludus de morte Claudi*. For *Naevius in ludo* see below, p. 135, n. 2.

The natural Greek words to represent the idea of satire are *κωμῳδεῖν κωμῳδία*—"voces ad quodvis fere ludibrii genus significandum usurpatae" (Wachsmuth *Corp. poesis ludib.* 25). In the well-known and chaotic passage of Joh. Lydus *De mag. pop. rom.* I, 41, *κωμῳδεῖν* is used to describe the spirit of Lucilius' writings, and *σατυρικὴ κωμῳδία* of the developed Roman satire. What the *σατυρικαὶ κωμῳδίαι* of Sulla (*Athen.* 261 c) were in fact it is quite impossible to say, but it would seem probable that the Greek designation represents an interpretation or conception of some poems of Sulla as Roman satires, from the standpoint of a later time. It is almost inevitable that the Greek grammarians who first gave a learned attention to Lucilius—Laelius

Now at the beginning of Book ii Horace, without circumlocution or apology, starts off at once with a technical designation of the Lucilian style—"sunt quibus in *satura*." Here at length we have a name, and together with the name we discern that some progress has been made toward defining it as a literary genus. Its laws have been abstracted and codified ("ultra *legem* tendere opus"), and Lucilius, though himself the "inventor," is thought of as having composed to a definite end:

> cum est Lucilius ausus
> primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem.

Here then, whether due to chance or to the developments of the intervening time, there is an absence of that vagueness of allusion which we noted in Book i. We have passed from the *character Lucilianus* to the recognition of a literary type. But though the occurrence of *satura* here and its repetition in the sixth poem (*saturis musaque pedestri*) would seem to point to the full habilitation of the word, yet as it is associated in the first passage with the technical language of a grammatical definition ("ultra legem"), so we may suspect that it was slow to obtain a place in the recognized literary vocabulary of the language. It is not to be wondered at that for his first book of satires Horace should not have employed as title a word which in the text of the book itself he has apparently not felt free to use. But for the second book it is not so clear, and it struck Porphyrio as peculiar that a work which avowed itself as satire should bear

Archelaus, Vectius Philocomus, and doubtless others—should have had occasion to assign his work to some general category of literature, and it is not easy to see where else it can have been placed than under the generic heading *κωμῳδία*. Such considerations would, perhaps, account for the early association of Lucilius with old comedy, and they may explain why Horace is at pains to state definitely that his own satirical writings are not meant for the stage—an assurance which would have been apparently superfluous with the title *satura*, but which would have some manifest motive if the Lucilian style were commonly classed as *κωμῳδία*—

> haec ego ludo
> quae neque in aede sonent certantia iudice Tarpa
> nec redeant iterum atque iterum spectanda theatris.

In contrast with these are the true stage comedies of Fundanius,

> arguta meretrice potes Davoque Chremeta
> eludente senem comis garrire libellos
> unus vivorum.

But from these considerations I draw no positive conclusions that Horace's satires were called either *ludi* or *comoediae*. Both observations serve rather to show that a fixed category of satire and a name were still lacking.

the title *Sermones:* "hos duos libros cum sermonum inscripserit tamen de his sic loquitur quasi satura" (ad ii. 1. 1). There is no evidence that the writings of Juvenal, for instance, were ever called either by their author or by the public anything else than *saturae:* but Horace chose for both books the title *Sermones*, and why? Was it because, as we have supposed,[1] he chose to use a specific descriptive name within the larger genus, or was the term *saturae* not yet sufficiently established to be available? Once again, in the epistle to Florus, Horace refers to his satires, and here also not by their technical, generic name, but descriptively as *Bionei sermones*, adding as if in explanation of their character as satires the words *et sale nigro*. It will not do to make too much of the passage, but the fact that the precise and technical designation of his odes and epodes has just preceded (*"carmine* tu gaudes hic delectatur *iambis"*) may raise the suspicion that the word *satura* was still a stranger even after the experiment of its employment in Book ii. Even as late as 30 A.D. one may infer from the language of Velleius that the word was not yet thoroughly naturalized. For in his survey of the republican literature in ii. 9 he classifies the names which he reviews under general categories of literary effort: "*oratores* Scipio Laeliusque, etc., ... Q. Mucius *iuris scientia* . . . . clara ingenia in *togatis* Afranii, in *tragoediis* Pacuvii atque Accii . . . . *historiarum* auctor Sisenna, Rutilius," etc. But in the midst of this series, following the tragedians, he inserts the Lucilian satire with only these words: "celebre et *Lucili nomen* fuit." For him, apparently, as for Cicero, Lucilius is an individual and not the representative of a literary genus.[2]

But it may be said, is not all this negative evidence, this argument

[1] See the writer's discussion, "Are the Letters of Horace Satires?" *Am. Jour. of Phil.* XVIII (1897), p. 313.

[2] A brief note in passing. Festus (ex Verrio) quotes from *Naevius in satyra* (257 M), "quia nam Saturnium populum pepulisti," a fragment which has generally been connected with the two well-known lines quoted by Cicero *De sen.* 20: "cedo qui vestram rem publicam," etc. The formula with which Cicero indicates the source of his quotation—"sic enim percontantur *in Naevii poetae ludo*"—has caused much debate, though in fact there is no good reason for questioning the integrity of the text. Now if the two fragments are from the same source, we have, for the purposes of our inquiry, the curious and noteworthy circumstance that Cicero cites the work with the words "in Naevii *ludo*," while Verrius, a generation later, cites the same work with Naevius "in *satyra*."

from silence, outweighed by the fact that Varro had already discussed the etymology of *satura* and inquired into its origins? It has been a very general assumption that the various speculations which Diomedes and the Horatian scholia give concerning the origin of the word *satura* and its application to a form of literature go back for the best part to Varro, and in this confidence a special feeling of security has been entertained concerning the foundations of our knowledge. But let us see. In the article of Diomedes the name of Varro occurs only once: "(satura dicta) a quodam genere farciminis, quod multis rebus refertum saturam dicit Varro vocitatum. Est autem hoc positum in secundo libro Plautinarum quaestionum 'satura est uva passa,'" etc. (*G.L.* I, 485). Diomedes (and his source) of course is discussing the origin of the name of the literary form, but it will be seen that this passage contains no evidence to show that Varro was doing so. Varro was explaining the word *satura* as it appeared in some connection in the language of Plautus, whether the Plautus which we now have, or a larger Plautus which he may have recognized. Now the word *saturam* is found in the *Amphitruo* (667), where it is applied to Alcumena in the natural and obvious meaning of pregnant, and it is to this passage that Marx refers Varro's gloss (*Proleg.*, p. xi). But I cannot entertain so much confidence in a matter so slightly reported to us, and indeed some obvious considerations would seem to me to make it unlikely that Marx is right. For if a grammarian offers a gloss or etymological explanation it is presumably to explain a difficulty or obscurity. This is not present in the case of *saturam* in the *Amphitruo*. Nor again would it be any explanation of the adjective use there found to point out another substantive use of the word. That the Plautine Questions would scarcely afford occasion to consider *satura* as the name of a form of literature need not be said. Of what word or phrase Varro's gloss is an explanation we can only conjecture, but not without plausibility. The archaic phrase *per saturam* is quoted from Laelius, from T. Annius Luscus (against Ti. Gracchus), and it is found in a fragment of Lucilius. In the time of Cicero and Varro it was already obsolete, and it continued so until it was resuscitated by the conscious archaist Sallust. Here was something of the older language which demanded explanation then as it does now.

The problem which it presented was to find a substantive (to be supplied) or a substantive meaning for the adjective form, to which the preposition could be logically prefixed. Varro, following the second alternative, finds it in the technical language of the culinary art, where as he says *satura* is a *genus farciminis*, and thus he affords a conceivable history of the origin of the phrase *per saturam*. Through Varro *satura* thus found a place among the words requiring glossographical treatment. Verrius, a successor in the same line of learned inquiry and collecting material for his general treatise, *De verborum significatu*, from Varro's monographical Plautine study, repeats his predecessor's explanation and adds another: "(satura) et lex multis alis legibus conferta." But in this addition, as Marx has pointed out, he has gone quite astray, misled by the occurrence of the phrase *per saturam* in connection with laws and the business of legislation, and so postulates a *lex satura* which is not attested by the examples to which he appeals. But to *satura* as a form of literature, like Varro, he makes no allusion. The application of these glosses to the explanation of the name of the literary genus belongs to the scholarship of a later time, which cast about for still other possibilities, in the familiar manner of ancient etymology. Thus "satura a *saturis*" and "satura a *lance* variis multisque primitiis referta" were excogitated—an explanation which in later antiquity came to prevail ("plerique satyram a lance . . . . nomen accepisse dicunt," *Ps. Acro p.*1 Keller). It would seem probable, and it is, I believe, generally assumed, that the passage of Diomedes is drawn from Suetonius without essential additions, but it must be entirely a matter of conjecture to what ultimate source it is to be referred—whether to Probus or to some other grammarian of the first century—nor does it much matter. Let it suffice to say that the most obvious etymological associations of the name—"a copia et saturitate rei"—apparently underlie Juvenal's description of the satirist's field:

> quidquid agunt homines, votum timor ira voluptas
> gaudia discursus, nostri farrago libelli est.

The purpose of this discussion is to show that to our earlier instances of the non-occurrence of the word *satura*, in connections

where it might have been looked for, we must add the important item that neither Varro nor Verrius explained the word as the name of a poetical form, nor alluded to it. For in view of the fact that Varro's consideration of the word in an entirely remote connection (*quaestiones Plautinae*) is cited, it would seem a tolerably certain conclusion that he had nowhere else discussed the matter. His silence, taken in conjunction with the other examples of its non-occurrence down to Horace's second book, point to the conclusion that the word was not yet in current usage to designate the Lucilian style. The situation in his time is indicated concretely it would seem by his own usage in reference to the satires of Abuccius, "cuius *Luciliano charactere* sunt libelli."

If, then, it seems a probable conclusion that the substantive *satura* as the designation of a form of literature was either not in existence or not in current usage down to the decade 40–30 B.C., how shall we explain the origin and genesis of it at that particular time? The older explanations of the name *satura* in spite of many differences have yet all rested on the assumption that the word was early in Latin usage, and for the most part have appealed to the designation of the early dramatic form which Livy describes in vii. 2. But whether Livy's account has any basis of ultimate historical fact or not, no one will now believe that the name *satura* in it (which Horace's essentially parallel description does not contain) has any claim to be looked upon as primitive or original. The word *saturae* in Livy belongs to the descriptive vocabulary either of the historian himself, or of a contemporary source, employing the new designation which the literary criticism of the period had but recently acquired to indicate the humorous and satirical character of the performances which are described. An historical development therefore from the early dramatic to the later literary satire, on the evidence of a common name, can no longer be traced.

Now the positive teaching of antiquity on this matter makes satire begin with Ennius,[1] and it distinguishes between satire *par excellence* (namely Lucilian) and the earlier satire of Ennius. Kiessling it was, I think, who first (1886) threw out the hint that Ennius with the title *satura* was aiming at some suggestion of miscellany

[1] Diomedes-Suetonius *G.L.* I, 485.

such as is contained in Alexandrine titles like *ἄτακτα* or *σύμμικτα*, and he suggested that *poesis* was probably to be understood with it; Leo[1] with sounder feeling connected the name with the colloquial phrase *per saturam*, but both erred in assuming that Ennius did or could have used the substantive form *satura*. Marx makes the necessary correction and conjectures that the miscellaneous poems of Ennius bore the title *poemata per saturam* and that following this model Lucilius used *sermones per saturam*. This suggestion rests upon the analogy of such titles as *Divi Claudi apotheosis Annaei Senecae per saturam* and *Pescennius Festus in libris historiarum per saturam* cited by Lactantius (*Inst.* i. 21. 13). Still another example can be adduced from the mediaeval *vita Boetii* (Peiper, p. xxxi), which, referring to the composition of the *De consolatione*, says: "in quo (sc. carcere) repositus hos *libros per satyram* edidit, imitatus videlicet Martianum Felicem Capellam." Whether in fact *per saturam* was attached to the title of Boethius' work the available record of inscriptions and subscriptions in the MSS does not reveal. The same may be said of the encyclopedia of Martianus Capella, with which the author of the life compares Boethius' work. However, the curious conceit of making Satura the narrator of the festivities with which the nuptials of Philology and Mercury were celebrated might be interpreted as a sort of jesting allusion to a form of title like *libri per saturam*.

These examples will suffice at least to show that the assumption of such a title for Lucilius is by no means incredible, and since *per saturam* is the only genuinely attested phrase from the early language from which the form *satura* can be derived, it is hard to see from what other source the origin of the name is to be sought. What *saturam* in the phrase *per saturam* is we do not know any better than the ancients did, nor are we likely to find out. The derivations of the ancient grammarians from *lanx satura*, *lex satura*, etc., are blind guesses, the futility of which is revealed by their variety; to the unsatisfying conjecture of one generation the next added still another. The method can be seen very clearly in the treatment of Verrius (Festus). To Varro's explanation *satura = genus farciminis* he adds a *lex satura*. But if one will follow the matter closely it

[1] "Varro und die Satire," *Hermes* XXIV (1889), p. 77.

will appear very clearly that this *lex* has its origin in a misapprehension of the meaning of the phrase *per saturam* in certain connections having to do with law and legislation.[1] With regard to *lanx satura*, the contribution of a still later time, we are no better off. It is only attested by the erudition of the grammarians in this connection, and it is not impossible that it also rests upon some similar misapprehension of *per saturam* in the context of sacrificial or ritualistic language.[2] As for Varro's *satura* as a *genus farciminis* I would not be boldly incredulous, but in the lack of evidence of usage one must accept it with some caution. All that remains of really attested usage from the early language itself is the phrase *per saturam*. Passing over Ennius one can discern an appropriateness in the title *libri per saturam* for the writings of Lucilius which may be variously illustrated, both from the character of the extant fragments and from ancient criticism. Lucilius was notoriously and even ostentatiously an extemporizer,

> in hora saepe ducentos,
> *ut magnum*, versus dictabat stans pede in uno,

and there is much probability that the term *schedium*,[3] which is variously associated with his writings, goes back to his own usage. For such characteristics of style, combined with a discursive handling of subject-matter, a more fitting title than *libri per saturam* could not easily have been devised.

In the period intervening between Lucilius and Horace the writings of Lucilius were the object of some learned study, the barest record of which Suetonius has preserved for us. Some of it had to do with

[1] See Marx *Proleg.* XI, and *Com. ad vs.* 48. The matter was correctly apprehended also by Funck in his Program of the Gymnasium at Kiel, 1888, p. 14: "Für so ganz ausgemacht möchte ich es aber doch nicht halten, ob wirklich die *lex satura* der Grammatiker der Ausgangspunkt der Redensart *per saturam* war; es wäre auch denkbar dass sie nur aus der juristischen Gebrauchssphäre sich rückwärts eine solche lex konstruirt hätten, und dass die Wurzeln der Formel schon im sermo vulgaris zu suchen wären." An early variant of the formula *per saturam*, but with no difference of meaning, is *in saturam*, found in the lex repetund., *C.I.L.* I, pp. 62, 72. A consideration of this phrase by Verrius or his source would have made the interpretation of *per saturam=per legem saturam* quite impossible. For the variation of prepositional usage one may compare *in vicem* and *per vices*.

[2] Cf. Funck *op. cit.*, p. 16: " Es ist also wenig Grund vorhanden mit Sicherheit von der *lanx satura* oder *satura* allein in dieser Bedeutung zu sprechen," etc.

[3] See the frag. ap. Fest. 294: "qui schedium fa<ciam>"=Marx 1297 and commentary.

the text of the poet, some with his life, nor is it unlikely that some steps were taken toward the definition of his γένος, such as for example the association of his satirical vein with the old Attic comedy. But it does not appear that his poetry was as yet recognized as constituting an independent literary type. As has been said above, for Cicero, Lucilius is merely an individual with individual traits[1] of a humorous or satirical tendency. Those who like Trebatius or Q. Abuccius write poems in his vein represent themselves or are represented as followers of Lucilius or imitators of his manner. That is to say, there was recognized and perhaps pretty well defined a *character Lucilianus*, but the generalization of this individual quality to a universal type had not yet been made, and as yet therefore the want of a generic name had not been felt.

Such then was the situation when Horace, after his return from the defeat at Philippi, was impelled, as he tells us, by the bitter experiences of life to try his hand at forms of verse which should afford an outlet to his spleen. The surviving results of this activity contained in the first book of the *sermones* afford clear evidence that we are in the very crisis where the experiments of a number of writers, their criticisms, disputes, and recriminations, were gradually evolving from the style and manner of Lucilius a literary form of a more universal and generic kind. All of Horace's utterances in the three or four critical essays which he contributes to the question reveal this process and become more intelligible in the light of this conception. His starting-point is from Lucilius; satire for him is still the *character Lucilianus*, but he shows signs of revolt. In i. 4 and i. 10 we have the documents which contain the evidence both of dependence and of revolt.[2] But Horace was not the only aspirant for honors in the revived Lucilianism of the time. Apart from Varro of Atax, whose work cannot have long antedated Horace's own first efforts, and the *quidam alii* of the same passage, there were others whose names Horace's criticism has preserved for us—Crispinus, Fannius, Fabius, poets who were preaching practical Stoic ethics in the vein

[1] Cf. *De orat.* iii. 171: "in quo lepide lusit *is, qui elegantissime id facere potuit*, Lucilius."

[2] See the writer's study of i. 4 ("A Protest and a Programme") in *Am. Jour. Phil.* XXI (1900), p. 121, and of i. 10 ("Horace and Lucilius") in *Studies in Honor of B. L. Gildersleeve*, p. 151.

of Lucilius, forerunners of Persius and Juvenal. Still others must have taken a hand in the critical and theoretical questions at issue —Hermogenes, Furius Bibaculus, Demetrius, and all the literary rabble hinted at in i. 10.[1] At the same time Valerius Cato was editing Lucilius, and his coterie of pupils and friends are among the critics whom Horace has provoked and against whom he defends himself.[2]

Thus in the decade 40 to 30 B.C. there was well under way an enthusiastic revival of Lucilius—in part of course only one manifestation of the same tendencies which were producing the archaic affectations of Sallust and Asinius—a revival which manifested itself in new texts of the poet, in emulation of the Lucilian style by contemporary writers, and in discussions of literary criticism and theory. But at the beginning of this time there was still no brief and comprehensive designation of the literary form which Lucilius had created. In consequence critical discussion and theory labored under the embarrassment of vague nomenclature (such as Horace's *hoc genus* or *versus*) or descriptive periphrasis (*his ego quae nunc olim quae scripsit Lucilius*). Thus from a Lucilian title such as *libri per saturam* a name was created by the demands of the time for a convenient designation, and the substantive form *satura* began to be employed. Whether it first came into vogue merely as a convenient abbreviation or as the result of some etymological fancy it is impossible to say. But for this second alternative it could be urged that etymology was one of the recognized means of restoring assumed ancient usage, and that the linguistic science of the time did not hesitate to put in practice the results to which it attained. At all events by the time Horace's second book appeared the usage had become sufficiently recognized in literary and gram-

[1] The satire of Lenaeus (*Magni Pompei libertus*) directed against Sallust belongs to this time (Suet. *de gram.* 15). The *Indignatio* of Valerius Cato (*ibid.* 11) in the mouth of the editor of Lucilius, and with its suggestion of Juvenal's *facit indignatio*, has the look of a Lucilian satire.

[2] Let me say in passing that I feel convinced that the eight lines prefaced to i. 10 in a part of our text tradition are Horatian, and that the *fictus adversarius* of the poem is generalized from Cato and his school. Thus, for example, *simius iste* would represent some character like Furius Bibaculus (whom Horace makes ridiculous in vs. 36), the faithful satellite of Cato and *doctus cantare Catullum* (cf. Heidel in *Proceedings Am. Phil. Assn.* XXXII [1900], p. xliii).

matical circles, and *satura* now appears as the technical designation of the literary form derived from Lucilius, which before this time had only been indicated by some descriptive periphrasis. To the period, therefore, of Horace's early satires, it would seem, must be attributed not only the generalization of the Lucilian style from an individual to a more generic type, but also the gathering up of this conception into a single name. Roman satire begins with Lucilius, but the better part of a century had elapsed before it claimed a place as a recognized and independent form of literature.[1]

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

[1] The remarkable paper of Dr. Alfred Klotz on the Catalogue of the writings of Varro in the latest number of *Hermes* (XLVI, 1 ff.) reached me too late to be taken account of here. The questions raised by the Varronian titles had not escaped me, but their consideration becomes the more pressing if in fact they are from Varro's own hand.

THE EARLY GOLD AND SILVER MANUSCRIPTS

By John M. Burnam

There exists a small group of manuscripts chiefly of the fifth and sixth centuries written usually on purple parchment and in gold letters, or in silver, sometimes employing these two metal tinctures in combination. One is in the Gothic language, probably an Italian production, two are Greek, and five are Latin and with possibly one exception assignable to the Italian peninsula. They form a special class in the larger group of very handsomely decorated codices of the early Christian period. All of them are interesting as monuments of Christian art and literature, and as such have been the subject of numerous articles in magazines, besides treatment in monographs and comprehensive treatises. The discussion of them has been from the point of view of art, history, paleography, and biblical criticism. The writer of the present paper believes they deserve a place in the history of symbolism also.

Chrysography or writing with gold tinctures has been treated by Ch. Graux in the *Revue de Philologie* V (1881), 117–21, and in the *Saglio Dictionnaire*, art. "Chrysographie"; by W. Wattenbach in his well-known *Schriftwesen*, 3d ed. (1896), 251–61, who made some additions to the material gathered by his predecessors; and nominally by Mau in the Pauly-Wissowa *Realencyclopädie* under the title *χρυσογραφία*, where, however, the topic is merely mentioned. Other mentions are found in Birt's *Antikes Buchwesen* (1882) 108 and 502, and once more in the same author's *Buchrolle in der Kunst* (1907) 22 n. and 302 n. 2 with some corrections[1] to previous statements. Some welcome contributions to the whole subject were furnished in 1902 by L. Blau in his *Studien zum althebräischen Buchwesen*. His ideas were partly utilized and partly opposed by L. Traube in his epoch-making essay *Nomina Sacra* (1907) 21–24; this work contains, too, on pp. 178–85 a valuable list of the earliest

[1] On p. 22 n. he cites a papyrus of the third or fourth century which shows that contrary to his earlier opinion, gold writing was possible on both parchment and papyrus, *ἐπὶ χάρτου ἢ διφθέρας*.

Latin manuscripts, biblical and patristic, and on pp. 56–87 a similar catalogue for the Greek language.

Blau's treatise deserves special mention at this point, for besides using whatever had been gathered by Graux and Wattenbach, he first saw the prime importance of the sections 176–79 of the famous Aristeas letter. This passage tells us how the high priest at Jerusalem sent to Ptolemy Philadelphus a series of handsome presents, among which was (176) *ταῖς διαφόροις διφθέραις ἐν αἷς ἡ νομοθεσία γεγραμμένη χρυσογραφίᾳ τοῖς Ἰουδαϊκοῖς γράμμασι θαυμασίως*. Again, p. 80 and n. 3, we learn that in the Song of Songs (I:3) the golden lines with silver points mean the Torah or Book of the Law (*ἡ νομοθεσία* in the aforesaid letter) written out in silver letters or words. On pp. 143–44 he adduces another interpretation traditional among the Hebrew doctors according to which silver lines should accompany golden letters.

This same scholar (pp. 157–62) brings up for discussion the entire topic of chrysography, and shows that whereas Loew (*Graphische Requisiten* I, 161 ff.) and Wattenbach (*op. cit.* 112) were able to cite no earlier authority for gold-lettered manuscripts than this same narrative regarding the high priest and Ptolemy but depended for proof on Josephus (*Antiqq. Judaeorum* XII, 2, 11 [III, 87, 19 Niese]), this extract is merely a reproduction of the words of Aristeas. And on pp. 46 and 159 he emphasizes the combination of gold and silver in the same codex or roll and claims with justice, as it seems to the present writer, that there were some very early books entirely in these metal tinctures; that is to say, that the doubts on this point shared by Traube and others are groundless, and it was not merely initial letters or lines or the *τετραγράμματον, τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἀνεκπροσφώνητον*, the *nomen Dei ineffabile*, which was so honored. When men once learned how to make a writing-fluid containing a solution of either of the precious metals, why should it not be applied to the entire compass of a venerable text?

In all this valuable treatise, there is nothing more interesting than the discussion of the rule that if the *nomen ineffabile* be written in gold, such writing must be hidden, that is, withdrawn from the public gaze. That name had a miraculous and magic power which rendered its use by the ignorant and uninitiated very dan-

gerous. This is a primitive conception, well known in the history of religion, current not merely among the Hebrews, but among early Christians too, for whom the name of the Savior had the same significance as the Tetragrammaton among the Jews. This fact accounts satisfactorily for the concealment of the *nomen ineffabile* and the loss of its true pronunciation even on the part of the priesthood. It became necessary to write out the skeleton of the word on the page of the Scriptures, it is true, but before the invention of the vowel points only a few persons were able to give the skeleton its clothing of flesh. Even the use of gold was a concealment—but we will presently return to this point. Readers of Traube's *Nomina Sacra* remember how he has traced the filiation between this Hebrew practice and the Christian system of abbreviation as opposed to the pagan or classical.

Finally, Blau suggests that in view of all the evidence we may refer the production of these costly gold and silver MSS of the Bible and Psalters to a Jewish or oriental origin; he seems to hold that the custom spread from the East to the Graeco-Roman world. But may we not assign at least a part of the glory of the invention to the Egyptians? If so, this is something to range alongside the production of illustrated books, an invention which we now know was due to the land of the Nile.

Whereas our authorities are able to quote a number of passages mentioning gold writing, silver seems to be mentioned in the Hebrew tradition regarding the Song of Songs, etc., and in the classical languages just one single time. This is the oft-quoted text from Jerome's preface to Job (cited from the edition of Vallarsius, Veronae 1734 and ss., Tom. X, 1099–1100): "Habeant qui volunt veteres libros vel in membranis purpureis auro argentoque descriptos,[1] vel uncialibus, ut vulgo aiunt, litteris, onera magis exarata quam codices: dum mihi meisque permittunt pauperes schedulas et non tam pulchros codices quam emendatos." This passage and another (Ep. XXII, Tom. I, 115B) show the natural anxiety of the earnest preacher and man of conviction lest his flock desert the essentials and

[1] The combination of purple parchment with gold and silver letters, together with the contrast of schedulae and codices, suggests that the spreading use of the codex form of books on membrana may be partly due to the greater ease of producing handsomely written and illustrated books in one way than in the other.

realities for the outward show and the frivolities of life; they also reflect the scholar and translator, the critic who was more concerned for the correctness of the biblical text than its external adornment. These texts testify as well to the presence of a number of people in the communion at an early age (Ep. XXII may be dated 384) who were interested in caligraphy and book decoration for artistic reasons. True, many of the Christians may have been members of the congregation of Rev. Dr. Yellowplush, but even these represent the unworthy side of a praiseworthy impulse.

In general, this and the similar citations refer often with disapproval merely to the decorative effect of the purple and the precious metals. And yet there are extracts from the writing of the Fathers from which the disciples of Rev. Dr. Yellowplush could draw a legitimate defense of their admiration for these unusually fine copies. There was current a system of interpretation in the works of their critics which they could employ when attacked, namely a resort to allegory, mysticism, and symbolism. Let us devote a few lines to the history of this movement.

The general problem of criticism and interpretation began at an early moment to confront those Greeks who read and studied the Homeric poems. The relevant questions became acute when religious opinions were involved, and as men found themselves drifting away from a simple and unquestioning belief in the gods of Olympus and the stories related about them in the two national epics, it was natural to explain these stories in a way to suit the later ideas. Many a statement in the text was evidently figurative; why not others as well? If we find allegory of service in philosophy, why not in poetry too? If Pythagoras arrives at a system of number-symbolism, and if Zeus was originally the sky, by skilful interpretation one may find numerical harmonies and moral signification in still other elements of ancient story.

The Stoics were the chief masters and champions of this mode of exegesis. They found it a convenient way of presenting their doctrines to the public and of defending the national religion. The various occurrences in the national mythology out of harmony with modern views became sometimes natural phenomena having no moral content at all, at other times, by way of the allegory, became

quite moral. It was soon found that this method of explanation made it easy to read into an ancient text a modern meaning which could then be read out again. Next it appeared that this process, besides its purely practical side in teaching philosophy and bolstering up a declining faith in the old religion, might become an intellectual exercise. Some of the explanations found in the later Christian champions of this method are startling examples of ingenuity, not infrequently farfetched and misplaced.

From Athens and the narrower Hellas the method passes over to Alexandria and the wider Hellas. In Alexandria the Hellenizing Jews made its acquaintance, and having to some degree lost their faith in the traditional meaning attached to the ideas and practices of the Mosaic Law, they readily adopted the new resource. How deeply it took root we know from the writings of Philo.

From the Jews and the Greeks the system reaches the Christians. One needs only to think of the parables of the Savior, references to the Lion of the tribe of Judah, to the Lamb that was slain, and to the entire books of John's Gospel and the Apocalypse to see how naturally the nascent church seized on this mode of interpretation.

From the canonical texts it passes over to devotional and exegetical works; for instance, the Pastor of Hermas is hardly anything but a long allegory. Origen resorts to forced explanations to drive home an argument, and henceforth in the writings, e.g., of Augustine and Jerome, allegory is a well-organized system. It applies everywhere and at all times. Every name, number, person, place, scene, or incident in the Old Testament must be prophetic of an occurrence or doctrine of the New. Hannah and her child were the prototypes of Mary and hers; Adam and Eve foreshadow the Savior and the Church.

Wherever in the Hebrew Scriptures you find the number 300, that means the crucifixion, because that number in the Greek system of notation is symbolized by the letter T, itself a form of the cross. The fact that the word and interpretation were in different languages did not, in the opinion of these investigators, invalidate the results. Thus *Adam*, a Hebrew word, means the world, because

the component letters are the initials of Ἀρκτοῦρος, Δύσις, Ἀνατολή, Μεσημβρία, or North, West, East, and South. These examples might be multiplied indefinitely by anyone who will take the trouble to turn the pages of Augustine and Jerome. The reader must admit that the contemporaries of those Doctors, and particularly the later generations accustomed to regard their words as inspired, were naturally inclined to find a hidden meaning in anything and everything connected with the Scriptures.

The doctrine of the time may be found in the following quotations:

St. Augustine (editio Benedictina, 11 vols., folio, Parisiis, 1679–1700) *In Johann. Evang. 7*, no. 9 Tractat. XXVIII (Tom. III, 2, 511C): "Omnia quae dicta sunt antiquo populo Israel in multiplici Scriptura Sanctae Legis, quae agerent, sive in sacrificiis, sive in sacerdotiis, sive in diebus festis, et omnino in quibuslibet rebus quibus Deum colebant quacumque illis dicta et praecepta sunt, umbrae fuerunt futurorum. Quorum futurorum? quae implentur in Christo." *Enarratio in Psalmum CXXXI. 2* (Tom. IV, 1472D): "Sed solemus in Psalmis non ad litteram adtendere, sicut in omni propheta, sed per litteram scrutari mysteria." Sermo CXLIX *de Verbis Act. 10*, etc. (Tom. V, 705B): "Omnia enim animalia quae Judaeis prohibita sunt manducare signa sunt rerum, et sicut dictum est, umbrae futurorum" (some examples which we omit). Same page, no. 5E: "Sic cetera quae ad hunc modum praecepta sunt Judaeis, umbraticae sunt significationes futurorum" (with examples). This mode of interpretation is called tropologia in Jerome's works; besides two passages cited below, we here note Ep. CXX *ad Hedibiam* (Tom. I, 842BCD): "Triplex in corde nostro descriptio, et regula Scripturarum est. Prima, ut intellegamus eas juxta historiam. Secunda, juxta tropologiam. Tertia juxta intellegentiam spiritualium. In historia, eorum quae scripta sunt ordo servatur. In tropologia, de littera ad majora consurgimus, et quicquid in priori populo carnaliter factum est, juxta moralem interpretamus locum, et ad animae nostrae emolumenta convertimus. In spirituali θεωρίᾳ ad sublimiora transimus, terrena dimittimus, de futurorum beatitudine, et caelestibus disputamus: ut praesentis vitae meditatio, umbra futurae beatitudinis sit."

Recalling now what has already been said about the concealment of the Ineffable Name, let us consider what St. Augustine says (*Quaestiones in Exod. II: 120*, Tom. III, 458EF): he begins by quoting Exod. XXVIII:36: "Et facies laminam auream puram, et formabis in eadem formationem signi, sanctitatem Domini: et impones illud super hyacinthum duplicem tortam: et erit super mitram; secundum adspectum mitrae erit: et erit super frontem Aaron. Et auferet Aaron peccata sanctorum eorum." These words are thus explained: "Quomodo formetur in lamina sanctitas Domini, non video, nisi aliquibus litteris, quas quidam quattuor esse dicunt Hebraeas, quod, ut Graeci appellant, *τετραγράμματον* nomen Dei ineffabile credunt fuisse vel esse adhuc usque. Sed quaelibet sint vel quomodolibet se habeant illae litterae, ut dixi, sanctitatem Domini vel sanctificationem, si hoc magis credundum est, quod Graecus habet *ἁγίασμα* non nisi litteris in auro formari potuisse crediderim."

Here, then, we find a mystic signification attributed to the gold on which, only, the hidden name of God was to be incised. This passage alone might have served as the starting-point for symbolism of the metal in those old Bibles and Gospels. But the lovers of handsome books with mystical tendencies were not limited to these words only, for there were four verses in the canonical Scriptures dealing with gold and silver which recur in the Fathers with allegorical or mystic comment. For instance, St. Augustine after saying (*Enarratio in Psalmum LXXII: 17*, Tom. 14, 751E): "intellegimus per aurum sapientiam, quae ita excellit inter omnes doctrinas, ut aurum inter metalla," cites as his proof Prov. VIII:10: "Accipite prudentiam sicut argentum, et sapientiam sicut aurum probatum." (Vulgate text ed. Fillion runs: "Accipite disciplinam meam et non pecuniam; doctrinam magis quam aurum eligite.")

The remaining verses in their Vulgate rendering are: Ps. XI:7: "Eloquia Domini, eloquia casta; argentum igne examinatum, probatum terrae, purgatum septuplum"; Ps. LXVII:14: "Si dormiatis inter medios cleros, pennae columbae deargentatae, et posteriora dorsi eius in pallore auri"; *ibid.*, vs. 31: "ut excludant eos qui probati sunt argento." Our patristic citations ring the changes on these extracts in a series of mystic interpretations. They are:

ORIGENES

(Cited from the edition of Delarue, Parisiis, 1723)

In Exod. Homelia XXIII (Tom. II, 175F), after citing Ps. XI:7, says: "Si ergo quae scripta sunt corde conceperis, erit sensus tuus probus, et argentum tuum, qui est sermo tuus, probatum." *In Lucam Hom. XXVII* (Tom. III, 965A): "Si dormieritis inter medios cleros, pennae columbae deargentatae et posteriora dorsi eius in virore auri."

HIERONYMVS

Epp. CXX (Tom. I, 816AB): "Quod si deponamus gravissimam sarcinam, et assumamus nobis pennas columbae, et volabimus, et dicetur nobis, Si dormiatis inter medios cleros etc. Dorsum nostrum quod prius informe erat, et gravi sarcina premebatur, habeat nitorem auri, quod interpretatur in sensu, et alas deargentatas, quae intelleguntur eloquia Scripturarum, et regnum Dei intrare poterimus." *In Ecclesiasten II: 8* (Tom. III, 400A): "Argentum et aurum semper Scriptura divina super sermone ponit et sensu. Unde et in sexagesimo septimo Psalmo, columba quae interpretatur in spiritu, manifestiores et visui expositas alas deargentatas habet, occultiorem vero intrinsecus sensum in auri pallore operit." *In Isaiam I: 2, 19 seqq.* (Tom. IV, 42DE): "Saepe diximus argentum et aurum pro sermone et sensu accipi, quae cum a Deo hominibus data sint, ut vel loquantur vel sentiant Deum, et laudent creatorem suum, illi abutuntur hoc munere in idolorum simulationem: juxta illud quod scriptum est (Hos. II:8) Dedi illis argentum et aurum; ipsi vero de argento et auro meo operati sunt Baal." *Ibid. XL: 20* (Tom. IV, 489C): "Juxta tropologiam possumus dicere, quod increpentur principes haereticorum, diversa idola de suo corde fingentes; vel eloquii venustate quod interpretatur argentum; vel splendore auri quod refertur ad sensum." *In Ezechielem II: 7, 20* (Tom. V, 75C): "Facilis autem sensus est juxta tropologiam, quod aurum et argentum, sensus et eloquia Scripturarum." *Ibid. VII: 22, 19* (Tom. V, 257AB): "Aurumque in sensu atque sapientia, et argentum in sermone atque eloquio susceperunt, ut quod mente conceperint, verbis explicent. De argento legimus," etc. (citing Ps. XI:7 and LXVII:14). *In Joel II: 4–6* (Tom. VI, 209E): "Et argentum illius et aurum, eloquia videlicet Scripturarum, et *νοήματα* id est

sententias . . . . suis erroribus manciparunt." *In Zachariam I: 4, 2* (Tom. VI, 809B): "Quod autem in sensu aurum accipiatur posteriora et humeri columbae in sexagesimo septimo Psalmo ostendunt: quae dicuntur auri virore sive fulgore radiare."

AVGVSTINVS

Quaestiones in Evang. I: 41 (Tom. III, 2, 247D): "Eloquium Domini argentum est." *Enarratio in Psalmum LXVII: 14* (Tom. IV, 673D): "Nullam quippe aliam melius hic intellegi puto columbam deargentatam, quam illam de qua dictum est, Una est columba mea (Cant. VI:8). Deargentata est autem, quia divinis eloquiis est erudita: eloquia namque Domini alio loco dicuntur argentum igne examinatum terrae purgatum septuplum."

EVCHERIVS

(*Cited from the Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum ed. De la Bigne, Lugduni 1677*)

Formularum Spiritalium cap. 7. 9 (Tom. VI, 836E): "Aurum interior Scripturarum intellectus. In Psalmo: Et posteriora dorsi eius in specie auri." *Ibid.* E: "Argentum, eloquia divina, sive intellectus litterae vel historiae. In Psalmo" (XI:7).

ANASTASIVS SINAITA

(*Works in the same Bibliotheca*)

Anagogicarum contemplationum in Hexaemeron VIII (Tom. IX, 897H): "Aurum . . . . hoc est divinitas, quae in terra Ecclesiae resplendet, et adoratur. . . . . In multis autem locis divinae Scripturae, ipse quoque perscrutatus invenies aurum sumi pro figura divinitatis Verbii."

GREGORIVS MAGNVS

(*Benedictine edition, Parisiis, 1705*)

Lib. IV *in Reges* 4, 27 (Tom. III, 206D): "Sed quia argenti nomine divina eloquia designantur, argentum in manu pueri est sermo divinus in virtute sciendi." *Super Cantica Canticorum Expositionis*, cap. III, 10 (Tom. III, 426B): "Praedicatores . . . . nitore eloquii quasi splendore argenti decoravit." Cf. I:30: "Per aurum quippe sapientia." *Moralia in Job IV: 3, 61* (Tom. I, 131B): "Quid

vero aurum nisi sapientiam appellat? de qua per Salamonem dicitur (Prov. XXI:20): Thesaurus desiderabilis requiescit in ore sapientis . . . . (C) Quid etiam per argenti, nisi eloquia divina figurantur?" XVI: 23. 23 (p. 509C): "Argenti autem nomine sacra eloquia designari testatur Psalmista (XI:7)." XVIII:27, 24 (p. 566C): "Argentum intellegi eloquii claritas solet, sicut alias dicitur: Eloquia Domini," etc. XVIII:28, 39 (p. 573A): "In argento eloquium, in auro vitae vel sapientiae claritas designari solet." XVIII:28, 73 (p. 591C): "Quia enim argento saepe eloquia divina designantur, possunt argenti vocabulo etiam eiusdem eloquii scriptores intellegi." XVIII:38, 17 (p. 901C): "In argento enim quid aliud quam claritas divini sermonis accipitur?"

In this series of citations there is an ever-recurring pair of equations: gold means perception, knowledge, wisdom, the power to comprehend the works and words of God; whereas silver uniformly means speech, the ability to give expression to the words of the Supreme Being. Now, as God is himself Supreme Wisdom and Knowledge, and as it was for various reasons customary to use gold and gold only to reproduce his name when appearing in writing, and yet concealed from the eyes of the ignorant, what was easier than to make the gold letters in and of themselves symbolize God? And does not the thought at once suggest itself that as silver is God's word, the canonical texts as being God's word should be reproduced in silver letters?

Now let us examine the state of the handsomest of the early MSS. Here we find a series of Bibles, Gospels, sometimes Psalters and Evangeliaries, whose writing is uniformly uncial; the parchment is frequently stained in some one of the purple hues, the book provided with paintings or drawings, or at any rate with some kind of decoration. On other occasions we find the precious tinctures so often referred to. One need not expect to find a surviving MS showing all these features at the same time; such a book, especially if inclosed in a worthy jeweled case like the "cumdachs" of the finest Irish Bibles, would be a "livre de grand luxe" indeed.

The gold and silver MSS have been best discussed by Traube in his *Nomina Sacra;* by St. Beissel (*Geschichte der Evangelienbücher in der ersten Hälfte des Mittelalters*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1906);

by H. Omont in *Notices et Extraits* XXXVI, 2 (1899), 599–675: "Notice sur un très ancien manuscrit grec de Saint Mathieu en onciales d'or sur parchemin pourpré et orné de miniatures, conservé à la Bibliothèque Nationale." The reader is referred to these papers for additional facts and bibliography.

GOTHIC: A famous codex argenteus now at Upsala, ultimately of Italian origin; holy names apparently in silver along with the rest of the text.

GREEK: The codex purpureus Petropolitanus saec. VI contracts the genuine *nomina sacra*, i.e. God and the members of the Holy Trinity, and writes them in gold, whereas man, heaven, Israel, David, and Jerusalem are done in silver, as is the remainder of the text. The Psalterium Turicense, probably saec. VI, has a silver text, but the captions to the Psalms and their initials are golden; and a contract form of ΘΕΟΣ or ΚΥΡΙΟΣ occurring at the beginning of a psalm is golden.

LATIN: Here there are no less than five surviving MSS that concern us.

1. Codex Brixianus, of the gospels: purple, silver text; as for the adornment of the holy names Traube speaks doubtfully.

2. The so-called Sarrezano MS of John's Gospel, now in the archives of Monte-Cassino: silver purple, holy names in gold.

3. Psalterium Sancti Germani, partly in Paris (no. 11947 du fonds latin), partly in the Imperial Library of St. Petersburg: silver purple, holy names in gold.

4. Verona VI ($\frac{30}{6}$): a gospel MS on purple, and like so many others just described, with silver text and holy names in gold.

5. Vindobonensis 1235, gospels: silver purple, holy names in gold.

The predominance of this combination of parchment stained in some purple hue with text in silver letters and the holy names in the royal metal, is remarkable in the region where the influence of Augustine and Jerome was always the greatest. It is, too, the region where Jerome's angry comment on the devotion to superabundance of ornament to the exclusion of true piety was most noticeable. The occurrence of a few surviving MSS of the character under consideration in the East might mean a widening of the influence of the Western Doctors in the other half of the Empire. It

seems that from those oft-quoted biblical verses and the doctrinal comment on them a mystical conclusion was drawn, in accordance with which the name of divine wisdom was done in contract, and thereby concealed form, and the divine word in silver.

It is well known that at a later period the tradition of gold writing revived or perhaps survived: but the writer has no evidence to show a continuance of the mystical tradition. S. Berger in his *Histoire de la Vulgate* has a whole chapter devoted to an *école chrysographique* and shows that there still exist no less than nineteen specimens of such workmanship, all produced within the confines of the Carolingian empire, between the years 780 and 880. Gold MSS continue sporadically for over two hundred years longer and actually reappear during the humanistic epoch. All that time silver was not absolutely forgotten. As for the gold or silver, we will content ourselves with citing from M. Prou (*Manuel de la paléographie latine et française*, 3me éd., 1910, p. 38): "Dans un certain nombre de manuscrits carolingiens écrits à l'encre noire, les titres, les initiales, les noms du Christ, de Dieu, du Saint-Esprit, sont seuls tracés en lettres d'or ou d'argent."

In conclusion, it may be observed that this use of handsome adornment, especially with the help of gold, is frequent in the finest early Christian mosaics. For information and details the reader is referred to the first volume of the *Histoire de l'art* now in process of publication under the editorship of André Michel.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

TWO LINGUISTIC TESTS OF THE RELATIVE ANTIQUITY OF THE *ILIAD* AND THE *ODYSSEY*

By John A. Scott

When Wolf sent a copy of his *Prolegomena* to Wilhelm von Humboldt, the latter replied to him; "Der cardo rerum liegt meines Erachtens bloss darin, dass in der *Ilias* wirkliche Verschiedenheiten des Styls, der Sprache, u.s.w. sein sollen. Bei diesen, glaube ich, hätten Sie anfangen müssen" (quoted by Geppert in his *Ueber den Ursprung der Homerischen Gesänge*, p. iii). This wise suggestion of von Humboldt's could not well be ignored, and so it has come about that one of the most vaunted proofs of diversity not only of authorship but of antiquity of the books of Homer has been the assumption of different and easily defined stages of linguistic development.

No single phase of language is better adapted for furnishing this test than the demonstrative article ὁ, ἡ, τό, both because it is used so frequently and also because it shows in Homer all the different stages through which it passed from a pure demonstrative to a simple defining article. The demonstrative is the older, the article the later development, so, if the demonstrative use is predominant in certain books, the articular in others, the belief is justified that the books were written at different periods, and thus also by different poets.

The use of the definite article has furnished one of the chief arguments for the comparative lateness of the *Odyssey;* cf. Monro in his *Odyssey, Books XII–XXIV*, p. 332: "The defining article is much more frequent in the *Odyssey*." The use and extension of the definite article in Homer has been the subject of repeated publications; three of which cover practically the same ground and reach essentially the same results.

Any one of these three investigations should have shown how vain the attempt to separate the books of Homer on the basis of the defining article.

Hugo Koch in a pamphlet of forty pages, *De Articulo Homerico* (Leipzig, 1872), published a complete list of references to all the

examples of ὁ, ἡ, τό, in Homer, noting the use as demonstrative pronoun, relative pronoun, or as defining article. No attempt was made to distinguish between the usage of the different books or poems, but the writer limited himself to giving a simple list of the different cases, genders, and numbers.

In addition to all these categories he noted as doubtful the examples where he could not decide whether the word was used as a demonstrative or a simple defining article. No statistics were given, but by adding up his various lists I find that he assigns 422 examples of the definite article to the *Iliad*, 214 to the *Odyssey*. I have omitted from these figures all forms which he regarded as doubtful.

The results reached by Koch are practically the same as those reached independently by Miss F. Melian Stawell and published in her *Homer and the Iliad*, pp. 278 ff. Miss Stawell gives 218 examples of the definite article in the *Odyssey*.

As she divided the *Iliad* into Original *Iliad* and Additions, and did not give full statistics for the Additions, her figures are not complete, but, even so, she gives about 400 examples of the definite article in the *Iliad*. The fact that Miss Stawell makes one *Odyssey* and two *Iliads*, the bounds of which are constantly shifting, seems to me to detract greatly from the force and value of her statistics, especially since for the assumed Additions she did not feel it necessary to give all the examples, but only the "bulk." Since publishing this book Miss Stawell has enlarged the scope of the Original *Iliad* with a corresponding contraction of the Additions. Cf. *Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* (1910) 387.

Nevertheless the publication of her results should silence the argument based on the supposed increasing use of the definite article in the *Odyssey*.

A pamphlet *Ueber den Artikel bei Homer* (Adam Stummer, Schweinfurt, 1886) contains by far the fullest and ablest treatment of this subject which I have seen. Stummer wrote it under the direction of Professor von Christ, and was completely dominated by the latter's theories of the older and later portions of the *Iliad*. Stummer believed in a more restricted use of the definite article than Koch and assigned to a place among demonstrative pronouns many

of the examples of the definite article of the latter. His figures are as follows: The definite article is found in the *Iliad* 218 times, against Koch's 422; definite article in the *Odyssey* 171 times, against 214. However, they agree in this, that each assigns the greater number to the *Iliad*. Stummer never refers to Koch and seems to have been unacquainted with his work.

Stummer tried to fit his statistics to von Christ's theory of the *Urilias*. Cf. p. 56: Number of verses in the original *Iliad* 8,981, examples of definite article in original *Iliad* 125, that is one definite article in each 72 verses; verses in additions to the *Iliad* 6,712, examples of definite article in additions to the *Iliad*, 93, or one definite article in each 72 verses. That is, *the Urilias and the additions show exactly the same ratio in the use of the definite article.* No wonder Stummer felt his pamphlet did not prove anything. The reviewer, Vogrinz, in *Bursians Jahresbericht* 46, 189, says, "Aus den Zahlenverhältnissen, die uns geboten werden, ergiebt sich kein so überwältigendes Resultat als man gern hätte und als Hentze anzunehmen geneigt scheint."

To continue with the figures given by Stummer: entire *Iliad*, verses 15,693, definite article 218, one to each 72 verses; entire *Odyssey*, verses 12,110, definite article 171, one to each 71 verses.

In the entire *Iliad* ὁ, ἡ, τό, as demonstrative pronoun, 3,000 times; as definite article 218 times, or in a ratio of 14:1. In the *Odyssey*, as demonstrative pronoun, 2,178, as definite article 171, or in a ratio of 13:1.

The three poems assigned to Hesiod have 2,330 verses, the definite article occurs in them 62 times, or one in 36 verses; ὁ, ἡ, τό as a demonstrative pronoun 404 times, as a true definite article 62 times, or in a ratio of 7:1. In the five greater Homeric Hymns there are 1,914 verses with 57 examples of the definite article, or one in each 33 verses, ὁ, ἡ, τό as demonstrative pronoun 217 times, as a true definite article 57 times, or in a ratio of 4:1.

To restate these important facts in a brief summary: *Iliad*, one definite article to each 72 verses; *Odyssey*, one definite article to each 71 verses; Hesiod one definite article to each 38 verses; Homeric Hymns one definite article to each 33 verses. Ratio of the use of ὁ, ἡ, τό as a demonstrative pronoun to the use as a pure definite

article: *Iliad* 14:1; *Odyssey* 13:1; Hesiod 7:1; Homeric Hymns 4:1.

There could be no more cogent reason than these statistics for assigning the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the *Urilias*, and the additions to a single period, a period widely separated from the time of the origin of the poems of Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns. Such was the spell or pall cast by disintegrating criticism that Stummer, von Christ, and the reviewer passed coldly by these important results and saw nothing in them but a failure to reach anything of value.

Higher criticism simply blindfolded Homeric investigators. From the above figures it is clear that the distance from Homer to Hesiod is many times greater than the distance from Hesiod to the Homeric Hymns, while the advance from the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey* is just that which might easily be made within the life of one man. Not only is it impossible to separate the *Iliad* from the *Odyssey* on the basis of the definite article, but however plausible the test when applied to individual books, as for example to K, the Doloneia, it breaks down at last, since *Odyssey* α and ω, two of the most despised books in Homer and presumably the latest, show the most restricted use of the definite article.

If the books of Homer could be dated by the use of the demonstrative pronoun as a definite article, then the oldest books would be *Odyssey* α, ζ, ω, the latest would be *Iliad* A, K, Λ, X, Ψ.

Whether the free use of the definite article as assumed by Koch and Miss Stawell or the restricted use of Stummer be accepted, there can be little doubt that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belong to the same stage in the development of ὁ, ἡ, τό from a demonstrative pronoun to a definite article.

Another excellent test for the relative antiquity of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, as well as for individual books, should be furnished by perfects in -κα, since these perfects are not of Indo-European but of Greek origin, and they show in existing Greek literature clear traces of their development from a sparing use in the singular indicative to a wide use in other moods and numbers. From the vast literature on this subject I select two works as sufficient for my purpose: Hirt *Handbuch der griechischen Laut- und Formenlehre* 471, "Das κ-Perfektum ist zweifellos eine griechische Neuschöpfung, deren

Entstehung und Ausbreitung wir noch einigermassen verfolgen können. Das κ tritt zuerst im Singular auf bei den ursprünglich auf Vokal ausgehenden Formen"; Lobell, *Quaestiones de Perfecti Homerici Forma et Usu* (Lipsiae, 1876), traces the development of the perfects in κ thus, pp. 23 f.: "κ in perfectum paulatim irrepsisse videtur hac via: (1) *a*, singul. pf. ind. conjunct. et plusq., *b*, verba contracta, exc. partic.; (2) participia verborum contractorum; (3) tertia persona pluralis ind.; (4) optativus; (5) participia verborum quae non sunt contracta."

Homer shows no further stages in the development of these perfects, since there are no examples of the infinitive, imperative, of the first or second persons in the plural of the perfect, and no plurals of any person in the pluperfect, and further Homer never has any perfects from consonant stems of the type found in ἔφθαρκα. Such a simple method for detecting late books in Homer could hardly have been neglected, and accordingly we find Monro and Leaf, each, in his Introduction to K, drawing an argument for the lateness of that book from the presence of certain verbs in -κα. I find that there are in the *Iliad* the following different verbs with a perfect in -κα (I quote in the form first appearing in the *Iliad*): ἀδηκότες K 98, βεβήκασι A 37, βεβλήκειν K 145, βεβλήκει Δ 108, βεβρωκώς X 94, δεδίσκεν E 811, ἑστήκει Γ 231, κέκμηκας Z 262, μέμβλεκε Δ 11, μέμηκεν Ω 420, πεφύκει Δ 109, τεθαρσήκασιν I 420, τεθνήκεσαν O 664, τέτληκας A 228, τετυχηκώς P 748, ὑπεμνήμικε X 491, παροίχοντο K 252—17.

The following verbs in the *Odyssey* occur with perfects in -κα: ἀδηκότες μ 281, βεβήκει α 360, βεβλήκει χ 258, βεβρωκώς χ 403, μέμβλεκε ρ 190, δεδαηκότες β 61, δεδαπτήκειν ρ 359, δέδικεν μ 93, ἑστήκει θ 305, πεφύκει ε 63, τέθνηκεν α 196, τέτληκε τ 347, τετύχηκε κ 88—13.

The thirteen of the *Odyssey* bear about the same relation to the seventeen of the *Iliad* as the number of verses in the *Odyssey* to the number of verses in the *Iliad*, so that the *Odyssey* has one different verb with perfect in -κα to each 931 verses, the *Iliad* one to each 923. I find the total number of all examples of perfects of this class in the *Iliad* is 85, in the *Odyssey* 55. The relatively larger number in the *Iliad* is due to the free use of βεβλήκει, ἑστήκει in descriptions of

fighting, as these two forms are found in the *Iliad* 25 times, in the *Odyssey* but 8.

If we omit these two forms we find that one example of these perfects is found in the *Iliad* in each 261 verses, in the *Odyssey* one in each 258 verses.

Practically all of these examples belong to the singular of the indicative or the subjunctive, so it will be sufficient for the purposes of this paper to quote the forms which show a later development. According to Lobell, quoted above, the second stage in the development of the perfects in *-κ* is found in the participle of contract verbs. There are three different participles of this class: *ἀδηκότες* K 98, 312, 399, 471, *μ* 281, *τετυχηκώς* P 748, *δεδαηκότες* *β* 61. Thus the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* have each two examples of these participles. The third stage is found in the use of the third plural of the perfect indicative; of this there are four examples: *ἑστήκασιν* Δ 434, *τεθαρσήκασι* I 420, 687, *τεθνήκασιν* O 664, *πεφύκασι η* 114. *πεφύκει* is the reading of the last word in many of the best manuscripts. The fourth stage is found in the use of the optative; of this there is but a single example, *βεβλήκοι* Θ 270. Here there are variant readings. The fifth stage is found in the use of the participle in other than contract verbs; of this there is one example, *βεβρωκώς* X 94, used also in the *Odyssey* *χ* 403. This marks the latest phase of the development of perfects in *κ* found in Homer, as the infinitive and first and second persons plural of the perfect and first, second, and third plural of the pluperfect do not occur. It will be noted that no examples of the third, fourth, or fifth stages of development are found in K, Ψ, or Ω, and but three, one of which is doubtful, are from the *Odyssey*. Here as in the case of the definite article we see how dangerous it is to base arguments on single books, since if perfects in *κ* be the basis for dividing the books of Homer, then the oldest books would be *Iliad* B, H, and *Odyssey* *π*. Since no one of these has a perfect of this formation, the latest books would be *Iliad* Δ, K, Π, and X, and, as in the case of the article, *Odyssey* *α* and *ω* would be near the oldest stratum. Taken as a whole the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belong to the same period in a perfectly well-defined stage in the development of the perfect in *κα*. It seems to me incredible that two poems of such bulk could show such similar treatment of the

definite article and of the perfects in *κα* and themselves be separated by any appreciable interval of time.[1]

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belong to the same era of linguistic development, and whether they are the work of one poet or not they are surely the product of the same age.

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[1] I have not added to the list of perfects in *κα*, *ἱλήκυσι* ϕ 365, since it is generally regarded as a present from a verb *ἱλήκω*. I have omitted *δέδοικα*, found in both poems, since the shift in the vowels of the diphthong clearly mark it as a different formation. I have also not admitted *μέμνεκεν* μ 395, since the *κ* is part of the root of the verb and is not an addition of the perfect stem.

THE *DE COMPOSITIONE* OF DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE *RHETORIC* OF ARISTOTLE

By H. P. Breitenbach

The *De Compositione* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus is a work that deserves more attention from students of language and literature than it has received.[1] Now that so excellent an edition and translation has been published, that of W. Rhys Roberts, there is every incentive for the study of the treatise.[2] A comparison of it with the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle promises to throw some new light upon the methods and results of both authors.

In this paper I purpose to indicate the attitude of each writer to his problem by disclosing and comparing the fundamental presuppositions that underlie the two treatises. I shall endeavor also, from the standpoint of aesthetics, to explain their divergent positions. Finally I shall refer to certain similar standpoints in modern rhetorical theory.

Of the two treatises the scope of the *De Compositione* is much the more limited. In c. i Dionysius suggests the following rhetorical classification:

$$\text{Discourse} \begin{cases} \text{Thought} \\ \text{Expression} \begin{cases} \text{Selection} \\ \text{Arrangement} \end{cases} \end{cases}$$

The *De Compositione* confines itself pretty strictly to the topic of arrangement; the other topics receive only occasional mention.

The scope of the *Rhetoric* is less easily defined. The search for it reveals a significant progression in Aristotle's point of view.

His avowed purpose is to establish rhetoric on a scientific basis by relating it to dialectics. Thus he hopes to avoid, on the one hand, the fragmentary treatment found in the ordinary rhetorical hand-

[1] Cf. Clayton Hamilton *Materials and Methods of Fiction*, p. 206.

[2] It is, however, only fair to state that this essay (together with some other studies of similar nature) was prepared several months before Professor Roberts' edition was announced as forthcoming.

books, and, on the other hand, the sophistical method, which involves numerous devices or tricks, such as introducing matters foreign to the issue but designed to work on the feelings of the audience.[1] In opposition to these methods he declares: "It is clear then that the only proper subjects of artistic treatment are proofs" (i. 1). Accordingly he defines rhetoric as "a faculty of discerning all the possible means of persuasion in any subject" (i. 2). That no reference to the domain of form or expression is implied at this point is indicated by the threefold analysis of the subject which he immediately makes: "The proofs provided through the instrumentality of the speech are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral character of the speaker, or in the production of a certain disposition in the audience or in the speech itself by real or apparent demonstration" (i. 2). Again he says: ". . . . a speech is naturally composed of three elements, viz., the speaker, the subject of the speech, and the persons addressed" (i. 3). To these topics, then, which he calls the only proper subjects of treatment in rhetoric, he devotes the first two books, comprising about three-fourths of the entire treatise. But at the outset of the third book he makes a new analysis in which all that he has before discussed constitutes only a third part. "There being three proper subjects of systematic treatment in rhetoric, viz., the possible sources of proof, style, and the right ordering of the parts of the speech, the first of these has already been discussed. . . . . We have next to discuss the question of style" (iii. 1).

Why, then, did Aristotle at the outset of his discussion analyze discourse so as to leave out of consideration the topic of expression? And why did he afterward change his point of view so as to admit it?

To take up each question in turn: Several reasons may briefly be set down which will throw light on the first point. The element of style or expression, which term may serve for the moment to include both the remaining topics of Aristotle, is not easily susceptible of intellectual comprehension—not, at least, in comparison with the subject to which Aristotle gives his main attention, the sources of proof. Also, the principles of style cannot well be worked out deductively. Likewise, they cannot easily be related to rhetoric's

[1] Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.*, c. 15.

"counterpart," dialectics. These perhaps are the main reasons why Aristotle did not include style in his first analysis of his subject.

Then, too, the topic style, like the appeal to the emotions of the audience, was a feature of the sophistical treatments of rhetoric, which Aristotle was opposing. We know that Gorgias, for example, devoted considerable attention to it. Moreover, while the *Rhetoric* was designed to be philosophical or scientific in its basis, it was practical in its aim. The matter of style is not of immediate importance from either of these points of view.

Finally, it may be that Aristotle's own appreciation of style was weak. In his extant works he assuredly exposes himself to this charge, although certain ancient critics, among them Dionysius himself, especially commend his style. Whether their judgment is without adequate grounds, or whether they are referring to works of Aristotle now lost, we can scarcely say. But so far as the evidence afforded by his own extant works is concerned, we should be justified in ascribing to him a lack of artistic ability. As for his appreciation of style in others, the fact that he disregards the works of his great contemporary Demosthenes has perhaps some bearing on the matter; and below, in the discussion of his treatment of style, his lack of interest in the details of expression will be shown.

The other question now remains for consideration: why Aristotle, after outlining his subject in such a way as to exclude the topic of style, changed his point of view and did discuss it. While perhaps no decisive answer can be given to such a question, some attempt at explanation may be offered. It is altogether likely, then, that Aristotle intended his treatment of rhetoric, as we have it in the first two books, to embrace the subject completely; which it does, so far as the logical aspect of the subject is concerned. Then, probably, his further studies drew his attention to the importance of the elements he had before neglected, and he added the third book as a sort of appendix. If it is true, as many scholars have concluded, that the *Poetics* was composed after the second book of the *Rhetoric* and before the third, the theory would receive considerable support.[1] For

[1] On the question of the genuineness of the third book and its relation to the rest of the *Rhetoric* and to the *Poetics*, see Christ *Griechische Litteraturgeschichte*, 3e Aufl., p. 483 and note, together with the references there given.

Aristotle's study of poetry would naturally bring him to a consideration of the stylistic element in oratory. Some confirmation of this is afforded by the frequent references in the third book to the *Poetics*, and especially by Aristotle's efforts to distinguish the appropriate styles of prose and poetry (for a discussion of which, see below).

At any rate, Aristotle assigns to the whole topic of style or expression only the brief third book of the *Rhetoric;* while Dionysius, having subdivided expression into selection and arrangement, devotes his entire treatise to the latter topic alone. It now remains to consider what are the fundamental rhetorical presuppositions of the two writers and to see how these underlie their respective treatments of the subject of style. In this investigation I shall view the treatises from the three standpoints which Aristotle distinguished—that of the hearer, that of the speaker, and that of the discourse itself.

Regarded from the point of view of the hearer, the fundamental principle of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric is what may be termed intellectual hedonism. "The acquisition of knowledge is pleasant" (i. 11. 2). "To receive information easily is naturally pleasing to all" (iii. 10. 2). "Accordingly, in style and enthymemes all those are pointed and lively that convey to us instruction rapidly" (iii. 10. 4). "Such a style is agreeable because the hearer is constantly thinking he has got hold of something" (iii. 9. 3). Other passages of the *Rhetoric* (e.g., iii. 11. 6, iii. 8. 2, i. 11. 21) convey the same idea. It is found elsewhere in his works also. At the opening of the *Metaphysics*, for example, he says: "All men have a natural longing for knowledge"; in the *Problems:* "The pleasure we receive from rhythm derives from the natural love of a recognizable (*γνώριμον*) regularity"; in the *Poetics:* ". . . . learning is most delightful not only to philosophers but in like manner to other persons" (iv. 4).

Indeed, Aristotle's very theory of art, as expressed in the *Rhetoric*, seems based upon this principle. "From the pleasure of learning and wonder it results that there is a pleasure in such things as the imitative arts, e.g., painting, sculpture and poetry, or in any successful imitative work, even if the actual object of imitation is not pleasant; as it is not the pleasantness of the object which produces the

pleasure but an inference from the copy to the original and in consequence of it a kind of learning" (i. 11).

In short, this principle of Aristotle's assumes that the hearer is actuated by the pleasure that accompanies the act of learning. Just as the satisfying of bodily hunger gives a feeling of well-being, so likewise, Aristotle would say, the mind is naturally hungry for information, and the satisfaction of this desire produces a feeling of pleasure. To this principle I have given the name intellectual hedonism to indicate that, while a pleasurable emotion is involved, its source is intellectual. According to this principle, one who heard bad tidings would nevertheless be pleased because he had learned something.

In contrast to the fundamental principle of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, that of the *De Compositione*, likewise from the standpoint of the hearer, may be termed aesthetic appreciation, by which I mean pleasurable emotion derived from what is artistic. Dionysius' attitude on this point is very manifest in numerous passages. In c. xi, for example, in a passage too long to quote here, he compares the pleasure derived from oratory to that derived from music. "In oratory also the words have melody, rhythm, variety and appropriateness; so that the ear takes pleasure in the melody, is captivated by the rhythm, delights in the variety, and in all requires appropriateness. The difference between the two is merely one of more or less." The same underlying principle of aesthetic appreciation is clearly shown in cc. ii, iii, iv, vi, ix, xii, xvi, etc. In fact, he maintains this point of view consistently throughout the treatise.

According to this view, the hearer is pleased, not because he learns something, as is Aristotle's idea, nor is it primarily because he receives pleasing information—but because he enjoys the oration as a thing of beauty, for its rhythm, its euphoniousness, etc.

We have now to consider the second point of view, that of the speaker. More specifically, our question is, What is the purpose of the speaker? What is the effect on the hearer that he aims to produce by means of the speech? Answering the question for the *Rhetoric*, we may say that, obviously, the aim and purpose is to produce persuasion. Indeed this is the essence of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, "a faculty of discerning all the possible means of per-

suasion in any subject."[1] Now to be consistent with himself, Aristotle should make the means of persuasion include only proofs appealing to the intellect. In point of fact, he does this, as we have seen, at the outset of his treatise. There he declares, "It is the proofs alone which form the proper subject of artistic treatment, and everything except the proofs is a mere accessory"; and he condemns those sophistical writers who "omit all mention of enthymemes which are the soul of proof, and occupy themselves almost exclusively with such things as lie outside the actual issue. For," he adds, "prejudice, compassion, anger and such emotions of the soul have no bearing upon the point at issue; they merely affect the minds of the jury." Again he makes a similar protest: "It is improper to warp the judgment of a juror by exciting him to anger or jealousy or compassion, as this is like making the rule that one is going to use, crooked." He would have all cases "determined absolutely by the laws, and as little as possible left to the discretion of the judges." For, besides other considerations, "feelings of affection or ill-will and private interests are necessarily often involved, so that they lose the power of adequately studying the truth, and their judgment is clouded by a consideration of their personal pleasure or pain." And a little further on he declares for the second time, "It is clear then that the only proper subjects of artistic treatment are proofs" (i. 1).

Evidently, then, Aristotle starts out with an intellectual point of view. The means of persuasion are to be confined to proofs appealing to the intellect. But in a very short time he shifts his position, and we find him admitting into consideration appeals to the emotions. Finally, he devotes considerable attention to them in the first part of the second book. A similar inconsistency we have already observed, in the case of his treatment of style, which likewise he at first excluded from consideration. His remarks on style and delivery, at the beginning of the third book, are in fact strikingly similar to those opinions just quoted relative to appeals to the emotions. "Strict justice, indeed, if applicable to rhetoric, would con-

[1] In the previous chapter he has declared: ". . . . Its function is not to persuade but to discover the available means of persuasion in any subject." From what follows, however, his meaning is clearly that it should succeed so far as is possible, although, like the art of medicine, it must sometimes fail.

fine itself to seeking a delivery such as would cause neither pain nor pleasure. For the right condition is that the battle should be fought out on the facts of the case alone: and therefore everything outside the direct proof is really superfluous, although extraneous matters are highly effective, as has been said, owing to the depraved character of the audience." And he argues that when one is teaching geometry "tricks of style" are not needed to gratify the audience.

The inconsistency, then, in regard to appeals to the emotions is of the same sort as the inconsistency with regard to style; and probably the same reasons lie at the bottom of it. These are: Aristotle's strong intellectual bias; his opposition to the sophistical treatments of the subject; possibly a lack of artistic appreciation. Here also another factor now comes to view—his low opinion of the popular audience as referred to above in the words, "the depraved character (*μοχθηρίαν*) of the audience." This opinion is expressed with various degrees of candor in several other passages of the *Rhetoric*, e.g., ii. 21, iii. 16, iii. 14.

In short, the aim of the speaker is persuasion, and not by intellectual means alone. Aristotle goes even farther than to admit emotional appeals among the means of persuasion: he admits also "apparent demonstration" as well as "real"; by this he means fallacious or specious reasons, etc. Examples of this "sophistical" element are to be found in iii. 14, 15, 16, etc.

So far as the aim of the speaker is considered in the *De Compositione*, it is referred to pleasing the auditor by the charm and beauty of the speech, by its effect, that is to say, as a work of art; the purpose is to produce not an intellectual, but an aesthetic, impression. Although in his other works Dionysius duly recognizes them, yet in the *De Compositione* he seldom makes direct reference to the production of clearness, lucidity, or any other intellectual effects as being a necessary aim of arrangement. On the contrary, he commends passages where the thought has been somewhat sacrificed to the artistic demands of expression, being left incomplete or made redundant. "Truly some clauses receive changes in their form, taking on additions not necessary to their sense, or undergoing curtailments whereby the thought is left incomplete. These changes are made by both poets and prose-writers, and for no other reason than that

the 'harmony' may become more charming and beautiful" (c. ix). In other passages also the same idea is expressed.

Since in the *De Compositione* the attitude of the hearer and that of the speaker exactly correspond, further discussion or citation of examples seems unnecessary. Instead, another indication of the aesthetic point of view in the treatise may be presented here—the character of the analogies employed.

Practically all the important analogies are drawn from the realm of fine art. I have already referred to one passage comparing oratory to music. In c. x, referring to charm and beauty as the characteristic aims of arrangement, Dionysius says: "For the ear requires both of these in much the same manner as does the eye. The eye looks upon images and pictures and sculpture and all the other handiwork of man, and finding therein charm and beauty, it is satisfied and desires nothing more." In c. xxi he compares composition to painting. In c. xxiii he says the smooth style resembles finely woven cloth or pictures in which light and shadow blend. In c. xxv, he says that the men of Demosthenes' time fashioned their discourses "not like to writings but to carvings and intaglios." Again, arguing in the same strain he speaks of the pupils of painters and sculptors, who would exhaust the ingenuity of their art on such details as veins and down. In the same chapter, to suggest how conscious art by dint of practice becomes second nature, he refers to the training of skilled performers on the lyre, harp, and flute. There are also some minor allusions of similar nature in the *De Compositione.*

It is to be noted that the *Rhetoric* contains no such comparisons.

The third significant relation, that of the speaker to the discourse, yet awaits consideration. The problem is represented by the question, in the case of each author: What is the nature of the discourse as a combination of words?

Taking up its consideration we come upon another divergence in the concepts of the two authors. Aristotle's idea as to the nature of a discourse may be only inferred from the *Rhetoric;* but in the *Poetics* (c. xxiii) what is probably his conception of it is expressed in the comparison of an epic poem to "a living organism." "It should have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end." He discusses tragedy in a

similar way, making the same comparison, and similarly explaining the organic interrelation of beginning, middle, and end. It seems altogether likely then that this view extends with Aristotle to a speech or any other discourse in the realm of rhetoric. This probability is strengthened by certain indications in the third book of the *Rhetoric* in his treatment of the exordium. For he compares it to the poem of epic or dithyrambic poetry, or the prologue of a drama: "As to the exordia of forensic speeches, it must be understood that they are equivalent to the prologues of dramatic or the proems of epic poetry; for the proems of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia. . . . . In rhetoric as in epic poetry the exordium is a sample of the subject, being intended," etc.

Moreover, Aristotle explains that exordia which do not set forth the end or object of a speech are not true exordia, but "merely means of remedying defects in the audience, serving to get their attention, remove prejudice, and the like. They are used in this way because the audience is corrupt. If this is not the character of the audience, there is no need of an exordium, except for the mere purpose of stating the facts summarily, that it may not be, as it were, *a body without a head*" (iii. 14). Besides the exordium a speech contains necessarily two parts, exposition and proof; the peroration is sometimes found as a third part, but it is not necessary to a speech. Probably, then, in Aristotle's opinion, the exordium is the "beginning," the exposition the "middle," and the proof the "end."

In short, the Platonic conception of discourse as an organism, which is a dominating idea in the *Poetics*, probably underlay, though less consciously, Aristotle's whole theory of discourse. Certainly it is an idea altogether likely to have accorded with his scientific type of mind and early-awakened interest in biology.

The underlying concept of Dionysius, from the point of view of the discourse as a combination of words, is not at all biological in its nature, but rather what may be called architectonic, or perhaps, in a restricted sense of the word, architectural. He has first analyzed words into their component syllables and these into their component letters: "We designate them letters because they are written with certain lines, and we term them elements because all speech takes its origin from them and into them resolves itself in its final analysis"

(xiv). Then, having given a long and detailed account of the quality and force of the several letters, he undertakes the task of synthesis: "What of these letters, then, having such number and such qualities, the so-called syllables are formed" (xv); and he examines the nature of syllables. Finally he remarks: "How, then, do I sum up this matter? I say that the diverse qualities of syllables originate in the combination of letters; that the nature of words varies according to the arrangement of syllables; and that discourse varies according to the degree of harmonious arrangement in the words" (xvi). His treatment of rhythm is altogether similar (see cc. xvii–xviii).

A composition in Dionysius' view is a structure formed like a building of a certain kind. It is as if a pyramid were constructed in several sections, each in turn composed of several subsections, and these again composed of the individual stones.[1] The stones represent the words which are fitted together to form the sub-sections, i.e., the clauses. The clauses in turn are adjusted one to another until they form suitable sentences. These, finally, Dionysius would say, form the structure of the whole composition. But while in all this process of construction the builder is supposed to be thinking of charm and beauty as aims, the structure has no fundamental organization. The units are built up independently of one another until the time comes for combining them; only then are they adjusted one to another.

In both analysis and synthesis Dionysius is governed by such an architectural analogy. At the outset of his treatise, to show that arrangement has more potency than selection (an idea that itself is significant of his attitude) he refers to "the other constructive arts, such as house-building and cabinet-making and the like, which take various kinds of material and out of them produce a composite result" (c. ii). Again, in c. vi, when explaining the function of arrangement, he uses as illustrations "house-building and shipbuilding and the like," to show how the materials are adjusted so as to form a harmonious structure. The latter passage well indicates the remarkable influence of the architectural concept on Dionysius' treatment of the subject. Unfortunately it is too long to be quoted here.

[1] Of course, to make the analogy complete, one would need to imagine that the nature of the several stones depends upon their constituent elements, just as that of words is supposed by Dionysius to depend upon the nature of the component syllables and letters.

In the last-mentioned passage Dionysius gives his principles of arrangement with reference to words. He also explains the similar principles that govern the disposition of clauses (cc. vii–ix). He has promised (c. v) to discuss likewise those that pertain to the arrangement of periods, but he dismisses the subject in two or three brief sentences (c. ix, *ad fin.*). This is significant, pointing to his greater interest in the details of style, and also indicating the inductive nature of his method. Conversely, Aristotle, his interest being of a philosophic nature, devotes the greater share of his attention to the larger elements of style and fails to carry his analysis into and through the details.

The fundamental presuppositions of the two authors have now been set forth with reference to the three aspects of discourse. According to Aristotle, the attitude of the hearer is that of intellectual hedonism; the aim of the speaker is to produce persuasion, even by appeals to the emotions or by sophistical proofs; the discourse is organic in structure. According to Dionysius, the attitude of the hearer is that of artistic appreciation; that of the speaker corresponds, his aim being to produce artistic enjoyment; the discourse is architectural in structure. Aristotle sets out with an intellectual predisposition, at first excluding all non-rational elements. Dionysius is interested rather in the artistic or aesthetic phase of the subject.

Several minor topics are treated in some detail by both Dionysius and Aristotle, affording an opportunity for further comparison. These include diction or choice of words, rhythm, the period, and the relation of prose and poetry. Careful study has revealed that the fundamental principles set forth above determine the respective treatments of these matters of detail also. On account of the limitations of space, however, only one of them, the relation of prose and poetry, can be discussed here.

At several points in the third book of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle distinguishes between the appropriate metrical structure of prose and poetry. Near the beginning of the book (c. i) he sketches the history of style to show how prose has become differentiated from poetry. "It was because the poets were thought, despite the simplicity of their sentiments, to have acquired their reputation by their style, that prose style assumed at first a poetical form, as, e.g., the

style of Gorgias. Nay, even at the present time it is the opinion of most uneducated persons that a poetical style is the finest. This, however, is an erroneous idea, the styles of prose and poetry being distinct, as is shown by the fact that the writers of tragedies themselves have ceased to use the poetical style as once they did. . . . . It is absurd then to imitate them who no longer employ their old style." In the following chapter (ii) he says: "Style should be neither mean nor exaggerated, but appropriate; for a poetical style, though not mean, is still not appropriate to prose." Throughout the chapter he refers repeatedly to the necessity for maintaining separate styles for prose and poetry. In c. iii he enters an objection against the misuse of epithets: "For if in poetry it is proper to speak, e.g., of 'white milk,' such epithets in prose are in any case inappropriate, and if there are many of them, they expose the art of the style and show it to be simple poetry." Another expression (*ἀντίμιμον* in *ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν*) he calls "a word which is at the same time a compound and an epithet, so that the prose is converted into poetry. . . . . The consequence is," he resumes, "that this poetical diction by its impropriety is a source of absurdity and tastelessness as well as of obscurity." In c. vi, among the means of producing dignity of style, he recommends the employment of metaphors, "being on your guard at the same time against a poetical style." At the close of c. vii, he suggests that the use of compound words, epithets, and strange words, which previously he has objected to, is permissible "when the speaker has mastered his audience and has aroused them to enthusiasm. . . . . For this is the language of enthusiasm and is . . . . suitable to poetry for the same reasons, as poetry is inspired." Aristotle's final reference to the relation of prose and poetry is in c. viii, in his treatment of rhythm in prose. He sums it up in his famous dictum: "A prose composition should have rhythm but not meter, or it will be a poem. But the rhythm should not be too elaborately finished, or in other words it should not be carried too far." He recommends the use of the paeon in prose on the ground that it alone cannot form a regular meter, and therefore it is the most likely to escape detection. Evidently, then, Aristotle's aim is, from a logical standpoint, to differentiate prose and poetry with regard to both diction and rhythm.

Dionysius appears to adopt Aristotle's distinction between prose and poetry, but actually his recommendations are quite diverse from those of Aristotle. For he devotes the final two chapters of his treatise to the consideration of "how discourse not in meter may become like a beautiful poem or lyric, and how a poem or lyric may become very similar to beautiful prose." To these subjects Dionysius seems to ascribe much importance, for not only does he accord them a prominent place in his treatise, but he prefaces his disclosures about them with a peculiar proclamation as to their esoteric nature: "They are very like to mysteries, and it is not proper that they be disclosed to everybody. Wherefore it would not be impertinent if I were to summon only those that possess the right to come into the inner precincts of style, but should enjoin the profane to close the gates of their ears." Then follows a statement of the controlling principle: "Prose cannot become like metrical and lyrical writing unless it contains concealed meters and rhythms. However, it is not fitting that it should appear to be meter or rhythm. For then it would be a poem or lyric and would depart from its proper character. It should simply appear rhythmical and metrical, for thus it may be poetical but not poetry, and lyrical but not a lyric." This statement closely resembles that of Aristotle on the same subject, but there is an important difference in application. Aristotle made his statement for the sake of calling attention to the distinction to be observed between the proper styles of prose and poetry; Dionysius, on the contrary, calls attention to their points of similarity. Now he proceeds to develop the idea that prose should contain concealed rhythms and meters. He cites the third book of the *Rhetoric* as authority for this idea, and adds: "We not only have Aristotle's testimony, but we find confirmation in experience itself to the effect that rhythms must be employed in prose if it is desired that it bloom with the beauty of poetry." But, as shown above, Aristotle is *not* desirous that prose "bloom with the beauty of poetry"; he has a quite different purpose in his consideration of their relationship. Dionysius, however, goes on to exhibit "the concealed rhythms" in a number of passages from Demosthenes, to show that they were introduced "not accidentally, but with full design."

Dionysius' final task is to disclose how poems and lyrics become

like beautiful prose (c. xxvi). The factors he mentions include variety in the arrangement of the individual words, and also in the length and the form of the clauses, so as not to make them coincident with the lines of verse. The feature of the analysis consists in the element of freedom which Dionysius detects in the most successful poetry, and which he ascribes to the endeavor to make it resemble prose. Judging from the passages he cites as examples and from his comments on them, the chief characteristic of this element of freedom is the employment of sentences and phrases of various lengths, so that the sense does not always come to an end with the line of verse; in a word, the use of *enjambement*, or run-on lines. In short, Dionysius is making a plea for artistic freedom in poetry, freedom from mechanical adherence to traditional or conventional rules.[1]

In summary, then, of these two topics with which Dionysius closes the treatise, it may be said that in both cases his aim is to further the cause of the artistic, the aesthetic element in discourse. On the one hand, he objects to awkward, wooden prose; on the other, to mechanical poetry. To remedy the one evil he refers as an exemplar to prose which resembles poetry in that it has rhythm; in the other case, he holds up as a model poetry resembling prose in that it has freedom of structure.[2]

[1] The position of Leigh Hunt in the English Romantic movement affords an interesting parallel.

[2] Theodore Watts-Dunton, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (9th ed. *s.v.* "Poetry"), says: "Perhaps the first critic who tacitly revolted against the dictum that substance, and not form, is the indispensable basis of poetry was Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose treatise upon the arrangement of words is really a very fine piece of literary criticism. In his acute remarks upon the arrangement of the words in the sixteenth book of the *Odyssey*, as compared with that in the story of Gyges by Herodotus, was perhaps first enunciated clearly the doctrine that poetry is fundamentally a matter of style. The Aristotelian theory as to invention, however, dominated all criticism after as well as before Dionysius."

This statement calls for some comment. In the first place, in the passage from Dionysius referred to (c. iii), Dionysius is *not* comparing the two arrangements; far from trying to show any contrast between the prose and the poetical passages, he has quoted both for the same purpose—to show the potency of arrangement of words as compared with selection. Furthermore, while certain passages in the *Poetics* have afforded a foundation for the so-called Aristotelian theory as to invention (see Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, pp. 134 ff.), yet the *Rhetoric*, as shown above, contains considerable evidence, to all appearances strangely neglected by Butcher, which tends to show that Aristotle clearly distinguished between the appropriate styles of prose and poetry. Dionysius, on the other hand, as is likewise shown above, occupied himself with pointing out their similarities rather than their differences.

A retrospect of the work of our two authors from the point of view of aesthetics exhibits a paradox. Both of them investigated the same phenomenon, Greek oratory, and in part they examined the same phase of it, the topic style; but their fundamental principles, as has been shown, are altogether diverse. Aristotle supposed on the hearer's part an intellectual attitude; in the speaker, the aim to persuade; in the discourse, an organic character. Dionysius requires in the hearer an aesthetic attitude; in the speaker, the aim to produce artistic effects; in the discourse, an architectural character. How are these striking differences to be explained? In part they are to be accounted for by the divergent aims and methods of the two writers. But a more ultimate explanation is to be found in the relation of these two men to the art of oratory which they were studying.

For Aristotle oratory was a practical art. In his generation it had achieved its utmost successes and had reached a pinnacle of greatness from which only recession was possible. Living accordingly in a very world of oratory, Aristotle, especially in view of his scientific proclivities, could not but envisage it with reference to its ulterior purpose and end, and could find it successful only as it achieved these. Necessarily his view was teleological in character.

Viewed in such an objective, teleological manner, the oration naturally assumes the character ascribed to it by Aristotle. Its substance or content is then of overshadowing importance. The hearer is concerned with the oration in an intellectual way, i.e., because he is to learn from it something that will direct his beliefs or conduct. But the speaker's business is to make the oration fulfil his purpose; success is the primary thing, to gain which it may be necessary to resort to emotional appeals or even to specious and sophistical arguments. Out of the speaker's vital purpose grows the nature of the discourse. Consequently it assumes an organic character, functioning, like an animal, for an ulterior, practical end.

Dionysius' point of view was quite different. When as a teacher of rhetoric at Rome he referred to the masterpieces of his native tongue as examples, he discerned in them an element lacking in Roman oratory; accordingly he analyzed them to try to account for it. In so doing he did not refer to the external purpose which the orations

were designed to fulfil, for Dionysius was lacking in the historic sense.[1] Consequently, given an oration which his native taste told him was superior, he would examine it for the sake of determining the sources of the effect upon himself, and perhaps on others too, his pupils for example. His point of view, then, was not objective in the sense in which Aristotle's was, but rather subjective; it was not teleological but aesthetic. For Dionysius, in short, oratory was a fine art.

Accordingly, he did not concern himself with the practical end subserved by the oration, and hence his main interest is not in its substance or content. Instead he analyzed out the sources of its aesthetic effects, and endeavored, from the elements thus detected, to reconstruct the oration synthetically. He assumed consequently that the hearer likewise takes an aesthetic attitude, and that the aim of the speaker, correspondingly, is to produce artistic appreciation. Moreover, the discourse is not now a vital thing, animated by its function in the practical world; it was viewed rather as a structure created by artistically combining certain materials selected beforehand, and selected not so much for their import as for the aesthetic effects they tend to produce. For Dionysius, then, the biological concept was not suitable, since he was emphasizing not content, but form. What he required was an artistic concept, and he found what answered his purposes in the architectural analogy.

In concluding, it may be briefly noted that modern rhetorical theory has made use of both the architectural and the organic concept of structure. The architectural concept has been held by many of the older rhetoricians in a more or less explicit fashion. With some it is scarcely distinguishable from a mechanical concept, in which discourse is thought of as resembling a machine in its structure. Among others the concept varies from that of a simple assemblage of materials to that of a highly elaborate structure of thought all of which, it is supposed, is preconceived in the mind of the writer. But with the more recent generation of scholars, under the stimulus of evolutionary thought, these theories of style have largely given way to the organic concept. This Platonic theory of discourse has now been developed and extended beyond the Aristotelian treatment

[1] Cf. W. Rhys Roberts *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters*, pp. 3–4.

so as not only to include the main outlines of the thought, but also to reach into the uttermost details of form or expression. Moreover, by directing attention to the essential part played in the rhetorical process by the free personality of the writer, the organic concept has suggested the clue for reconciling the seemingly diverse claims of thought and expression. Thus it has opened the way to a truly comprehensive aesthetic theory of discourse—one which includes and, so far as possible, harmonizes the essential features of both the Aristotelian and the Dionysian treatment.

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style of Gorgias. Nay, even at the present time it is the opinion of most uneducated persons that a poetical style is the finest. This, however, is an erroneous idea, the styles of prose and poetry being distinct, as is shown by the fact that the writers of tragedies themselves have ceased to use the poetical style as once they did. . . . . It is absurd then to imitate them who no longer employ their old style." In the following chapter (ii) he says: "Style should be neither mean nor exaggerated, but appropriate; for a poetical style, though not mean, is still not appropriate to prose." Throughout the chapter he refers repeatedly to the necessity for maintaining separate styles for prose and poetry. In c. iii he enters an objection against the misuse of epithets: "For if in poetry it is proper to speak, e.g., of 'white milk,' such epithets in prose are in any case inappropriate, and if there are many of them, they expose the art of the style and show it to be simple poetry." Another expression (*ἀντίμιμον* in *ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν*) he calls "a word which is at the same time a compound and an epithet, so that the prose is converted into poetry. . . . . The consequence is," he resumes, "that this poetical diction by its impropriety is a source of absurdity and tastelessness as well as of obscurity." In c. vi, among the means of producing dignity of style, he recommends the employment of metaphors, "being on your guard at the same time against a poetical style." At the close of c. vii, he suggests that the use of compound words, epithets, and strange words, which previously he has objected to, is permissible "when the speaker has mastered his audience and has aroused them to enthusiasm. . . . . For this is the language of enthusiasm and is . . . . suitable to poetry for the same reasons, as poetry is inspired." Aristotle's final reference to the relation of prose and poetry is in c. viii, in his treatment of rhythm in prose. He sums it up in his famous dictum: "A prose composition should have rhythm but not meter, or it will be a poem. But the rhythm should not be too elaborately finished, or in other words it should not be carried too far." He recommends the use of the paeon in prose on the ground that it alone cannot form a regular meter, and therefore it is the most likely to escape detection. Evidently, then, Aristotle's aim is, from a logical standpoint, to differentiate prose and poetry with regard to both diction and rhythm.

Dionysius appears to adopt Aristotle's distinction between prose and poetry, but actually his recommendations are quite diverse from those of Aristotle. For he devotes the final two chapters of his treatise to the consideration of "how discourse not in meter may become like a beautiful poem or lyric, and how a poem or lyric may become very similar to beautiful prose." To these subjects Dionysius seems to ascribe much importance, for not only does he accord them a prominent place in his treatise, but he prefaces his disclosures about them with a peculiar proclamation as to their esoteric nature: "They are very like to mysteries, and it is not proper that they be disclosed to everybody. Wherefore it would not be impertinent if I were to summon only those that possess the right to come into the inner precincts of style, but should enjoin the profane to close the gates of their ears." Then follows a statement of the controlling principle: "Prose cannot become like metrical and lyrical writing unless it contains concealed meters and rhythms. However, it is not fitting that it should appear to be meter or rhythm. For then it would be a poem or lyric and would depart from its proper character. It should simply appear rhythmical and metrical, for thus it may be poetical but not poetry, and lyrical but not a lyric." This statement closely resembles that of Aristotle on the same subject, but there is an important difference in application. Aristotle made his statement for the sake of calling attention to the distinction to be observed between the proper styles of prose and poetry; Dionysius, on the contrary, calls attention to their points of similarity. Now he proceeds to develop the idea that prose should contain concealed rhythms and meters. He cites the third book of the *Rhetoric* as authority for this idea, and adds: "We not only have Aristotle's testimony, but we find confirmation in experience itself to the effect that rhythms must be employed in prose if it is desired that it bloom with the beauty of poetry." But, as shown above, Aristotle is *not* desirous that prose "bloom with the beauty of poetry"; he has a quite different purpose in his consideration of their relationship. Dionysius, however, goes on to exhibit "the concealed rhythms" in a number of passages from Demosthenes, to show that they were introduced "not accidentally, but with full design."

Dionysius' final task is to disclose how poems and lyrics become

like beautiful prose (c. xxvi). The factors he mentions include variety in the arrangement of the individual words, and also in the length and the form of the clauses, so as not to make them coincident with the lines of verse. The feature of the analysis consists in the element of freedom which Dionysius detects in the most successful poetry, and which he ascribes to the endeavor to make it resemble prose. Judging from the passages he cites as examples and from his comments on them, the chief characteristic of this element of freedom is the employment of sentences and phrases of various lengths, so that the sense does not always come to an end with the line of verse; in a word, the use of *enjambement*, or run-on lines. In short, Dionysius is making a plea for artistic freedom in poetry, freedom from mechanical adherence to traditional or conventional rules.[1]

In summary, then, of these two topics with which Dionysius closes the treatise, it may be said that in both cases his aim is to further the cause of the artistic, the aesthetic element in discourse. On the one hand, he objects to awkward, wooden prose; on the other, to mechanical poetry. To remedy the one evil he refers as an exemplar to prose which resembles poetry in that it has rhythm; in the other case, he holds up as a model poetry resembling prose in that it has freedom of structure.[2]

[1] The position of Leigh Hunt in the English Romantic movement affords an interesting parallel.

[2] Theodore Watts-Dunton, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (9th ed. *s.v.* "Poetry"), says: "Perhaps the first critic who tacitly revolted against the dictum that substance, and not form, is the indispensable basis of poetry was Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose treatise upon the arrangement of words is really a very fine piece of literary criticism. In his acute remarks upon the arrangement of the words in the sixteenth book of the *Odyssey*, as compared with that in the story of Gyges by Herodotus, was perhaps first enunciated clearly the doctrine that poetry is fundamentally a matter of style. The Aristotelian theory as to invention, however, dominated all criticism after as well as before Dionysius."

This statement calls for some comment. In the first place, in the passage from Dionysius referred to (c. iii), Dionysius is *not* comparing the two arrangements; far from trying to show any contrast between the prose and the poetical passages, he has quoted both for the same purpose—to show the potency of arrangement of words as compared with selection. Furthermore, while certain passages in the *Poetics* have afforded a foundation for the so-called Aristotelian theory as to invention (see Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, pp. 134 ff.), yet the *Rhetoric*, as shown above, contains considerable evidence, to all appearances strangely neglected by Butcher, which tends to show that Aristotle clearly distinguished between the appropriate styles of prose and poetry. Dionysius, on the other hand, as is likewise shown above, occupied himself with pointing out their similarities rather than their differences.

A retrospect of the work of our two authors from the point of view of aesthetics exhibits a paradox. Both of them investigated the same phenomenon, Greek oratory, and in part they examined the same phase of it, the topic style; but their fundamental principles, as has been shown, are altogether diverse. Aristotle supposed on the hearer's part an intellectual attitude; in the speaker, the aim to persuade; in the discourse, an organic character. Dionysius requires in the hearer an aesthetic attitude; in the speaker, the aim to produce artistic effects; in the discourse, an architectural character. How are these striking differences to be explained? In part they are to be accounted for by the divergent aims and methods of the two writers. But a more ultimate explanation is to be found in the relation of these two men to the art of oratory which they were studying.

For Aristotle oratory was a practical art. In his generation it had achieved its utmost successes and had reached a pinnacle of greatness from which only recession was possible. Living accordingly in a very world of oratory, Aristotle, especially in view of his scientific proclivities, could not but envisage it with reference to its ulterior purpose and end, and could find it successful only as it achieved these. Necessarily his view was teleological in character.

Viewed in such an objective, teleological manner, the oration naturally assumes the character ascribed to it by Aristotle. Its substance or content is then of overshadowing importance. The hearer is concerned with the oration in an intellectual way, i.e., because he is to learn from it something that will direct his beliefs or conduct. But the speaker's business is to make the oration fulfil his purpose; success is the primary thing, to gain which it may be necessary to resort to emotional appeals or even to specious and sophistical arguments. Out of the speaker's vital purpose grows the nature of the discourse. Consequently it assumes an organic character, functioning, like an animal, for an ulterior, practical end.

Dionysius' point of view was quite different. When as a teacher of rhetoric at Rome he referred to the masterpieces of his native tongue as examples, he discerned in them an element lacking in Roman oratory; accordingly he analyzed them to try to account for it. In so doing he did not refer to the external purpose which the orations

were designed to fulfil, for Dionysius was lacking in the historic sense.[1] Consequently, given an oration which his native taste told him was superior, he would examine it for the sake of determining the sources of the effect upon himself, and perhaps on others too, his pupils for example. His point of view, then, was not objective in the sense in which Aristotle's was, but rather subjective; it was not teleological but aesthetic. For Dionysius, in short, oratory was a fine art.

Accordingly, he did not concern himself with the practical end subserved by the oration, and hence his main interest is not in its substance or content. Instead he analyzed out the sources of its aesthetic effects, and endeavored, from the elements thus detected, to reconstruct the oration synthetically. He assumed consequently that the hearer likewise takes an aesthetic attitude, and that the aim of the speaker, correspondingly, is to produce artistic appreciation. Moreover, the discourse is not now a vital thing, animated by its function in the practical world; it was viewed rather as a structure created by artistically combining certain materials selected beforehand, and selected not so much for their import as for the aesthetic effects they tend to produce. For Dionysius, then, the biological concept was not suitable, since he was emphasizing not content, but form. What he required was an artistic concept, and he found what answered his purposes in the architectural analogy.

In concluding, it may be briefly noted that modern rhetorical theory has made use of both the architectural and the organic concept of structure. The architectural concept has been held by many of the older rhetoricians in a more or less explicit fashion. With some it is scarcely distinguishable from a mechanical concept, in which discourse is thought of as resembling a machine in its structure. Among others the concept varies from that of a simple assemblage of materials to that of a highly elaborate structure of thought all of which, it is supposed, is preconceived in the mind of the writer. But with the more recent generation of scholars, under the stimulus of evolutionary thought, these theories of style have largely given way to the organic concept. This Platonic theory of discourse has now been developed and extended beyond the Aristotelian treatment

[1] Cf. W. Rhys Roberts *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters*, pp. 3-4.

so as not only to include the main outlines of the thought, but also to reach into the uttermost details of form or expression. Moreover, by directing attention to the essential part played in the rhetorical process by the free personality of the writer, the organic concept has suggested the clue for reconciling the seemingly diverse claims of thought and expression. Thus it has opened the way to a truly comprehensive aesthetic theory of discourse—one which includes and, so far as possible, harmonizes the essential features of both the Aristotelian and the Dionysian treatment.

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ROMAN PRAYER AND ITS RELATION TO ETHICS

By Gordon J. Laing

It is a commonplace of writers on comparative religion that primitive prayers contain no ethical element.[1] It is said that in the early days of religion men importuned their gods for increase of blessings or decrease of sufferings. They prayed for victory over their enemies, for the rich booty of successful warfare, for fruitfulness in their flocks, herds, and fields, and, at a later stage of their development, for success in ventures of trade. They prayed also for relief in time of pestilence, famine, or other calamity. Furthermore, far from confining their petitions to their own prosperity, they frankly and openly prayed that disaster and death might be the portion of their enemies. But they did not pray to the gods to make them better men, to give them clean hearts, to guide them in the straight and narrow way of purity and rectitude, to strengthen them so that they could resist temptation. In a word, for many primitive cultures a complete divorce of religion and morality is assumed. Morality of a kind these cultures had, but it was independent of their religion. With them religion was the means of getting in touch with the powers of the unseen world, whose assistance could be secured by due forms of ritual; while the morality they knew was founded on social conditions. Offense against the moral code made one liable to punishment by such forms of reprisal as the community recognized but did not necessarily imply any offense against a god. The union of morality and religion came comparatively late.

Such is the description frequently given of the relation of religion and morality among primitive peoples, and the lack of the ethical element in their prayers is continually emphasized.

In this paper it is my purpose to examine Roman prayers with a view to determining to what extent they conform to or diverge from the type described above; and where they diverge, to ascertain the sources of the new elements contained in them. I will begin with some of the prayers given by Appel in his *Romanarum precationum*

[1] See Tylor *Primitive Culture* 364.

reliquiae (pp. 8 ff. of his *De Romanorum precationibus*[1]). For example, in the well-known prayer in Cat. *Origin.* i. fr. 12 (p. 55, Peter) the tone resembles that of a man who makes a proposal rather than that of one who offers a petition. The god is treated pretty much as if he were merely another person with a range of desires similar to those of his petitioner, and the advantage that will accrue to him if he grant the request is pointed out: "Iuppiter, si tibi magis cordi est nos ea tibi dare potius quam Mezentio, uti nos victoris facias." So also in the prayer of the Roman commander to Jupiter in Liv. i. 12. 4 the relation of suppliant and god is closely analogous to that of man and man: "deme terrorem Romanis fugamque foedam siste. Hic ego tibi templum Statori Iovi voveo." The vow of Appius in Liv. x. 19. 17 is couched in the simplest terms of *quid pro quo:* "Bellona, si hodie nobis victoriam duis, ast ego tibi templum voveo." A striking example of this primitive type of Roman prayer is furnished by the vow of the *ver sacrum* by Cornelius Lentulus in 217 B.C. (Liv. xxii. 10. 2 ff.): "Si res publica populi Romani Quiritium ad quinquennium proximum, *sicut velim eam salvam,* servata erit hisce duellis, *quod duellum populo Romano cum Carthaginiensi est quaeque duella cum Gallis sunt, qui cis Alpis sunt,* tum donum duit populus Romanus Quiritium: quod ver attulerit ex suillo ovillo caprino bovillo grege *quaeque profana erunt,* Iovi fieri, ex qua die senatus populusque iusserit." Here we have a vow hedged about with such conditions and stipulations as one might find in a formal contract. The speaker manifestly wishes to make it clear exactly what he expects and exactly what the god is to expect. The formal phraseology is designed to exclude any misunderstanding by the party of the first or of the second part. The state is not merely to be saved but to be saved *sicut velim eam salvam.* Any mistake as to what wars are referred to is prevented by the clause *quod duellum,* etc. What Gauls are meant is made clear by the clause *qui cis,* etc. That animals already vowed to other divinities are excluded is definitely stated in the words *quaeque profana erunt.* The half-dozen *si*-clauses that follow the passage quoted and complete the vow are inserted for the same purpose. There are many other examples of this meticulous precision in the prayers in Appel's conspectus: e.g.,

[1] *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten,* VII. Band, 2. Heft.

the words *sicut dixi* in the prayer of the *vilicus* in Cato *De agricultura* 141. 2: "lustrique faciendi ergo, *sicut dixi*, macte hisce suovetaurilibus lactentibus esto"; and in the dedicatory prayer of Domitius Valens in *CIL.* III, 1933: "hisce legibus hisce regionibus *sic, uti dixi*, hanc tibi aram, Iuppiter optime maxime, do dico dedicoque." Less baldly stated but in effect the same are the prayers offered on the occasion of the *ludi saeculares* of 17 B.C. (*CIL.* VI, 32323). In Romulus' dedication of the *spolia opima* (Liv. i. 10. 6) the circumstances under which the present offering is made and the conditions which shall govern future dedications of the same kind are specifically set forth: "Iuppiter Feretri, haec tibi *victor* Romulus *rex regia* arma fero templumque . . . . dedico sedem opimis spoliis, quae *regibus ducibusque hostium caesis* me auctorem sequentes posteri ferent." In this as in other prayers the business-like attitude of the speaker is emphasized by the plain form of address, Iuppiter Feretri, without magnifying epithet or clause. Other illustrations of this style of address are furnished by the prayer of the *fetialis* in Liv. i. 32. 10: "audi Iuppiter et tu Iane Quirine," and by that of the *fetialis, idem* i. 24. 7: "audi Iuppiter, audi pater patrate populi Albani, audito populus Albanus." The element of adoration is conspicuously lacking, the nearest approach to it being a matter-of-fact acknowledgment of superior power, such as is found in a later part of the last prayer quoted: "tantoque magis ferito quanto magis potes pollesque."

But in many cases no condition or stipulation or consideration is expressed or implied. The suppliant merely appeals to the higher powers for assistance as in Liv. xxix. 27. 1. That a note of adoration is heard in this and in other prayers where nothing is said of the advantage to the god, and that we have such phrases as "divi divae, qui maria terrasque colitis, vos precor quaesoque," admits of simple psychological explanation. More or less unconsciously, perhaps, on that analogy of the relation of man and god to the relations of man and man, or, to put it another way, on the basis of the essentially social nature of prayer,[1] he who has nothing to offer tends to flatter his god with fair words. Another example of this occurs in the prayer in Velleius Paterculus ii. 131. 1 where Mars is addressed

[1] See Strong *The Psychology of Prayer*, chap. i.

as "auctor ac stator Romani nominis Gradive Mars." That magnifying phrases are confined to this type of prayer is not claimed, but that they bulk larger here seems certain.

Other strictly mundane elements are found. A common one is that of the claim, as in the prayer of Romulus in Liv. i. 12. 4: "Iuppiter, *tuis iussus avibus* hic in Palatio prima urbi fundamenta ieci," and in that of Camillus (Liv. v. 21. 2.): "*tuo ductu*, Pythice Apollo, *tuoque numine instinctus*." The trend of the prayer in each of these cases is that the god, being in a sense responsible for the initial steps, should help his people through stress and crisis to the goal of success. The same suggestion of a claim upon the services of the god is discernible in Tac. *Hist.* iv. 58: "Te Iuppiter . . . . quem per octingentos viginti annos tot triumphis coluimus." To this type belongs also the prayer in Cic. *De dom.* with all its elaborate rhetoric: "vos [i.e. dii] obtestor, quorum ego a templis atque delubris pestiferam illam et nefariam flammam depuli, teque Vesta mater, cuius castissimas sacerdotes ab hominum amentium furore et scelere defendi," and a few lines below: "si in illo paene fato reipublicae obieci meum caput pro vestris caerimoniis atque templis perditissimorum civium furori atque ferro." In other prayers the suppliant does not so much suggest claims as advance reasons why the god should grant his request. In the prayer of Spurius Postumius (Liv. ix. 8. 8) the humiliation of the Romans in being sent under the yoke by the Samnites is urged as a reason for the gods' assisting them in the further prosecution of the war with that people: "dii immortales . . . . vos satis habeatis vidisse nos sub iugum missos . . . . novos consules legiones Romanas ita cum Samnite gerere bellum velitis ut omnia ante nos consules bella gesta sunt." The plea here is that they had suffered enough. This same idea that there was a limit beyond which it was hardly reasonable that the displeasure of gods should go is found in the prayer of Vocula in Tac. *Hist.* iv. 58: "Iuppiter . . . . Quirine si vobis non fuit cordi me duce haec castra incorrupta et intemerata servari, at certe pollui foedarique a Tutore et Classico ne sinatis." In the long prayer in Verr. ii. 5. 184 ff. Cicero urges the crimes of Verres against the sanctuaries of the gods as a reason for their punishing him.

Another aspect of man's communion with his gods is seen in the

curse-tablets. In the case of many of these it is clear that the author of the curse believes that he can compel the gods or demons addressed to do his will. Many examples are given by Audollent.[1] The content of these *defixiones* also is of great significance in determining the attitude of the ancients toward their gods, for it will be remembered that the authors of the tablets call down disasters of all kinds upon their enemies in no uncertain terms.[2]

So far the prayers examined have conformed more or less to the type of primitive prayer described at the beginning of this paper. It is clear that the Romans bargained with their gods, flattered them, reasoned with them, made claims upon them, and on occasion even attempted to force them. Of adoration, of contemplative prayer, of ethical concepts there are in the cases before us but few traces. Even in such a prayer as that in Valerius Maximus viii. 1. 5, where Tuccia, addressing Vesta, says, "si sacris tuis castas semper admovi manus," the significance of *castas* is probably ceremonial rather than ethical. Must we then assume that Roman prayer in general was of this primitive type, that it was confined for the most part to petitions for material blessings, and that it was without ethical content? Two questions must be answered before we can arrive at any satisfactory conclusions on this point: I, What is included under the term "ethical"? and II, Are these prayers that have been discussed, so many of which are formal vows, representative of the attitude of the Romans in their personal supplications to the gods? In regard to the first question I would refer to Jevons' remarks in his chapter on prayer,[3] where he points out that even the appeal of an army of savages to their war-god for victory implies a species of group morality. Such an appeal is not merely a petition for personal or individual advantage, but springs from feelings of loyalty and patriotism. Whether patriotism is always a virtue is, I suppose, a debatable question, but it approaches closely enough to the moral to serve as an illustration of the too rigid exclusion of morality from primitive prayers. There is a distinct ethical element in such a prayer as that offered by one of the Osages to Wohkonda, the Master of Life:

[1] *Defixionum tabellae quotquot innotuerunt* (p. 345).

[2] Cf. Audollent *op. cit.* (p. 249).

[3] *Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, pp. 144 ff.

"Wohkonda, pity me, I am very poor; give me what I need; give me success against mine enemies, that I may avenge the death of my friends. May I be able to take scalps, to take horses."[1] In the sense in which ethical content is predicated of prayers like this, even those Roman prayers that I have quoted are ethical. Whether the term "ethical" in the broader sense of "pertaining to right and wrong, to virtue and vice" may also be applied to Roman prayers can best be determined by answering the question propounded above under II, for that will involve a more thorough examination of the prayers and accounts of prayer given by Roman writers. Among others we must review the satirists and philosophers, for although it is to be remembered that the satirists exaggerate and the philosophers tend to the ideal, yet it cannot be doubted that we have in them indications of the character of contemporary prayer. They are for the purposes of this inquiry sources which must be treated warily but which can on no account be disregarded. I shall begin, however, neither with satirist nor philosopher but with some of the poets of the late Republican and early Imperial periods, only reminding the reader by way of preface that it is not always easy to distinguish between poetry and piety, between rhetoric and religion.

It is a curious fact that the first prayer breathing a spirit of adoration in Latin occurs in Lucretius, the exponent of Epicurean rationalism. I mean the famous invocation to Venus at the beginning of the first book. Many critics[2] have commented on what they have been pleased to call Lucretius' inconsistency in prefacing his iconoclastic poem with lines permeated by a spirit of fervid devotion. But as Hadzsits in *Classical Philology* II, 187 ff., has shown, there is no real inconsistency. We have abundant testimony that Epicurus and his followers believed in prayer. They did not think that the gods could be induced by prayers and sacrifices to grant men's desires, and Lucretius in v. 1198 ff. speaks disdainfully of those who prostrate themselves before stone altars; but prayers of contemplation and adoration were a part of their system, and only he, they claimed, who was free from all fear of the gods was in a position

[1] Tylor *Primitive Culture* II, 365, and Jevons *op. cit.* 143.

[2] The various explanations offered are given by Merrill in his edition of Lucretius, p. 260.

to open his mind to the images that flowed from that divine perfection.[1] We find an approach to adoration also in Catullus' ode to Diana (34); her descent from Jove, her sovereignty over hills, woods, and rivers form the prelude to the prayer that she aid the Romans. Similar but much briefer is the appeal to Hymen at the beginning of 61. In this poem we find that device of repetition ("O Hymen Hymenaee io, O Hymen Hymenaee") so common in litanies of all ages, the earliest example of which in Latin is in the "Carmen Arvale." The same solemnity of style that characterizes Catullus' invocation of the gods in these odes is seen in vs. 91 of 63: "Dea magna, dea Cybelle, dea domina Dindymi." In 64. 193 ff. Ariadne strengthens her appeal to the Eumenides by referring to her helplessness ("inops . . . . amenti caeca furore") and to her sincerity ("quae quoniam verae nascuntur pectore ab imo"). The latter clause introduces an ethical element into the supplication which is found also in that most pathetic of all Catullus' poems, 76, where after throwing himself on the compassion of the gods ("O Di, si vestrum est misereri . . . . me miserum adspicite"), he bases his petition for divine aid on the purity of his past life ("si vitam puriter egi"). What he means by *puriter* is made clear by vss. 3–4 ("nec sanctam violasse fidem nec foedere in ullo divum ad fallendos numine abusum homines"), and the ethical content of such a prayer as this can without doubt be assumed for all supplications addressed to Jupiter in his capacity of god of truth, to Fides, to Dius Fidius, and to all deified abstractions of moral ideas.

The communion of the shepherds with their gods in Virgil's *Eclogues* is on the basis of definite consideration. So Corydon in vii. 31 promises Diana that if his success in hunting continue, he will set up a marble statue of her; and in the next line Thyrsis, mocking his rival's words, assures Priapus that he shall have a statue of gold if the flocks show increase. The tone of the invocation at the beginning of the *Georgics* (i. 5 ff.) is one of devout reverence: "Vos o clarissima mundi lumina, labentem caelo quae ducitis annum." Sun and moon, Bacchus and Ceres, Fauns, Dryads, and other spirits of the woodlands are invoked in sonorous phrases setting forth their powers and attributes. Here and there we are reminded of the

[1] See Masson *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, pp. 284 ff.

Lucretian invocation, but the shift from god to god excludes that concentration of fervor which, passing beyond the bounds of reverence into contemplative adoration, is the most salient characteristic of Lucretius' lines. The form and content of the Virgilian prayer sprang from that combination of rare artistic sense and religious reflection which shows itself in so much of Virgil's poetry. Pious he was, but not pious only, he knew to the full the aesthetic effect of accumulations of names and epithets charged with religious associations. He employs the same device in the prayer in 498 ff. of this book: "Di patrii, Indigetes, et Romule Vestaque mater," etc. Cf. also the invocation to Bacchus in *Georg.* ii. 1 ff. The prayer of Aeneas to Venus in *Aeneid* i. 327 ff. is a flurry of adoration, a plea for pity and a promise of sacrifice ("O dea certe . . . . ignari erramus . . . . multa tibi . . . . cadet hostia"). In i. 731 there is an example of that custom of hinting to the god that he ought to grant the request: "Iuppiter, *hospitibus nam te dare iura loquuntur*, hunc laetum Tyriisque diem Troiaque profectis esse velis." This attitude toward the god recurs in ii. 689 ff., where Anchises asks for a sign. In Aeneas' prayer to Apollo in iii. 84 ff. the urgency of the case is emphasized by a rapid fire of imperatives and brief questions. The pitifulness of their plight is also part of their plea ("reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli"). In the last words of this prayer the god is asked to glide into their hearts ("animis inlabere nostris"), the worshiper being confused with the seer. Iarbas' prayer in iv. 206 not only reveals his feeling that his service to Jupiter in making him the tutelary divinity of his realm ("Iuppiter omnipotens, cui nunc Maurusia pictis gens epulata toris Lenaeum libat honorem") entitles him to expect divine assistance, but in the following lines ("an te, genitor, cum fulmina torques, nequiquam horremus?") contains almost a challenge that the god show his power. Iarbas' action in touching the altar as he prayed ("talibus orantem dictis arasque tenentem") is not intended merely to add solemnity, as Conington suggests in his note, but belongs like such an action as embracing the knees of a statue of a god to that quasi-coercion of the divine powers traces of which have already been noticed. That familiarity of tone which we have found in so many of the prayers examined is especially noticeable in Aeneas' prayer to Jupiter (v. 687)

on the occasion of the fire among the ships. It comes out in the *si*-clauses in 697 and 698 but is still more prominent in 690 ff., the burden of which is "Either save us or destroy us completely." The hero's prayer to Apollo in vi. 56 ff. contains a reminder of the god's former protection of their fortunes, a reference to the guidance he had recently vouchsafed, and a plea that the wanderings had lasted long enough. This thought that the Trojans had suffered enough is seen also in the appeal in 631. In viii. 572 ff. when Evander prays, he makes it perfectly clear that he asks for life only on the understanding that he shall see his son Pallas in safety. In ix. 404 ff. Nisus claims the assistance of Diana on the strength of former offerings to her. Ascanius bases his prayer to Jupiter in ix. 625 partly on the fact that his undertaking is a bold one ("audacibus adnue coeptis"); then he speaks of the offering he will make if Jupiter favor him. The prayer of Pallas in x. 421 ff. is of the simple vow form. In a word, Virgil's prayers conform for the most part to the primitive type, though doubtless this is to some extent due to his desire to reproduce faithfully the simplicity of the pastoral and heroic types of character which he is portraying.

Some examples of contemporary prayer and some passages showing his views on the subject are found in Horace's poems. In *Epist.* i. 4. 8 ff. intelligence, eloquence, influence, reputation, health, and a decent competence are mentioned as typical of the kinds of things nurses prayed for in behalf of the children in their charge. The old man in *Sat.* ii. 3. 283 prays for life: "me surpite morti: dis etenim facile est." In the same satire (288 ff.) a mother bargains with Jupiter for the cure of her child. The first part of *Od.* i. 31 contains a list of the things which Horace disdains to pray for—things which are obviously the objects of other men's prayers: fertile fields, goodly herds, gold and ivory of India. Sometimes it is a foolish prayer that the poet glances at contemptuously as in *Sat.* ii. 6. 8. ff.: "si veneror stultus nihil horum, O si angulus ille proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum! O si urnam argenti fors quae mihi monstret." Many of Horace's own prayers conform to the common types of the day, but we cannot found on these any theories of the poet's personal views. When in Ode i. 3 he prays for the safety of a friend he is conforming to a literary rather than a theological theory. The

same is true of his prayer to Faunus in iii. 18 and to Diana in iii. 22. Nor can we regard as anything more than a thoughtless echo of primitive religious ideas those lines (*Od.* i. 21. 13 ff.) in which he says that Apollo moved by prayer will not only save the Romans but will send war, pestilence, and famine among their enemies the Britons and Persians. We get much closer to Horace's own ideas in such prayers as that given at the end of Ode i. 31 ff.: "frui paratis et valido mihi, Latoe, dones et, precor, integra cum mente nec turpem senectam degere nec cithara carentem." Similar in tone is that in *Ep.* i. 18. 107: "sit mihi quod nunc est, etiam minus, et mihi vivam quod superest aevi, siquid superesse volunt di: sit bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum copia, neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae." But the next two lines give a new turn to the thought: "sed satis est orare Iovem, qui ponit et aufert, det vitam, det opes: aequum mi animum ipse parabo." According to the last words one can himself, without aid of gods, attain the moral quality ("aequum animum"); while in the first lines we have the old idea that it is external goods that one should seek from Heaven. How deeply grounded the latter thought was we see from the passage in Cicero *Nat. deor.* iii. 36: "num quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit umquam? At quod dives, quod honoratus, quod incolumis. Iovemque optimum et maximum ob eas res appellant, non quod nos iustos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos, incolumis, opulentos, copiosos."

The purest note in all Horace's words on communion with the gods is sounded in *Od.* iii. 23. 17: "immunis aram si tetigit manus," for the emphasis here is on the moral stainlessness of the worshiper, *immunis* meaning *immunis scelerum.* The recurrence of this idea in the passages from Persius and Seneca which I shall cite below affords a substantial support to this interpretation in spite of the many arguments that have been advanced against it.[1]

In the *Carmen Saeculare* the prayers beginning with vs. 37 and ending in vs. 52, consistent with the formal character of the whole ode, revert to the type shown by so many of the vows quoted in the first part of this paper.

[1] See Postgate *Classical Quarterly* IV (1910), 106 ff.; Granger *Classical Review* XXIV (1910), 46 f.

It is characteristic of the conservative piety of Tibullus that in i. 10. 25 he assures his Lares that the sacrifice of the victim which shall be theirs if they save him will be accompanied by due forms of ritual: "hanc pura cum veste sequar," etc. The tone of the prayers in the third book of the collection (with the exception of iii. 6. 1) is different. The author of iii. 8. (iv. 2) 1 ff., where Mars is warned against Sulpicia, is flippant. The same is true of iii. 10 (iv. 4), where the lover does not only make vows, but if his mistress have a relapse, he abuses the gods: "interdum vovet; interdum quod langueat illa, dicit in aeternos aspera verba deos." At the end of the same elegy we are told that Phoebus will be so delighted with the offerings that both lover and mistress will bring him on the latter's recovery that the other gods will wish that they also had powers which could win them such gratitude. In iii. 11. (iv. 5) 9 ff. the Genius is asked to favor the lover only so long as he is faithful.[1] The prayer in Propertius ii. 16. (iii. 8) 30, that Venus bring about the discomfiture of a rival, is typical of a large group of supplications addressed to that goddess.

In *Am.* ii. 13. 7 in a prayer to Isis Ovid strengthens his appeal by a rhetorical amplification of the extent of her power in a style similar to that already pointed out in the case of Virgil (p. 187): "Isi, Paraetonium genialiaque arva Canopi quae colis et Memphim palmiferamque Pharon," etc. There is moral significance in the prayer in ii. 14. 43 where the gods are implored to forgive the sin of abortion on the ground that it has been committed only once. It is noticeable also that it is the gods in general whose wrath at this sin is assumed. In iii. 10 with characteristic irreverence Ovid reasons with Ceres on the inconsistency of her festival being a period of continence. In *Met.* i. 377 ff. the burden of the prayer offered by Deucalion and Pyrrha to Themis is that now if ever is the time for a manifestation of divine compassion. Special stress is laid upon the justice of the prayer: "si precibus . . . . numina iustis victa remollescunt." The *si*-clause does not express doubt but points out the appropriateness of the occasion for a demonstration of the quality referred to. The *si*-clause in the prayer of Daphne (*ibid.* 545) and in many other passages has a similar force. The prayer of Myrrha

[1] Cf. Hendrickson in *Class. Jour.* V, 255.

at the time of her temptation (x. 321 f.), when she beseeches the gods to save her from the sin of incest, is of especial interest for our inquiry: "Di precor et pietas sacrataque iura parentum hoc prohibete nefas scelerique resistite nostro." In the supplication she makes after she has sinned (x. 483 ff.) we have an early reference to the possibilities of confession as a means of gaining divine forgiveness: "O siqua patetis numina confessis, merui nec triste recuso supplicium." Ovid recurs to this thought in 488: "numen confessis aliquod patet." Along the same lines is the reference to a realization of error as a reason for the god's relenting in Medea's prayer in xi. 131 ff.: "da veniam, Lenaee pater, peccavimus." In the *Fasti* i. 65 ff. the favor of Janus is solicited for those whose efforts have brought about peace on land and sea. When the poet in iii. 714 asks that Bacchus be propitious to him, he emphasizes the fact that it is his festival he is celebrating: "Bacche fave vati, dum tua festa cano." In iv. 1 ff. Ovid chats with Venus just as in the first book he interviews Janus. The emphasis on personal chastity is noteworthy in the prayer of Claudia Quinta on the occasion when the ship carrying the image of Cybele stuck in the mud in the Tiber (iv. 319 ff.): "supplicis, alma, tuae, genetrix fecunda deorum, accipe sub certa condicione preces. Casta negor. Si tu damnas, meruisse fatebor; morte luam poenas iudice victa dea. Sed si crimen abest, tu nostrae pignora vitae re dabis et castas casta sequere manus." Octavian's prayer to Mars (v. 573 ff.) contains the words "stetque favor causa pro meliore tuus." The next line, however, reverts to the usual form of the vow: "templa feres et, me victore, vocaberis Ultor." A suggestive commentary on the character of some kinds of supplication offered by Romans is furnished by the prayer which Ovid puts into the mouth of the trader in v. 681 ff.: "ablue praeteriti periuria temporis . . . . pateant veniente die periuria nobis, nec curent superi siqua locutus ero. Da modo lucra mihi, da facto gaudia lucro, et fac ut emptori verba dedisse iuvet." The next two lines give the poet's comment: "talia Mercurius poscentem ridet ab alto, se memor Ortygias surripuisse boves." In the words spoken by Metellus before entering the temple of Vesta when fire had broken out (v. 450 ff.), it is ceremonial sin that is referred to: "si scelus est, in me commissi poena redundet."

One of the most significant accounts of prayer is that contained in the second satire of Persius. Grounded on fact doubtless are the prayers he censures: e.g., those for the death of an uncle or a ward (vss. 10, 12), those for treasure trove (vs. 11), for a great marriage for the heir of the family (vs. 37), for fertility of flocks (vs. 46), for physical strength (vs. 41)—some of them prayers of criminal intent and only to be muttered under the breath, others harmless enough in themselves but devoid of real piety: "Haec sancte ut poscas," sneers Persius, "Tiberino in gurgite mergis mane caput bis terque et noctem flumine purgas." The satirist scouts the idea that a god would listen to evil prayer or that the sacrifices made could influence him: the offerings acceptable to the gods are duty to god and man, purity of heart, and nobility of character (vss. 73–74). If the worshiper have these, a handful of meal will win acceptance (vs. 75). We have in this satire two elements: first an indication of the kind of prayers Romans sometimes offered, and secondly Persius' ideas of the only really acceptable types of offering. It is an example of primitive pagan prayer subjected to analysis by a Stoic philosopher. That such prayers were offered is attested by abundant evidence. I have already drawn attention to the character of the contents of the *defixionum tabellae*, and the prevalence of the criminal element in the prayers men muttered has been demonstrated by Sudhaus,[1] Schmidt,[2] and Conington.[3]

Seneca's remark in *Ep.* 10. 5 is in substantial agreement with Persius: "nunc enim quanta dementia est hominum! turpissima vota dis insusurrant . . . . quod scire hominem nolunt, deo narrant." Other passages in Seneca throw light on prayers, calling attention either to their foolishness or to the presence of still more reprehensible qualities: *De ben.* vi. 27. 7: "votum tuum aut supervacuum est aut iniuriosum." In the fragment preserved by Lactantius (Haase 123) he speaks of the inefficacy of costly sacrifices and emphasizes the importance of the pure mind and honest purpose. So too in *De ben.* i. 6. 1 ff. he points out that not in victims, even though they be decked out with ornaments of gold, lies the honor of gods, but in

[1] *Archiv f. Religionsw.* IX (1906), 185 ff.

[2] *Veteres philosophi quomodo iudicaverint de precibus*, pp. 26 f., 61 f.

[3] *The Satires of A. Persius Flaccus.*

the piety and rectitude of the worshipers. A little meal and vessels of earthenware suffice the good for the service of the gods, nor do the wicked escape the taint of impiety by staining altars with streams of blood. In *Ep.* 95. 40 Seneca tells us that to be good is the best way to propitiate the gods and to imitate them is their most pleasing service. In *Nat. Quaest.* iii. praef. 14 he warns men not to harbor evil thoughts, but to raise pure hands to heaven and ask for nothing that would mean deprivation for another. The "bona mens," however, that he bids men pray for in *Ep.* 10. 4, is mental, not moral, health.[1] The phrase has the same meaning in Petronius 88, a passage which has other points of similarity with those quoted from Seneca and Persius: "ac ne bonam quidem mentem aut bonam valetudinem petunt, sed statim ante quam limen Capitolii tangant, alius donum promittit si propinquum extulerit, alius si thesaurum effoderit, alius si ad trecentiens sestertium salvus pervenerit."

In saying what men ought not to pray for Juvenal in his tenth satire shows us what men did pray for. One man's supplication is for great power (56 ff.), another's for a wife, another's for children (352), another's for long life (188 ff.); mothers pray for beauty for their children (289 ff.), and in all the temples are offered prayers for wealth. Juvenal's censure of these types of prayer is an odd medley of material and moral considerations. He bids men not to pray for great power because it has proved the ruin of many. He cites the tragedy of Sejanus' end as a case in point, and describes the horrors of his fall with all the resources of rhetorical declamation. As a warning to those who pray that their life may be long he details the unsightliness and physical disabilities of extreme old age. He tries to frighten those who pray for riches by dwelling on the dangers to which great wealth would expose them. On the other hand there is a moral element in his censure of parents' prayers for beauty in their children, for he contends that beauty and chastity rarely go together (297): "rara est adeo concordia formae atque pudicitiae"; and when at the end of the satire he discusses suitable subjects for prayer

[1] It would be apart from the purpose of this paper to attempt to reconcile with the passages quoted those other passages in Seneca's works in which he seems to disapprove not only of wicked or foolish prayers, but of prayers of all kinds. This question has been admirably discussed by Schmidt in the treatise already cited.

(354 ff.), he urges men to ask for a stout heart that shall not know fear of death, that shall be able to bear any hardships, that shall never stoop to anger or desire, and that shall prefer honest toil to all the lures of indulgence, luxury, and ease. Some commentators see high moral intent in vss. 346 ff., where Juvenal advises men not to pray for such things as have been mentioned above but to let the gods decide what is good and useful for them; they will give what is suitable even if it be not pleasant. Mayor compares the passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* i. 3. 2, where we are told that Socrates prayed to the gods for good things, leaving them to decide what things were good. But judging from the language used by Juvenal here ("conveniat . . . . utile . . . . aptissima"), from the trend of the arguments throughout the greater part of the satire, and from the illustrations given (350–53), worldly rather than spiritual considerations predominate. The illustrations are especially instructive in determining Juvenal's meaning: Why pray for a wife when she might turn out to be a harridan or worse? Why pray for children when they might disgrace you?

Some of the thoughts in Juvenal's discussion of prayer are traced by Mayor[1] and Schmidt[2] back to Valerius Maximus. The resemblances are certainly striking. Cf. Val. Max. vii. 2 ext. 1: "at haec [i.e. marriages] ut aliquando illustrant, ita nonnumquam funditus domos evertunt . . . . divitias adpetis, quae multis exitio fuerunt, honores concupiscis, qui complures pessum dederunt, regna tecum ipsa volvis, quorum exitus saepenumero miserabiles cernuntur."

The authors examined give, I think, a fair representation of prayer as it was practiced and preached among the Romans. I shall add only one more writer, namely Apuleius of Madaura, not because any distinctly new elements are found in the prayers in his works but because some of the qualities discussed appear there in a far higher degree of intensity. Appeals to the compassion of gods we have seen in many prayers, but few of them rival in pathos Psyche's plea to Ceres (vi. 2): "miserandae Psyches animae supplicis tuae subsiste," etc. The most striking feature of Apuleius' prayers, however, is their

[1] *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal.*

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 28–29.

fervor of adoration. An example is furnished by the passage cited above where Psyche, bowing her head in the dust at Ceres' feet, adores and magnifies her: "per ego te frugiferam tuam dexteram istam deprecor, per laetificas messium caerimonias, per tacita secreta cistarum." Of similar character is Psyche's prayer to Juno (*ibid.* 4), and that to the gods in xi. 1. The prayer of Lucius to Isis after his initiation into her mysteries (xi. 25) is of the same type but breathes a purer spirit of adoration. He extols her manifold powers in golden phrases that carry the reader up to the very threshold of divine compassion and love: "sancta et humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, semper fovendis mortalibus munifica, dulcem matris affectionem miserorum casibus tribuis . . . . et depulsis vitae procellis salutarem porrigas dexteram." Not a thousand tongues, he cries, not an eternity of unflagging speech could begin to express the adoration of his heart. Nor can any paraphrase reproduce the startling effectiveness of Apuleius' rhetoric. Adoration we have found before in Roman writers, but only here do we find that exaltation which transcends the things of this world and passes into the mystic.

To sum up, while Roman prayer throughout its whole history retained for the most part a primitive form, yet it did at an early date in certain cults involve moral ideas—not moral merely in the sense in which Jevons uses the term but moral in the ordinary acceptation of the word. These moral ideas were at least as early as the worship of Jupiter as the god of truth and good faith, a cult which belongs to the first days of Roman history. It should, however, be noticed that originally there was no connection between moral ideas and the cults of the gods in general, and that in some cults such a connection was never developed. On the other hand prayers quoted in this paper make it clear that there was a tendency in the direction of a closer drawing together of moral and religious ideas. This tendency is not as strong as one would expect it to be. The prayers exemplifying it are, in comparison with those of more primitive type, relatively few in number. But sporadic as they are they do exist, as the quotations show. It is not necessary to assume that all these moral ideas came to the Romans through the medium of Greek philosophy. The philosophical schools, however, constituted one of the chief sources, and the views of Horace, Persius, and Seneca were influenced

by them. That some Romans practiced the precepts which we find in the works of these writers it is reasonable to assume. As regards those types of prayer which the satirists attack most bitterly—the wicked and foolish prayers—there is no doubt that they existed and were even frequent; but that they were the most common kinds of prayer cannot be believed. The satirist has ever loved the extreme. The most common type of prayer was neither immoral nor moral. It was ceremonial.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

STUDIES IN GREEK NOUN-FORMATION

Based in part upon material collected by the late A. W. Stratton, and prepared under the supervision of Carl D. Buck[1]

LABIAL TERMINATIONS

Words in *-φη* or *-φᾱ* (also *-φᾰ́*)—in *-φης* or *-φᾱς*, gen. *-φου*—and in *-φος* and *-φον*, gen. *-φου*.

By E. H. Sturtevant

The existence of an Indo-European suffix *-bho* has long been recognized, and in recent years it has received rather frequent treatment. There is an excellent summary of our present knowledge of the subject in the new edition of the second volume of Brugmann's *Grundriss* (Part I, pp. 386 ff.; see his references to the more important literature). Upon this we must base our introductory remarks on the use of the suffix in Indo-European in general (pp. 197 to 199), although we shall depart from Brugmann's treatment at several points, and our third paragraph is entirely new.

Only a few words containing the suffix can with any certainty be ascribed to the parent speech. In the first rank stand *ἔριφος* (from **eribhos*), Ir. *earb* "goat," Swed. *järf* "gulo borealis" (from **erbhos*) : Lat. *aries*, Lith. *ėras* "lamb"; *ἀλφός* "white," as substantive "white leprosy," Lat. *albus*, OHG. *elbiz*, OB. *lebedĭ*, Serv. *làbud* "swan" : OHG. *elo* "yellow"; OP. *naiba-* "beautiful, good," Ir. *noib*, *noeb* "holy" : Lat. *niteo*, Ir. *niam* "splendor," Skt. *nílas* "dark blue"(?). We should probably add to the list *ἔλαφος* (from **eln-bhos*) : Goth., Eng. *lamb* (from **lon-bhom*) : *ἐλλός* (from **ἐλνός*) "young deer," Cymr. *elain* "hind," OB. *jelen* "deer" (see Osthoff *Etymologische Parerga* 305); *σφός*, OPr. *subs* "selbst, eigen" (from **s^{e}bho-*), Goth. *sibja*, NHG. *Sippe*, OB. *seb-rŭ* "free peasant," Lat. *Sab-īnī* : **se-* reflexive; and Slavic *svobó-da*, *svobo-dá* "freedom," *Suēbī*, OHG. *Swābā*, NHG. *Schwaben* : **sṷe-* reflexive.[2]

[1] See Introductory Note, *CP.* V. 323 ff.

[2] Cf. Lidén *Studien z. altind. u. vergl. Sprachgeschichte* 54 and Solmsen *Untersuchungen z. griech. Laut- u. Verslehre* 197 f. Solmsen derives Skt. *sabhā* "assembly" also from the reflexive stem, but it seems preferable to connect it with the demonstrative **se-* (see p. 199). Brugmann, *Grundr.* 2. 1^2. 388 (cf. also *Demonstrativpronomina*

It is impossible to draw a sharp distinction between words with an Indo-European suffix and those with a "root-determinative." For example, *κνάφος*, *γνάφος* "a carding comb," *κνάπτω* "card wool," Lith. *knìbti* "pluck," *knĕbti* "pinch" (Sütterlin *IF.* 25. 66), clearly belong with *κνῆν* "scrape, scratch"; accordingly *κνάφος* may originally have been an abstract derivative in *-bho*, while *ἄγναφος*, *N.T.*, may possibly represent an Indo-European adjective. Similarly we have *(σ)κέραφος*, *σχέραφος* "mockery, abuse," Hesych., Lett. *schk'erbs* "rude," *skarbs* "sharp, etc." : *κείρω*, Lat. *careo*, etc. (Brugmann *IF.* 15. 97). *τρυφή* "luxury," properly "destruction," *τρύφος τό* "fragment" (perhaps originally masculine, cf. *ἔδαφος*), *θρύπτω*, Lett. *drubascha* "fragment," *drubasas* "splinter" stand beside *θραύω* "break," *θραυστός* "frangible," Lett. *drupi* "fragments," *drúpu* "fall to pieces" (cf. p. 209), etc.

Scholars have been more successful in tracing certain uses of the suffix back to pro-ethnic times. Thus, all branches of the Indo-European stock employ it in animal names. Adjectives, though rather less numerous except in Baltic-Slavic, are quite as widespread. It is hardly possible to classify their meanings except for the several languages separately.[1] Abstracts occur with some frequency in Baltic-Slavic and Greek, and occasionally elsewhere.

The abstracts and adjectives seem to be very closely related. The suffix-form *-ĭbhā-* common in abstracts in Baltic-Slavic, stands beside *-ĭbho* in Lithuanian and Greek adjectives.[2] Such pairs as Lith. *dalýbas* "sharing" : *dalýbos* (plural) "division," especially of an inheritance, and Goth. *halbs* "half" : *halba* fem. "Seite, Teil" are significant. The animal names probably represent, in part at least, a specialization of the adjectives. For example, several animal names

31), on the other hand, connects only Slavic *svobo-da* with the reflexive stem. Apparently he loses sight of the fact that these etymologies are quite independent of Solmsen's theory that I-E. *su-* became *s-* under certain unknown conditions, since the *semantic* equivalence of **sue-* and **se-* is indubitable.

[1] Brugmann, *loc. cit.*, lays stress upon the color words; but, of the half-dozen he names, Lat. *galbus* is very likely a Celtic loan word with suffix *-uo* (Walde), while *ἀλωφός* and *ἄργυφος* may be specifically Greek.

[2] The constant length of the *-ī-* in Baltic is not original, as is shown by Slavic *-ĭ-*. Lithuanian *-ỹba*, *-ỹbė* in abstracts may have been influenced by the equivalent suffix *-ỹsta*, *-ỹstė*. The adjectives in *-ỹbas* clearly stand in some secondary relation to those in *-ỹvas*, Slavic *-ĭvŭ* (see Leskien *Bildung d. Nomina im Lit.* 353). But Greek *σέρῖφος* (see p. 209) indicates that the parent language had the suffix *-ībho* as well as *-ĭbho*.

in *-bho* were originally color words. With these we must include words like Goth. *-dūbō*, OHG. *tūba*, Eng. *dove* : Ir. *dub* "black" (? Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 306), which did not contain the suffix.

The parent speech also employed the suffix in *-bho* or *-bhā* to form derivatives from pronominal stems. The derivatives from the reflexive pronouns have been given above (p. 197). Lidén, *Studien z. altind. u. vergl. Sprachgeschichte* 52 ff., finds demonstrative stems in Lombard *-aib*, OHG. *-eiba* "district" (from I-E. **oi-bhā* or **ai-bhā* : **e-*, **o-* demonstrative), Skt. *sabhā* "assembly" (from I-E. **se-bhā* : **se-* demonstrative), and Skt. *ibhas* "elephant," properly "possession, property," *ibhyas* "rich" (: **i-* demonstrative). Some of these pronominal derivatives belong with the adjectives (*σφός*, OPr. *subs*); Germanic *-aib* and *-eiba* and Skt. *sabhā* have a collective force, and so go more nearly with the abstracts.

All the inherited types are represented in Greek, and a large majority of the Greek derivatives fall under them.

1. *Animal names.*—As in Indo-European in general, animal names most frequently show the suffix under discussion. *ἔριφος* and probably *ἔλαφος* were inherited (see above). *κόττυφος* "blackbird" is perhaps onomatopoetic in its first member. Prellwitz suggests a derivation from **kukʲubhos* (with dissimilation of the first vowel?), and compares Skt. *kukkubhas* "phasianus gallus." Brugmann, *Grundr.* 2. 1². 390, sees onomatopoeia in the bird names *κέπφος*, *κουκούφας*, and *ἀπαφός*. Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, thinks that *κέπφος* is probably foreign. *κουκούφας* (also *κουκοῦφος*) seems to be an Egyptian word for *ἔποψ* (Thompson *op. cit.*; cf. Horapollo 1. 55). *ἀπαφός· ἔποψ, τὸ ὄρνεον*, Hesych., is very likely a variant of its synonym, under the influence of the animal names in *-φος*.

The Hesychian *κόραφος· ποιὸς ὄρνις* is derived from the stem seen in *κορώνη*, *κόραξ*, Lat. *cornix*. *σιγαλφοί· . . . . οἱ ἄγριοι τέττιγες*, Hesych., is to be connected with *σιγηλός* "mute," used of animals in Arist. *H.A.* 1. 1. 29, and with *σιγᾶλέος* "silent." Probably it applies to the species of which the scholiast on Ar. *Av.* 1095 Dind. says: *ἕτερον δὲ γένος σίγιον καλεῖται παρὰ τὴν σιωπήν.*[1]

[1] Schmidt writes Hesychius' lemma *σιγαλ[φ]οί*, while L. Dindorf (*Thesaurus* 7. 216) prefers *σιγαλέοι*. Doubtless one or the other is right as far as the first definition (*οἱ ἄφωνοι.*) is concerned; but I suspect that two articles have been amalgamated.

κεμφός· ἄλαφος, Hesych., belongs with *κεμάς -άδος*, Hom.,+. The suffix is *-φι-*, although it is possible that the influence of the primitive carried the word over to the *-άς -άδος* declension. *χρύσαφος*, Marcell. Sid., and *χρύσοφος*, *CGL.*, a fish, Lat. "aurata," show the influence of the suffix, but they are probably modifications of *χρύσοφρυς*, the name which is usually applied to the fish in question, rather than new derivatives from *χρυσός*. *κίραφος· ἀλώπηξ* is a derivative of the word which precedes it in Hesychius, *κίρα· ἀλώπηξ, Λάκωνες*; unless we should rather suspect a corruption of the text. An article in Antonius Monachus' lexicon runs: *βοῦφος· ὄρνεον. βοῦφος ἐπιφοιτᾷ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσυνέτων καὶ παχυφρόνων εἴρηται.* Whether the bird in question was merely a creature of the imagination or a real bird of sluggish habits, its name is derived from *βοῦς*.

The late *κουτάλαφας* "cicada," Port., seems to be connected with *κουτάλα*, Doric for *σκυτάλη* "club, staff," also "sucker" on a tree (Geop. 9. 11. 4). Perhaps we may think of *κουτάλαφας* as the "insect on the twigs."

ὄρφος,[1] a kind of fish, is Attic *ὀρφώς*, assimilated to the words with our suffix.

γρύψ, *γρυπός* (also *γρυφός*) "griffin," Hes.,+, and its variants. *γρυβός*, Hesych., and *γρυφός*, Pomponius Mela, are certainly to be connected in some manner with Hebrew *k'rūb*, a creature combining the forms of man, ox, lion, and eagle (Ezek., chap. 1) or of man, lion, and eagle (Ezek., chap. 10). As there seems to be no satisfactory Semitic etymology of the word (Thayer *Lexicon of the New Testament*, *s.v.* *χερουβίμ*), it is probable that Greek and Hebrew borrowed from some common source. The final consonant of the Hebrew word makes it probable that *γρυβός* was the original Greek form, in spite of its late appearance in our records.[2] The stem with *π* is due to a fancied connection with *γρυπός* "hook-nosed." *γρυφός* and *γρύψ*, *γρυφός* (Verg. *Ec.*,+) show the influence of the animal names in *-φος*.

σίλφη "book worm" may be derived from *ψιλός* "bare," in view of Aristotle's (*H.A.* 8. 17) remark: *τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον* (i.e., as the

[1] Herodian, 1. 166. 19 L., cites the word as a barytone. Modern *ὀρφός* is from *ὀρφώς*.

[2] Cf. Fick *KZ.* 42. 288. This view now seems to me more probable than the one which I expressed in *CP.* V. 331.

serpents) *καὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐκδύνει τὸ γῆρας ὅσα ἐκδύνει, οἷον σίλφη.* . . . . The change from *ψ-* to *σ-* would have to be explained as an instance of dissimilation (from **πσιλπη*). Both meaning and etymology of *τίφη*, Ar. *Ach.* 920, 925, are uncertain. It is indeed said by Phrynichus, 359 Ruth., and the scholiast on the passage to be equal to *σίλφη*; and probably we should read *τίφη* instead of *σίφη* in Herodian 1. 108. 14 L.: *ἐγένετο δὲ ἔλλειψις, ὡς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἡ ⟨τ⟩ίφη ἐκ τοῦ σίλφη παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένη.* . . . . But the two words can hardly have been equivalent in Aristophanes' day. In the *Acharnians*, Nicharchus propounds a scheme to burn the ships by putting a wick *ἐς τίφην*, and sending it to the dockyard through a sewer. Dicaeopolis replies: *σελαγοῖντ' ἂν ὑπὸ τίφης τὲ καὶ θρυαλλίδος*; Clearly a book worm is out of the question; a glow worm would fit the context admirably.[1] We may at least, therefore, be sure that *σίλφη* and *τίφη* have no etymological connection, and that in the classical period they differed in meaning. The semantic confusion which we have noticed in Herodian and elsewhere was responsible for Lucian's *τίλφη*, a contamination of the two.

Beside *(σ)κιδάφη* and *κίδαφος*[2] "fox," we find *κινδάφη, κινδάφιον*, Hesych., and *σκίνδαφος*, Oudendorp's conjecture for *σκινδακός* in Aelian. The forms with a nasal represent a contamination with the synonymous *κίναδος*, but the etymology of *κίδαφος* itself is unknown. Other obscure words are *(ἀσ)κάλαφος*, an unknown bird (see p. 215), *ῥάφοι· ὄρνεις τινές*, Hesych., *βαιῶμφαι· αἱ αἶγες ἐν ἱερατικοῖς*, Hesych., *σύρφος· θηρίδιον μικρόν, ὁποῖον ἐμπίς*, Hesych., *κυφή*, a kind of shrimp, Epich., +, *καθουφήν·*[3] *ἀλώπεκα*, Hesych.

Εἰραφιώτης, Lesb. *Ἐρραφεώτης*, an epithet of Dionysus, h. Hom., +, suggests **εἴραφος, *ἔρραφος* "goat" (Froehde *BB.* 21. 199), or "fox" (Ehrlich *KZ.* 39. 567), or the like.

ἀκαλήφη[4] and *(ἀ)σκαλᾰ́φη* "sea-nettle," as well as "nettle," and *γόμφος· ἰχθύς*, Hesych. : *γόμφος* "nail" are animal names only in

[1] Herwerden, *Lex. Gr. Suppl.*[2], identifies Aristophanes' *τίφη* with the homonymous plant name.

[2] Hesychius' first definition, "*δόλιος*," doubtless represents a figurative use of the animal name.

[3] Schmidt conjectures *κάθουριν* = *κόθουριν*.

[4] *ἀκαλύφη*, in Pollux and Simeon Seth, seems to be an itacistic blunder for this. See also *Thesaurus s.v.*

a derived sense, and are quite independent of the suffix. *σέρφος*, the name of an insect, is a variant of the adjective *σέριφος* (see below). There are also several compound animal names in the following word-lists, as *τραγέλαφος*, *σχινότροφος*, *κιχλοκόσσυφος*.

2. *Adjectives.*—Several of the Greek adjectives with suffix *-φος* have a derogatory force. But there is hardly sufficient evidence that this is anything more than accidental and that such a force had become consciously associated with the suffix. *λίσφος* "*ἄπυγος*," Moer., Tzetz., as substantive, *λίσφα τὰ ἰσχία . . . . .*, *E.M.*, is cited as Attic for *λίσπος*. A derogatory connotation attaches to the latter form in Ar. *Ran.* 826, *λίσπη γλῶσσα* (of Euripides), to the compounds, *λισπόπυγος* and *λισπόπυξ*, and to *ὑπόλισπος* in Ar. *Eq.* 1368, *πολλοῖς γ' ὑπολίσποις πυγιδίοισιν ἐχαρίσω*. Elsewhere *λίσπος* has no disagreeable connotation, and *ὑπόλισφος* in Philostr. *De Gymn.* 35, *τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῷ ἰσχίῳ μήθ' ὑπόλισφα ἔστω μήτ' αὖ περιττά*, is innocent enough. *λίσφος* is a derivative of *λισσός* "smooth" (cf. *ὄλισβος* from *ὀλισθάνω*, *ὄλισθος*; *CP.* V. 337). *λίσπος* has fallen under the influence of *λιπαρός*, etc.

σκελιφρός "dry, parched, lean," Hipp., implies a base **σκελιφος*, from *σκέλλω* "make dry, parch." The form *σκελεφρός*, Erot., shows assimilation of *ι* to the preceding *ε*, and so does the primitive adjective in its two recorded substantival uses: *κελεφός*, Hegemonius, +, is one of the numerous late Greek words for "leper"; *σκέλεφορ* (Schmidt; MS *σκέλεφερ*)· *βόλου ὄνομα*, Hesych., was perhaps a throw in which some or all of the *tali* rested upon the narrow side, hence the "narrow throw."

According to Antonius Monachus and Suidas, the phrase *γραῦς σέριφος* or *γραῦς σερίφη* was properly the Sicilian name of the locust usually called *μάντις*, and was used figuratively for "old maid"; but they have evidently reversed the process: *γραῦς* means "old woman" literally, not figuratively. The adjective appears elsewhere in the proper name *Σέριφος*, a small island (cf. Fick *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen* 57), in *σέριφον*,[1] a kind of wormwood, and in the Hesychian gloss: *Σέριφος*· *Ἀριστοφάνης τὴν Λακεδαίμονα Σέριφον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πόα*

[1] L. and S. cite *σέριφος ἡ* from Dioec. 3. 27 (= 3. 24 Spengel). That passage, however, contains the accusative singular without the article. The gender is shown to be neuter by the article in Galen 13. 126 K.

σέριφος λεγομέμη. Instead of this Photius writes: *Σέριφον· τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, διὰ τὸ σκληρῶς ζῆν*. . . . . Apparently *σέριφος* meant "dry," in combination with *πόα* "hay," and in the phrase *γραῦς σέριφος* "a dried-up old woman"; while *σέριφον* "wormwood" and *Σέριφος*, the island name, as well as *Σέριφος* = *Λακεδαίμων*, show a derived sense, "unpleasant, harsh" (cf. *ξηρός* opposed to *ἡδύς* in Eur. *Andr.* 784). *σέρφος*, an insect, differs only in the form of the suffix. For the root, Prellwitz suggests a comparison with *ξερός* "dry."

στέριφος "barren," of women, animals, and plants, Ar., +, is a derivative of the synonymous *στεῖρος*; likewise *στέριφος* "firm" from *στερεός*. *ἄγροφον· ὀρεινόν*, Galen *Lex. Hipp.*, is derived from *ἀγρός*. *στυφός* "astringent" comes from *στύω* "make stiff." *λίηφος· δεινός*, Hesych., is possibly connected with *λίην* "very much, overmuch." In *λαφός· ὁ ἀριστερᾷ χειρὶ χρώμενος*, Hesych., *φ* probably represents *ϝ*.

There remain four color words, of which one, *ἀλφός*, is certainly inherited. *ἀλωφός* "white," Hesych., is made on the same root as *ἀλφός*, Lith. *alvas*, etc., and is probably an inherited form (see Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 388). *ἄργυφος*,[1] a Homeric epithet of sheep, contains the stem of *ἄργυρος* and Skt. *árjunas* "white." *κίνιφος· ὁ ποίκιλος*, Anton. Mon., Suid., seems to go with *κινέω*, *κίνυμαι* "go" and *κινύσσομαι* "waver, sway."

3. *Abstract substantives.*—Most of the Greek abstracts in our suffix differ from those in Baltic-Slavic in having the *o*-stem and masculine gender. All the masculines have recessive accent. The inherited forms *(σ)κέραφος*, *σχέραφος*, *κνάφος*, *γνάφος*, *τρύφος*, and *τρυφή* may contain the suffix (see p. 198). It is certainly present in the following (Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 390): *κόλαφος* "buffet" : *κόλος*, *κολάζω*, etc.; *φλήναφος* "ineptiae" : *φληνέω*, *φληνάω*, *φληνύω*; *κρόταφος* "side of the forehead," plural "the temples," originally "a striking, a pulse" : *κρότος*, *κροτέω*, *κρόταλον*. *τὸ ἔδαφος*, originally a masculine abstract, owes its change of stem and gender to the influence of the synonymous and cognate *ἔδος*. Homeric *εἰλυφόων* "whirling" implies an abstract substantive **ϝέλυφος* :

[1] *ἀργόφεος* is an extension of this on the model of *ἀργύρεος*, *μαρμάρεος*, etc. (Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 387). Lycophron's *συφός* "pig sty," beside Homeric *συφεός*, *συφειός*, shows the reverse process.

*ϝέλνυμι (εἰλύω).[1] τῦφος "smoke, folly" : θύω must antedate the dissimilation of aspirates.

For the noun σκίραφος and its derivatives we have a bewildering array of meanings. σκίραφος itself means "trickery, cheating" in Hipponax, "gambler" and "licentious" according to Herodian 1. 225. 13 f., 2. 581. 22 ff. L., and "dice box" according to the *E.M.* σκιραφεῖον is the name of an Athenian gambling den (Isocr., +). σκ[ε]ιραφεῖν means "play at dice" (Hesych.); σκιραφευτής, "dice player" (Amphis); and σκιραφώδης, "tricky, swindling" (Phrynichus in *A.B.* 101). Herodian, *loc. cit.*, is surely right in deriving the group from Σκίρον, the name of the red light district in Athens, where the σκιραφεῖον was situated. The various recorded meanings can most easily be arranged if we start with σκίραφος in an abstract sense "rascality, gambling." This developed into the concrete "dice box" and "rascal, gambler." The connecting link between Σκίρον and σκίρ-α-φος was probably *σκίρ-ων "frequenter of the Σκίρον."

Several Greek abstracts show the feminine which appears constantly in Baltic-Slavic. τρυφή has already been mentioned. κνήφη "the itch," LXX, Suid., is a specifically Greek derivative from κνῆν "scratch, tickle," and has no direct connection with the inherited κνάφος.

Beside the familiar κορυφή, we find a masculine κόρυφος[2] in an inscription in the Megarian dialect (*IG.* 4. 929. 17 ff.) referring to certain landmarks between Epidaurus and Corinth. Κόρυφον, the name of a mountain near Epidaurus, Paus. 2. 28. 2, suggests that the word is Epidaurian rather than Megarian. A wholly different meaning of the *o*-stem appears in the Hesychian gloss, κόρυφος· κόρυμβος γυναικεῖος. The force of κορυφή, as of κόρυφος, is usually concrete, "summit, top"; but a trace of the abstract meaning "height" is preserved in Pindar's κορυφὰ λόγων, λόγων κορυφαί "the climax," κορυφαὶ πόλεων "the best of cities," etc.; although here too the concrete idea was present to consciousness, as is shown by Plato's use of the noun with the verb "to go" (*Crat.* 415 A)—

[1] Solmsen *Untersuchungen z. griech. Laut- u. Verslehre* 325. His alternative suggestion of an original adjective is less probable, since it would not correspond in meaning with the Greek adjectives in -φος.

[2] The accent is determined by Herodian 1. 225. 18 L.

ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα, ... ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν.

4. *Concrete substantives.*—Like other abstract substantives, those in *-φος* and *-φη* sometimes came to have a concrete sense, as *ἔδαφος* "bottom," e.g., of a ship, *Od.* 5. 249, *σκίραφος* "gambler," *φλήναφος* "babbler," *κορυφή* "summit." Other concrete substantives, as we have seen above (pp. 202 ff.), sprang from the substantival use of adjectives in *-φος*, as *κελεφός* "leper" and *σκέλεφορ* "a throw at dice" from **σκέλιφος* "dry, thin"; *Σέριφος*, an island, and *σέριφον* "wormwood" from *σέριφος* "dry, unpleasant"; *λίσφον* "(small) buttock" from *λίσφος* "smooth, flat"; *ἀλφός* "a dull-white leprosy" from *ἀλφός* "white."

After the model of these and similar words, the suffix *-φος*, *-φη* was used to form concrete substantives. *γάλεφος*, Interpol. Diosc., is a variant of the plant names *γάλιον*, *γαλεόβδολον*, and *γαλεόψις*. Walde, *s.v. galea*, derives these three words from *γαλέη* "weasel," in the secondary sense of "helmet" which is seen in the borrowed Latin *galea*. *γάλεφος* is derived from the same base with the suffix *-φος*. *ἐγκίλλαφον· οὐρά*, Hesych., is a derivative of *ἔγκιλλον· οὐράν*, Hesych. *ἀγρίφη*[1] "harrow, rake," with its derivative *ἀγρῖφνα*, *Anth. P.* 6. 297, and *ἄγριφος* "grapple," Const. Porph., may be from *ἀγρεύω*, *ἀγρέω*. *ἄγριφος* "wild olive," Hesych., whence comes *Ἀγρίφα· Ἀθηνᾶ*, Hesych., seems to be connected with *ἄγριος* "wild." *οὔλαφος· νεκρός*, Hesych., suggests *ὄλλυμι*, *οὐλόμην*, etc. *ταρήφη· τάρπη*, Hesych., goes with *τάρπη*, and *ταρσός*, *ταρρός* "crate, basket."

Ἄλθηφον or *Ἄλθηφος*, the name of a district in Troezenia, belongs with *ἄλθετο*, *ἀπαλθήσεσθον* "heal," Hom., *ἀλθήσκω*, Hipp., *ἀλθαίνω*, Hipp. and Alexandrian epic poets, *ἄλθεξις* "a healing," Hipp., Galen, *ἀλθαία* "wild mallow," Theophr. (as proper name, Hom.), *ἀλθήεις*, *ἀλθεστήρια*, Nic., *ἀλθεύς*, *ἄλθος*, Hesych., and several proper names in *Ἀλθαι-*, *Ἀλθη-*, *-άλθης* in inscriptions of Ephesus, Eretria, Cos, and Thasos (Fick-Bechtel, pp. 52 f.). The group evidently belongs primarily to the Ionic dialect, and hence our word is a trace of the original Ionic speech of the Argolic Acte[2] (cf. Buck

[1] Herodian, 1. 345. 32 L., cites it among *τὰ εἰς φη παραληγόμενα φύσει μακρᾷ*.

[2] In this connection we may add that Strabo, 10. 4. 18, says that the son of Cirrus, one of the founders of Argos, was named *Ἀλθαιμένης*.

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serpents) καὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐκδύνει τὸ γῆρας ὅσα ἐκδύνει, οἷον σίλφη. . . . . The change from ψ- to σ- would have to be explained as an instance of dissimilation (from *πσιλπη). Both meaning and etymology of τίφη, Ar. *Ach.* 920, 925, are uncertain. It is indeed said by Phrynichus, 359 Ruth., and the scholiast on the passage to be equal to σίλφη; and probably we should read τίφη instead of σίφη in Herodian 1. 108. 14 L.: ἐγένετο δὲ ἔλλειψις, ὡς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἡ ⟨τ⟩ίφη ἐκ τοῦ σίλφη παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένη. . . . . But the two words can hardly have been equivalent in Aristophanes' day. In the *Acharnians*, Nicharchus propounds a scheme to burn the ships by putting a wick ἐς τίφην, and sending it to the dockyard through a sewer. Dicaeopolis replies: σελαγοῖντ' ἂν ὑπὸ τίφης τὲ καὶ θρυαλλίδος; Clearly a book worm is out of the question; a glow worm would fit the context admirably.[1] We may at least, therefore, be sure that σίλφη and τίφη have no etymological connection, and that in the classical period they differed in meaning. The semantic confusion which we have noticed in Herodian and elsewhere was responsible for Lucian's τίλφη, a contamination of the two.

Beside (σ)κιδάφη and κίδαφος[2] "fox," we find κινδάφη, κινδάφιον, Hesych., and σκίνδαφος, Oudendorp's conjecture for σκινδακός in Aelian. The forms with a nasal represent a contamination with the synonymous κίναδος, but the etymology of κίδαφος itself is unknown. Other obscure words are (ἀσ)κάλαφος, an unknown bird (see p. 215), ῥάφοι· ὄρνεις τινές, Hesych., βαιῶμφαι· αἱ αἶγες ἐν ἱερατικοῖς, Hesych., σύρφος· θηρίδιον μικρόν, ὁποῖον ἐμπίς, Hesych., κυφή, a kind of shrimp, Epich., +, καθουφήν·[3] ἀλώπεκα, Hesych.

Εἰραφιώτης, Lesb. Ἐρραφεώτης, an epithet of Dionysus, h. Hom., +, suggests *εἴραφος, *ἔρραφος "goat" (Froehde *BB.* 21. 199), or "fox" (Ehrlich *KZ.* 39. 567), or the like.

ἀκαλήφη[4] and (ἀ)σκαλᾰ́φη "sea-nettle," as well as "nettle," and γόμφος· ἰχθύς, Hesych. : γόμφος "nail" are animal names only in

[1] Herwerden, *Lex. Gr. Suppl.*[2], identifies Aristophanes' τίφη with the homonymous plant name.

[2] Hesychius' first definition, "δόλιος," doubtless represents a figurative use of the animal name.

[3] Schmidt conjectures κάθουριν = κόθουριν.

[4] ἀκαλύφη, in Pollux and Simeon Seth, seems to be an itacistic blunder for this. See also *Thesaurus s.v.*

a derived sense, and are quite independent of the suffix. *σέρφος*, the name of an insect, is a variant of the adjective *σέριφος* (see below). There are also several compound animal names in the following word-lists, as *τραγέλαφος*, *σχινότροφος*, *κιχλοκόσσυφος*.

2. *Adjectives.*—Several of the Greek adjectives with suffix *-φος* have a derogatory force. But there is hardly sufficient evidence that this is anything more than accidental and that such a force had become consciously associated with the suffix. *λίσφος* "*ἄπυγος*," Moer., Tzetz., as substantive, *λίσφα τὰ ἰσχία . . . . .*, *E.M.*, is cited as Attic for *λίσπος*. A derogatory connotation attaches to the latter form in Ar. *Ran.* 826, *λίσπη γλῶσσα* (of Euripides), to the compounds, *λισπόπυγος* and *λισπόπυξ*, and to *ὑπόλισπος* in Ar. *Eq.* 1368, *πολλοῖς γ' ὑπολίσποις πυγιδίοισιν ἐχαρίσω*. Elsewhere *λίσπος* has no disagreeable connotation, and *ὑπόλισφος* in Philostr. *De Gymn.* 35, *τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῷ ἰσχίῳ μήθ' ὑπόλισφα ἔστω μήτ' αὖ περιττά*, is innocent enough. *λίσφος* is a derivative of *λισσός* "smooth" (cf. *ὄλισβος* from *ὀλισθάνω*, *ὄλισθος*; *CP.* V. 337). *λίσπος* has fallen under the influence of *λιπαρός*, etc.

σκελιφρός "dry, parched, lean," Hipp., implies a base **σκελιφος*, from *σκέλλω* "make dry, parch." The form *σκελεφρός*, Erot., shows assimilation of *ι* to the preceding *ε*, and so does the primitive adjective in its two recorded substantival uses: *κελεφός*, Hegemonius, +, is one of the numerous late Greek words for "leper"; *σκέλεφορ* (Schmidt; MS *σκέλεφερ*)· *βόλου ὄνομα*, Hesych., was perhaps a throw in which some or all of the *tali* rested upon the narrow side, hence the "narrow throw."

According to Antonius Monachus and Suidas, the phrase *γραῦς σέριφος* or *γραῦς σερίφη* was properly the Sicilian name of the locust usually called *μάντις*, and was used figuratively for "old maid"; but they have evidently reversed the process: *γραῦς* means "old woman" literally, not figuratively. The adjective appears elsewhere in the proper name *Σέριφος*, a small island (cf. Fick *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen* 57), in *σέριφον*,[1] a kind of wormwood, and in the Hesychian gloss: *Σέριφος*· *Ἀριστοφάνης τὴν Λακεδαίμονα Σέριφον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πόα*

[1] L. and S. cite *σέριφος ἡ* from Dioec. 3. 27 (= 3. 24 Spengel). That passage, however, contains the accusative singular without the article. The gender is shown to be neuter by the article in Galen 13. 126 K.

σέριφος λεγομέμη. Instead of this Photius writes: *Σέριφον· τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, διὰ τὸ σκληρῶς ζῆν*. . . . . Apparently *σέριφος* meant "dry," in combination with *πόα* "hay," and in the phrase *γραῦς σέριφος* "a dried-up old woman"; while *σέριφον* "wormwood" and *Σέριφος*, the island name, as well as *Σέριφος* = *Λακεδαίμων*, show a derived sense, "unpleasant, harsh" (cf. *ξηρός* opposed to *ἡδύς* in Eur. *Andr.* 784). *σέρφος*, an insect, differs only in the form of the suffix. For the root, Prellwitz suggests a comparison with *ξερός* "dry."

στέριφος "barren," of women, animals, and plants, Ar., +, is a derivative of the synonymous *στεῖρος*; likewise *στέριφος* "firm" from *στερεός*. *ἄγροφον· ὀρεινόν*, Galen *Lex. Hipp.*, is derived from *ἀγρός*. *στυφός* "astringent" comes from *στύω* "make stiff." *λίηφος· δεινός*, Hesych., is possibly connected with *λίην* "very much, overmuch." In *λαφός· ὁ ἀριστερᾷ χειρὶ χρώμενος*, Hesych., *φ* probably represents *ϝ*.

There remain four color words, of which one, *ἀλφός*, is certainly inherited. *ἀλωφός* "white," Hesych., is made on the same root as *ἀλφός*, Lith. *alwas*, etc., and is probably an inherited form (see Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 388). *ἄργυφος*,[1] a Homeric epithet of sheep, contains the stem of *ἄργυρος* and Skt. *árjunas* "white." *κίνιφος· ὁ ποίκιλος*, Anton. Mon., Suid., seems to go with *κινέω*, *κίνυμαι* "go" and *κινύσσομαι* "waver, sway."

3. *Abstract substantives.*—Most of the Greek abstracts in our suffix differ from those in Baltic-Slavic in having the *o*-stem and masculine gender. All the masculines have recessive accent. The inherited forms *(σ)κέραφος*, *σχέραφος*, *κνάφος*, *γνάφος*, *τρύφος*, and *τρυφή* may contain the suffix (see p. 198). It is certainly present in the following (Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 390): *κόλαφος* "buffet" : *κόλος*, *κολάζω*, etc.; *φλήναφος* "ineptiae" : *φληνέω*, *φληνάω*, *φληνύω*; *κρόταφος* "side of the forehead," plural "the temples," originally "a striking, a pulse" : *κρότος*, *κροτέω*, *κρόταλον*. *τὸ ἔδαφος*, originally a masculine abstract, owes its change of stem and gender to the influence of the synonymous and cognate *ἕδος*. Homeric *εἰλυφόων* "whirling" implies an abstract substantive **ϝέλυφος* :

[1] *ἀργύφεος* is an extension of this on the model of *ἀργύρεος*, *μαρμάρεος*, etc. (Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 387). Lycophron's *συφός* "pig sty," beside Homeric *συφεός*, *συφειός*, shows the reverse process.

*ῥέλνυμι (εἰλύω).[1] τῦφος "smoke, folly" : θύω must antedate the dissimilation of aspirates.

For the noun σκίραφος and its derivatives we have a bewildering array of meanings. σκίραφος itself means "trickery, cheating" in Hipponax, "gambler" and "licentious" according to Herodian 1. 225. 13 f., 2. 581. 22 ff. L., and "dice box" according to the *E.M.* σκιραφεῖον is the name of an Athenian gambling den (Isocr., +). σκ[ε]ιραφεῖν means "play at dice" (Hesych.); σκιραφευτής, "dice player" (Amphis); and σκιραφώδης, "tricky, swindling" (Phrynichus in *A.B.* 101). Herodian, *loc. cit.*, is surely right in deriving the group from Σκίρον, the name of the red light district in Athens, where the σκιραφεῖον was situated. The various recorded meanings can most easily be arranged if we start with σκίραφος in an abstract sense "rascality, gambling." This developed into the concrete "dice box" and "rascal, gambler." The connecting link between Σκίρον and σκίρ-α-φος was probably *σκίρ-ων "frequenter of the Σκίρον."

Several Greek abstracts show the feminine which appears constantly in Baltic-Slavic. τρυφή has already been mentioned. κνήφη "the itch," LXX, Suid., is a specifically Greek derivative from κνῆν "scratch, tickle," and has no direct connection with the inherited κνάφος.

Beside the familiar κορυφή, we find a masculine κόρυφος[2] in an inscription in the Megarian dialect (*IG.* 4. 929. 17 ff.) referring to certain landmarks between Epidaurus and Corinth. Κόρυφον, the name of a mountain near Epidaurus, Paus. 2. 28. 2, suggests that the word is Epidaurian rather than Megarian. A wholly different meaning of the *o*-stem appears in the Hesychian gloss, κόρυφος· κόρυμβος γυναικεῖος. The force of κορυφή, as of κόρυφος, is usually concrete, "summit, top"; but a trace of the abstract meaning "height" is preserved in Pindar's κορυφὰ λόγων, λόγων κορυφαί "the climax," κορυφαὶ πόλεων "the best of cities," etc.; although here too the concrete idea was present to consciousness, as is shown by Plato's use of the noun with the verb "to go" (*Crat.* 415 A)—

[1] Solmsen *Untersuchungen z. griech. Laut- u. Verslehre* 325. His alternative suggestion of an original adjective is less probable, since it would not correspond in meaning with the Greek adjectives in -φος.

[2] The accent is determined by Herodian 1. 225. 18 L.

ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα, ... ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν.

4. *Concrete substantives.*—Like other abstract substantives, those in *-φος* and *-φη* sometimes came to have a concrete sense, as *ἔδαφος* "bottom," e.g., of a ship, *Od.* 5. 249, *σκίραφος* "gambler," *φλήναφος* "babbler," *κορυφή* "summit." Other concrete substantives, as we have seen above (pp. 202 ff.), sprang from the substantival use of adjectives in *-φος*, as *κελεφός* "leper" and *σκέλεφορ* "a throw at dice" from **σκέλιφος* "dry, thin"; *Σέριφος*, an island, and *σέριφον* "wormwood" from *σέριφος* "dry, unpleasant"; *λίσφον* "(small) buttock" from *λίσφος* "smooth, flat"; *ἀλφός* "a dull-white leprosy" from *ἀλφός* "white."

After the model of these and similar words, the suffix *-φος*, *-φη* was used to form concrete substantives. *γάλεφος*, Interpol. Diosc., is a variant of the plant names *γάλιον*, *γαλεόβδολον*, and *γαλεόψις*. Walde, *s.v. galea*, derives these three words from *γαλέη* "weasel," in the secondary sense of "helmet" which is seen in the borrowed Latin *galea*. *γάλεφος* is derived from the same base with the suffix *-φος*. *ἐγκίλλαφον· οὐρά*, Hesych., is a derivative of *ἔγκιλλον· οὐράν*, Hesych. *ἀγρίφη*[1] "harrow, rake," with its derivative *ἀγρῖφνα*, *Anth. P.* 6. 297, and *ἄγριφος* "grapple," Const. Porph., may be from *ἀγρεύω*, *ἀγρέω*. *ἄγριφος* "wild olive," Hesych., whence comes *Ἀγρίφα· Ἀθηνᾶ*, Hesych., seems to be connected with *ἄγριος* "wild." *οὔλαφος· νεκρός*, Hesych., suggests *ὄλλυμι*, *οὐλόμην*, etc. *ταρήφη· τάρπη*, Hesych., goes with *τάρπη*, and *ταρσός*, *ταρρός* "crate, basket."

Ἄλθηφον or *Ἄλθηφος*, the name of a district in Troezenia, belongs with *ἄλθετο*, *ἀπαλθήσεσθον* "heal," Hom., *ἀλθήσκω*, Hipp., *ἀλθαίνω*, Hipp. and Alexandrian epic poets, *ἄλθεξις* "a healing," Hipp., Galen, *ἀλθαία* "wild mallow," Theophr. (as proper name, Hom.), *ἀλθήεις*, *ἀλθεστήρια*, Nic., *ἀλθεύς*, *ἄλθος*, Hesych., and several proper names in *Ἀλθαι-*, *Ἀλθη-*, *-άλθης* in inscriptions of Ephesus, Eretria, Cos, and Thasos (Fick-Bechtel, pp. 52 f.). The group evidently belongs primarily to the Ionic dialect, and hence our word is a trace of the original Ionic speech of the Argolic Acte[2] (cf. Buck

[1] Herodian, 1. 345. 32 L., cites it among *τὰ εἰς φη παραληγόμενα φύσει μακρᾷ*.

[2] In this connection we may add that Strabo, 10. 4. 18, says that the son of Cirrus, one of the founders of Argos, was named *Ἀλθαιμένης*.

Greek Dialects 2). Very likely the Troezenian variety of vine, called *ἀλθηφιάς* (Arist. *ap. Ath.* 31 C), got its name from the district *Ἄλθηφον*, either directly or from *Ἀλθήφιος*, the man for whom Aristotle says that it was named.

If *μαστροφός*, Hesychius' variant for *μαστροπός* "leno," is a derivative of *μαστήρ* "seeker," the *π* of the common form may be due to popular association with *-τροπος* as it appears, for example, in *δύστροπος*, the first word in Hesychius' definition of *μαστροπός*.

5. *Proper names.*—Many appellatives also appear as personal names, among which we may note such as *Κόττυφος*, *Κοσσύφα*, *Ἔριφος*, *Ἀσκάλαφος*, which belong to the large class of simple names, originally nicknames, based upon names of animals. Cf. Fick-Bechtel 314 ff. and Bechtel "Griech. Personennamen aus Spitznamen," *Abh. Gött. Ges. Wiss.* 1898, No. 5, p. 17, and *passim*. *Ἔλαφος* is the name of a small stream in Arcadia (Paus. 8. 36. 7), but on its supposed occurrence as a personal name see Bechtel *op. cit.* 45.

Some names in *-φος* may be regarded as the short forms of full names the second member of which begins with *φ*, e.g., *Ἄντιφος* beside *Ἀντιφάνης*, *Ἀντίφιλος*, *Ἀντιφῶν*, etc., or *Στάρτοφος* beside *Στρατοφάνης* (so Fick-Bechtel 255). But there are several for which no such full names are quotable, and there is no reason why we should not recognize the adjective suffix *-φος* as one of those which, like *-λος*, etc. (cf. Fick-Bechtel 24 ff.), may be employed in short names derived from full names or in those of the class treated of by Bechtel *op. cit.*

Thus *Τέκταφος*, which Fick-Bechtel say implies a full name *Τεκτα-φῶν* or the like, is more probably formed directly from the stem of *τέκτων*; similarly *Ἄσταφος* from *Ἄστων*, while *Ἄστοφος* is a short form of *Ἀστό-φιλος* or the like; *Κέρκαφος*, a mythical ancestor of the Rhodians, from *κερκνός· ἱέραξ*, Hesych. (Fick *BB.* 21. 280); *Τύλιφος*, a mythical shepherd, from *τύλη*, *τύλος*. Is *Θελέροφος*, name of a poet, formed from a **θέλερος* "wishing, wilful"? There are some examples of similar extensions in *-φας*. *Ματρίφας* (gen. *Ματρίφα*, *IG.* 12. 2. 646. 19) is, like *Ματρίχη*, from *Μᾶτρις*. From *Κλέων* is formed *Κλιόνφας*, *IG.* 12. 3. 1181 (or *Κλιώνφας*? Cf. names in *-ωνδας* and *-ονδας*), and the name of another Melian, *Ἐπόνφας*, or *Ἐπόνφης* in the adopted Attic form, *IG.* 12. 3. 1187,

must be of the same type (from an *Ἔπων?). Ὀνόφας, Herodian 1. 57. 15, 2. 655. 4, may be a nickname derived from ὄνος.

6. *Regressive formations from diminutives in -αφιον.*—Such a form as ἐλάφ-ιον, Ar.,+, diminutive of ἔλαφος, gave rise to θηρ-άφιον from θήρ, and to a whole series of diminutives having no relation to animal names, e.g., ξυράφιον, χρυσάφιον, χωράφιον, μνημάφιον, etc. In a similar fashion arose the diminutives in -ιφιον and -υφιον. Cf. now especially Walter Petersen *Greek Diminutives in* -ION, pp. 276 ff. In late times these were felt as diminutives in -ιον, and by regressive derivation there arose many new forms in -φος, -φη, -φα. So modern Greek χωράφα, ξυράφα, from χωράφιον, ξυράφιον, like σταφύλα (not from ancient σταφυλή, but) from σταφύλιον, and countless others. Cf. Hatzidakis Μεσαιωνικὰ καὶ νέα Ἑλληνικά 2. 139 ff. θήραφος, a late medical term for a small insect, arose in the same way, and θέαφος, θείαφος (also τεάφη) "sulphur" is very likely a regressive formation from θεάφιον, rather than an original formation in -φος and the source of θεάφιον, as assumed by Petersen *loc. cit.*

The form of the words that we have been discussing calls for some treatment. It will be enough, however, to summarize briefly from that point of view some of the facts already stated in detail. In particular we must notice the two dissyllabic forms of the suffix, -ιφος and -αφος.

The suffix *-ĭbho-* appears in Baltic-Slavic abstracts and Lithuanian adjectives as well as in Greek adjectives (see p. 198). Probably it arose from the incorrect analysis of derivatives of *i*-stems (cf. ἔρι-φος : Lat. *aries*). We have discussed σέρ-ῑφος (beside the substantive σέρφος), στέρι-φος, κίνι-φος, and *σκελ-ιφος. Τύλ-ιφος (: τύλη, τύλος "callus") was probably in the first place an adjective meaning "callous." In ἄγρι-φος the ι belongs to the base.

The suffix -φος was frequently appended to the weak form of nasal stems as in ἔλα-φος : ἐλλός from *ἐλνός (above, p. 197), κόρα-φος : κορώνη, Κέρκα-φος : κερκνός, Τέκτα-φος : τέκτων, Ἄστα-φος : Ἄστων. In several other cases we may suspect that the base of a derivative in -αφος is a lost substantive in -ων; σκίρα-φος "rascality" seems to be from *σκίρων "frequenter of the Σκίρον" (see p. 204), φλήνα-φος "ineptiae" may be from *φλήνων, and possibly

κρότα-φος, from **κρότων*. From these and similar words arose a suffix *-αφος* which appears in *χρύσ-αφος* : *χρύσ-οφρυς*, *ἕδ-αφος* : *ἕδος*, *ἐγκίλλ-αφον* : *ἔγκιλλον*. Compare with these words the diminutives in *-άφιον*.

Nearly all words containing our suffix have recessive accent. The exceptions are: the inherited *ἀλφός* (with its congener *ἀλωφός*), the feminines *κυφή*, *καθουφή*, *τρυφή*, and *κορυφή*, of which only the last certainly contains the suffix, the Hesychian glosses *σιγαλφός* and *κεμφάς*, which may have been influenced by the primitives *σιγηλός* and *κεμάς*, the late word *κελεφός* and the obscure word *μαστροφός*, and finally, *στυφός*.

VARIATION BETWEEN THE THREE LABIAL MUTES

So many of the words in *-φη*, *-φης*, and *-φος* show variants with *β* or *π*, that we are compelled to inquire into the causes of the variation. For completeness' sake we shall include in the discussion a number of words which do not properly fall under the topic to which these studies are devoted; and we shall find it convenient to treat here the few cases of variation between *π* and *β*.

1. *π* : *β*.—The Indo-European variation between tenuis and media, particularly frequent in root-finals (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 629 ff.), is not often reflected in the Greek labial stems. It occurs, for example, in *σκαπάνη* "mattock," *(σ)κάπετος* "trench," etc., Goth. *skaban* "shear" : Lat. *scabo*, Lith. *skabùs* "cutting" (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 629); and in Lat. *stīpo*, Lith. *stimpù* "stiffen," Eng. *stiff*, etc. : *στίβος* "path," *στίβη* "hoar frost," *στείβω*, Lith. *staĩbus* "strong," etc. (Walde).

The *β* of *βλάβη*, beside Cretan *ἀβλοπές*, *ἀβλοπία*, *καταβλαπέσθαι*, with original *π* as is shown by Lat. *mulco*, is due to assimilation to the initial consonant of the root (cf. vulgar Eng. *Babdist* for *Baptist*).

Νιόπη, on an Attic vase, gets its *π* from the rather numerous mythological names in *-όπη* (Meisterh.³ 77. 3). *γρύψ*, *γρυπός*, beside *γρυβός* with original *β*, shows the influence of *γρυπός* "crooked" (see above, p. 200). *ἀστραπή* for *ἀστράβη* "saddle," Anon. in Rhett. Gr. 8. 668, involves a rather grotesque popular etymology. *κῆβος* = *κῆπος*, *στύβη* = *στύπη*, and *κόλλαβος* = *κόλλοψ*, *κόλλοπος* show the influence of the suffix *-βος*, *-βη* (see *CP.* V. 332, 333, 341).

2. π : ϕ.—A larger number of Greek words show a variation between π and ϕ, and in some cases this may go back to proethnic times. There was in the parent speech an occasional interchange of tenuis and tenuis aspirata (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 632 f.), as in πλατύς : Skt. *pṛthúš*, Lat. *rota* : Skt. *ráthas*, Av. *raṇō* "wagon." We have an additional example of this kind in Lat. *pampinus*, *papilla*, Skt. *pippalas* "berry," etc. : πομφός "blister," πομφόλυξ, πέμφιξ "bubble" (see Walde *s.v. pampinus*).

The interchange of Indo-European *bh* and *ph* appears in τρύφος τό "fragment," Hom., +, τρυφή, θρύπτω, etc., Lett. *drubascha* "fragment," *drubasas* "splinter" beside *drupi* "fragments" and *drúpu* "fall to pieces."[1]

Walde, *Etym. Wörterb. s.v.*, finds Indo-European variation between *bh* and *p* in σκάριφος "stile," σκαριφισμός "a scratching," Ar., σκαριφάομαι "scratch, sketch," Schol. Ar., Lat. *scrībo*, OHG. *scrīban*, OS. *scrīƀan*, OFris. *skriva* "write" : Lett. *skrīpāt* "to scratch," *skrīpsts* "curved knife," OIsl. *(h)rífa* "to scratch." If, however, we assume I-E. **sqrīph-* (Prellwitz), we can trace all the forms to one original, for the Germanic words with *b* are probably Latin loan words, as is indicated by their meaning and by the *f* of OIsl. *(h)rífa*. The meaning of OFris. *skrīva*, OE. *scrīfan* "to enjoin punishment upon," OIsl. *skript* "confession, punishment" may easily be derived from the meaning "write"; cf. γράφεσθαι "to indict" and γραφή "indictment."

τέθηπα "be astonished," Hom., beside ἔταφον, Hom., τάφος "astonishment," Hom., owes its π as well as its τ to the dissimilation of aspirates.

More frequently the Greek variation between ϕ and π is due to analogy. As Osthoff, *Perfect* 301, long ago showed, the ϕ of ἀλείφω, beside λίπα, λίπος, λιπαρός, etc., arose from the analogy of ἐρέψω, ἤρεψα : ἐρέφω, and the like. Similarly the presents in -πτω form the connecting link between forms with original π and later forms

[1] It is possible that *drup-* represents I-E. **dhrup-*, but an Indo-European variation between *bh* and *p* is problematic. The relationship of Eng. *drop*, etc. (I-E. **dhrub-*), is not certain. It was suggested above (p. 198) that the forms with *bh* contain the suffix *-bho-*, *-bhā-*. If so, this group differs from many others that exhibit "root determinatives" only in that we can identify one of the "determinatives" with a formative element that continued to be productive. In any case, the words certainly belong under this head.

with φ. Thus we have κάπη "crib, manger," Hom., but ἔγκαφος "mouthful," Eupolis (ἐγκάπτω "gulp down," perfect ἐγκέκαφα); σκαπάνη "mattock," (σ)κάπετος "trench," Lat. *scapula* "shoulder blade," OB. *kopati* "dig," but σκαφή, σκάφος "a digging," σκαφεύς, ἐσκάφην, etc. (σκάπτω; Solmsen *Beitr. z. griech. Wortforschung* 196 ff.); ῥαπίς "needle," Epich. 138 Kaib., Lith. *verpú* "spin," but ῥαφίς "needle," ῥαφή "a stitching, seam," ῥαφεύς, etc. (ῥάπτω; cf. Prellwitz); ῥιπή, Hom., +, but ῥιφή "a throw," Lyc., ἀναπόριφος "ἄμεμπτος," papyri, ἐρρίφην, Eur., +, ῥιφήσομαι, LXX, + (ῥίπτω); (σ)κνιπός "niggardly," Lucillius in *Anth. P.* 11. 172, (σ)κνιπότης, Ps.-Hipp., +, but σκνιφός, Phryn., +, Γνίφων, Μισόγνιφος, Luc. (σκνίπτω "pinch, nip"). The φ of σκνιφός,[1] beside (σ)κνιπός "dim-sighted," κεκνιπωμένοι· . . . . ἢ κνιποὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, Hesych., is due to the pair σκνιφός : (σ)κνιπός "niggardly." That κνέφας "darkness" cannot be responsible for the change is shown by the initial σ.

Laconian ἄγριππος "wild olive," in a proverb cited by Antonius Monachus and others, beside ἄγριφος "wild olive," Hesych., and its derivative Ἀγρίφα· Ἀθηνᾶ, Hesych., suggests a popular connection with the phrase ἄγριος ἵππος. Perhaps Cyprian ἔλφος· βούτυρον, Hesych., beside ἔλπος· ἔλαιον, στέαρ, εὐθηνία, Hesych., owes its φ to the influence of ἀλείφω and the related forms. Doric ῥάφα "a large radish" and ῥαφανίς : ῥάπυς "turnip," Lat. *rāpum*, etc., were perhaps connected in the popular mind with ῥαφίς "needle," an implement that was not unlike a radish in shape.

From their first appearance until the present day the two words γρῖπος "fishing net," Artemid., Diog. L., +, and γρῖφος "riddle," Ar., +, have been kept distinct, with the exception of two occurrences of γρῖφος "net" in Plut. 2. 471 D and Opp. H. 3. 80.[2] The π of γρῖπος is further attested by γριπεύς "fisher," Theocr., +, Γρίπων, the name of a fisherman, Leonidas in *Anth. P.* 7. 504, γριπηίς, Antipater in *Anth. P.*, γριπεύω, γρίπισμα, Anton. Mon., γριπίζω, Hesych. It seems more likely, then, that the copyists have blundered than that Plutarch and Oppian really knew a by-form γρῖφος = γρῖπος.

[1] On the provenience of the word, see Herwerden.

[2] γιριφος in Pap. Tebt. 2. 486 is very dubious, and the perfect participle γεγριφώς in Hesych. is in line with πέπομφα, etc.

The Latin *cupa* "cask, vat" (*κοῦπα*, *IG.* 14. 1342, *ἡμι-κοίπη*, inscr. in *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr.* 1866, 384) appears as *κοῦφον* in ostraka and papyri (95 A.D., +) and in the *Apophthegmata Patrum*.[1] The word has evidently been brought into semantic relationship with *κοῦφος* "light," i.e., "movable." *κόλφος*, *IG.* 14. 189, +, Modern Greek *κόρφος*, *κόλφος* is *κόλπος*, which changed its *p* to *ph* in Latin (cf. Ital. *golf*, Fr. *golfe*),[2] and was taken back into Greek in the new form.

ἀμφίδαφος = *ἀμφιτάπης*, Pap. Ox. 2. 298. 9, 10 (first century A.D.), is for **ἀμφίδαπος*. Cf. *ἀμφίταπος*, LXX, +, and *δάπις* = *τάπης*. The second *φ* is due to assimilation. Cf., with assimilation in the opposite direction, *Ἀνθίλοχος* = *Ἀντίλοχος*.

We have noticed the effect of the suffix *-φος*, *-φη* in *ἄπαφος* : *ἔποψ* (p. 199) and *ταρήφη* : *τάρπη* (p. 205). *κάφος*, *E.M.*, Eust., beside *κάπος* "breath," is of doubtful authenticity. Apparently the word was coined to explain the Homeric *κεκαφηότα θυμόν*. Eust., 1280. 34 f., says: *Ἀποκαπύσαι δὲ ψυχὴν τὸ ἀποπνεῦσαι. κάφος γάρ φασι τὸ πνεῦμα, ἐξ οὗ τὸ κεκαφηότα θυμόν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ κάπος, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ὁ κῆπος, ὡς ἀλλαχοῦ εἴρηται.*[3] I doubt the connection of *στύπος* "stick" with *στυφοκόπος* = *ὀρτυγοκόπος*.

On *λίσπος* beside *λίσφος*, see p. 202, and on *μαστροφός* beside *μαστροπός*, see p. 206.

3. *β* : *φ*.—One of the best-known features of the Macedonian dialect is the development of the Indo-European mediae aspiratae into mediae. In the present connection we need mention only those words in which Macedonian *β* stands as stem final beside general Greek *φ*. The most certain instances are *κάραβος* : *Σκάρφη*, *κόμβος* : *γόμφος*, *γομφίος*, and *νίβα* : *νίφα*. (See Hoffmann *Die Makedonen* 28, 37, 52.) For the personal name *Κόρραβος*, Hoffmann, *op. cit.* 146, thinks of the suffix *-φος*, but the suffix *-βος* is more common in personal names (see *CP.* V. 337 ff.). We may add to Hoffmann's material *κυβός* = *κυφός*, Orion 38. 6 (Herwerden), and the geographical name *Ottolobos* = *Ὀκτώλοφος*, which Livy (31. 36, 40, 44. 3) uses

[1] The papyri and ostraka show that Sophocles, *Lexicon s.v.*, was wrong in assuming a nominative *κοῦφος*. The feminine *κοῦφα* is very late.

[2] See Kretschmer *BZ.* 10. 581, and Triandaphyllidis *Lehnwörter d. mittelgriech. Vulgärliteratur* 168 footnote. (In line 5 *κόλπος* is a misprint for *κόλφος*.)

[3] Cf. Fay *CQ.* 1. 18. On the etymology of *κεκαφηότα*, see Solmsen *Beitr. z. griech. Wortforschung* 123.

of a place in Macedonia and of another in Perrhaebia on the Macedonian border.

Hoffmann, *op. cit.* 37, also finds a Macedonian word *νίβᾱ* "spring" in the Hesychian gloss, *νίβα· χιόνα, καὶ κρήνην*, interpreted in the light of the version given by Suidas and Photius: *νίβα· χιόνα. καλεῖται δὲ οὕτως καὶ κρήνη ἐν Θράκῃ*; for he thinks that the second sentence necessarily implies a nominative *νίβα*. He finds confirmation of such a Macedonian form in the derivative N*ίβας*, the name of a place near Thessalonica. There is no doubt that the article in Hesychius treats two distinct words, but the true form of the second is shown by N*ίψ*, N*ιβός· ὄνομα κρήνης*, *E.M.* 568. 16, and N*ίψ*, N*ιβός· κρήνη*, Sophonius in Hilgard's Theodosius 2. 402. 8. With the last-mentioned glosses Hesychius is in perfect harmony, while the phraseology of Suidas and Photius is not necessarily inconsistent with them. The substitution of *νίψ*, *νιβός* for Hoffmann's *νίβᾱ* does not of course affect his argument that the word, together with N*ίβας*, is Macedonian and belongs with Ir. *snigim* "drop, rain," and Skt. *snihyati* "become moist, sticky," etc., from a root *sneigʷh-* (whether this group is to be combined with that meaning "snow" is, however, a further question). But it is also possible that the root is *neigʷ*, which appears in *νίζω*, *νίπτω*, *νίπτρον*, *χέρνιψ*, *χέρνιβον*, Skt. *nenekti*, *nejayati* "wash," Av. *naēnižaiti* "wash something off," etc. In that case there would be nothing in the form of the word to suggest Macedonian origin.

The Indo-European interchange between media and media aspirata appears, for example, in *ὄλβος* "wealth," Skt. *árjati* "earn" : *ἀλφή* "gain," Skt. *árhati* "deserve," *arghá* "worth"; *κύβος* "a hollow above the hips of cattle," Eng. *hip*, Lat. *cubo* : *κυφός* "stooping, hump-backed" (Walde, *s.v. cubitum*); *στραβός* "squinting," *στρόβος* "a whirling," *στρεβλός* "distorted," Lat. (originally Umbrian) *strebula* "meat from the hips of oxen" : *στρέφω*, *στρόφος* (Walde); Ir. *mebul* "disgrace," Goth. *bi-mampjan* "mock, deride" : *μέμφομαι*, *μομφή*, *μεμφωλή* (Fick 2^4, 208, keeps Ir. *mebul* separate). *ὄροβος* "bitter vetch," *ἐρέβινθος* "chick pea" : Lat. *ervum*, OHG. *araweiz*, NHG. *Erbse* may represent I-E. **erogʷo-* : **erogʷho-* (Walde; cf. *CP.* V. 332).

In several words analogy has led to the substitution of *φ* for an original *β*. *καλυφή* "covering," papyrus of the first century A.D., in

the phrase *ἀπὸ καλυφῆς αἰγιαλοῦ* "from high water mark" (or possibly "from low water mark"), beside *καλύβη* "hut, cell," Hdt., +, was formed from *καλύπτω* on the basis of the pairs *κρυφή* : *κρύπτω*, *τρυφή* : *θρύπτω*, *βαφή* : *βάπτω*, etc. Similarly *ἀκαλυφής*, Soph., +, and *ἀκάλυφος*, Diog. L., were formed from *καλύπτω* on the model of such pairs as *ἀναφής*, Plat., +, : *ἅπτομαι*, *ἀρραφής*, Arat., *ἄρραφος*, *N.T.*, +, : *ῥάπτω*, *ἄγναφος*, *N.T.*, +, : *γνάπτω*, *ἄταφος* : *θάπτω*, *ἄτρυφος*, Alcm., : *θρύπτω*. *κολυφρόν· ἐλαφρόν*, Hesych., beside *κολυμβάω* "dive," *κόλυμβος* "diver," Ar., etc., Goth. *hlaupan*, NHG. *laufen* (Zupitza *German. Gutturale* 118) shows the influence of *ἐλαφρός*.

If *τρίφος*, which Du Cange cites from a gloss as equivalent to *τρίβος*, is a genuine form, it was made from *τρίψω* and *ἔτριψα* on the model of *σκάφος* : *σκάψω* and *ἔσκαψα*, *ὄροφος* : *ἐρέψω* and *ἤρεψα*, etc. If *στῖφος* "throng, mass" and *στιφρός* "firm, solid" are akin to *στείβω*, their *φ* is due to some similar analogical influence (cf. the ambiguous *στιπτός* "trodden down" and "tough, sturdy"). Uhlenbeck's (*Etym. Wörterb. d. ai. Sprache*) connection of Skt. *stibhiš* "tuft, bunch" with these words is not probable enough to warrant the assumption of a third root form beside **steip-* and **steib-*. For *γρυφός* beside *γρυβός*, see p. 200.

The reverse analogical change of original *φ* to *β* also occurs. In *κρυβήσομαι*, Eur., *ἔκρυβον*, *ἐκρύβην*, Apollod., +, *κρυβῆ*, *ἀπόκρυβή*, *ἀποκρυβήσομαι*, LXX, +, *ἐγκρύβω*, Diod., +, Κρύβηλος Hesych., Κρυβοί, a Byzantine geographical name, etc. (cf. also Lobeck *Phryn.* 317), beside earlier *κρυφηδόν*, Hom., *κρύφιος*, Hes., +, *κρύφα*, etc., the change was due to the analogy of *τρίβω* beside *ἔτριψα*, *βλάβη*, *ἐβλάβην*, beside *βλάπτω*, and the like, perhaps in this case assisted by the existence of the adverbs *κρύβδην* and *κρύβδα*. Modern Greek has not only *κρύβω*, but also *σκάβω*, *ράβω*, *κλέβω*, etc. Cf. Hatzidakis *KZ.* 27. 76. If we assume an original aspirate for *βόμβος* on account of Skt. *bambharas* "bee" (found only in lexicons), *bambhāravas* "lowing" of cows, *bambharālis* "fly," a persistent feeling for the onomatopoetic character of the word would help explain the change from voiceless *φ* to *β*. The same consideration applies to *στόμβος· βαρύηχος*, *βαρύφθογγος*, Galen *Lex. Hipp.*, beside *στόμφος* "bombast," *στομφός* "bombastic," *στόμφαξ*, *στομφάζω*, Ar.[1]

[1] These words have no connection with *στόβος* "abuse, bad language," or with *σομφός* "spongy," of sounds, "hollow, loud."

There remain a number of words which show a variation between φ or μφ and μβ, on the basis of which a number of scholars have inferred a change in Greek itself of aspirate to media after nasals.[1] The group μφ, however, often remains (e.g., γόμφος, νύμφη, μομφή), and no satisfactory limitation of the operation of the supposed phonetic law has yet been proposed.

In some cases the variation is clearly Indo-European (see Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 633), as ἀστεμφής "firm," στέμφυλα "olives *or* grapes pressed dry," Skt. *stambhate* "become firm *or* rigid": στέμβω "shake," OHG. *stampfon*, Eng. *stamp;* ἀφρός, νέφος, etc.: ὄμβρος, Skt. *ámbu* "water," Arm. *amp* "cloud;" θάμβος "astonishment," ON. *dapr* "sad": τάφος "astonishment;" κάρφω "wither," κάρφη "hay," κάρφος, Lith. *skrebiù* "become dry": κράμβος "dry, loud," Ar., κρόμβος "dry, roasted," Hesych., κρομβόω "roast," Diphil., NHG. *rümpfen*. In μέμφομαι : Ir. *mebul*, Goth. *bimampjan* (see above, p. 212) Greek has preserved only the aspirated form of the root. We have a similar interchange of I-E. labio-velars in ὄφις, Skt. *áhis* "snake": OHG. *unc* "snake," ἴμβηρις· ἔγχελυς. Μηθυμναῖοι, Hesych. Perhaps, however, we should omit the last word on account of its vocalism (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 634).

στρόμβος "top" : στρέφω, στρόφος, etc., was probably influenced by ῥόμβος "top."

The tendency established by such pairs as ἀστεμφής : στέμβω, ἀφρός : ὄμβρος, τάφος : θάμβος, κάρφω : κράμβος, στρόμβος : στρέφω, sometimes became effective even where it was not assisted by similarity of meaning with any of these.[2] Thus we find μβ instead of φ in κόρυμβος "summit, hairpin," κορύμβη "hairpin": κορυφή, κόρυφος "summit, peak, hairpin" (see above, p. 204); βρέμβος = βρέφος, Hesych.; κύμβος, κύμβη "cup" : Skt. *kumbhás* "cup," Av. *xumba-* "pot"; ἀτέμβω "cheat" : Skt. *dabhnóti, dábhati* "injure, deceive." Perhaps we should set down here

[1] Most recently Otto Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 240 f., who gives references to earlier discussions. All the examples contain Greek labials except πύνδαξ πυθμήν, for which Brugmann, *Grundr.* 1². 633, suggests Indo-European variation between *d* and *dh*.

[2] For such imitative substitution, which is not to be denied a wide scope in language, and which many regard as a fundamental factor in the regular phonetic changes, compare Wheeler "Causes of Uniformity in Phonetic Change," *Trans. Am. Phil. Assn.* 32, 5 ff., especially p. 14, and Thurneysen *Etymologie* 17 ff., *KZ.* 44. 111.

κύ(μ)βη "head," *E.M.*, Georg. Sanguinatius : Cretan κυφά "head," Hesych. λιμφός· συκοφάντης . . . . ἢ μηνυτὴς παρανόμων, Hesych., is probably not to be identified with λιμβός "greedy," Hesych., +.

That the change in question took place after the dissimilation of aspirates is indicated by κύμβος : Av. *xumba-* from **khumbho-*, and ἀτέμβω : Skt. *dábhati* from **dhebh*.[1] Hence in θρόμβος "lump, clot of blood" : τρέφεσθαι "curdle," ταρφύς, etc., and θρεμβός "fat," *CGL.* : τρέφω (cf. *CP.* V. 334), we have to account for the initial aspirate by the analogy of such forms as θρέψω, ἔθρεψα, and τέθραμμαι.

The occasional interchange of *bh* and *b* in the parent speech and of φ and μβ in Greek furnish us two possible points of contact between the suffixes in φ and β. Perhaps, then, it is not altogether accidental that both the suffixes are employed to form animal names and derogatory adjectives. See *CP.* V. 331, 333 ff., and Niedermann, *IF. Anz* 19. 32 f. The present writer, however, does not know of any word with Indo-European suffix *-bo* from *-bho*. We may, perhaps, suspect some such relationship between ἀσκάλαφος, κάλαφος, an unknown bird, Arist., +, and ἀσκάλαβος, καλαβάς "spotted lizard," Nicand., +. That the words date from prehistoric times is indicated by the fact that both Ἀσκάλαφος and Ἀσκάλαβος occur as mythological proper names. Their etymology is unknown. As was shown in *CP.* V. 326 ff., the Greek suffix -βος is chiefly due to adaptation in Greek itself. To the factors there discussed we may now add one more: the Greek substitution of μβ for φ seems to have affected a few words in which φ was a formative element.

The preceding discussion covers the words in which φ appears to be a formative element. The great majority of words in -φη, -φης, and φος are forms with radical φ, which, with their numerous compounds, e.g., -γραφος, -σοφος, -τροφος, swell the lists to such proportions that their publication must be deferred.

[1] τύμβος "foolish," a word that has been inferred from Euripides' γέροντα τύμβον, and Hesychius' τυμβογέρων· ἐσχατόγηρως, and compared with τῦφος "smoke," is purely imaginary.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

SOLON'S TROCHAICS TO PHOKOS

εἰ δὲ γῆς ἐφεισάμην
πατρίδος, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίης ἀμειλίχου
οὐ καθηψάμην μιάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος,
οὐδὲν αἰδεῦμαι· πλέον γὰρ ὧδε νικήσειν δοκέω,
πάντας ἀνθρωπους.

οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ
ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸς σὺκ ἐδέξατο·
περιβαλὼν δ'ἄγραν ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἐπέσπασεν μέγα
δίκτυον θυμοῦ θ'ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς·
ἤθελον γὰρ κεν κρατήσας πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν
καὶ τυραννεύσας 'Αθηνῶν μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν,
ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κ'απιτετρῖφθαι γένος.

The purport of these lines has often been misunderstood. The second fragment is simply a dramatic and ironical statement of the view of the man in the street that Solon was a fool in not making himself tyrant. There is nothing in either fragment to justify the interpretation that they are Solon's serious apology for not having seized and used the tyranny in the interests of either of the two political parties. That interpretation may or may not seem to be suggested by the words in the additional trochaics in Aristotle's *Politeia* 12. 3:

οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος
ἁνδάνει βίᾳ τι ῥέζειν.

The occurrence of the idea there would not necessitate its importation here.

If we should concede for the sake of the argument that the passage before us is a real political apology, to whom is it addressed? All hypotheses in this matter are based on the comments of Plutarch in his Life of Solon (c. 15). But Plutarch is himself really interested only in his Platonizing moral interpretation of Solon's scorn of the tyranny. And so he does not even make it quite clear which party we are to suppose to have urged the tyranny on Solon. He says in c. 14 that it was οἱ προιστάμενοι and even many τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν. The word εὐτολμότερον, if we could press Plutarch's words, would perhaps imply that Solon was expected to exercise the tyranny in the interests of the popular party. The προιστάμενοι might be the leaders of the people, or the prominent citizens generally, or, since Plutarch

says that both parties hoped that he would favor them, the leaders of both parties. Plutarch throws no further light on the question, and from this point on his vocabulary and phrasing have ethical rather than political significance—ἐκάκιζον, ... καταγελῶντες . . . . τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ φαύλους, on which I will comment later. This vagueness of Plutarch seems to have affected his modern interpreters. Croiset says "les partisans du régime monarchique l'ont trouvé naïf" (*Lit. Grecque* II, 127). Busolt assumes (II, 296) that it was expected "dass Solon seine Macht zur Aufrichtung einer volksfreundlichen Tyrannis benutzen würde." This seems to imply that the lines to Phokos are an apology to the popular party, and Busolt confirms this by the observation that Plutarch lays the reproach in the mouths of the πολλοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι, which words, as we shall see, have ethical, not political, meaning. Busolt, however is not quite clear, for he continues: "Trochaeen die er an Phokos richtete rechtfertigen vorzugsweise seine Ablehnung der Tyrannis. Gegenüber der Volkspartei berief er sich auf das Zeugniss der Mutter Erde." This sentence seems to imply a false antithesis, since on Busolt's theory both defenses are addressed to the popular party. He may have been unconsciously influenced by von Wilamowitz, who writes (*Aristoteles und Athen* II, 310), "Waren die Trochaeen in erster Linie bestimmt seine Ablehnung der Tyrannis zuverteidigen, so setzte sich Solon mit den Vorwurfen der Armen in dem Iambos auseinander," etc., where, unless the implied antithesis is misleading, we have a distinct assumption that the apology in the trochaics is addressed to the *aristocratic* party. I do not mean to cavil at the expressions of these distinguished scholars, but merely to show how the uncertainty of the subject betrays itself in the embarrassment of the style. The political aspect of the matter is by no means clear. But the meaning of the verses is perfectly clear, as soon as we perceive that the apology which they contain is not a political apology at all. It is at the most the ironical apology of the higher morality to the lower morality of the man of the world—the apology of a Socrates to a Callicles (Plato *Gorg.* 522D).

That Plutarch took it so is apparent from his introductory words to the second fragment: ἃ δὲ φυγόντος αὐτοῦ τὴν τυραννίδα πολλοὶ καταγελῶντες ἔλεγον, etc. This is what the multitude said when all was over. The words above, οἱ συνήθεις ἐκάκιζον, refer perhaps to the taunts of cowardice while he was hesitating. A little farther on the words τοὺς πολλοὺς do not mean the popular party; they are simply the Platonic "many," the ordinary man to whom as to Thrasymachus and Callicles moral disinterestedness is foolishness (cf. *Rep.* 360D; and *Gorgias, passim*). One cause of the misinterpretation of the first fragment is the misunderstanding of the words οὐ . . . . μάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος, which will hardly bear Wilamowitz' interpretation, "mag ich auf meinen Ruf als weiser einen Schandfleck damit gebracht haben dass ich die Tyrannis verschmähte." The word μάνας is altogether too strong, I think, for the hypothetical reproach of neglecting

to seize a political opportunity with unscrupulous audacity. But it is just the right word to express the Greek feeling and Solon's own feeling of the guilt and shame that attached to tyranny, and a little attention to an often overlooked but not infrequent idiom enables us to take it so. The negative force of the *οὐ* extends not merely to the verb but to the two participles. What Solon says is, "I am not ashamed if I did not bring pollution and disgrace upon my fair fame by seizing [and did not seize] ruthless tyranny." For other examples of this construction, cf. Plato. *Timaeus* 77B, with my note in *AJP*, X, 74; *Rep.* 582B, where some commentators go astray; Homer *Il.* 22. 283; *Hymn to Demeter* 157; Pindar *Nem.* iii. 15:

> *ὧν παλαίφατον ἀγορὰν*
> *οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας τεὰν*
> *ἐμίαινε κατ' αἶσαν ἐν περισθενεῖ μαλαχθείς*
> *παγκρατίου στόλῳ.*

Wilamowitz argues that the second fragment must precede the first because *βαθύφρων* and *βουλήεις* defined the *κλέος*, which is said to be stained in the first. But this implies not only that Plutarch quotes the passages in the wrong order, which is possible enough, but that he positively misinterpreted the first fragment. For Plutarch says, not with reference to *βαθύφρων*, etc., but of the *κλέος* of the first fragment, *ὅθεν εὔδηλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῆς νομοθεσίας μεγάλην δόξαν εἶχεν.* But apart from Plutarch's testimony it is obvious that the ironical words, "Solon was not a deep or shrewd-witted man," are not the natural description of the kind of moral *κλέος* that could be polluted and put to shame. Professor Wilamowitz' own translation of the line betrays some uneasiness. He renders "Solon hat *also* den Ruf der Weisheit nicht verdient." But this surely implies an *ἄρα* which is not in the text.

The dramatic irony of the passage has been still more strangely misunderstood by Croiset, who in the second edition of his *Greek Literature* (II, 127) takes the last four lines as Solon's "indignant and eloquent reply," and translates them: "Je voudrais, si j'avais pris le pouvoir et mis la main sur d'immenses richesses, si j'avais été, ne fût-ce qu'un jour, tyran d'Athènes, je voudrais que de ma peau écorchée on fît une outre et que ma race fût abolie." This, of course, is a complete misunderstanding. The words are simply Solon's dramatic and satiric attribution to his critics of the immoral sentiment that the enjoyment of tyranny even for a day is worth any crime and any punishment. They are exactly in the vein of the oft-quoted speech of Eteocles which Plato reprobated. Eurip. *Phoenissae* 503 ff.:

> *ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν, μῆτερ, ἀποκρύψας ἐρῶ·*
> *ἄστρων ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἡλίου πρὸς ἀντολὰς*
> *καὶ γῆς ἔνερθεν, δυνατὸς ὢν δρᾶσαι τάδε*
> *τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν Τυραννίδα.*

PAUL SHOREY

ON A NEW ARGIVE INSCRIPTION

Bull. Corr. Hell. XXXIV (1910), 331 ff.

An important fifth-century inscription of Argos, found in 1906, is published for the first time by Vollgraff in the last number of the *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*. The editor accompanies the text with a translation and an exhaustive commentary which are in most respects admirable. But exception must certainly be taken to the punctuation and interpretation of ll. 3–6, which he reads and translates as follows:[1] χρέματα δὲ μὲ 'νπιπασκέσθō ὁ Κνόσιο[ς] ἐν Τυλισσ̄οι, ὁ δὲ Τυλίσιος ἐν Κνοσσ̄οι. ὁ χρέιζ[ō]ν μēδὲ χόρας ἀποτάμνεσθαι μēδατέρονς μēδ' ἀ[π]ανσαν ἀφαιρῖσθαι, "Les Knossiens ne pourront acquérir de biens à Tylissos, ni inversement les Tylissiens à Knossos. Les créanciers ne pourront enlever tout ou partie ni aux uns ni aux autres." This interpretation involves four serious difficulties: (1) the absence of a negative before Τυλίσιος, (2) the construction χρέιζ[ō]ν . . . . ἀποτάμνεσθαι, (3) an unknown use of χρήιζω, (4) the accusative μēδατέρονς translated as if it were a genitive or a dative of interest. Upon the first point the editor makes no comment. But surely μēδέ is required to justify the translation "ni inversement les Tylissiens," whereas the clause as it stands with δέ can only denote a contrast to the preceding prohibition. Upon the second and third points the editor comments as follows (p. 350): "Il y a ici confusion entre deux constructions également bonnes: ὁ χρέιζōν . . . . ἀποταμνέσθō, et: τὸν χρέιζοντα . . . . ἀποτάμνεσθαι." "Χρήζω signifie généralement: *avoir besoin de, désirer*, quelquefois: *rendre un oracle*. Je ne connais pas d'autre texte ou il ait, comme c'est le cas ici, la signification de prêter. On sait que, pour rendre ce dernier sens, les Grecs se servaient couramment du present κίχρημι."

All these difficulties are removed by a simple change in the editor's punctuation. The first sentence ends, not with Τυλισσ̄οι, but with χρέιζ[ō]ν, and means: "The Cnossian may not acquire property in Tylissus, but the Tylissian may do so in Cnossus if he wishes." Of the two Cretan cities in question (with whose relations to each other and to Argos this Argive inscription deals), Tylissos was of course the weaker and was protected against the aggrandizement of Cnossian capitalists, just as the allies of Athens were protected by a similar prohibition of acquisition of their property by Athenians. Cf. Dittenberger *Sylloge*, No. 80, ll. 35 ff., aptly quoted by the editor, p. 338, with whose comments our translation accords better than his own. For Cnossos had no need of such protection, and so it is expressly stated that any Tylissian who wished (ὁ χρέιζον = ὁ βουλόμενος, as often) might acquire property in Cnossos. The second sentence is also now in order, μēδατέρονς being of course the subject of the infinitives: "Neither party shall seize a part of the land or appropriate it all."

I add a few minor comments. κἐλ Λευκόπορον, l. 8, the editor says is for καὶ ἐν Λευκόπορον, comparing ἐλ (= ἐν) Λακεδαίμονι, *IG.* IV, 952. In the

[1] I change the editor's style of transcription to the extent of inserting the macron over *e* and *o* where they stand for long vowels.

Argive dialect it must stand rather for *καὶ ἐ(ν)ς Λευκόπορον*, to be compared with Lac. *ἐλ Λακεδαίμονα*, Att. *τὸλ λίθōς*, Cret. *τοῖλ λείονσι*, etc.

In l. 9 we read *'ῖ κα τ͡ῶι Μαχανεῖ θύομες τὸνς ϝεξέκοντα τελέονς ὄϝινς*, "whenever we sacrifice the sixty wethers to Zeus Machaneus." The editor remarks, p. 351, "Le mot *'ῖ* est nouveau. Il ne s'est rencontré, jusqu' ici, ni dans les auteurs ni dans les textes épigraphiques." He quotes two other hitherto unpublished inscriptions of Argos in which the same form occurs, but with locative force "where," and rightly concludes that the temporal use is secondary. He explains the form as an old locative of *ὄς*, and parallels *ἶ, οἶ, ὄθι*, with *ἄγχι, ἀγχοῦ, ἀγχόθι*. But *ἄγχι*, from which *ἀγχοῦ, ἀγχόθι* are formed after the analogy of *o*-stem forms like *οἶ, ὄθι*, etc., is certainly not itself an *o*-stem locative, nor is it possible so to explain *ἶ*, if this is understood as representing a form with inherited *ι*-vowel. This new *ἶ* is nothing more nor less than the well-known West Greek *εἶ* in a spelling which is indeed surprising in so early an inscription, of any other dialect than Boeotian, but which *ἀφαιρῖσθαι*, l. 6, = Att. *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι*, though this of course is not a case of a genuine diphthong, sufficiently justifies us in recognizing. In later Argolic inscriptions we find *καλῖσθαι, Διvία, Κλιναγόρου, Τισικράτεος*, etc. See Hoffmann, in *SGDI*. IV, 427. Why this spelling was especially persistent in the case of *ἶ*, which in the later inscriptions quoted by Vollgraff occurs three times, although *ει* appears in other words, as *ἀποδείξει, Λυκείου, εἰκόνι*, I do not pretend to explain. But the identity of this *ἶ* with *εἶ* appears to me inevitable.

The inscription exhibits the characteristics to be expected in Argolic, such as, not to mention general Doric features, *νσ* in *ἐνς, τόνς, ἀ[π]ανσαν*, etc., *ἰαρός* with lenis (but also *ἀ[π]ανσαν!*), *ποί, ἀλιαίαι, ἀϝρέτενε*. For the first time *ὄις* = Lat. *ovis*, Skt. *avis*, etc., is quotable with its original *ϝ*, namely acc. pl. *ὄϝινς*, l. 10. Note also *ὄπυι* 'whither' like Cret. *ὄπυι* (*ὖς* was already known in Argolic), *πρεσγέαν* with *πρεσ-* as in Attic but *γ* as in Boeot. *πρισγεῖες*, Cret. *πρεῖγυς*, etc., and especially *οὗτο* l. 14 = *τοῦτο*, as in Boeotian. But the most interesting form is the third plural imperative middle *ποιγραψάνσθō*, l. 26, on account of its bearing upon a question which is discussed in Kühner-Blass *Griech. Gram.* II, p. 62, and Brugmann *Griech. Gram.*[3], p. 344, footnote, and is referred to briefly in my *Greek Dialects*, p. 106, § 140, 3*b*. After citing Epid. *φερόσθō*, Lac. *ἀνελόσθō*, Heracl. *ἐπελάσθω*, as coming from *-νσθω* (formed of course after the analogy of the active *-ντω*) with the same loss of *ν* without vowel lengthening as is regular in the case of inherited *νσ* + consonant (§ 77.2), I add "But Corcyr. *ἐκλογιζούσθω* comes from *-ονσθω* of later origin and with later treatment of *νσ*, (77.3, 78), and it is possible to read *φερόσθō*, etc., likewise early Att. *-όσθων*." Now that Arg. *ποιγραψάνσθō* ranges itself beside Corcyr. *ἐκλογιζούσθω*, the probability that the same history is to be assumed for the other forms is greatly increased and I should now definitely prefer the latter view.

CARL D. BUCK

LATIN *ss* INSTEAD OF INTERVOCALIC *R*

One of the standing riddles of Latin morphology is presented by the superlatives in *-issimus*. It seems clear that the suffix stands in some relation to the suffix *-simus* (from *-s-mmo-*) of *maximus, proximus*, etc., and to *-isimus* (from *-is-mmo-*) of *pulcherrimus, facillimus*, etc.; but no satisfactory way of accounting for the double *s* has yet been suggested.

Precisely the same difficulty is met in the archaic *s*-futures and *s*-subjunctives from vowel stems, such as *indicāsso, negāssim, prohibēssit*. Their parallelism with *faxo, faxim, capso, empsim*, etc., is perfectly obvious, and one can scarcely doubt the connection of both with the Indo-European *s*-aorist; but here again none of the various attempts to account for the double *s* etymologically has won any general acceptance.

We may get some light upon the second group of forms by observing the behavior of the *s*-aorist in Greek. In that language intervocalic *s* was regularly lost, but in all *s*-aorist forms which retained their aoristic use, and in most futures (originally aorist subjunctives), intervocalic *s* appears as *σ*: ἔστησα and ἕλυσα were prevented from becoming *ἔστηα and *ἕλυα by the analogy of ἔδειξα, ἔλεψα, etc. (see Brugmann *Greek Grammar*[3] 314). Similarly, I think, *capso, faxim*, etc., prevented **indicāso* and **prohibēsit* from becoming **indicāro* and **prohibērit* at the time when **genesis* was becoming *generis*. But the effort to pronounce the significant *s* of these words at a time when in other words intervocalic *s* was becoming every day less and less familiar led to an "over-correction." Instead of a simple intervocalic *s*, people pronounced a long or double *s*.

In similar fashion, the influence of *maximos, proximos, pessimos*, etc. (possibly also of **pulchersimos*, and **facilsimos* from **pulchr-is-mmos* and **facl-is-mmos*), induced a change of **ditisimos* to *ditissimos* rather than to **ditirimos*. This suffix *-isimos* is, of course, the same *-is-mmos* that appears in *pulcherrimus, facillimus*, etc., but without syncope of the antepenultimate vowel.

Double *s* for intervocalic *s* appears also in *quaeso* (*quaesso, CIL.* 10. 2311, Plaut. *Ps.* 1322). The perfect **quaes-si* (see Sommer *Handbuch* 612) induced the development of the present **quaeso* to *quaesso*, although in another part of the community or in a different usage the regular change to *quaero* took place. *Nāsus* (*nassum*, Plaut. *Merc.* 310), beside *nāris* and *nāres*, similarly owes its *ss* instead of *r* to **nās*, the nominative singular of the consonant stem (cf. Osthoff *MU.* 2. 48 f.). Another example may be found in *vās, vāsis* (*vassa*, Plaut. *Merc.* 781), although the etymology of the word is unknown. The *s* of Umbrian *vasor, vaso, vasus* would also have to be explained by analogy.

E. H. STURTEVANT

BOOK REVIEWS

The "Iphigenia in Tauris" of Euripides. Translated into English Rhyming Verse with Explanatory Notes by GILBERT MURRAY, LL.D., D.LITT., Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. Oxford University Press (American Branch), 1910.

The reader knows pretty well by this time what he may expect from a new translation by Professor Murray of a play of Euripides. Looked at as an English poem it will be certain to give pleasure. A strong sense of beauty in general will be exhibited, and an excellent technical facility. Comparison with Swinburne will inevitably suggest itself, and Professor Murray would doubtless be the first to declare that he cannot afford such a comparison. Still it must be said that if the swell and surge of Swinburne's line is not to be expected, Swinburne's characteristic vices are absent as well. As far as taste can take the place of genius Professor Murray is competent to make the substitution. He could not be guilty of bombast or redundancy or turgidity, and doubtless the restraint of his verse will cause it to be felt by many as more "Greek."

"Iphigenia in Tauris" is a poem so specially adapted to Professor Murray's talents that it is surprising he has left it so long untranslated. It is a romantic play with a happy ending, altogether modern in its psychology and as tightly bound together as though it were by Sardou. The dreadful problem of the Eumenides, of sin and remorse, which makes some Greek plays such hard reading, is here treated quite simply in the spirit of Ibsen by showing Orestes as the victim of fits, apparently epileptic in character. The noble rivalry in self-devotion of the two young heroes, the quiet competence of the heroine, the sympathetic action of the chorus allow the modern reader to know where he stands—a privilege he certainly loses when Jason and Medea wrangle, when Hercules gets drunk, when the objections of Pentheus (apparently so well founded) to the doings of the Maenads bring him to ruin. In a word, Euripides and Professor Murray have here collaborated to produce what should be the most popular of their joint works.

It would be interesting to secure, if we could, the opinion of Euripides on the question of rhymed verse as his English vehicle. In the matter of dramatic dialogue we may perhaps guess that he would approve the great English tradition of unrhymed verse. It is difficult to see any advantage of the rhymed couplet capable of offsetting its obvious disadvantages, but Professor Murray rhymes easily and well, and naturally likes to do it. The

question of the choruses is altogether different. Here the English tradition is all for rhyme; to omit it would be to lop off one of the wings on which the lyric flies. And yet Professor Murray's lyrics, graceful, charming, and certain as English songs, are precisely the most doubtful part of his rendering of the original. They come too trippingly on the tongue. There seems to be a fallacy in supposing that because a Greek strophe can be conveniently divided on the page into short verses it can be represented by an English strophe of equally short verses with a rhyme at the end of each. The rhyme interrupts the rhythm as the natural pause does not—it is a pebble on which the stream breaks, whereas the pause is a ripple due to the laws of motion of the fluid itself. Thus the movement of

τὰν πολυόρνιθον ἐπ' αἶαν,
λευκὰν ἀκτάν, Ἀχιλῆος
δρόμους καλλισταδίους,
ἄξενον κατὰ πόντον; (435–38)

is not reproduced by the movement of

Birds, birds, everywhere,
White as the foam, light as the air;
And ghostly Achilles raceth there,
Far in the Friendless Waters.

To go through Professor Murray's poem line by line with the original at hand gives a fresh sense of his dexterity as a translator. It is perhaps worth noting that he is unfortunate in retaining a discredited reading in l. 258 and in rendering ll. 258–59

'Tis so long a time, and never yet,
Never, hath Greek blood made this altar wet,

since Orestes speaks at l. 72 of the altar "where Hellene blood is shed," and Iphigenia herself explains that a captive who died at her hands wrote her letter for her. And in view of the fact that she could not write, there is something droll in the expansion of ll. 206–7 into

From the beginning Strife,
As a book to read, Fate gave me for mine own.

Expansion is in fact the temptation Professor Murray cannot resist, but a single example must suffice to warn the reader that he is not reading Euripides. Whereas Iphigenia said in Greek (369)

Ἄιδης Ἀχιλλεὺς ἦρ' ἄρ', οὐχ ὁ Πηλέως,

she says in English:

Is he a vampyre, is he one
That fattens on the dead, thy Peleus' son?

But this is captious. Professor Murray's versions are to be received with gratitude. They are of great interest to scholars, and they have had a surprising effect in mollifying a public disposed to eliminate scholarship.

EMILY JAMES PUTNAM

Die Komposition der pompejanischen Wandgemälde. Von GERHART RODENWALDT. Berlin: Weidmann, 1909. Pp. 270. Mit 38 Abbildungen im Text.

This book, a dissertation presented at Halle in 1908, of which the first three chapters were printed under the title "Qua ratione pictores Pompeiani in componendis parietibus usi sint," is an interesting attempt to solve the much-debated problem how much is Greek and how much Roman in the Pompeian wall paintings, or, at least, to contribute to the solution of the question by a careful study of one aspect of the paintings, namely, the composition.

Briefly stated, Dr. Rodenwaldt's contention is that landscape painting and, in general, the elaborate backgrounds and attempts at spatial effect which are so common in the Pompeian wall paintings, represent a development of the Roman period and do not go back, as has often been maintained, to Greek originals of the Hellenistic age. In expounding this thesis, Rodenwaldt in his first chapter discusses "Raumdarstellung auf griechischen Tafelbildern," arguing, from various bits of evidence, both literary and monumental, that the Greek painters of easel pictures never advanced very far in the direction of giving depth to their compositions by the use of perspective and a free distribution of the figures in space. Even in the post-Alexandrian period, he maintains, the figures in Greek easel pictures were commonly all placed on the same level and moving parallel to the plane of the picture like figures in relief; and the frame of the composition was never more than a narrow, stage-like space, bounded at the back by a wall or a mass of trees and rocks, or by a group of figures crowded close together as in the famous Alexander mosaic in Naples. In his second chapter, then, which treats of "Römische Wandbilder," the author calls attention to the marked contrast between such Greek paintings and works like the Vatican landscapes with scenes from the *Odyssey*, and on the basis of paintings of the second Pompeian style found in Rome postulates a development in the art of wall painting from (1) simple landscapes to (2) landscapes with figures and (3) landscapes with figures combined into mythological scenes. For such a development he finds evidence in literature, especially in the often-quoted passage in Vitruvius (vii. 5. 1) and in Pliny's account of Studius (*N.H.* 35, 116). The beginnings of such landscape painting he would place some time between 60 or 50 B.C. and the date of the *De architectura*. Furthermore, in the landscapes with figures, the figures themselves are often absolutely different from the relief-like types of the Greek painters. Not only are they freely distributed in space, but they usually move obliquely to the plane of the picture, and are represented in very lively action; the proportions are notably slender, the joints small, the whole effect un-Greek. On the other hand, in many of the wall paintings found in Rome, and even more in the paintings from Pompeii, figures and groups of pure Greek style appear in elaborate settings which

show the influence of the Roman development. Such *contaminatio*, Rodenwaldt maintains, is due to the influence of Greek easel pictures, an influence that made itself felt as soon as the simple landscape developed into the landscape with figures and increased in importance as time went on.

Having thus expounded his theory, Rodenwaldt next proceeds to an analysis of a great number of Pompeian wall paintings, with a view to showing how the Greek and the Roman elements were combined in the second, the third, and the fourth Pompeian styles and for different classes of subjects (chaps. iii–ix). The concluding chapter, "Ein griechisches Kompositionsprinzip," is an excursus on the principle of composition embodied in the Alexander mosaic and other works.

Against the theory which is here advanced many objections can be urged. The evidence on which Rodenwaldt relies to determine the character of Hellenistic painting is not sufficient to establish his contention that the Greeks never advanced beyond a simple "Ausfüllung der Fläche" or the production of "einen engen bühnenartigen Raum"; he does not consider the possibility of the development in the post-Alexandrian period of an art of wall painting independent of the development of the easel picture; his interpretation of Vitruvius vii. 5.1 f. (pp. 22 ff.) is less satisfactory than the older interpretation of Helbig and Woermann which makes *antiqui* (i.e., the painters of the Hellenistic period) the subject not only of *imitati sunt* but also of *ingressi sunt;* and many will hesitate to accept as Roman compositions the landscapes with scenes from the *Odyssey* and the paintings from the *casa degli epigrammi* with their Greek inscriptions.

But whatever one may think of Rodenwaldt's theory, there can be no doubt as to the value of his analytical chapters. These are full of interesting comparisons and suggestions, not only in respect to the Pompeian paintings themselves, but also in respect to the Greek originals on which they are based; see, for instance, the remarks on the "Master of the Europa Picture" (pp. 69 ff., 85 ff., 108 ff.) and the proposed attributions to Timomachos or his school (p. 58) and to Nikias (p. 77). In these chapters the author displays a knowledge of his material which is at once comprehensive and intimate, and it is here that he has made his most important contribution to the study of the Pompeian wall paintings. This part of the book, at least, can be heartily recommended to all who desire more than a superficial knowledge of these important monuments of ancient art.

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Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina. Recensuit A. B. DRACHMANN. Vol. II: Scholia in Pythionicas. Leipzig, 1910. Pp. xvi+270. M. 6.

The first volume of this work, containing the scholia on the Olympians, was issued in 1903, before *Classical Philology* had begun publication. The

present notice will therefore include some account of the book as a whole, which is to be concluded with a third volume, containing the Nemean and Isthmian scholia.

The scholia to Pindar are among the most important which we possess for any classical author, and are not only indispensable for the understanding of Pindar himself, but also are full of information concerning ancient history, myth, and religion. Indeed they have probably been studied quite as much for their bearing upon these more general subjects as for the light they throw upon the meaning of the most difficult, and yet most rewarding, of poets. A new edition of these scholia was very much needed, for the great work of Boeckh (1819) does not separate the scholia according to their manuscript sources, as indeed was scarcely possible with the scanty evidence at Boeckh's disposal. The edition of Abel (1884), and particularly of his successor (1891), is chiefly valuable as showing how such a work ought not to be done.

The present work, prepared in close connection with Schroeder's masterly edition of the text of Pindar (1900), must form, with Schroeder's, the basis of all serious study of Pindar for many years to come. Drachmann's first volume has now been before the public so long that it is unnecessary to dwell upon the accuracy and fidelity with which he has performed his duty. The endless labor which he has spent upon the manuscript study of the scholia—the most difficult of all paleographical work—is amply rewarded, and he presents to the philological world, in these modest volumes, a masterpiece of solid but unpretentious scholarship. The Pythian scholia are but little more than half as voluminous, in proportion to the text, as the Olympian. The student will therefore not expect the fulness of explanation, or the variety of alternate interpretations, which was found in Vol. I. Yet even here he may choose between no less than four slightly different views of κτίλον Ἀφροδίτας (P. 2. 31), and similarly of τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχᾳ (P. 2. 101), γένοιο δ' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών (P. 2. 131), and elsewhere.

Drachmann complains that he has not been so successful in emending the text of the scholia in this second volume as in the first. He is inclined to attribute this partly to weariness of brain, and partly to the different nature of the errors in the Pythian scholia, which seem to be less simply verbal than in the Olympian scholia. But the reader will detect no falling off in our editor's insight, for the traces of Drachmann's improving hand are by no means rare. So in a scholium on Ἰξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα (P. 2. 40) he reads παρεκβέβηκε for παρεμβέβληκε, a manifest improvement; and two pages later, on ἔμαθε δὲ σαφῶς (P. 2. 45), he substitutes διατεθεῖσιν for the unintelligible διατεθείς, though the note still seems incomplete. In the note on the Centaurs (on P. 2. 85), Drachmann's οὐ κατέσχον ἑαυτούς is far better than any reading in the manuscripts, and the same may be said of τῆς Ἀρχιλόχου δυσφημίας, φησὶν ὅτι, in the note on P. 2. 113. But the emendations which Drachmann has adopted from his keen-sighted friend Schroeder far outnumber his own—evidence of a modesty as rare

as it is admirable. Though a considerable number of passages, as was inevitable, are still marked *vix sanum*, or *sensu cassa*, yet the scholia, in this new edition, read intelligibly for the most part. And since these scholia form the chief basis of all our knowledge of Pindar, we cannot be too grateful to Drachmann for the self-sacrificing labor which he has so devotedly, and at the same time so profitably, spent upon them.

EDWARD BULL CLAPP

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The So-called Rule of Three Actors in the Classical Greek Drama. By KELLEY REES. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1908. Pp. 86. $0.79.

Professor Rees has amplified his dissertation by the following papers: "The Meaning of Parachoregema," *CP* II, 387 ff.; "The Number of the Dramatic Company in the Period of the Technitae," *AJP* XXXI, 43 ff.; and "The Three-Actor Rule in Menander," *CP* V, 291 ff. In the earliest period of tragedy but a single actor appeared upon the scene at a time; Aeschylus was the first to employ a two-actor scene; and Sophocles was the first to see the dramatic possibilities of the three-actor scene and to handle it with facility. This development is outlined in Aristotle's *Poetics* 1449*a* 15, and the aesthetic canon resulting therefrom is expressly stated in Horace's dictum: *nec quarta loqui laboret* (*Ars Poet.* 192). But the misinterpretation of these passages and of a gloss in Hesychius (*s.v.* *νέμησις ὑποκριτῶν*, which really refers to the manner of assigning protagonists to poets) has caused modern scholars to formulate the rule that ancient playwrights had only three actors at their disposal. An examination of the extant plays and of the new Menander fragments shows that for a variety of reasons three actors occasionally seem insufficient for presenting certain passages, that frequently rôles must be split (as in the *Oed. Col.*, where, if only three actors were available, the part of Theseus must be carried by all three in turn) and that such splitting results in overloading, "lightning" changes of costume, and incongruous assortment of parts (e.g., the rôles of Heracles and Deianeira in the *Trachiniae* must be performed by the same person). Furthermore, if we except the period of the Peloponnesian War and of the synchoregia in 406/5, there was no excuse for such thrift as all this would imply. On the other hand, it is likely that outside of Athens, in the period of the guilds (third and fourth centuries), such a restriction did obtain, and it would then naturally take its rise from the need of economy by the manager of a traveling troupe. Fortunately, four Soteric inscriptions for the years 272–269 B.C. are extant and in every case the dramatic troupes (twenty-two in all) consist of three actors. The controverted term *παραχορήγημα* belongs to the same period and has no connection with the choregic system. It is derived from *χορηγεῖν* in its non-technical sense of "spend" and

denotes any "extra expense"; i.e., by special contract the authorities might secure an addition (usually a fourth actor) to what the technitae would normally provide. In the later literature protagonist, deuteragonist, and tritagonist were used in the sense now generally understood, but originally they referred not to the character of the rôles which an actor was to play but to his own histrionic ability—the protagonist was a star; the tritagonist a "ranter." Thus, three second-rate actors might form a "barnstorming" troupe and in the traditional view one would be the protagonist, another the deuteragonist, and the last the tritagonist; but properly speaking they would all be *δευτεραγωνισταί*. Finally, in the case of nine plays the old three-actor distribution of parts is contrasted with a new one of Rees's own devising—allowing from four to seven actors in each cast. In these new arrangements he tries to assign a separate actor to each important part, to avoid the combination of male and female rôles and of extremes in age, and in general to form only such groupings as would be likely to escape the spectators' attention.

The skill with which Professor Rees urges his views, the neatness with which they reinforce one another, and the flood of light which they shed upon certain dark gaps in our knowledge give his theories considerable weight—in fact, with most of his conclusions the reviewer finds himself in substantial accord. Sometimes, however, an attempt seems to have been made to prove too much; for example, in the statement that "'tritagonist' is a term apparently invented by Demosthenes, was applied only to Aeschines, and was never in any period a recognized title" (p. 34). This is improbable enough in itself, seems inconsistent with the statements made on the very next page, and is expressly disproved by Demos. *De Falsa Legatione* §247: *ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ' ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς δράμασι τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐξαιρετόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ γέρας τοῖς τριταγωνισταῖς τὸ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρ' ἔχοντας εἰσιέναι.* This passage is earlier than Demosthenes' use of the term elsewhere (viz., in the *De Corona*), and, though Aeschines is of course mentioned in the context, both the sentiment itself in the form of a general statement and the use of the plural *τριταγωνισταῖς* and of the phrase *ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς δράμασι τοῖς τραγικοῖς* show that this was no word newly coined for the occasion and distinctly imply that tritagonists, whatever their function, were well known to Demosthenes' contemporaries. It is, therefore, hard to believe that in a contemporaneous passage, Arist. *Poetics* 1449*a* 16, *Αἰσχύλος . . . . τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, πρωταγωνιστήν* has no reference to acting (pp. 31 f.). Other possibilities are excluded by the fact that theatrical matters are under discussion, an argument which Rees himself accepts as satisfactory in another instance (p. 32, n. 6). Now if we ask ourselves whether Aristotle considered the dialogue in Aeschylus the protagonist because it was first in order of appearance in a play or better than choral parts to perform or as having the chief rôle, we must surely accept the last reason. Yet this conclusion does not invalidate

Rees's main thesis, for it is quite possible that the rule of three actors and consequently the traditional meaning of protagonist, etc., go back farther than he supposes and actually antedate this period. Rees is himself of the opinion that the use of ἀγωνίζομαι and its compounds with reference to actors began "soon after the introduction of the actors' contest in 449" (p. 35). Before the organization of formal guilds, at Thoricus and elsewhere in the fifth century and in almost every deme in the fourth century dramatic spectacles were celebrated (p. 65); and since it was within the range of possibility for three actors unassisted to present most plays (at least with slight alterations), it is likely that the troupes which visited these festivals were usually no larger. Hence, there may well have arisen in the "provinces" an unofficial nomenclature which would obtain no recognition at Athens or, indeed, in official records anywhere. In this connection it is significant that "wherever Aeschines is spoken of as 'tritagonist' to anyone, it is with reference to performances in the country" (p. 34, n. 6).

Again, is not the possibility worth considering that Aeschylus introduced the second actor (and consequently the two-actor scene) but had no others at his disposal; that Sophocles added the third actor (and consequently the three-actor scene) but had no more than this at his disposal; and that, somewhat later, more actors became available but without further additions to the number appearing together in one scene? There must have been a dearth of actors in the early days (pp. 60 f.); and just as the supply would seem about to exceed the demand, a corresponding change in dramatic technique would cause a need of still more. Certainly, the early plays have little fault to find with the two-actor arrangement; and if Aeschylus had been amply provided with actors, is it conceivable that a man of such inventive genius and initiative would not once in over thirty years have allowed three of them to appear together?

Other matters may be dismissed more briefly: p. 20, n. 1, l. 3, for "plays to be given" read "poets competing"; p. 23, the quotation from the *Ars Poetica* comes from l. 192; p. 34, n. 6, ἐτριταγωνιστεῖς (*sic*); pp. 36 f., another example of τὰ δεύτερα λέγειν referring to but one rôle occurs in Plutarch *Cicero* xii; p. 40, n. 1, perhaps "completed the trio" would be a preferable translation; p. 48, n. 1, a better explanation of Alcestis' silence is advanced in Haigh's *Tragic Drama* 288; p. 54, ll. 18 f., O'Connor has already pointed out the inapplicability of the reference to Aeschines; p. 58, l. 5, for "Chrysothemis" read "Hermione"; p. 63, n. 4, add a reference to Plutarch *De Gloria Ath.*, p. 348*f*–349*a*; p. 72, "Four men and a boy constituted the normal (Elizabethan) traveling troupe." Is there other evidence for this? The play quoted as proof in the footnote seems to point in the other direction: "But one boy? Then, I see there's but few women in the play." As Dr. Rees is fond of Elizabethan parallels, it may be not out of place to cite Brander Matthews' suggestion that Touchstone's disquisition on lies is "put precisely where it is to give Rosalind time to change from

the boyish costume of Ganymede into the ampler habiliments of her own sex"; cf. *A Study of the Drama* 129.

This subject has received no independent treatment since Hermann (1840), Richter (1842), and Beer (1844), and such an investigation was badly needed. Every reader of the later plays must feel and resent the artificiality and the absurdities which the current theory involves. Few would find solace in such suggestions as the following by Hermann: "The effect would be heightened still more when the spectator saw the same actor, who earlier in the play had been led forth to the tomb in the character of Antigone, return in the character of a Messenger to relate her death. Though the mask and dress were changed, the same voice and stature were perceptible in both, so that the spectator would feel that the ghost of Antigone was speaking through the mask of the Messenger" (p. 14). If Professor Rees's conclusions are accepted (as they inevitably must be in all essential particulars), we shall rest under no further necessity for such apologies. Finally, I would express the hope that these studies be continued into the field of Roman comedy, which likewise has not for some time been thoroughly examined from this point of view and would certainly yield valuable, though probably less revolutionary, results.

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Demetrii et Libanii qui feruntur ΤΥΠΟΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΟΙ *et* ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΜΑΙΟΙ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΕΣ. Edidit VALENTINUS WEICHERT. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910.

The appearance of Foerster's text of Libanius gives the signal for his pupils to produce the dissertations inspired by his life-long work in this field. Weichert's little book is not labeled a dissertation, and in form it appears as an addition to the texts of the Teubner Library. But it has all the earmarks of a dissertation, and on page lxxiv, in an addendum, its author has forgotten to remove the words *haec dissertatio*. The brief tract which has come down to us under the name of Demetrius of Phalerum discusses 21 types of letters. The writer, allowing for the increasing complexity of life, prophesies that time will give birth to many other such types, but asserts that he has personally met with only those on his list, a pathetic admission, since the love letter is not included. His examples of letters of introduction, condolence, congratulation, and the rest are as frigid as one would expect from an author whose first sentence takes up 13 lines of Teubner text. The most curious type is the allegorical, which corresponds remotely to the modern communication by code or cipher, though its real meaning seems to have been left to the intelligence of the unhappy recipient. Demetrius offers certain epistolary problems of this sort, with their solutions.

The tract ascribed by some to Libanius has more claim to be called a "Complete Letter Writer," and defines 41 types, not omitting the love letter. His examples are less stilted than the other's, but we cannot believe that such a handbook had any vogue outside the school of rhetoric; in fact we have letters enough among the papyri collections to prove that the real thing was unlike in all respects to the school formula. But there was, no doubt, a special etiquette for writing to a sophist, and perhaps it was such a handbook as this that inspired Marcus Aurelius, whose epistolary style is so admired by Philostratus, with his exclamatory letter to Fronto—"O verba! O nitor! O argutiae! O kharites! O δεκησις! O omnia!"

In his Introduction Weichert collects the precepts of the rhetoricians on the varieties, style, and subject-matter of the model letter. One observes that such rules were made to be broken. The pupil is warned by Demetrius to avoid philosophic reflections, circumlocutions, sententiae, and other sophistic devices, but we know well that no sophist or pupil of a sophist had the heart to leave them out.

On the question of the authorship of these two tracts Weichert decides that the Demetrius who composed the τύποι was not he of Phalerum, and he follows Brinkmann in assigning the work to the second century B.C.; it was written by one Demetrius, in Egypt, and is the oldest extant handbook of its type. Weichert was able to test the tract assigned to Libanius in the tradition by an analysis of that sophist's own letters, and decides that they reflect the school of Libanius, so that we have here the familiar ghost of the pupil who publishes his master's notes in a form not intended by the lecturer. And since another tradition assigned the tract to Proclus the Platonist, which is impossible, it is evident that here we have the clue to the pupil's name, especially as we know that Libanius had no less than three correspondents named Proclus. This is a very neat explanation of the Proclus tradition and of the obvious likeness to the style of Libanius himself. This gives us for both the tracts that other soothing apparition—another man of the same name.

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February, 1911

A Study of the Greek Epigram before 300 B.C. By FLORENCE ALDEN GRAGG. *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.* Vol. XVLI, No. 1 (September, 1910). Pp. 62.

The material of Miss Gragg's essay includes 324 epigrams from monuments and from the literary tradition. The writer's purpose is to define the characteristics of these epigrams, and in so doing to mark such development as is discernible before the Hellenistic period. Although there is no trace of polemic in the discussion, the conclusions militate against Reitzenstein's views: Miss Gragg believes that satirical epigrams were written in the sixth

century, that "satiric, convivial, gnomic, and love epigrams are developing rapidly" in the fifth century, and that "the epigram was early considered a distinct branch of literature." To a considerable extent her disagreement with Reitzenstein is due to her less skeptical attitude toward the epigrams attributed to classical poets in the literary tradition, and to her inclusion of material from Archilochus, Theognis, Euenus, and others that is usually treated as elegy rather than epigram. To a less degree the difference may be due to the elasticity of descriptive terms: who shall say whether the mere appearance of the name of the dead or of the dedicator *extra metrum* is sufficient to stamp an epigram as "a recognized form of *Kunstdichtung*"? All depends upon Reitzenstein's understanding of the terms employed; Miss Gragg is evidently attaching a different import to them.

In general the conservative attitude toward Reitzenstein's ingenious theories is commendable, especially in respect to the contention of the German scholar that the "literary" epigram necessarily presupposes the collection in book form of inscribed epigrams; nor are we disposed to object to the charity of the author in recognising the authenticity of epigrams ascribed to early poets in MSS. But we must demur to the inclusion of the short elegiac poems of Euenus, Theognis, and others in an account of the epigram. Not that these poems do not belong in such a study, but simply that the writer, having once included them, immediately imposes upon herself a larger task—the history of τὰ ἐλεγεῖα and not merely of the epigram. For whatever connection they may have with epigram, their precise relation cannot be appreciated if they are considered apart from longer elegies. Miss Gragg does not need to be reminded that historical study of the epigram before 300 is impossible; the only historical introduction to the Hellenistic epigram is through τὰ ἐλεγεῖα in the broadest sense.

The essay bears every trace of careful workmanship: it shows an admirable command of the sources and of the interpretative material; it contributes interesting notes on the influence of other types, on meter, and on dialect; and it serves a very useful purpose in the mere collection of the scattered remains of early epigram, and in the convenient tabulation of recurrent details and formulas in the inscribed epigram. Although a defect in the plan has given rise to partial truth or total error, in execution the study is a model *Erstlingsarbeit*.

HENRY W. PRESCOTT

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P. Terenti Afri Hauton Timorumenos. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, Critical Appendix, and Index, by F. G. BALLENTINE. Boston: Benj. H. Sanborn and Co., 1910. Pp. xxi+129.

This is a difficult book to review. It shows careful study of Terentian literature (with one odd gap, noted below), and independent examination

of the play itself. But the editor fails to keep clearly in mind the class of readers for whom he was, in theory, writing. The book forms part of a series professedly intended for college students. Such students will find much that it contains of no help, mere extraneous erudition; they will also miss much which they have a right to expect.

Of the sixteen pages of the Introduction four treat briefly the production of the *Hauton*, its plot, characters, and reputation. The other twelve present a new feature in editions of Terence, an excellent discussion of the Influence of Terence upon English comedy. There is not a word, however, about Terence's life and work, his merits and his weaknesses, his countrymen's estimate of him, his place in the history of Greco-Roman comedy and in Latin literature, his meter and prosody, stage performances, etc. Mr. Ballentine explains the omission of "the meter, prosody, etc., of Terence" as due to the fact that they are found in practically all of the annotated editions of Terence. But nowhere does he enumerate such editions or give a list of books or articles to which the intelligent student may go for light on the important topics named above. Yet the Notes and the Critical Appendix are full of references (e.g., to metrical matters, the illustrated MSS) which assume a large measure of the knowledge which the editor nowhere helps the student to acquire, at least in any systematic way. Too often, also, there are no notes on lines or groups of lines which, as the reviewer knows from experience, trouble college students. Help is not always given where it is first or most needed; *amicum* is genitive in 24, *iniquom* in 27, yet the form is first discussed in 606. One other fault in the presentation of the editor's stores of information is the fact that often books which have passed through many editions, such as the *Latin Grammar* of Stolz and Schmalz and the *Antibarbarus*, are cited without indication of the edition he was using.

The best part of the book is the Critical Appendix. Here the editor shows independence, knowledge, judgment, good taste. He is in general a conservative, yet is capable of innovation. He made good use of Professor Warren's *Bibliography of Terence* and his copy of Umpfenbach's edition, with Warren's own corrections and additions (see the Preface). Only a hint of the good things can be given. He rightly retains *suum* in Per. 7, keeps the MSS verse-order in 3 ff., retains 6–9 (with *simplici*, however, in 6), 48–50, and keeps *agrum* in 63 (of course he declines to insert it in 64). At 72 he gives a good text in reading *At enim me quantum*, etc. In 83 he declines to emend *meruisti* to *commeruisti*. In 135 he reads *dignum quovis* (instead of *quovis dignum*), correcting Umpfenbach's report of A's reading. For other good textual notes see on 176, 183 (here he omits *magna* as a gloss, and retains *usque; iam inde usque a pueritia*, it might be added, makes an adjective with *familiaritàs* needless), 192. Punctuation comes in for a good share of attention, with results usually good: see on 82–83, 114, 128, 140, 163, 181.

The change in 162, however, gives an unnatural place to *hodie:* no one need be afraid of medial incision (see Professor Goodell's paper, "Bisected Trimeters in Attic Tragedy," *Classical Philology* I, 145–66).

In the commentary there is much of interest and value. Especially good are the notes describing various expressions as "proverbial" and the notes bringing Terence's verses beside their Greek originals, real or supposed (see, e.g., on 61–62, 63–64, 293–95). In the latter connection, however, the editor has missed a chance (see, e.g., on 440) to bring out the wide difference which sometimes obtains between Terence's verses and those cited by ancient authority as his originals. Professor West, in his edition of the *Andria* and the *Hauton* (1888), pp. xxix, 154–55, showed very briefly but well how such a discussion might illuminate the question of the originality of Latin literature. The lack of such a general discussion is emphasized by the fact that the Index contains no caption referring to Greek at all and does not contain the name of Menander or that of Philemon. The citations from modern English plays help at times. Notes giving reminiscences of Plautus in Terence and reminiscences of Terence in later Latin authors are also good and helpful.

The author seems oddly unfamiliar with American work which touches Terence more or less closely. A knowledge of Miss Saunders' dissertation, *Costume in Roman Comedy* 30–39, would have eliminated from p. 57 the groundless statement that the Prologus carried an olive branch; the two passages cited from Livy are in no way relevant and the illustrated MSS are against Mr. Ballentine's view. In the note on 46 there should have been a reference to Professor Flickinger's paper, "On the Prologue to Terence's Heauton," *Classical Philology* II, 157–62. Study of Professor Clement's paper on "The Use of *enim* in Plautus and Terence," in *AJP* XVIII, 402–15, and of Professor Kirk's on "*Etiam* in Plautus and Terence," *ibid.* 26–42, would have led to better notes (e.g., on 72, 235, etc.) on these two poor words, so shamefully treated by editors and critics of Plautus and Terence. On 313 a reference might have been added to Professor Harkness' paper in *AJP* XXXI, 154–74, "The Final Monosyllable in Latin Prose and Poetry."

In a number of places I differ from Mr. Ballentine in interpretation, in others again I think more helpful matter might have been added to his notes, even by one who kept steadily in mind the college student. But for detailed discussion of such points there is here no room.

To sum up, there is in this book abundant evidence of long, faithful, and fruitful study of Terence. It is to be hoped that Professor Ballentine will continue that study. Increasing experience in editing will brush aside the weaknesses which this book shows on the side of presentation.

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Libanii Opera. Recensuit RICHARDUS FOERSTER. Vol. V. Declamationes i–xii. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909.

Foerster, with this volume, begins a series of four that are to be devoted to the more definitely sophistic works of Libanius. The Declamations were more read in the Middle Ages than the Orations and consequently survive in more MSS, and have been more exposed to the carelessness of copyists: the greater the opportunity for emendation. Nor had the editor for this part of his task any MS so trustworthy as the Augustanus and Chisianus had proved for the Orations. He has forsaken the order followed by Reiske, and arranges, according to the subject-matter, first the mythographical, then the historical and ethical compositions, but he has put first of all the *Apology* of Socrates because of its kinship to the Orations. Here Libanius assumes the rôle of a friend of Socrates attacking Anytus. The speech is written with the ardor and the fellow-feeling to be expected from one who was himself an instructor of youth, and Libanius neglects the charge of impiety to defend Socrates from what he thought a graver accusation. Foerster explains certain obscurities in the argument by the theory that Libanius had before him that notorious speech by Polycrates the sophist which Isocrates had attacked, and that he is refuting this speech point by point, though, as the fragments of Polycrates show, he did not follow it slavishly. Here Foerster differs from Dindorf and Cobet. Anthologists and grammarians neglected this *Apology* and it survives in few MSS. Reiske omitted from his collection the declamation that follows, "On the Silence of Socrates," though it was evidently popular. A pupil of Socrates pleads to be allowed to talk with his master in prison, alleging, against the historical evidence, that this privilege was denied to all. The composition bristles with the regular sophistic commonplaces, nightingales and swan songs, Marsyas and Orpheus.

What the readers of Libanius preferred were the mythographical exercises that follow, the speeches of Menelaus and Odysseus to recover Helen, Achilles replying to Odysseus as he might have replied in the Ninth *Iliad*, for the Trojan saga still fascinates beyond every other theme. Orestes defends himself before a jury, Poseidon and Ares bring charge and countercharge over the death of Halirrhothius, and the volume ends with imaginary speeches by Themistocles and Cimon, which had considerably less vogue. Foerster rejects from the corpus and assigns to Choricius on the grounds of style, the speech of Patroclus, the Ῥήτορος λόγος and the "Apology of a Father." More than once he speaks of forthcoming dissertations, presumably by his pupils, which will support with fuller arguments than he can give his editorial decisions.

The English quotation on p. 451 might have been revised to make sense, and we note that though this is a volume of declamations, "Orationes" appears on the back of the cover.

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November, 1910

Die Entstehung der Odyssee und die Versabzählung in den griechischen Epen. By AUGUST FICK. Goettingen, 1910. M. 7.

In this work of his advanced years Fick assumes the entire truth of the theories with which his name has long been associated; there are no doubts and no misgivings—his most common expressions are "sicher," "zweifellos," and "ohne Zweifel"; there are no more facts of any value to be found regarding the language or the origin of the Homeric poems; Ruth need expect no gleanings in the fields of this thrifty Boaz.

According to Fick the *Odyssey* consists of four original poems put together by botchers and blockheads. The four poems are a "Nostos" consisting of 1,944 verses divided into eight books of 243 verses each, composed in Chios about 700 B.C.; a "Gegennostos" of 1,215 verses, or five books of 243 verses each, composed in Rhodes a little after 700 B.C.; a "Tisis" of 3,520 verses and an introduction of 110 verses, composed in Crete early in the seventh century; a "Telemachie" of 1,760 verses composed in Laconia about 620 B.C. The two "Nostoi" were blended by Alcman; later poets without poetic ability and with no sense of humor started to piece out and interweave with their own wretched verses these four poems; the absurdity of the one was surpassed by the ignorance of the next: "Dieser Unfug kann nicht von unserem Einleger in den Nostos herrühren, denn es ist rein undenkbar, dass ein halbweg vernünftiger Mensch sein immerhin doch ganz verständig begonnenes Werk in so verrückter Weise fortsetze" (p. 150). It was Kynaithos beyond all others who brought ruin and disaster, he it was who "geschädigt und verwüstet die alten herrlichen Dichtungen." The poems were mutilated by Kynaithos about 500 B.C., in Sicily, where he produced his version; he created the character of the blind poet Demodokos in order to praise himself; he has long been concealed behind this mask, but has been found out at last (p. 183): "Es kann wohl keinem Zweifel unterliegen, dass in diesen Einlagen der blinde Kynaithos unter der Maske des Demodokos selber steckt und sich in seiner masslosen Eitelkeit selbst verherrlicht." The plan of the present *Odyssey* "is a crime against human intelligence" (p. 168): "Billig fragt man da, wie kam Kynaithos, denn dieser wird als Verüber dieses *Verbrechens gegen den gesunden Menschenverstand* nachgewiesen werden, zu einer so unsinnigen Anordung?"

Each of the four original poems found in the *Odyssey* was composed in pure Aeolic Greek, since they can be rewritten in that dialect; verses that cannot be so changed reveal the later hand. The following examples will show how simple the change from the present traditional form to the pure original:

κ 35: *καί μ' ἔφασαν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον οἴκαδ' ἄγεσθαι.* Simply drop the pronoun *μ'*, insert *γὰρ*, substitute *ἔφαν* for *ἔφασαν*, drop *οἴκαδ'*, insert *αὐτόν*, and behold we have a pure Aeolic verse,

καὶ γὰρ ἔφαν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον αὐτὸν ἄγεσθαι.

μ 64: ἀλλά τε καὶ τῶν αἰὲν ἀφαιρεῖται λὶς πέτρη. Insert ἴαν, change αἰὲν to αἰεὶ, ἀφαιρεῖται to ἀγρεῖ, and we have the verse, metrically impossible,

ἀλλά τε καὶ τάων ἴαν αἰεὶ ἀγρεῖ λὶς πέτρα.

Yet we are asked to believe that bards could make such wholesale changes, but left κε, κεν, θεά in the poems, because they could not force ἄν and θεός into the meter.

A numerical system founded on the calendar lies at the base of these poems: the week had nine days, the sidereal month twenty-seven days. Now multiply 9 by 27 and we have 243, which is the fifth power of 3; further, 3 times 243 is 729, and this again is twice 364½, i.e., twice the length of the solar year. The number 243 is the number of verses in each of the 8 (8 is the third power of 2) poems of the "Nostos." This theory is not to be tested by the poems, but the poems by the theory. All verses which refuse to fit into 243 are to be rejected; e.g., cf. p. 127: "Man erkennt den späteren Ursprung teils schon durch ihre Sprachfehler, sicher jedoch allemal an der Unmöglichkeit, sie in das herrschende Zahlensystem einzufügen."

In the "Gegennostos" the calendar is different; Odysseus stays one year with Circe, one month with Aeolus, a month on the island of the Sun; thus, if we add one month for his other adventures, we have fifteen months, and by figuring the month at thirty days, we have 450 days, or the exact number of verses in each division of the "Gegennostos," a coincidence so remarkable that accident is out of the question. To be sure no one of these divisions has 450 verses, but they can easily be changed. The numbers though fixed are fluid, since when Fick first published his hidden numbers for the "Urmenis" he found the divisions each had 242 verses, but now, since he has found the true number in the fifth power of three, each of these same divisions oddly enough has 243 verses, or a most remarkable agreement with the "Nostos."

Wonderful as the numerical agreements are in these poems it is in the "Tisis" that all the majesty is seen. "This poem has 3,520 verses with an introduction of 110 verses, thus, in all 3,630, and the 3,630 represents ten solar years or eleven sidereal years. Now take away the 110 and we have 3,520, or ten lunar years" (p. 93). To be sure, the introduction has 187 verses, but it must be reduced to 110, else it would not be a multiple of 5, 10, and 11, the only frame on which the poet of the "Tisis" could work.

On p. 193 proof is given to show that the week of seven days was known: "Philoctetes had seven ships, a certain proof of the seven days of the week, also the ship of the Phaeacians had fifty-two men, hence the year had fifty-two weeks." The author hints that this knowledge of a week of seven days and a year of fifty-two weeks may be due to Babylonian influence.

However, the year was most accommodating and shifts at will; cf. p. 200: "Odysseus had twelve ships and in the capture of the goats each ship received nine goats as its share of the booty. Now then, 9 times 12 is 108,

or one-third of 324, the number of days in a sidereal year. But Odysseus received for himself alone ten goats. Just add 10 to 108 and we have 118; but 118 is one-third of 354, the number of days in the lunar year." Here the lunar year has 354 days, while in the "Tisis" it obligingly had but 352, and the sidereal year here has only 324 days against the 330 of the "Tisis." Exact figures, as a rule, are exacting, but this calendar method requires only that we have some divisor or multiple of 350, 360, 364, 354, 352, 330, 324; or a divisor of some fraction of them, e.g., 243, is approximately two-thirds of 364, hence we can work in groups of 3, 9, 27, 81, and multiples thereof, and so with fractions of all the rest.

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The Rise of the Greek Epic. By GILBERT MURRAY. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. Pp. xi+283.

As a piece of fascinating and brilliant writing Professor Gilbert Murray's volume of Harvard Lectures deserves extended review. As yet another contribution to the deluge of Homeric "literature," it must be put off with a brief notice. He has actually accomplished the feat of writing nearly three hundred pages on the Homeric problem with little or no mention of Wolf, Lachmann, and the Villoison scholia. Instead of these things he gives a generalized yet vividly concrete and picturesque description by the methods of Renan of how the thing might have happened, thus plausibly leading us to his conclusion that it did in fact so happen.

He describes after Wilamowitz and on the analogy of the Germanic invasions of the Roman empire the weltering chaos in which the Mycenaean civilization broke up, and out of which emerged dimly discerned in the dark ages the Greece that we know—the Greece of the πόλις.

"Homeros is the name of an imaginary ancestor" worshiped by the schools of bards who reflect or conventionally preserve the traditions of these ages. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* took shape in the public recitations of such bards at great Ionian festivals—prototypes of the Panathenaea. In these poems we are brought face to face "with something in a sense greater and more august than individual genius." We associate the unique imaginative intensity that pervades the *Iliad* with something personal. But this is an illusion. The existing texts cannot be accounted for on the hypothesis of one great poet working either near the beginning or near the end of the process. The grand style and imaginative unity of the *Iliad* means "that generation after generation of poets lived in the same schools . . . . steeped themselves to the lips in the spirit of *this great poetry*" (italics ours). These schools and the exigencies of their audience maintained the archaizing conventions of the epic (bronze armor, for example) and expurgated the old "Pelasgian foolishness" that survives in Hesiod and even in Aeschylus.

But at the same time or a little later some of them wrought irreparable injury to the human race by permitting the invasion of the Milesian spirit of levity and lubricity into the greatest poem that the world has known. And Mr. Murray is not certain that he would "subscribe half a crown to save Aristeides of Miletus and all his kin from everlasting death." It would be interesting to learn how much his austere Puritanism would subscribe to redeem Milton, whose nuptials of Adam and Eve was evidently in part inspired by the "Milesian" marriage of Zeus and Hera.

All this is most entertaining and has received its full meed of praise from reviewers. Professor Murray has not only studied and utilized with consummate literary skill the suggestions of Cauer, Robert, Leaf, Bréal, and the rest, but he has read Matthew Arnold and Mr. Andrew Lang, and is aware that he cannot *prove* anything. Unfortunately he forgets this when he enters upon the detailed disintegrating analysis of the poems, and so permits himself an ingenuity of caviling hypercriticism that even Robert might envy.

There is space for but one illustration. On p. 44, arguing that the interpolation of the breastplate has introduced confusion of thought, Professor Murray quotes *Iliad* vii. 251: "Right through the shining shield came the strong spear and was driven heavily through the richly wrought breastplate, but he twisted aside and escaped black death," with the comment "Too late! You can twist aside from a spear that is coming through your shield but not from one that has already been heavily driven through your breastplate." If Professor Murray feels such absolute confidence in this argument, why does he substitute "driven heavily" for Lang, Leaf, and Myer's "pressed it on," and why, with no indication of the omission, does he omit the line "And straight forth beside the flank the spear rent his doublet"? Why does he fail to note in xi. 436 ff. the addition in identical context of the words "and tore clean off the flesh of the flanks, but Pallas Athene did not suffer it to mingle with the bowels of the hero"? The poet in both places thinks of a spear so directed that after penetrating all defenses it either just grazes or slightly wounds the flesh. This is reasonable enough. The position of the words "swerved and escaped black death" need not be pressed to mean that he swerved after the arrow had already penetrated the breastplate any more than Pallas Athene's miraculous guidance of the spear need be supposed to take place after it had pierced the shield and breastplate. In *Iliad* xx. 275 ff., where there is no breastplate, after it is said that Achilles' spear pierced Aeneas' shield and the shield cracked under it, the poet adds "and Aeneas crouched and held up the shield away from him in dread," etc. In all such cases, the naïveté of the formula is as natural a *husteron proteron* as is our habit of shrinking after we have seen the lightning flash. The intended meaning is clearly that the hero saw the weapon coming and crouched or swerved. If the absurdity is so patent, how was it accepted by the audience of Ionian warriors for whose sake "all the heroes were summarily provided with" (interpolated) "breastplates"? No Homeric

naïveté can exceed that of a critic who writes in his text that there is not a word about the breastplate in *Iliad* iv. 134 ff., and then inserts the footnote "I think the θώρηξ and the μίτρη are both interpolated here," or who accounts for the absence of the breastplate interpolations in K (the *Doloneia*) by the supposition that the breastplate interpolations took place while K was still separate and that "when K was modified and inserted in the *Iliad* the interest in the armor question had died down."

It is all, as I have said, very delightful reading, but when regarded as argument or science must be taken subject to verification.

PAUL SHOREY

Omero di Engelbert Drerup. Versione fatta da ADOLFO CINQUINI E FRANCESCO GRIMOD, con Aggiunte dell' Autore e appendice di LUIGI PERNIER. Bergamo: Istituto Italiano d'Arti Grafiche—Editore, 1910. Pp. 292. L. 10.

Professor Drerup's well-known book published in 1903 needs no further recommendation. But this Italian edition is in many respects a new work. The author guarantees the fidelity of the translation, and has brought the work down to date with the aid of such specialists as Professor Halbherr, Dr. Luigi Pernier, Dr. Roberto Paribeni, and Dr. Alessandro Della Seta. In addition to this, the number of the illustrations has been so increased (from 123 to 223) and their quality so improved that Professor Drerup is not claiming too much for the book when he says in the preface that in its present form it presents a better and fuller picture of the most ancient civilization of Greece than any other one book. Not only the archaeologist in the small college, but teachers of Homer everywhere will find it an immense convenience to have practically all the illustrative material that they need in the small compass of this beautifully executed volume of 292 pages. For this purpose the book can easily be used by those who do not read Italian, and the extremely moderate price brings it within the reach of those who cannot afford a costly Homeric and "Minoan" library.

The thanks of all scholars are due to the publishers of this handsome and helpful volume, and we trust that they will maintain the high standard which it sets in the promised second volume of their series, *La civiltà Ellenica.*

PAUL SHOREY

The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric. By LOUIS JOHN PAETOW, PH.D. Vol. III, No. 7, The University of Illinois Studies. Urbana-Champaign: University Press, 1910. Pp. 134. $1.00.

Dr. Paetow's monograph deals with the eternal problem of the classical, the scientific, and the "modern" course as it presented itself to the Middle

Ages—classics being represented by grammar in the classical and mediaeval sense of "the art of explaining poets and historians," science by the scholastic logic and the Arabian Aristotle, and the practical business course by medicine, Roman law, and especially the *ars dictaminis*, or training in letter writing and the art of drawing up documents.

The mediaeval Renaissance, whose fruits were the schools of Chartres and Orleans and the humanism of John of Salisbury, did not find acceptance in the great universities of the thirteenth century, where the scholastic philosophy absorbed all interest not devoted to the professions. The plaints of the humanists and the strangely modern satire of the old French poem on the Battle of the Seven Liberal Arts were as powerless to check the tendency as is the wail of the twentieth-century Greek professor today. The up-to-date student disdained the discipline of grammar and the culture of the "authors," and "logic," the scientific philosophy of the day, confirmed him in his attitude—

> Soothed him up with lofty talk
> And bore him up on high,
> And ere that he had learnt to walk
> Would teach him how to fly.

In the century preceding Petrarch, the study of language and literature was at its very lowest ebb, and the brilliance of this morning star of the Renaissance is largely due to the fact "that it happened to be darkest just before the dawn."

I am not sure that Dr. Paetow's theses are absolutely new. But I have already found his collections of facts not readily available elsewhere extremely useful, and expect to have occasion to use them again. A helpful bibliography is appended.

PAUL SHOREY

Some Figurative Uses of "Venire" and "Ire." By JAMES RAIDER MOOD. Johns Hopkins dissertation. Baltimore: J. H. Furst Company, 1907. Pp. viii+47.

The author has divided his subject into three chapters. Chap. i, "With Case," deals with types like *ad (in) spem venire (ire)*; chap. ii, "With predicate Nominative or Accusative," *comitem venire (ire)*, *leve (levius) venire (ire)*, *obortum venire (ire)*, *exoriens venire*, *dolendum venire;* chap. iii, "With Inanimate Subjects Thereby Personified," discusses types like *fatum veniens (venturum*, etc.). Throughout, the prose examples are separated from the poetical. In the conclusion the author summarizes his results, commenting on the range, growth, and meaning of the various usages.

The period covered extends from Plautus to the end of the second century A.D. The author realizes that the more promising field is the period lying

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instructor. It is therefore in response to an actual want that the new collection has been published.

There are 18 plates containing 25 pages from 22 manuscripts. Some of them are new, others have been published in works not generally accessible; only a few are familiar. Practically all the authors are of interest to the student of the classics, Augustine's *Homilies* and Jerome's *De viris illustribus* being the only patristic works represented. The plates are excellent; they are arranged chronologically and represent the various scripts from square capitals to the humanistic script. More than half the manuscripts are in the library at Wolfenbüttel, e.g., the *Agrimensores* (uncial), Augustine's *Homilies* (Merovingian), Isidore's *Etymologies* (Italian half-cursive), and the following minuscule MSS: *Pompei commentum artis Donati* (saec. VIII), Aurelius Victor (saec. IX), Suetonius (saec. XI), Propertius (saec. XI–XII), Martianus Capella (saec. XIII), Vegetius (saec. XIV), Juvenal (saec. XIV), Tibullus (saec. XV), the Panegyrici (saec. XV). The other libraries represented are: Berlin, Virgil ("Augusteus"); Florence, Virgil ("Mediceus"), Caesar, (Beneventine script); Bamberg, Jerome, *De viris illustribus* (half-uncial), *Scriptores historiae Augustae* ("insular"); Madrid, Isidore's *Etymologies* (Visigothic); Paris, Suetonius ("Memmianus"); Erlangen, Cicero, *De inventione* (saec. X), Isidore's *Etymologies* (saec. XII); Venice, Tacitus, *Dialogus* (saec. XV).

A booklet accompanying the plates contains a brief history, written in Latin, of the manuscripts, with a selected bibliography. There is no transcription of the text and discussion of the script.

Further series, of a more special character, are promised if the reception of the first is favorable. It is to be hoped that the untimely death of Ihm will not interfere with the project. It would be easy to combine in future issues a scientific and a practical purpose. It would be very desirable, for example, to have published a collection of plates from Spanish manuscripts no longer in Spain, to supplement the series published by Ehwald-Loewe.

CHARLES H. BEESON

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M. Tulli Ciceronis Paradoxa Stoicorum, Academicorum Reliquiae cum Lucullo, Timaeus, De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato. Fasciculus I. Ed. OTTO PLASBERG. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908. Pp. iv+196. M. 8.

The task of preparing a new (and much needed) edition of this group of Cicero's philosophical works was intrusted to Professor Plasberg by the Royal Prussian Academy fourteen years ago. The first fascicle contains the *Paradoxa*, the *Academica*, and the *Timaeus*. The *Academica* are printed in the following order: The *Varro*, or the first book of the *Academica Pos-*

teriora the title of which in the form *Academicus I* has an unfamiliar look, then the fragments of Book II and part of the fragments of Book III followed by the fragments of the *Catulus* and by the *Lucullus*. The other fragments of Book III and those of Book IV, since they are derived from the *Lucullus*, are entered as footnotes to that work on the appropriate pages. The ancient *testimonia* precede the *Academica* and also the *Timaeus*.

The distinguishing feature of this edition of the *Timaeus* is the interlinear arrangement of the Greek with the Latin text, an arrangement so convenient that it justifies the typographical difficulties it must have caused. Brackets inclose such passages of each author as are not found in the other, so that the relation of the Latin to the Greek original is easily made out.

The text of the *Paradoxa*, of the *Lucullus*, and of the *Timaeus*, like the text of earlier editions, rests primarily upon A B Vossiani 84 and 86, and V (Vindobonensis 199). Besides these MSS the editor cites for the *Paradoxa* F (Florentinus Marcianus 257, M Monacensis 528, Harleiani 2622 and 2682; for the *Lucullus* F, M, and, where V fails, N Notradamensis Parisinus 17812); for the *Timaeus* F, M, L Vossianus 10. Variants for the Greek text are occasionally cited from A, P, Y, F, and the *testimonia* of Proclus as given in Burnet's edition. For *Academicus I* some sixty MSS have been used, but the promised discussion of them has been postponed till the publication of the third fascicle, containing *De Divinatione* and *De Fato*, in order to avoid repeating the same subject-matter. Its place is taken by a brief summary (p. 33). The MSS are divided into two main classes, Δ, subdivided into "meliores," headed by Parisinus 6331 (Halm's P) and including a MS similar to Halm's V, and "deteriorum genera," including Halm's A; Γ, subdivided into "genus corruptum" and "genus interpolatum," which includes Halm's G. For further information the reader is referred to an article by Ed. Stroebel, *Philologus* 52, and to the dissertation by Otto Dieckhoff, *De Ciceronis libris de natura deorum recensendis* (Göttingen, 1894).

Besides the readings of the MSS and of the very early editions, the critical apparatus includes the readings of the editions of Halm and Baiter (1861), Baiter (1865), Müller (1878–79), and, for the *Academica*, Reid (1885). The edition of Schneider (1891) is occasionally quoted for the *Paradoxa*. The text is the most conservative that has yet appeared and the editor has done good service in relegating to the notes the greater number of the conjectures adopted by earlier editors, thus clearing the ground for further work on the text. For example I have noted in the *Paradoxa* 39 instances where the present text differs from that of Halm; in 31 conjectures have been replaced by MSS readings and in 12 readings of A have replaced those of V or of inferior MSS. The text of the *Lucullus* is closer to the text of Reid (whose arguments are often quoted) than to that of any other editor, but I have noted some 85 cases where the two editions vary; in 38 of them conjectures are replaced by MSS readings and in 24 the readings of A have replaced those of inferior MSS; in 11 cases MSS readings have been discarded in favor of

conjectures. Sixteen passages (ten of them in the *Lucullus*) are starred as being corrupt.

The editor has incorporated in the text a score or more of his own emendations. I give a few specimens: *Lucullus* 44, *convincitur* (coniungitur, MSS); 113, *hi minores* (mihi or mi minores, MSS); 124, *merus numerus* (numerus, Bentley; mens, MSS), *Timaeus* 8, *fit* (sit, MSS).

When the text differs from the best MSS and often when it differs from the editions cited, the reading adopted is supported by references to articles by modern scholars or by cross-references to Cicero's other works. Not infrequently explanatory and linguistic notes are added, e.g., p. 66 (*Paradoxa* 7), malo *masculinum;* p. 160.9 (*Timaeus* 7), *in hac formula* (i.e., de his quae diximus) *nullo fere discrimine tribus pronominibus utitur, quae sunt* hic, is, ille. When Cicero has translated from Greek sources, the original Greek, if known, is usually quoted in the notes.

The value of the work lies in the full critical apparatus and in the usually close adherence to the best MSS rather than in any notable emendations of the text. It has taken rank at once as the authoritative critical edition of this portion of Cicero's works.

FLORENCE ALDEN GRAGG

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Die Blütezeit der griechischen Kunst im Spiegel der Reliefsarkophage. Von DR. HANS WACHTLER. *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*, 272. Bändchen. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. Pp. 112. M. 1.25.

To draw in firm outlines the history of Greek sculpture down to the end of the fourth century B.C., to comment incisively upon each member of a series of illustrative monuments, never to lapse into vagueness or gush or dulness, and to keep within the limit of little more than one hundred pages—this is Dr. Wachtler's notable achievement. His booklet well deserves translation into English, all the more as information is scanty in our language regarding the objects he has chosen for detailed study, viz., the magnificent sarcophagi from Sidon, now in Constantinople, and the hardly less magnificent Fugger sarcophagus in Vienna.

F. B. TARBELL

De Lycophrone Mythographo. Dissertatio inauguralis quam ad summos in philosophia honores et amplissimo philosophorum ordine Lipsiensi rite impetrandos scripsit HORSTIUS GASSE. Leipzig: Hoffmann, 1910. Pp. 73.

Dissertations on Lycophron are few and far between, and the advent of a new one deserves more than passing notice. In Fock's *Catalogue* eight titles only, not all of which are of actual dissertations, are entered under

Lycophron's name, as compared with over 1,000 for Homer and 650 for Sophocles. Perhaps this may serve as a speaking testimonial to the relative importance of these authors. And yet there are problems enough connected with the *Alexandra* which are not bad subjects for Doctors' dissertations. There are obscure passages which need further elucidation in spite of voluminous scholia, and the investigation of sources is always a fertile field; so that the novice has ample opportunity to win his spurs.

The dissertation before us belongs to the second of the two classes just mentioned. It is an investigation of sources. Holzinger and Ciaceri have worked in this field, as well as Geffken in his *Timaios' Geographie des Westens*, Walter in a Basel dissertation of 1903 (*De Lycophrone Homeri imitatore*), and others, and the work of these predecessors has naturally had to be considered by the author. Lycophron's indebtedness to Homer is apparent to every reader of the *Alexandra* and was set forth in detail by Walter; but there is such a mixture of Homeric and post-Homeric matter that Holzinger argued that in composing his poem Lycophron introduced the myths from memory. Gasse proposes another explanation. In a word, the thesis which he attempts to establish is that the poet used a prose source for these stories, that is to say that he had before him a compendium of the myths relating to the Trojan cycle. This compendium, he argues, was based upon the epic cycle, the later epic poems, tragedies, and books pertaining to certain regions. He relies upon two arguments for his proof: (1) that while the poet narrates certain incidents at length, others which are poetic in character and would easily lend themselves to elaboration and embellishment are treated very briefly; and (2) the fact that earlier and later stories are found together. The wanderings of Odysseus, ll. 648–819, are a good example. Both of these points may be admitted and, in fact, Gasse seems to have established them by sufficient evidence; but whether they necessarily lead to the conclusion which he wishes may be questioned. The argument is, however, ingenious and well set forth and the evidence skilfully marshaled, showing a good grasp of the subject. The thesis is decidedly above the average of Doctors' dissertations and an important addition to the literature of Lycophron; but a bibliography, even if short, should have been appended. If we are not mistaken the author will be heard from later.

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Costume in Roman Comedy. By CATHERINE SAUNDERS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1909. Pp. x+145.

In this addition to the Columbia University Series of Studies in Classical Philology the writer presents, under a somewhat dubious title, a methodical investigation of the conventions of Roman comic costume. This has been based chiefly upon the comedians themselves and Bethe's photographic

reproductions of miniatures from the Ambrosian and other manuscripts of Terence (Leyden, 1903). Other minor sources specified are Pompeian wall paintings, Campanian reliefs, statuettes and Roman terra cottas, Donatus, Euanthius, Pollux, and "scattered references mainly from Roman literature." Though the term costume has been used broadly to designate "not only the actual dress of the actors, but also such other properties as have a particularly close connection with the characters under discussion," so pertinent a topic as the use of masks has, by reason of its compass, been omitted. The chapters presented deal with Sources, Terminology, Prologus, Stock-Rôles, and Unusual Rôles. Critical consideration is given to the theories of the origin of the miniatures and the period represented by them, and, while "the value of the archetype or the faithfulness of the descendants to that archetype" is questioned (p. 12), a very just refusal is accorded the extreme view of Englehardt, that a mere illustrator of the text devised the series.

However a more positive faith, at least in the value of the archetype, seems necessary to justify the sober use made of the pictures, and more effort to discover, perhaps by a comparative method, the testimony of this archetype would have been both welcome and consistent. Without full use of C and P, which are still inaccessible, though Father Ehrle of the Vatican has promised a publication of the former, it seems that critical work upon the miniatures must lack finality and real effectiveness. In the discussion of the Prologus, the writer after distinguishing the Roman and Greek types is concerned chiefly with Fabia's theory of the probable costume of the Terentian prologue-speaker. The adverse criticism of his supposition, that Prologi carried as insignia fillet-wound branches (p. 36), gains much sympathy.

The examination, however, of his other main contention, that the *ornatus prologi* of Hec. Prol. ii was the *ornatus* of the *adulescens* as a stock-rôle, seems a sophistical effort to exalt the credibility of the miniatures at the expense of the literary evidence. From the variety of prologue types shown in the former it is assumed that "absolute identity and uniformity of make-up for the Roman Prologus may easily have been a matter of indifference" (p. 38).

Other chapters present at greater length the evidence from Plautus and Terence and the miniatures for the costuming of specific rôles. The miniatures themselves are obviously responsible for the method employed, by which their testimony is subjoined rather than correlated. The list of citations, unfortunately without index, is seemingly exhaustive within the limits determined for the title and supplies in convenient and reliable form an interesting collection of scenic matter. A few errors in type I have recorded elsewhere in an earlier notice of the monograph (*Class. Weekly*, III, No. 21).

Dr. Saunders has studied the miniatures with great care and ingenious insight into their crudities and, though the result emphasizes most perhaps

between the one he has chosen and the rise of the Romance languages, and evidently regards his present paper as merely preliminary to a more important investigation. Within his field, the author has omitted Trogus-Justinus and Curtius, both of whom would have furnished him additional examples of the usages he discusses. The collection of examples from the authors employed is not exhaustive. It is not essential, perhaps, to the plan of the paper to cite all the occurrences of a given phrase in each author, but it would be desirable to know, especially in chap. i, just how complete the lists are intended to be. Sometimes all the cases are listed, sometimes only a single example is given. At least the earliest example of a given usage should be included, e.g., p. 7, Ter. *Adel.* 240, *venias in periclum*, should be inserted as a parallel for the Caesar example on p. 12; p. 19, Ter. *Adel.* 677, *advocatum venire*, should be added to the Cicero examples, and p. 9, Nepos *Dat.* 11, *in conloquium veniret*, to the Livy example.

I have noted a few slips of the pen and some typographical errors. In the quotation of Müller, p. 3, the German is bad; the citation from the *Tristia* should be 4, 10, 117 instead of 4, 10, 7, *indicem* should be read instead of *iudicem*, and quotation marks should be inserted before *ihre* and after *widerlich;* p. 7, Plaut. *Poen.* 185, read *venerit* for *venit;* p. 8, Sen. *Dial.* VI, 26, 3, read *percussoris* for *percursoris;* p. 24, Sext. Turp., insert *ire* after *ebrium;* p. 27, Verg. *Aen.* VII, 470, read *Teucris* for *Tucris;* and p. 43, Verg. *Georg.*, read 1, 29 for 129.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Mood will complete his study and so double the worth of an already valuable investigation.

CHARLES H. BEESON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Palaeographia Latina. Exempla Codicum Latinorum Phototypice Expressa Scholarum maxime in usum. Edidit MAXIMILIANUS IHM. Series I. Lipsiae: In Aedibus B. G. Teubneri. M. 5.

If the increasing number of paleographical works may be taken as an indication of the growing recognition of the importance of paleography as a subject of instruction, those who are especially interested have every reason to be satisfied. The older generation had to be content with Arndt's *Schrifttafeln* (1874), now in its fourth edition (Tangl, 1904–1907). In 1903 Steffens published the first part of his excellent *Lateinische Paläographie*, so excellent, indeed, that a second edition and a translation of the work into French soon followed. In response to frequent requests the publishers of the great Leyden series of facsimiles issued a collection containing fifty-four plates (*Album Palaeographicum*, 1909).

Inexpensive as these works are in comparison with previous publications, the cost is still a drawback. Something was wanted that was within the reach of the average student to serve as the basis for the lectures of the

instructor. It is therefore in response to an actual want that the new collection has been published.

There are 18 plates containing 25 pages from 22 manuscripts. Some of them are new, others have been published in works not generally accessible; only a few are familiar. Practically all the authors are of interest to the student of the classics, Augustine's *Homilies* and Jerome's *De viris illustribus* being the only patristic works represented. The plates are excellent; they are arranged chronologically and represent the various scripts from square capitals to the humanistic script. More than half the manuscripts are in the library at Wolfenbüttel, e.g., the *Agrimensores* (uncial), Augustine's *Homilies* (Merovingian), Isidore's *Etymologies* (Italian half-cursive), and the following minuscule MSS: *Pompei commentum artis Donati* (saec. VIII), Aurelius Victor (saec. IX), Suetonius (saec. XI), Propertius (saec. XI–XII), Martianus Capella (saec. XIII), Vegetius (saec. XIV), Juvenal (saec. XIV), Tibullus (saec. XV), the Panegyrici (saec. XV). The other libraries represented are: Berlin, Virgil ("Augusteus"); Florence, Virgil ("Mediceus"), Caesar, (Beneventine script); Bamberg, Jerome, *De viris illustribus* (half-uncial), *Scriptores historiae Augustae* ("insular"); Madrid, Isidore's *Etymologies* (Visigothic); Paris, Suetonius ("Memmianus"); Erlangen, Cicero, *De inventione* (saec. X), Isidore's *Etymologies* (saec. XII); Venice, Tacitus, *Dialogus* (saec. XV).

A booklet accompanying the plates contains a brief history, written in Latin, of the manuscripts, with a selected bibliography. There is no transcription of the text and discussion of the script.

Further series, of a more special character, are promised if the reception of the first is favorable. It is to be hoped that the untimely death of Ihm will not interfere with the project. It would be easy to combine in future issues a scientific and a practical purpose. It would be very desirable, for example, to have published a collection of plates from Spanish manuscripts no longer in Spain, to supplement the series published by Ehwald-Loewe.

CHARLES H. BEESON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

M. Tulli Ciceronis Paradoxa Stoicorum, Academicorum Reliquiae cum Lucullo, Timaeus, De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato. Fasciculus I. Ed. OTTO PLASBERG. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908. Pp. iv+196. M. 8.

The task of preparing a new (and much needed) edition of this group of Cicero's philosophical works was intrusted to Professor Plasberg by the Royal Prussian Academy fourteen years ago. The first fascicle contains the *Paradoxa*, the *Academica*, and the *Timaeus*. The *Academica* are printed in the following order: The *Varro*, or the first book of the *Academica Pos-*

teriora (the title of which, in the form *Academicus I*, has an unfamiliar look), then the fragments of Book II and part of the fragments of Book III, followed by the fragments of the *Catulus* and by the *Lucullus*. The other fragments of Book III and those of Book IV, since they are derived from the *Lucullus*, are entered as footnotes to that work on the appropriate pages. The ancient *testimonia* precede the *Academica* and also the *Timaeus*.

The distinguishing feature of this edition of the *Timaeus* is the interlinear arrangement of the Greek with the Latin text, an arrangement so convenient that it justifies the typographical difficulties it must have caused. Brackets inclose such passages of each author as are not found in the other, so that the relation of the Latin to the Greek original is easily made out.

The text of the *Paradoxa*, of the *Lucullus*, and of the *Timaeus*, like the text of earlier editions, rests primarily upon A B (Vossiani 84 and 86), and V (Vindobonensis 189). Besides these MSS the editor cites for the *Paradoxa* F (Florentinus Marcianus 257), M (Monacensis 528), Harleiani 2622 and 2682; for the *Lucullus* F, M, and, where V fails, N (Notradamensis Parisinus 17812); for the *Timaeus* F, M, L (Vossianus 10). Variants for the Greek text are occasionally cited from A, P, Y, F, and the *testimonia* of Proclus as given in Burnet's edition. For *Academicus I* some sixty MSS have been used, but the promised discussion of them has been postponed till the publication of the third fascicle, containing *De Divinatione* and *De Fato*, in order to avoid repeating the same subject-matter. Its place is taken by a brief summary (p. 33). The MSS are divided into two main classes, Δ, subdivided into "meliores," headed by Parisinus 6331 (Halm's P) and including a MS similar to Halm's V, and "deteriorum genera," including Halm's A; Γ, subdivided into "genus corruptum" and "genus interpolatum," which includes Halm's G. For further information the reader is referred to an article by Ed. Stroebel, *Philologus* 52, and to the dissertation by Otto Dieckhoff, *De Ciceronis libris de natura deorum recensendis* (Göttingen, 1894).

Besides the readings of the MSS and of the very early editions, the critical apparatus includes the readings of the editions of Halm and Baiter (1861), Baiter (1865), Müller (1878–79), and, for the *Academica*, Reid (1885). The edition of Schneider (1891) is occasionally quoted for the *Paradoxa*. The text is the most conservative that has yet appeared and the editor has done good service in relegating to the notes the greater number of the conjectures adopted by earlier editors, thus clearing the ground for further work on the text. For example I have noted in the *Paradoxa* 39 instances where the present text differs from that of Halm; in 31 conjectures have been replaced by MSS readings and in 12 readings of A have replaced those of V or of inferior MSS. The text of the *Lucullus* is closer to the text of Reid (whose arguments are often quoted) than to that of any other editor, but I have noted some 85 cases where the two editions vary; in 38 of them conjectures are replaced by MSS readings and in 24 the readings of A have replaced those of inferior MSS; in 11 cases MSS readings have been discarded in favor of

conjectures. Sixteen passages (ten of them in the *Lucullus*) are starred as being corrupt.

The editor has incorporated in the text a score or more of his own emendations. I give a few specimens: *Lucullus* 44, *convincitur* (coniungitur, MSS); 113, *hi minores* (mihi or mi minores, MSS); 124, *merus numerus* (numerus, Bentley; mens, MSS), *Timaeus* 8, *fit* (sit, MSS).

When the text differs from the best MSS and often when it differs from the editions cited, the reading adopted is supported by references to articles by modern scholars or by cross-references to Cicero's other works. Not infrequently explanatory and linguistic notes are added, e.g., p. 66 (*Paradoxa* 7), malo *masculinum;* p. 160.9 (*Timaeus* 7), *in hac formula* (i.e., de his quae diximus) *nullo fere discrimine tribus pronominibus utitur, quae sunt* hic, is, ille. When Cicero has translated from Greek sources, the original Greek, if known, is usually quoted in the notes.

The value of the work lies in the full critical apparatus and in the usually close adherence to the best MSS rather than in any notable emendations of the text. It has taken rank at once as the authoritative critical edition of this portion of Cicero's works.

FLORENCE ALDEN GRAGG

SMITH COLLEGE

Die Blütezeit der griechischen Kunst im Spiegel der Reliefsarkophage. Von DR. HANS WACHTLER. *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*, 272. Bändchen. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. Pp. 112. M. 1.25.

To draw in firm outlines the history of Greek sculpture down to the end of the fourth century B.C., to comment incisively upon each member of a series of illustrative monuments, never to lapse into vagueness or gush or dulness, and to keep within the limit of little more than one hundred pages—this is Dr. Wachtler's notable achievement. His booklet well deserves translation into English, all the more as information is scanty in our language regarding the objects he has chosen for detailed study, viz., the magnificent sarcophagi from Sidon, now in Constantinople, and the hardly less magnificent Fugger sarcophagus in Vienna.

F. B. TARBELL

De Lycophrone Mythographo. Dissertatio inauguralis quam ad summos in philosophia honores et amplissimo philosophorum ordine Lipsiensi rite impetrandos scripsit HORSTIUS GASSE. Leipzig: Hoffmann, 1910. Pp. 73.

Dissertations on Lycophron are few and far between, and the advent of a new one deserves more than passing notice. In Fock's *Catalogue* eight titles only, not all of which are of actual dissertations, are entered under

Lycophron's name, as compared with over 1,000 for Homer and 650 for Sophocles. Perhaps this may serve as a speaking testimonial to the relative importance of these authors. And yet there are problems enough connected with the *Alexandra* which are not bad subjects for Doctors' dissertations. There are obscure passages which need further elucidation in spite of voluminous scholia, and the investigation of sources is always a fertile field; so that the novice has ample opportunity to win his spurs.

The dissertation before us belongs to the second of the two classes just mentioned. It is an investigation of sources. Holzinger and Ciaceri have worked in this field, as well as Geffken in his *Timaios' Geographie des Westens*, Walter in a Basel dissertation of 1903 (*De Lycophrone Homeri imitatore*), and others, and the work of these predecessors has naturally had to be considered by the author. Lycophron's indebtedness to Homer is apparent to every reader of the *Alexandra* and was set forth in detail by Walter; but there is such a mixture of Homeric and post-Homeric matter that Holzinger argued that in composing his poem Lycophron introduced the myths from memory. Gasse proposes another explanation. In a word, the thesis which he attempts to establish is that the poet used a prose source for these stories, that is to say that he had before him a compendium of the myths relating to the Trojan cycle. This compendium, he argues, was based upon the epic cycle, the later epic poems, tragedies, and books pertaining to certain regions. He relies upon two arguments for his proof: (1) that while the poet narrates certain incidents at length, others which are poetic in character and would easily lend themselves to elaboration and embellishment are treated very briefly; and (2) the fact that earlier and later stories are found together. The wanderings of Odysseus, ll. 648–819, are a good example. Both of these points may be admitted and, in fact, Gasse seems to have established them by sufficient evidence; but whether they necessarily lead to the conclusion which he wishes may be questioned. The argument is, however, ingenious and well set forth and the evidence skilfully marshaled, showing a good grasp of the subject. The thesis is decidedly above the average of Doctors' dissertations and an important addition to the literature of Lycophron; but a bibliography, even if short, should have been appended. If we are not mistaken the author will be heard from later.

WILLIAM N. BATES

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Costume in Roman Comedy. By CATHERINE SAUNDERS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1909. Pp. x+145.

In this addition to the Columbia University Series of Studies in Classical Philology the writer presents, under a somewhat dubious title, a methodical investigation of the conventions of Roman comic costume. This has been based chiefly upon the comedians themselves and Bethe's photographic

reproductions of miniatures from the Ambrosian and other manuscripts of Terence (Leyden, 1903). Other minor sources specified are Pompeian wall paintings, Campanian reliefs, statuettes and Roman terra cottas, Donatus, Euanthius, Pollux, and "scattered references mainly from Roman literature." Though the term costume has been used broadly to designate "not only the actual dress of the actors, but also such other properties as have a particularly close connection with the characters under discussion," so pertinent a topic as the use of masks has, by reason of its compass, been omitted. The chapters presented deal with Sources, Terminology, Prologus, Stock-Rôles, and Unusual Rôles. Critical consideration is given to the theories of the origin of the miniatures and the period represented by them, and, while "the value of the archetype or the faithfulness of the descendants to that archetype" is questioned (p. 12), a very just refusal is accorded the extreme view of Englehardt, that a mere illustrator of the text devised the series.

However a more positive faith, at least in the value of the archetype, seems necessary to justify the sober use made of the pictures, and more effort to discover, perhaps by a comparative method, the testimony of this archetype would have been both welcome and consistent. Without full use of C and P, which are still inaccessible, though Father Ehrle of the Vatican has promised a publication of the former, it seems that critical work upon the miniatures must lack finality and real effectiveness. In the discussion of the Prologus, the writer after distinguishing the Roman and Greek types is concerned chiefly with Fabia's theory of the probable costume of the Terentian prologue-speaker. The adverse criticism of his supposition, that Prologi carried as insignia fillet-wound branches (p. 36), gains much sympathy.

The examination, however, of his other main contention, that the *ornatus prologi* of Hec. Prol. ii was the *ornatus* of the *adulescens* as a stock-rôle, seems a sophistical effort to exalt the credibility of the miniatures at the expense of the literary evidence. From the variety of prologue types shown in the former it is assumed that "absolute identity and uniformity of make-up for the Roman Prologus may easily have been a matter of indifference" (p. 38).

Other chapters present at greater length the evidence from Plautus and Terence and the miniatures for the costuming of specific rôles. The miniatures themselves are obviously responsible for the method employed, by which their testimony is subjoined rather than correlated. The list of citations, unfortunately without index, is seemingly exhaustive within the limits determined for the title and supplies in convenient and reliable form an interesting collection of scenic matter. A few errors in type I have recorded elsewhere in an earlier notice of the monograph (*Class. Weekly*, III, No. 21).

Dr. Saunders has studied the miniatures with great care and ingenious insight into their crudities and, though the result emphasizes most perhaps

their many inconsistencies and consequent negative value for the purpose in hand, her scholarly analysis of their characteristics is an essential contribution to the perplexing problem of their status.

JOHN W. BASORE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Zum Alexandrinischen Antisemitismus. Von ULRICH WILCKEN. (Des XXVII. Bandes der Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Königlichen-Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, No. XXIII.) Leipzig: Bei B. G. Teubner, 1909. Pp. 59. M. 2.40.

Wilcken has collected and discussed a number of documents relating to anti-Jewish feeling and demonstrations in the first and second centuries. An interesting series of texts is included, reporting trials and convictions of Alexandrians (Isidorus, Lampo, Appianus) before various emperors. These are interpreted by Wilcken as relating to Alexandrian Jewish-Hellenic controversies which being carried to Rome resulted disastrously for the anti-Semitic party. Wilcken holds, as formerly, that these so-called Acts of Martyrdom represent a novel type of Alexandrian literature, based upon official sources, but worked up for partisan purposes. The whole makes a very significant group of texts, and Wilcken's interpretation of them is striking and suggestive, if not in all points convincing.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Corpus Medicorum Graecorum auspiciis Academiarum associatarum ediderunt Academiae Berolinensis Hauniensis Lipsiensis. X, 1.1: Philumeni De Venenatis Animalibus eorumque Remediis e codice Vaticano primum edidit MAXIMILIANUS WELLMANN. Lipsiae et Berolini: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, MCMVIII.

The editor of this recently discovered text is the author of *Die pneumatische Schule bis auf Archigenes in ihrer Entwickelung dargestellt* (Berlin, 1895) and of many articles on the Greek physicians published in *Hermes* and in the journals of the learned societies. He is eminently fitted to write with authority upon his subject, Greek medicine, and in the present instance has performed his duties as editor in praiseworthy fashion.

As he says in his preface, Wellmann chanced upon the treatise *De venenatis animalibus* in the spring of 1907 in Cod. gr. 284 (s. XI) of the Vatican library. The contents of this manuscript, which seems to have

been designed as a convenient collection of authorities on medicaments, includes, first, books vi–xi of Galen's *περὶ κράσεως καὶ δυνάμεως τῶν ἁπλῶν φαρμάκων*, so interpolated from the *περὶ ὕλης ἰατρικῆς* of Dioscurides as to fill out the subjects not treated by Galen; second, the pseudo-Dioscuridean *περὶ δηλητηρίων φαρμάκων*; third, on foll. 264*v*–288*v*, the present treatise; the last two leaves are filled with miscellaneous excerpts. The manuscript was copied by an uneducated scribe.

Wellmann has supplemented the short discussion in the preface of his edition by an article in *Hermes* ("Philumenus," *Hermes* xliii. 374 ff.), in which he has more carefully traced the relations between Philumenus and later writers. Aside from the fact that hitherto Philumenus was known to us only as he was cited, the great value of the present discovery lies in the care that he generally takes to name the authorities from whom he draws, for Philumenus was a compiler rather than an originator. Chief of these is Archigenes, who Wellmann thinks was used even more than the actual citations show, and whose method of presenting the subject Philumenus follows. Other sources are Apollonius, Herophileus, Theodorus, Soranus, and Strato. Galen is not cited, and it is therefore conjectured that Philumenus was his contemporary and is to be dated about 180 A.D. Later writers, namely Aëtius Amidenus (sixth century) in his lib. xxiii. 1–44, Paulus Aegineta (seventh century) in his *Compendium de Re Medica* v. 1–26, and the pseudo-Dioscurides (seventh century) in the *περὶ ἰοβόλων*, depend largely upon Philumenus, but in his *Hermes* article Wellmann adopts the view that all these citations come through the medium of the *Συναγωγαὶ ἰατρικαὶ πρὸς Ἰουλιανόν* of Oribasius, a considerable portion of which has been lost. Wellmann has been able, in editing the text, to use the portions of these later writers which are clearly dependent upon Philumenus. Inasmuch as the accounts in Aëtius, Paulus, and pseudo-Dioscurides are frequently fuller than those in Philumenus himself, it may be inferred that the latter has been purposely condensed for use in the compilation.

The treatise itself deals with the bites of venomous animals. The author generally presents a short description of each creature, follows this with an account of the symptoms attendant upon the wound which it inflicts, and finally enumerates the antidotes, often naming the physician from whose writings they are taken. The first five sections are occupied with the discussion of wounds inflicted by mad dogs, after which he treats of the various kinds of serpents, the wasp, bee, and spider, lizards, and other poisonous creatures. Indices of words and of writers will increase the value of the text for the ordinary classicist, while for the specialist in this field its interest will be extreme. I have noted the following misprints: p. 18. 20, *γύρον* for *γῦρον*; p. 37. 21, *δηχθάντις* for *δηχθάντες*.

FRANK E. ROBBINS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Νέαι Ἑρμενεῖαι Ἀναγλύφων. By ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ Ν. ΣΒΟΡΩΝΟΣ. Athens: Ἡ ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἑλληνικὴ Ἐκδοτικὴ Ἑταιρεία, 1910.

Some years ago Professor Svoronos, one of the most brilliant of archaeologists, conceived the magnificent plan of publishing, with photographic reproductions, full explanatory and critical text, and complete bibliography, every piece of work of Hellenic antiquity preserved in the National Museum in Athens. This monumental work, in quarto form beautifully executed, is to appear in Greek and German at the same time, bearing the titles Τὸ ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἐθνικὸν Μουσεῖον, *respective, Das Athener National Museum.* Sixteen fascicules have already appeared, each containing at least twenty-four pages of text and ten photographic plates. Under the title given above the publishers have sent out selections from the numbers already published. They comprise illuminating discussions, in the author's brilliant style, of half a dozen votive reliefs and, as *pièce de resistance,* an account of his remarkable discoveries at Colonus Hill. Following an old clue given by Professor Kastriotes he found under a cottage on the southeast slope of the hill the opening of a deep chasm which he identified as the entrance to the subterranean dwelling of the August Ones. When in Athens last summer, I had the good fortune to be directed to this same house; Mme. Loukisa very kindly opened her home to me and permitted me to explore her cellar *ad libitum.* I found there a great hole, which might be the entrance to a deeper chasm. But I failed, through my own inability to see, perhaps, to discover that deeper "chasm into which one can make one's way for a distance of many meters without finding the end." We shall hope to see soon the excavations completed that Svoronos proposes to institute, that the shrine of the August Goddesses may become a place of pilgrimage for all who love the poet of Colonus Hill. The simple fifth- and fourth-century reliefs, with their representations of Heracles at the Gate of Hades, that led to this full discussion of Colonus and the Academy and their heroes and shrines will have a new and larger influence from henceforth.

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

Κρίσις τῆς Πλατωνικῆς Ἐκδόσεως τῆς ὑπὸ ΣΠ. Μωραΐτου. By ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ Κ. ΓΑΡΔΙΚΑΣ. Athens: Sakellarios, 1908. Pp. 72.

One of the striking features of the Hellenic spirit of today is the ambition of the Greek who has made a fortune at home or abroad to make that fortune a blessing to his people. An Ἀβερώφ builds a stadium; a Σαγγρῆς builds schools in every quarter of his kingdom; a Βαλλιανός erects a library, a Συγγρός a museum. In like generosity of spirit the Zographos Library was founded by the man whose name it bears for the publication of classical

Greek texts. In this Zographos Series not long since appeared the first volume of Plato: Introduction, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Gorgias*, by Sp. Moraïtes. This new Plato has met with a warm reception at the hands of M. Gardikas, a classical docent in the University of Athens, who assails it at a thousand vulnerable points. Moraïtes' modern Greek, both in point of style and syntax and orthography, he finds faulty to a degree unpardonable in a philologist. And as an interpreter of Plato the editor fails utterly to satisfy his critic; he understands neither Plato's words nor his grammar nor his ideas. Moraïtes' textual criticism fares no better at his critic's hands. Gardikas even accuses him of misappropriation of the work of other editors and interpreters of Plato. Gardikas closes his monograph with some wholesome advice to the older scholar for the improvement of the later volumes upon the first.

The critique appears a little too polemical and severe. But the criticisms are not general, but backed up with copious examples and citations by page and line. There are many points of criticism that the reviewer would like to take up in detail; but this is not our fight.

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

Culti e Miti nella Storia dell'Antica Sicilia. By EMMANUELE CIACERI. Catania: Battiato, 1911. Pp. x+324.

In this work we have gathered together in finished form, but with much additional material, the results of many separate studies by Ciaceri upon Sicilian cults and myths. The evidence from literature, from epigraphy, from archaeology, and especially from numismatics has been carefully collected and studied. Valuable too is the study of the survivals of antique ritual and beliefs in certain contemporary Sicilian festivals of the Catholic saints; such for example as the *festa* of Saint Agata, a clear survival of the *Isidis Navigium*, still celebrated at Catania on March 5.

The work falls into five chapters: i, "Culti indigeni ellenizati"; ii, "Miti e culti di carattere apparentemente orientale"; iii, "Le grandi divinità greco-romane"; iv, "Le divinità minori"; v, "Eroi e personaggi mitici"; and an index. To the reviewer these chapters appear of somewhat uneven merit. The treatment of the indigenous cults is sane and conservative. Only the cults of Ἀδρανός, the παλικοί, Δάφνις, πεδιοκράτης, and Ἔρυξ (*sic*) are demonstrably indigenous. Chap. ii, a good piece of destructive criticism, reduces the Phoenician element in the religion of the Sicilians to a minimum. It should serve as a corrective to the overemphasis on this element by Holm and Freeman. Especially convincing is the treatment of the Heracles myth, which Ciaceri rightly believes represents a Boeotian-Argive influence. In the chapter on the Greco-Roman divinities the author rightly lays stress on the position of Rhodes as the original seat for Sicilian cults

such as Ζεὺς Ἀταβύριος, Ἀπόλλων Καρνεῖος, Δημήτηρ and Κόρη, and upon the position of Syracuse and Gela as disseminating centers. The treatment of the cult of Δημήτηρ and Κόρη deserves special mention. Here, however, it would have been well to have set forth more fully the influence of the Sicilian cult upon that of *Ceres*, *Liber*, and *Libera* at Rome (cf. Wissowa *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 246). The relation between the θεογάμια and the *sacrum anniversarium Cereris* seems reasonably sure. The combination by which Ciaceri reconstructs the features of the festival of Ἄρτεμις ἄγγελλος is ingenious and convincing. On the other hand, chaps. iv and v, while valuable as containing convenient narrative summaries of the dispersion of the worship of the minor divinities and the heroes, do not give such clear evidence of independence and conservatism. The treatment of Daphnis, for example, is very slight, not to say sketchy. The author is unacquainted with the excellent study of the Daphnis myth by H. W. Prescott, *Harvard Studies*, Vol. X.

In general, the reviewer has felt that Ciaceri at times has allowed his usually conservative scholarship to be led astray in two directions. On the one hand, we have too persistent an adherence to nature-personifications as the universal solvent for all mythological phenomena. Cf. the treatment of the legend of the *fratres pii* for an example. Again, Ciaceri is led astray by his fondness for conjectural combinations—the besetting sin of all mythographers, ancient and modern. Many scholars will be unable to assent to the attempt to show a relationship between γρεᾶτις, γέρρα: γελεᾶτις, γαλεῶτις, pp. 18, 19. Again on p. 177, even though the current explanations of the epithet βαιῶτις as referring to the ears of Aphrodite, or as showing some connection with the fish βαιών are rejected, one may hesitate on historical grounds to believe in the transfer of this cult from the Campanian Baiae to Syracuse. On p. 183, to infer from ἐπὶ ἱεροθύτα the existence of a cult of Hestia at Agrigentum is inadmissable, for ἱεροθύτης (cf. Stengl *Kultusaltertümer*, p. 46) is a generic term for a sacrificing priest. Other examples might be cited, but these will be sufficient to indicate that, as in all mythographic works, the conclusions of this useful and valuable study must be carefully tested.

GEORGE CONVERSE FISKE

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Adnotationes super Lucanum primum ad vetustissimorum codicum fidem edidit JOHANNES ENDT. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909. Pp. xi+445.

Of the two classes of *scholia* on the *Pharsalia*, the so-called *Commenta*—extracts and comments without the text of the poet—and the *Adnotationes*, the former existing in complete form only in the codex Bernensis 370 (C),

has long ago in Usener's *M. Annaei Lucani Commenta Bernensia* (Leipzig, 1869) received scholarly publication. The part of this commentary which also appears in another Berne manuscript (B) has been collated by Hagen (*N.J.* 131, 277).

The *Adnotationes* have heretofore been available only in the ancient, partial publication of Oudendorp (1728) and the *farrago* of *scholia*, drawn in part from the former, which Weber supplies in the third volume of his edition of Lucan (Leipzig, 1831). The miscellaneous and uncritical character of these has long been recognized, and the timely task of supplying a new text, based on fuller and more reliable manuscript authority, has fallen to the judicious care of Professor Endt. A thorough consideration of the relative value of the several manuscripts in which the *scholia* appear, in whole or in part, results in the discrimination of an original and a revised form, and the selection of the five manuscripts of the better class (W, C, U, G, P), dating from the tenth to the twelfth century, as the basis of the present text. The revisions of the *Adnotationes* and other *scholia*, which appear in five inferior manuscripts, have been collected and, it is intimated (p. ix), will be published. The deficiency of such an authoritative apparatus is easily discernible in the critical editions of Lucan by Hosius and Francken. The latter knew at first hand those in two Leyden manuscripts (V and U), one of which (V) Endt considers of inferior value (p. ix). The readings of the *scholia*, available to Hosius through Usener, appear in his *apparatus criticus* under (A), but by reason, no doubt, of their limited authority are in repeated instances widely discrepant (e.g., i. 35; i. 402; iii. 39; iv. 199).

To institute a general comparison with Weber's notes would be a bootless task, but it may be observed that his medley at i. 427, which includes the Ciceronian fragment from the *pro Scauro* and supplies Müller's text for it, is reduced in the present edition to: Arvernique—de his Cicero ait in Scauriana "Inventi sunt, qui etiam fratres populi Romani nominarentur," with no variants for *Arverni* (*Alverni*, Weber). Whether the scholiast sins against Cicero, in confusing the Arverni with the Aedui, or whether by bona fide citation he relieves Lucan of one of his many sins against history, neither Francken nor Haskins takes the trouble to consider. A commentary on the infallibility of the commentator will be his blundering assignment of "*Phaselus ille*," etc. (Cat. 4.1), to Plautus at v. 518, and a line of his own poet (i. 230) to Vergil at viii. 380.

The notes are brief in form and are concerned with the usual commonplaces of historical and geographical comment, free illustration from other authors, and the citation of variant readings, in which particular they will doubtless be considered to have most value, though Francken confesses "raro inveni quod ad emendationem posset adhiberi." The source of these, at least for the recension W U C, the editor refers (p. xi) to the grammarian Vacca, the admiring biographer and expositor of Lucan. In the uncertainty of his date it is clear from the citation (vii. 471) from Livy's narrative of

the Civil War and two other references to it (x. 471; x. 521) that the original commentary antedates, at any rate, the loss of these books.

The volume contains, besides the *scholia*, the *Vita Lucani* professedly drawn from Vacca, an outline, *De bello civili inter Caesarem et Pompeium*, *Argumenta* before books i, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, and *Periochae* before books ii, iii, iv, x.

As *corrigenda* I note *auctorn on* for *auctor non* (i. 24), and in the *lemma* of i. 260, *I*, apparently, for *T*.

The editor has appended serviceable indices and on the whole has contributed with fidelity a text of ancient *scholia* which may in authority rank with the admirable Donatus of Wessner.

JOHN W. BASORE

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Textes grecs inédits de la collection papyrologique de Genève. Par JULES NICOLE. Avec VI planches. Mémoire publié à l'occasion du Jubilé de l'Université, 1559–1909. Genève: Georg, 1909. Pp. 49.

Of the eight Greek texts which Professor Nicole publishes, six are from papyri, one from a parchment fragment, and one from a wax tablet. The earliest form a group of three documents relating to the circumcision of priests in Egypt. These date from the reign of Antoninus, and help to augment the papyrus literature on this subject, which already includes documents at Berlin and Strassburg and from Tebtunis. The wax tablet belongs to the sixth century and preserves Ps. 91:1–7, 10–13, in the Septuagint version. But Professor Nicole's most considerable texts are fragments from Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*, from Thucydides, book ii, and from Demosthenes' First Philippic. These papyri range from the second to the fifth centuries and help to carry back the manuscript tradition of these important works into antiquity. To the four columns of the Aeschines, Professor Nicole appends a collation with the text of Blass. The papyrus is in general agreement with the better class of Aeschines manuscripts. A full series of excellent facsimiles adds greatly to the value of Professor Nicole's volume.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Griechische Papyri im Museum des Oberhessischen Geschichtsvereins zu Giessen. Im Verein mit O. EGER herausgegeben und erklärt von ERNST KORNEMANN und PAUL M. MEYER. Band I, Heft 2, von PAUL M. MEYER. Urkunden No. 36–57, mit 3 Lichtdrucktafeln. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. Pp. 104. M. 8.

The first part of the Giessen papyri to be published contains twenty-two documents from the Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine periods, edited

with full introductions and commentaries by Paul Meyer. The earliest are Greek translations of demotic contracts from the reigns of Euergetes II and Epiphanes. Of the Roman documents the most considerable are three decrees of Caracalla, the first of which preserves the text of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* by which the rights of Roman citizenship were extended to the *peregrini* of the empire. The limitations under which this was done are at last made clear by this text, which should take an important place among Roman historical documents. The second decree preserves a supplement to the well-known amnesty proclaimed in February, 212. The indices are reserved for the third and concluding part of the volume.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Natursagen. Eine Sammlung naturdeutender Sagen, Märchen, Fabeln, und Legenden. Herausgegeben von OSKAR DÄHNHARDT. Band II: "Sagen zum Neuen Testament." Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1909. Pp. xvi+316.

Tennyson's

> Glastonbury, where the winter thorn
> Blossoms at Christmas, mindful of Our Lord,

and his "passion flower at the gate" well illustrate the kind of folk-tales Dähnhardt has collected. That widespread popular tendency, half faith, half fancy, to interpret the everyday phenomena of nature in terms of religion and religious history, as men understood them, has produced an extraordinary mass of legend of curious interest. In many of these, no doubt, ideas really pagan have been given a Christian turn. Others reflect well-known incidents in the narratives of Jesus' infancy, especially those preserved in the apocryphal gospels, e.g., of Thomas and James, to the wide influence of which these legends bear striking testimony. A favorite expression of this religious fancy was the naming of trees and plants, or perhaps only the explanation of an existing name, from an imaginary connection with gospel or apostolic history, real or apocryphal. The Judas tree is a familiar example. Peter is, of course, a leading figure. The fish which was to enable him to pay the temple tax is variously identified in Italy, Sicily, Flanders, and Russia. The keys of heaven once dropped from Peter's hands upon the earth, and where they fell, the primrose (*Schlüsselblume*) sprang up. Cursing plays a larger part than blessing in these stories: children are cursed by Jesus; Jews are turned to swine by St. Hubert; the annoying mule in the inn stable is cursed by Mary. The mediaeval mind, it would seem, found cursing more edifying, or at least more congenial, than blessing. The great majority of the tales have little charm or force, but they are redeemed by a small number in which native wit or real religious feeling finds quaint

expression. The editor and his collaborators have gathered them from a wide range. Not only every part of Europe, but Malta, Palestine, Iceland, and the East Indies have made their contribution. The legends and sayings are compactly presented in German, with variant forms, if such exist, and full references to the sources. There is an extended bibliography, and an index makes the book easy of consultation.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Zum aegyptischen Grundbuchwesen in römischer Zeit. Untersuchungen auf Grund der griechischen Papyri. Von OTTO EGER, DR. JUR. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. Pp. viii+212. $1.67.

The Greek papyri discovered in such abundance in Egypt in recent years have thrown much light upon many phases of Egyptian life under the Ptolemies and the Roman Empire. A great many of them relate to the somewhat intricate system of land tenure under which the soil of Egypt was tilled so advantageously to the Empire. Eger has examined a wide range of published papyri in the effort to elicit their testimony as to this land system, particularly as reflected in the land registries which played an important part in it under the Romans. In these record offices (*βιβλιοθῆκαι*) were preserved documents establishing the legal status of every piece of land within their jurisdiction. The Romans had inherited from the Ptolemaic administration of Egypt an extended classification of lands: *γῆ βασιλική* or *δημοσία*, *γῆ οὐσιακή*, *γῆ ἱερά*, *γῆ προσόδου*, *γῆ ἰδιωτική*, and *κατοικικὸς κλῆρος*. Obviously much of this land was hardly subject to sale, but everything relating to the private and catoecic lands—mortgages, purchases, inheritances, or other transfers—had to be reported to the *βιβλιοφύλακες* for record. In the *βιβλιοθήκη* the legal situation of each parcel was thus steadily reflected. The details of these situations are carefully worked out by Eger on the basis of some 600 papyri, mostly of the Roman period. A valuable feature in the Roman land-office was its accessibility to private persons, who might thus satisfy themselves as to the condition of a piece of property before leasing or purchasing it on what might have proved false representations. The land-office was thus quite as truly a benefit to the individual as to the state. Eger has made a thorough and accurate study of his materials, and his work illustrates the way in which the now multiplying papyri illumine ancient life. An index would have added much to the usefulness of the book.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Classical Philology

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THE ORIGIN OF THE REALISTIC ROMANCE AMONG THE ROMANS

BY FRANK FROST ABBOTT

One of the most fascinating and tantalizing problems of literary history concerns the origin of prose fiction among the Romans. We can trace the growth of the epic from its infancy in the third century before Christ as it develops in strength in the poems of Naevius, Ennius, and Cicero until it reaches its full stature in the *Aeneid*, and then we can see the decline of its vigor in the *Pharsalia*, the *Punica*, the *Thebais*, and *Achilleis*, until it practically dies a natural death in the mythological and historical poems of Claudian. The way also in which tragedy, comedy, lyric poetry, history, biography, and the other types of literature in prose and verse came into existence and developed among the Romans can be followed with reasonable success. But the origin and early history of the novel is involved in obscurity. The great realistic romance of Petronius of the first century of our era is without a legally recognized ancestor, and has no direct descendant. The situation is the more surprising when we recall its probable size in its original form. Of course only a part of it has come down to us, some one hundred and ten pages in all. Its great size probably proved fatal to its preservation in its complete form, or at least contributed to that end, for it has been estimated that it ran from six hundred to nine hundred pages, being longer therefore than the average novel of Dickens and Scott. Consequently we are not dealing with a bit of ephemeral literature, but with an elaborate

composition of a high degree of excellence, behind which we should expect to find a long line of development. We are puzzled not so much by the utter absence of anything in the way of prose fiction before the time of Petronius as by the difficulty of establishing any satisfactory logical connection between earlier forms of literature and the romance of Petronius. We are bewildered, in fact, by the various possibilities which the situation presents. The work shows points of similarity with several antecedent forms of composition, but the gaps which lie in any assumed line of descent are so great as to make us question its correctness.

If we call to mind the present condition of this romance and those characteristic features of it which are pertinent to the question at issue, the nature of the problem and its difficulty also will be apparent at once. Out of the original work, in a rather fragmentary form, only four or five main episodes are extant, one of which is the brilliant story of the Dinner of Trimalchio. The action takes place for the most part in southern Italy, and the principal characters are freedmen who have made their fortunes and degenerate freemen who are picking up a precarious living by their wits. The freemen, who are the central figures in the novel, are involved in a great variety of experiences, most of them of a disgraceful sort, and the story is a story of low life. Women play an important rôle in the narrative, more important perhaps than they do in any other kind of ancient literature—at least their individuality is more marked. The efficient motif is erotic. I say the efficient, because the conventional motif which seems to account for all the misadventures of the anti-hero Encolpius is the wrath of an offended deity. A great part of the book has an atmosphere of satire about it which piques our curiosity and baffles us at the same time, because it is hard to say how much of this element is inherent in the subject itself and how much of it lies in the intention of the author. It is the characteristic of parvenu society to imitate smart society to the best of its ability, and its social functions are a parody of the like events in the upper set. The story of a dinner party, for instance, given by such a *nouveau riche* as Trimalchio would constantly remind us by its likeness and its unlikeness, by its sins of omission and commission, of a similar event in correct society. In other words it would be a parody

on a proper dinner, even if the man who described the event knew nothing about the usages of good society, and with no ulterior motive in mind set down accurately the doings of his upstart characters. For instance, when Trimalchio's chef has three white pigs driven into the dining-room for the ostensible purpose of allowing the guests to pick one out for the next course, with the memory of our own monkey breakfasts and horseback dinners in mind, we may feel that this is a not improbable attempt on the part of a Roman parvenu to imitate his betters in giving a dinner somewhat out of the ordinary. Members of the smart set at Rome try to impress their guests by the value and weight of their silver plate. Why shouldn't the host of our story adopt the more direct and effective way of accomplishing the same object by having the weight of silver engraved on each article? He does so. It is a very natural thing for him to do. In good society they talk of literature and art. Why isn't it natural for Trimalchio to turn the conversation into the same channels, even if he does make Hannibal take Troy and does confuse the epic heroes and some late champions of the gladiatorial ring? In other words, much of that which is satirical in the *Satirae* of Petronius is so only because we are setting up in our minds a comparison between the doings of these rich freedmen and the requirements of good taste and moderation. But it seems possible to detect a satirical or a cynical purpose on the part of the author carried farther than is involved in the choice of his subject and the realistic presentation of his characters. Petronius seems to delight in putting his most admirable sentiments in the mouths of contemptible characters. Some of the best literary criticism we have of the period he presents through the medium of the parasite rhetorician Agamemnon. That happy phrase characterizing Horace's style, "curiosa felicitas," which has perhaps never been equaled in its brevity and appositeness, is coined by the incorrigible poetaster Eumolpus. It is he too who composes and recites the two rather brilliant epic poems incorporated into the *Satirae*, one of which is received with a shower of stones by the bystanders. The impassioned eulogy of the careers of Democritus, Chrysippus, Lysippus, and Myron, who had endured hunger, pain, and weariness of body and mind for the sake of science, art, and the good of their fellow-men, and the diatribe against the pursuit of material comforts

and pleasure which characterized the people of his own time are put in the mouth of the same *roué* Eumolpus. These situations have the true Horatian humor about them. The most serious and systematic discourse which Horace has given us, in his *Satires*, on the art of living comes from the crack-brained Damasippus, who has made a failure of his own life. In another of his poems, after having set forth at great length the weaknesses of his fellow-mortals, Horace himself is convicted of being inconsistent, a slave to his passions, and a victim of hot temper by his own slave Davus. We are reminded again of the literary method of Horace in his *Satires* when we read the dramatic description of the shipwreck in Petronius. The blackness of night descends upon the water; the little bark which contains the hero and his friends is at the mercy of the sea; Lichas, the master of the vessel, is swept from the deck by a wave; Encolpius and his comrade Giton prepare to die in each other's embrace, but the tragic scene ends with a ridiculous picture of Eumolpus bellowing out above the roar of the storm a new poem which he is setting down upon a huge piece of parchment. Evidently Petronius has the same dread of being taken too seriously which Horace shows so often in his *Satires*. The cynical, or at least unmoral, attitude of Petronius is brought out in a still more marked way at the close of this same passage. Of those upon the ill-fated ship the degenerates Encolpius, Giton, and Eumolpus, who have wronged Lichas irreparably, escape, while the pious Lichas meets a horrible death. All this seems to make it clear that not only does the subject which Petronius has treated inevitably involve a satire upon contemporary society, but that the author takes a satirical or cynical attitude toward life.

Another characteristic of the story is its realism. There are no marvelous adventures, and in fact no improbable incidents in it. The author never obtrudes his own personality upon us, as his successor Apuleius sometimes does, or as Thackeray has done. We know what the people in the story are like, not from the author's description of them, but from their actions, from the subjects about which they talk, and from the way in which they talk. Agamemnon converses as a rhetorician might talk, Habinnas like a millionaire stone-cutter, and Echion like a rag-dealer, and their language and style is what we should expect from men of their standing in society

and of their occupations. The conversations of Trimalchio and his freedmen guests are not witty, and their jests are not clever. This adherence to the true principles of realism is the more noteworthy in the case of so brilliant a writer as Petronius, and those of us who recall some of the preternaturally clever conversations in the pages of Henry James and other contemporary novelists may feel that in this respect he is a truer artist than they are.

One other characteristic of the novel of Petronius must be noted in this connection. It is cast in the prose-poetic form, that is, passages in verse are inserted here and there in the narrative. In a few cases they are quoted, but for the most part they are the original compositions of the novelist. They range in length from couplets to poems of three hundred lines. Sometimes they form an integral part of the narrative, or again they illustrate a point, elaborate an idea in poetry, or are exercises in verse.

We have tried to bring out the characteristic features of this romance in order that we may see what the essential elements are of the problem which faces one in attempting to explain the origin of the type of literature represented by the work of Petronius. What was there in antecedent literature which will help us to understand the appearance on Italian soil in the first century of our era of a long erotic story of adventure, dealing in a realistic way with every-day life, marked by a satirical tone, and with a leaning toward the form of the *prosimetrum*? This is the question raised by the analysis of the characteristics of the story which we have made above. We have no ambitious hope of solving it, yet the mere statement of a puzzling but interesting problem is stimulating to the imagination and the intellect, and I am tempted to take up the subject because the discovery of certain papyri in Egypt within recent years has led to the formulation of a new theory of the origin of the romance of perilous adventure, and may, therefore, throw some light on the source of our realistic novel of everyday life. My purpose, then, is to speak briefly of the different genres of literature of the earlier period with which the story of Petronius may stand in some direct relation, or from which the suggestion may have come to Petronius for his work. Several of these lines of possible descent have been skilfully traced by others. In their views here and there I have made

some modifications, and I have called attention to one or two types of literature, belonging to the earlier period and heretofore unnoticed in this connection, which may help us to understand the appearance of the realistic novel.

It seems a far cry from this story of sordid motives and vulgar action to the heroic episodes of epic poetry, and yet the *Satirae* contain not a few more or less direct suggestions of epic situations and characters. The conventional *motif* of the story of Petronius is the wrath of an offended deity. The narrative in the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid* rests on the same basis. The ship of their enemy Lichas on which Encolpius and his companions are cooped up reminds them of the cave of the Cyclops; Giton hiding from the town crier under a mattress is compared to Ulysses underneath the sheep and clinging to its wool to escape the eye of the Cyclops, while the woman whose charms engage the attention of Encolpius at Croton bears the name of Circe. It seems to be clear from these reminiscences that Petronius had the epic in mind when he wrote his story, and his novel may well be a direct or an indirect parody of an epic narrative. Rohde in his analysis of the serious Greek romance of the centuries subsequent to Petronius has postulated the following development for that form of story: Travelers returning from remote parts of the world told remarkable stories of their experiences. Some of these stories took a literary form in the *Odyssey* and the *Tales of the Argonauts*. They appeared in prose too in narratives like the story of *Sinbad the Sailor* of a much later date. A more definite plot and a greater dramatic intensity were given to these tales of adventure by the addition of an erotic element which often took the form of two separated lovers. Some use is made of this element, for instance, in the relations of Odysseus and Penelope, perhaps in the episode of Aeneas and Dido, and in the story of Jason and Medea. The intrusion of the love *motif* into the stories told of demi-gods and heroes, so that the whole narrative turns upon it, is illustrated by such tales in the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid as those of Pyramus and Thisbe, Pluto and Proserpina, or Meleager and Atalanta. The love element, which may have been developed in this way out of its slight use in the epic, and the element of adventure form the basis of the serious Greek romances of Antonius Diogenes,

Achilles Tatius, and the other writers of the centuries which follow Petronius.

Before trying to connect the *Satirae* with a serious romance of the type just mentioned, let us follow another line of descent which leads us to the same objective point, viz., the appearance of the serious story in prose. We have been led to consider the possible connection of this kind of prose fiction with the epic by the presence in both of them of the love element and that of adventure. But the Greek novel has another rather marked feature. It is rhetorical, and this quality has suggested that it may have come, not from the epic, but from the rhetorical exercise. Support has been given to this theory within recent years by the discovery in Egypt of two fragments of the Ninos romance. The first of these fragments reveals Ninos, the hero, pleading with his aunt Derkeia, the mother of his sweetheart, for permission to marry his cousin. All the arguments in support of his plea and against it are put forward and balanced one against the other in a very systematic way. He wins over Derkeia. Later in the same fragment the girl pleads in a somewhat similar fashion with Thambe, the mother of Ninos. The second fragment is mainly concerned with the campaigns of Ninos. Here we have the two lovers, probably separated by the departure of Ninos for the wars, while the hero, at least, is exposed to the dangers of the campaign. It was pointed out after the discovery of this find that the large part taken in the story by the carefully balanced arguments indicated that the story grew out of exercises in argumentation in the rhetorical schools.[1] The elder Seneca has preserved for us in his *Controversiae* specimens of the themes which were set for students in these schools. The student was asked to imagine himself in a supposed dilemma and then to discuss the considerations which would lead him to adopt the one or the other line of conduct. Some of these situations suggest excellent dramatic possibilities, conditions of life, for instance, where suicide seemed justifiable, misadventures with pirates, or a turn of affairs which threatened a woman's virtue. Before the student reached the point of arguing the case, the story must be told,

[1] Cf. Schmid, "Der griechische Roman," *Neue Jahrb.*, Bd. XIII (1904), 465–85; Wilcken, in *Hermes* XXVIII, 161 ff., and in *Archiv f. Papyrusforschung* I, 255 ff.; Grenfell-Hunt *Fayûm Towns and Their Papyri* (1900) 75 ff. and *Rivista di Filologia* XXIII, 1 ff.

and out of these narratives of adventure, told at the outset to develop the dilemna, may have grown the romance of adventure, written for its own sake. The story of Ninos has a peculiar interest in connection with this theory, because it was probably very short, and consequently may give us the connecting link between the rhetorical exercise and the long novel of the later period, and because it is the earliest known serious romance. Ou the back of the papyrus which contains it are some farm accounts of the year 101 A.D. Evidently by that time the roll had become waste paper, and the story itself may have been composed a century or even two centuries earlier. So far as this second theory is concerned we may raise the question in passing whether we have any other instance of a genre of literature growing out of a schoolboy exercise. Usually the teacher adapts to his purpose some form of creative literature already in existence.

Leaving this objection out of account for the moment, the romance of love and perilous adventure may possibly be then a lineal descendant either of the epic or of the rhetorical exercise. Whichever of these two views is the correct one, the discovery of the Ninos romance fills in a gap in one theory of the origin of the realistic romance of Petronius, and with that we are here concerned. Before the story of Ninos was found, no serious romance and no title of such a romance anterior to the time of Petronius was known. This story, as we have seen, may well go back to the first century before Christ, or at least to the beginning of our era. It is conceivable that stories like it, but now lost, existed even at an earlier date. Now in the century, more or less, which elapsed between the assumed date of the appearance of these Greek narratives and the time of Petronius, the extraordinary commercial development of Rome had created a new aristocracy—the aristocracy of wealth. In harmony with this social change the military chieftain and the political leader who had been the heroes of the old fiction gave way to the substantial man of affairs of the new, just as Thaddeus of Warsaw has yielded his place in our present day novels to Silas Lapham, and the bourgeois erotic story of adventure resulted, as we find it in the extant Greek novels of the second and third centuries of our era. If we can assume that this stage of development was reached before the time of Petronius we can think of his novel as a parody of such a romance. If, however,

the bourgeois romance had not appeared before 50 A.D., then, if we regard his story as a parody of a prose narrative, it must be a parody of such a heroic romance as that of Ninos, or a parody of the longer heroic romances which developed out of the rhetorical narrative. If excavations in Egypt or at Herculaneum should bring to light a serious bourgeois story of adventure, they would furnish us the missing link. Until, or unless, such a discovery is made the chain of evidence is incomplete.

The two theories of the realistic romance which we have been discussing assume that it is a parody of some anterior form of literature, and that this fact accounts for the appearance of the satirical or cynical element in it. Other students of literary history, however, think that this characteristic was brought over directly from the Milesian tale[1] or the Menippean satire.[2] To how many different kinds of stories the term "Milesian tale" was applied by the ancients is a matter of dispute, but the existence of the short story before the time of Petronius is beyond question. Indeed we find specimens of it. In its commonest form it presented a single episode of everyday life. It brought out some human weakness or foible. Very often it was a story of illicit love. Its philosophy of life was: No man's honesty and no woman's virtue are unassailable. In all these respects save in the fact that it presents one episode only, it resembles the *Satirae* of Petronius. At least two stories of this type are to be found in the extant fragments of the novel of Petronius. One of them is related as a well-known tale by the poet Eumolpus, and the other is told by him as a personal experience. More than a dozen of them are imbedded in the novel of Apuleius, the *Metamorphoses*, and modern specimens of them are to be seen in Boccaccio and in Chaucer. In fact they are popular from the twelfth century down to the eighteenth. Long before the time of Petronius they occur sporadically in literature. A good specimen, for instance, is found in a letter commonly attributed to Aeschines in the fourth century B.C.

[1] Some of the important late discussions of the Milesian tale are by Bürger *Hermes* (1892) 351 ff.; Norden *Die antike Kunstprosa* II, 602, 604 n.; Rohde *Kleine Schriften* II, 25 ff.; Bürger *Studien zur Geschichte d. griech. Romans* I (*Programm von Blankenburg a. H.* 1902); W. Schmid *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Alt.* (1904) 474 ff.; Lucas, "Zu den Milesiaca des Aristides," *Philologus* 61 (1907), 16 ff.

[2] On the origin of the *prosimetrum* cf. Hirzel *Der Dialog* 381 ff.; Norden *Die Antike Kunstprosa* 755.

As early as the first century before Christ collections of them had been made and translated into Latin. This development suggests an interesting possible origin of the realistic romance. In such a collection as those just mentioned of the first century B.C., the central figures were different in the different stories, as is the case, for instance, in the *Canterbury Tales*. So original a writer as Petronius may well have thought of connecting these different episodes together by making them the experiences of a single individual. The Encolpius of Petronius would in that case be in a way an ancient Don Juan. If we compare the *Arabian Nights* with one of the groups of stories found in the Romances of the Round Table we can see what this step forward would mean. The tales which bear the title of the *Arabian Nights* all have the same general setting and the same general treatment, and they are put in the mouth of the same story-teller. The Lancelot group of Round Table stories, however, shows a nearer approach to unity since the stories in it concern the same person and have a common ultimate purpose, even if it is vague. When this point had been reached the realistic romance would have made its appearance. We have been thinking of the realistic novel as being made up of a series of Milesian tales. We may conceive of it, however, as an expanded Milesian tale, just as scholars are coming to think of the epic as growing out of a single hero-song rather than as resulting from the union of several such songs.

To pass to another possibility, it is very tempting to see a connection between the *Satirae* of Petronius and the prologue of comedy. Plautus thought it necessary to prefix to many of his plays an account of the incidents which preceded the action of the play. In some cases he went so far as to outline in the prologue the action of the play itself in order that the spectators might follow it intelligently. This introductory narrative runs up to seventy-six lines in the *Menaechmi*, to eighty-two in the *Rudens*, and to one hundred and fifty-two in the *Amphitruo*. In this way it becomes a short realistic story of everyday people involving frequently a love intrigue and told in the iambic senarius, the simplest form of verse. Following it is the more extended narrative of the comedy itself with its incidents and dialogue. This combination of the condensed narrative in the story form, presented usually as a monologue in simple verse, and

the expanded narrative in the dramatic form, with its conversational element, may well have suggested the writing of a realistic novel in prose. A slight, though not a fatal, objection to this theory lies in the fact that the prologues to comedy subsequent to Plautus changed in their character, and contain little narrative. This is not a serious objection, for the plays of Plautus were still known to the cultivated in the later period.

The mime gives us still more numerous points of contact with the work of Petronius than comedy does.[1] It is unfortunate both for our understanding of Roman life and for our solution of the question before us that only fragments of this form of dramatic composition have come down to us. Even from them, however, it is clear that the mime dealt with everyday life in a very frank, realistic way. The new comedy has its conventions in the matter of situations and language. The matron, for instance, must not be presented in a questionable light, and the language is the conversational speech of the better classes. The mime recognizes no such restrictions in its portrayal of life. The married woman, her stupid husband, and her lover are common figures in this form of the drama, and if we may draw an inference from the lately discovered fragments of Greek mimes, the speech was that of the common people. Again, the new comedy has its limited list of stock characters—the old man, the tricky slave, the parasite, and the others which we know so well in Plautus and Terence, but as for the mime, any figure to be seen on the street may find a place in it—the rhetorician, the soldier, the legacy hunter, the inn-keeper, or the town crier. The doings of kings and heroes were parodied. We are even told that a comic Hector and Achilles were put on the stage, and the gods did not come off unscathed. All of these characteristic features of the mime remind us in a striking way of the novel of Petronius. His work, like the mime, is a realistic picture of low life which presents a great variety of characters, and shows no regard for conventional morals. It is especially interesting to notice the element of parody, which we have already observed in Petronius, in both kinds of literary productions. The theory that Petronius may have had the composition of his *Satirae* suggested to him by plays of this type is greatly

[1] Cf. Rosenblüth *Beiträge zur Quellenkunde von Petrons Satiren* (Berlin, 1909).

strengthened by the fact that the mime reached its highest point of popularity at the court in the time of Nero, in whose reign Petronius lived. In point of fact Petronius refers to the mime frequently. One of these passages is of peculiar significance in this connection. Encolpius and his comrades are entering the town of Croton and are considering what device they shall adopt so as to live without working. At last a happy idea occurs to Eumolpus and he says "why don't we construct a mime?" and the mime is played, with Eumolpus as a fabulously rich man at the point of death, and the others as his attendants. The rôle makes a great hit, and all the vagabonds in the company play their assumed parts in their daily life at Croton with such skill that the legacy hunters of the place load them with attentions and shower them with presents. This whole episode in fact may be thought of as a mime cast in the narrative form, and the same conception may be applied with great plausibility to the entire story of Encolpius.

We have thus far been attacking the question with which we are concerned from the side of the subject-matter and tone of the story of Petronius. Another method of approach is suggested by the Menippean Satire,[1] the best specimens of which have come down to us in the fragments of Varro, one of Cicero's contemporaries. These satires are an olla podrida, dealing with all sorts of subjects in a satirical manner, sometimes put in the dialogue form, and cast in a *mélange* of prose and verse. It is this last characteristic which is of special interest to us in this connection, because in the prose of Petronius verses are freely used. Occasionally the verses in the *Satirae* are quoted from another source, but usually they are the compositions of Petronius himself. If it were not aside from our immediate purpose it would be interesting to follow the history of this prose-poetical form from the time of Petronius on. After him it does not seem to have been used very much until the third and fourth centuries of our era. However, Martial in the first century prefixed a prose prologue to five books of his *Epigrams*, and one of these prologues ends with a poem of four lines. The several books of the *Silvae* of Statius are also preceded by prose letters of dedication.

[1] This theory in the main is suggested by Rohde *Der griechische Roman*[2] 267 (Leipsig, 1900) and by Ribbeck *Geschichte d. röm. Dichtung*[3] III, 150.

That strange imitation of the *Aulularia* of Plautus of the fourth century, the *Querolus*, is in a form half prose and half verse. A sentence begins in prose and runs off into verse, as some of the epitaphs also do. The *Epistles* of Ausonius of the same century are compounded of prose and a great variety of verse. By the fifth and sixth centuries a *mélange* of verse or a combination of prose and verse is very common, as one can see in the writings of Martianus Capella, Sidonius Apollinaris, Ennodius, and Boethius. It recurs again in modern times, for instance, in Dante's *La Vita Nuova*, in Boccaccio, *Aucassin et Nicollette*, the *Heptameron*, the *Celtic Ballads*, the *Arabian Nights*, and in *Alice in Wonderland*. A little thought suggests that it is not an unnatural medium of expression. A change from prose to verse or from one form of verse to another suggests a change in the emotional condition of a speaker or writer. We see that clearly enough illustrated in tragedy or comedy. In the thrilling scene in the *Captives* of Plautus, for example, where Tyndarus is in mortal terror lest the trick which he has played on his master, Hegio, may be discovered and he be consigned to work in chains in the quarries, the verse is the trochaic septenarius. As soon as the suspense is over it drops to the iambic senarius. If we should arrange the commoner Latin verses in a sequence according to the emotional effects which they produced, at the bottom of the series would stand the iambic senarius. Above that would come trochaic verse, and we should rise to higher planes of exaltation as we read the anapaestic, or cretic, or bacchiac. The greater part of life is commonplace. Consequently the common medium for conversation or for the narrative in a composition like comedy made up entirely of verse is the senarius. Now this form of verse in its simple, almost natural, quantitative arrangement is very close to prose, and it would be a short step to substitute prose for it as the basis of the story, interspersing verse here and there to secure variety, or when the emotions were called into play, just as lyric verses are interpolated in the iambic narrative. In this way the combination of different kinds of verse in the drama, and the prosimetrum of the Menippean Satire and of Petronius may be explained, and we see a possible line of descent from comedy and this form of satire to the *Satirae*.

These various theories of the origin of the romance of Petronius—

that it may be related to the epic, to the serious heroic romance, to the bourgeois story of adventure developed out of the rhetorical exercise, to the Milesian tale, to the prologue of comedy, to the verse-*mélange* of comedy or the mime, or to the prose-poetical Menippean satire—are not, of necessity, it seems to me, mutually exclusive. His novel may well be thought of as a parody of the serious romance, with frequent reminiscences of the epic, a parody suggested to him by comedy and its prologue, by the mime, or by the short cynical Milesian tale, and cast in the form of the Menippean satire, or, so far as subject-matter and realistic treatment are concerned, the suggestion may have come directly from the mime, and if we can accept the theory of some scholars, who have lately studied the mime, that it sometimes contained both prose and verse, we may be inclined to regard that type of literature as the immediate progenitor of the novel even in the matter of external form, and leave the Menippean satire out of the line of descent. Whether the one or the other of these explanations of its origin recommends itself to us as probable or not, it is interesting to note, as we leave the subject, that, so far as our present information goes, the realistic romance seems to have been the invention of Petronius.

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SUSPECTED FLAWS IN HOMERIC SIMILES

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Nothing in the Homeric poems has been the theme of more consistent praise than the similes with which the narrative is adorned. To some eminent authorities the beauty and perfect appositeness of these figures, and the power and richness of the imagination to which we owe them, have appealed so strongly, that they have seen in these phenomena one of the best proofs of unity of authorship. So Nitzsch *Beiträge* 339, Mure *Hist. Gr. Lit.* II, 89 ff., O. Jäger *Homer u. Horaz* 73 f., 115 ff., and others. Mr. Green, *The Similes of Homer's Iliad* 30, tells us that his "consideration of the similes left him more than ever what he was before—a believer in one great poet Homer." The dissector of the poems, on the other hand, while he cannot but admit the supreme excellence, in this respect, of the agency or combination of agencies which he styles "Homer," is led by certain characteristics of the similes which he believes he has discovered to a conclusion confirmatory of his view of the multiple origin of the epics. To state some considerations which may assist the settlement of this difference of opinion is the object of the present paper.

To begin with, trouble has arisen from repetition. First, there is repetition of the subject-matter of the simile. The same object is employed over and over again for the sake of illustration—the sun or a star, the lion, the boar, a pillar, leaves, trees, snow, torrents, and the like. But there is nothing in that. It might be said, in varying degree, of poets generally who delight in this figure of speech. It can be said of Firdausi. A reviewer in the *Athenaeum*, No. 4131, p. 823, notes that it is a "characteristic of the epic style and in keeping with its simplicity." It is very marked in the *Idylls of the King*. If we classify the similes in that poem, we find eleven are taken from gems, eight from leaves, the same number from the dog and from ghosts, and so on. Similes are, in Wordsworth's words, "loose types of things through *all* degrees," and it is only natural that poets should have their preferences, and should

love to dwell on some departments of nature and human life more than others.

But, secondly, we have repetition of phraseology. In the numerous lion similes, for instance, the same phrases are used to describe the animal's hunger, the object of his attack, the men and dogs who resist him, and the way in which they foil and smite him. In fact it can be shown that the similes have a commonplace, or, as the Germans style it, a *Gemeingut*, of their own. That will surprise no one who is familiar with the extent and character of the Homeric repetitions generally. Indeed it supplies an argument for unity. The professional dissector of the poems, on the other hand, is inclined to see in this recurrence of phraseology the imitation or plagiarism which he finds everywhere in the epics, and which he regards as an important factor in their development.

But, thirdly, there is repetition of the simile. An image used to illustrate a situation or incident in one part of the poems recurs bodily in another passage, with hardly a change of a line except at the beginning or the end of the description. And this is held to negative absolutely the idea of unity of authorship. Dr. Leaf (on O 263 ff., which is the famous simile, repeated from Z 506 ff., of the horse breaking from his stable and galloping across the plain to the river) challenges the defenders of the unity of the *Iliad* to say "how a single 'Homer' could have thus repeated his own best passages, careless of their appropriateness." The allegation in the last four words will receive attention farther on.

In dealing with this third point, it is necessary that we obtain an accurate idea of the number of instances to be found in the two epics. They are fewer than dissectors sometimes assume, and too few, we hope to show, to support the conclusion which they seek to draw. If we take a fairly full enumeration, such as that given by Friedländer in his *Zwei hom. Wörterverz.* 786 ff., we find there are, in the *Iliad*, 182 similes of some extent, 17 comparatively short, and 27 of the very briefest. For the *Odyssey* the figures are 39, 6, and 13 respectively. The reasons for the difference in this respect between the two epics are well ascertained, and need not detain us.

If, now, we examine this list with the aid of any edition which gives parallel passages, we find there are hardly a score in which

there is repetition of the *ipsissima verba*. And a number of these are of the very shortest, as ἐρεμνῇ (κελαίνῃ) λαίλαπι ἶσοι and φλογὶ εἴκελος ἀλκήν. They are paralleled by Tennyson's "like fire," "like a ghost," or "like a star," or by Firdausi's brief and recurring comparisons of a hero to a lion or a crocodile, or of life to a short stay in a roadside inn. Nothing is to be inferred from such cases.

Those which remain appear to be Z 506 ff. and O 263 ff., Paris (and Hector) compared to a horse that breaks from the stable; Λ 548 ff. and P 657 ff., Aias (and Menelaus) retreating slowly like a baffled lion; N 389 ff. and Π 482 ff., Asios (and Sarpedon) falling like a poplar or pine; E 782 f. and H 256 f., the Achaeans (and Aias and Hector) compared to lions or boars; I 14 f. and Π 3 f., Agamemnon (and Patroclus) weeping like a spring of dark water; δ 45 f. and η 84 f., of the palace of Menelaus (and Alcinous); ζ 229 ff. and ψ 156 ff., of the beautification of Odysseus by Athené; and δ 535 and λ 411, of the murder of Agamemnon.

There thus seem to be just eight cases worthy of attention. What is the explanation of the duplication? Some dissectors affirm that it is due to plagiarism. "Late" contributors to the poems appropriated a predecessor's work. Others think that two contributors, at different periods, took the same image from a common stock. But in either case, it is surely strange that duplicates are so few—hardly more than are to be found in the *Idylls*. In particular we should expect to find duplication in books which are "late," especially if they are fighting books—for it is in books of battle that similes most abound. M, for example, is a fighting book, and it is also late, being an "Expansion" and "Ionian." But it has 10 fine similes, all original. Dr. Leaf says they are "on the whole the most elaborate and beautiful in Homer." He does object to three as inappropriate in their setting, and Professor Murray follows him. We hope to show that they have misappreciated all these three similes in M. But at least its late Ionian author had not the plagiarist taint. Again, N is said to be mostly late and to have been much "worked over" (*stark überarbeitet*), but of its 15 similes only one recurs, and that one *may* be original in N. It certainly suits its setting admirably. Π and P, which are said to be full of

late matter, have 40 similes between them, but only two duplicates. The end of P, from 543, is said to be "very late." It contains 9 splendid similes, only one of which is found elsewhere, and that one (657 ff.), as we shall see, is considered by "most editors" to be original in P. It is very difficult, in view of such instances and figures, to accept the explanation from imitation or borrowing, whether from a predecessor or a common stock.

To sustain such a theory, it would be necessary for its advocates to prove, beyond doubt, that in such cases the recurring simile is in one of its occurrences unsuitable to the context and borrowed. This can seldom, if ever, be shown. But till that is done, we are entitled to accept the duplicated image as original in both cases. The burden of proof is on him who seeks to eject. When we examine the critical literature of the subject, we find in every case, either that there is so little to go upon that no authority seriously asserts plagiarism, or that there is a decided conflict of opinion. We have space for only two well-known cases, both of which are discussed by Dr. Leaf.

The first case, the famous simile in Z 506 ff. and O 263 ff., has already been quoted, with Dr. Leaf's conclusion from it. As applied to Paris in Z, he approves of it highly. In O, "inserted to illustrate not the exuberant beauty, but merely the speed of Hector," it "loses much of its force." It is "a clear plagiarism of a passage whose intrinsic beauty marked it out for plunder." A single Homer could not have "thus repeated his own best passages, careless of their appropriateness." Is it certain then that this simile is appropriate only in Z? It is not. The authorities are not agreed. See Ameis-Hentze's *Anhang* to O 263. Some critics concur with Aristarchus in objecting to the simile in O. Düntzer (*Hom. Abh.* 501) is one. Mr. Green (*op. cit.* 227) also says briefly and not very decisively that the simile "seems to suit Paris better." Christ (*Wiederholungen* 262, and *Iliad* 64) evidently had difficulty in deciding, and he, it should be noted, holds it as proved (*pro explorato habeo, Iliad* 22) that the poet did not hesitate to do what to other critics is unthinkable, that is, to use a simile a second time. Geddes again (*Problem* 208 f.) is satisfied with Blackie that "the application to Hector is the older and primary one," and adds the shrewd

remark that δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας "is more appropriate regarding the resuscitated Hector than the skulking Paris." But we must not press the particulars of a Homeric comparison. That the simile is suitable of Paris no one can deny. But surely it is just as appropriate of Hector, ἄσμενος ἐκ θανάτοιο, restored to life and vigor by Apollo (who ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα ποιμένι λαῶν), and exulting in and employing his newly recovered strength to repair by rapid movement about the ranks the fortunes of his side. Paris had simply put on his armour and hurried across the Trojan plain. But all this wrangling over small details is futile. Granting, as Christ does for Homer, that a poet may reproduce a passage that pleases him, it is idle to expect that it shall be, beyond all possibility of cavil, as apposite in one place as in the other. It is enough for our purpose, in the present case, that the critics have failed to prove that the simile is not tolerable in O. Till they do so, Dr. Leaf's challenge may be disregarded by "the defenders of the *Iliad*."

The other case is Λ 548 ff. and P 657 ff., of a lion slowly retreating from a fold. Most editors, as Dr. Leaf tells us in a note on the lines in Λ, and as may be seen from Ameis-Hentze's *Anhang*, have favoured P. Dr. Leaf finds the simile "very appropriate" in Λ. And others will think the same. Either side may be right or wrong, but till the critics agree that the lines are bad in one of the two books, and tell us which that is, there is nothing against unity. The "bungling" (*stümperhaft*) interpolator, expander, or harmonizer cannot be inferred till bungling is established. And there is the same disagreement as to the other duplicates in our list.

The facts, then, do not suit the theory of *Flick-Poets* or *Nachdichters* stealing and stumbling. Surely if they were, as is constantly assumed, composers of a very low order, their traces would have been more plentiful. Some extreme interpreters *do* track these spoilers everywhere in the poems, but their more moderate brethren have always condemned their excesses. Kammer (*Ästh. Komm.* 113) does not like such blots on the poems as the comparison, P 243 f., of Hector, pervading the battle and urging on his men so that they ἰθὺς Δαναῶν βρίσαντες ἔβησαν, to an overshadowing cloud, or Hera's description of Artemis, Φ 483, in the course of a volley of abuse, as "a lion to women." Only the late, weak, and imitative

poet could be guilty of such absurdities. Others will disagree in these as in other cases of mere subjective appreciation, and will ask for more precise proof. To them the uniform splendour of the Homeric similitudes is unquestioned, and absolutely excludes the hypothesis of a crowd of botchers, or a number of manipulating poets in successive ages. Father Browne (*Handbook* 320) considers that "Homer's" power in using this figure of speech is "truly marvellous." And yet to him the *Iliad* is the composition not of one but of a number of Homers working in different centuries.

So much for repetition in and of the Homeric similes. Another aspect of the case for disruption which is based on this branch of the technique of the poems is given by Professor Murray in *The Rise of the Greek Epic* 215 ff. The state of things in old epic days which he conceives is this. There was a great common store of images, on which the contributors to the two poems were at liberty to draw, and different individuals might select the same one from the stock in different ages. When the poems took final shape, a simile which had been thus favoured would remain imbedded in two or more strata. Professor Murray is led to this conclusion by two facts. First, the similes have all "the same ready-made air," and secondly, "a good many of them are not apposite to the case for which they are used."

The similes are, as we have said, by universal agreement, one of the finest features of the Homeric poems. On no other individual element in the poetry has more praise been lavished by writers of all Homeric creeds. To Jebb (*Homer* 26 ff.) similes are "an abounding source of variety, vividness, and beauty." They "indicate a spontaneous glow of poetical energy." "Their occurrence seems as natural as their effect is powerful." They have helped, Wittich thinks (*Homer in seinen Bildern* 8), to make the poems immortal, and there are those who think they have never been surpassed in the poetry of all the long line of Homer's successors. Professor Murray even seems to agree. He pronounces the similes to be "the very breath of life of the poetry of Homer." He can enjoy with others "their vividness, their closeness of observation, their air of freshness and spontaneity"—an air which hardly consists with a "ready-made" one—but all these qualities are only apparent. The

similes are "deceptive." They have only an appearance of originality. "Nearly all are taken from older books, and many of them were originally written to describe some quite different occasion." It is a sweeping and, we believe, an absurdly inaccurate statement.

Mülder also (*Quellen* 328 ff.) thinks the Homeric similes are borrowed ornaments, and that they are used for the sake of effect rather than to help the clear presentation of facts. He even argues, in pursuance of his general theory of the origin of the *Iliad*, that in the battle scenes they take the place of tactical and strategical details. But there seems to be little enough to support such a view. It is founded mainly on the observation that the *tertium comparationis* is often vague and the application loose. It may be so; but does the simile ever suffer in beauty or in illuminating effect? In spite of such defects on the surface the Homeric simile, as Professor Mackail puts it (*Lectures on Greek Poetry* 68), "reached perfection." It seems ungracious to disparage such gems on account of some small fault in the setting. It is the weakness of much Homeric criticism that it seeks to bind genius by regulations *de minimis*.

Professor Murray gives several examples from the *Iliad* in support of his theory. They are "mere illustrations. The force of the argument, of course, depends upon the number of such cases." This suggests that such cases are numerous. But that cannot be admitted. The instances in which critics believe they have discovered inapposite images seem to be comparatively few. I venture to think Professor Murray finds them numerous because the text has not been carefully studied, and because the way of the poems in regard to the application of similes has not been appreciated as it commends itself to the majority of writers on the subject.

Professor Murray's first three cases are those mentioned by Dr. Leaf in the end of his *Introduction* to M. The first is the comparison (M 41 ff.) of Hector to a boar or lion surrounded by hunters. As the beast charges now here, now there, his tormentors give way, and "even so Hector went and besought[1] his comrades through the press, and spurred them on to cross the dyke, but his horses dared not. . . . ." Dr. Leaf thinks (*Introduction* to M) that the simile

[1] Lang, Leaf, and Myers. Mr. Blakeney gives "Hector kept turning now here, now there," accepting the better reading, ἐλίσσετ' for ἐλλίσσετ'.

was "meant for Aias retreating slowly with his face to the foe, not for Hector urging on the pursuit," and Professor Murray follows him. The situation for which it was probably written originally is that of "a hero left alone, hard pressed by enemies, but refusing to retreat." But how can it be said that an animal doing his best to escape from a circle of hunters is "refusing to retreat"? And if the poet *had* compared Aias retreating slowly to a lion that cannot retreat at all, what would the comments of our two authorities have been?

"But," Professor Murray continues, "as the passage stands, the Greeks are flying and Hector pursuing them back beyond their wall." Not at all. Far from representing them as now "flying," the poet of M (l. 38) conceives them as "huddled together" in a crowd behind the wall, *νησὶν ἔπι γλαφυρῇσιν ἐελμένοι* (*v.l. ἐεργμένοι*). And Hector, far from making what Professor Murray calls "a triumphant advance," cannot pursue, because he cannot get over the fosse. This is stated at length in 49–59, which immediately follow the picture of the unfortunate animal hemmed in by huntsmen, and what the poet illustrates is the helplessness of Hector and his men. He compares it to the helplessness of a lion or boar against "fearful odds," and the eager movements of Hector to the rushes which the beast makes in order to escape. Surely the passage has not been carefully read. Miss Stawell (*Homer and the Iliad* 53 f.) shows that the point of the simile has been missed "by pressing the details," a mistake which, as she truly says "is not uncommon," though she herself, it seems to me, is not quite accurate in saying that Hector "is not at bay, but taking the offensive." For the moment which the poet illustrates, Hector is not only not taking the offensive, though he would like to do so, but is completely baffled, and as powerless as the lion or the boar.

Next, M 131 ff. The whole passage 127–53 should be read. It contains two similes. The Trojans are now at the gate in the wall. In front of it are the two Lapiths, who are compared to two oaks, 131–34. "A moment after"—in this "moment" of the poet's narrative, be it observed, nine lines are devoted to the advance of Asios' party—"we are told that they charged and fought like wild boars." Professor Murray observes scathingly that people who

stand firm like oaks are not like wild boars that rush out. He admits that the observation sounds captious. But it seems to be worse. I think it has no foundation in the text. Men who have been like oaks as they stand firm may be appropriately compared to boars δοχμὼ ἀΐσσοντε as soon as they move against an advancing enemy. And this is the poet's procedure. There is no difficulty, and we do not require the "solutions" of Porphyry and Hephaestion. The only possible excuse for misapprehension is to be found in a slight digression—paralleled by Dr. Monro in his note *a.l.*—in which the poet tells us that the Lapiths had been inside the gate till the Trojans advanced, when they rushed out to repel the attack—ἐκ δὲ τὼ ἀΐξαντε πυλάων πρόσθε μαχέσθην. The interpretation of Professor Murray could be justified only if ἔστασαν, 132, could be taken as meaning that the two Lapiths remained motionless through the whole scene, and if we disregarded altogether what the poet tells us, 137–45, about the advance of Asios' division to the gate.

The next example is M 167–72. "Asius, who is leading the Trojan attack, cries out that 'these men are like a swarm of bees or wasps who . . . . pour out to fight with hunters. . . . .' That comparison can scarcely have been invented to describe two solitary heroes standing in front of a gate." This seems to be an incorrect statement. The Lapiths are not stationary. They have charged and are fighting Asios and his company. But what is of more importance is that the poet does *not* say that the two men are like a swarm of bees or wasps. What he actually says is, just as wasps or bees defend their nest, so do these heroes, *though they are but two*, refuse to retire from the gate. The essence of the comparison is the determined defence in the two cases, and the words used of the Lapiths, καὶ δύ' ἐόντε, might well have saved the passage from Professor Murray's interpretation. If the two Lapiths *are* compared to a swarm of bees or wasps, then surely we have a *Stümper* of the first magnitude. Not *facile princeps*, however, for those who (on Professor Murray's principle) compared Odysseus to a haggis in υ 25 ff., Penelopé to a lion in δ 791 ff., or Aias to an ass in Λ 558 ff. (see Finsler *Homer* 498), are at least his equals.

Finally, the two similes in O 618–29. Professor Murray says, "Hector's onset is compared (1) to waves falling on a rock, which

stands immovable; (2) to a wave crashing down upon a ship, which is badly shaken; then comes v. 629, 'even so was the spirit of the Achaeans shaken within their breasts.' I suspect that these two similes come from separate sources; the minstrel felt them to be not quite consistent, so he added vs. 629. It is worth remarking that the five lines just preceding are inconsistent with their present context, and were condemned by Zenodotus and Aristarchus."

Professor Murray here only indicates suspicion, so it is not necessary to go into this case at length. But it may be observed that the five lines athetized by the Alexandrians are not the five just preceding 629, but 610–14, and it is difficult to see how the athetesis can affect the question. Secondly, it is not stated in the second simile that the ship was badly shaken. Nor does *ἐδαΐζετο* in the application of the simile to the hearts of the Achaeans mean "was shaken," unless the lexica are wrong. This mistranslation has probably led to the introduction of the shaking of the ship. Thirdly, in the same simile the most important words are passed over. They describe the effect of the storm on the ship and on the sailors. To their terror the poet compares the distress of the Achaeans (*ἐδαΐζετο θυμός*). He had begun by comparing Hector's onset to the rush of a wave. It is, as Dr. Leaf remarks, "a two-sided simile." The poet is led on by a detail in his own picture (a detail not essential to the comparison first instituted, but added, *more Homerico*, to make it more effective), and, in Dr. Leaf's words, "evolves another comparison from the same picture." The poet does exactly the same in one of the similes already considered, M 146 ff. The *κόμπος ὀδόντων* of the boar suggests another comparison, "so clattered the bright bronze on the breasts of the two heroes." As regards the passage in O, much has been written on it since as far back as Heyne's time, but there seems to be nothing wrong with the similes.

These are the cases on which Dr. Leaf and Professor Murray rely. A better and fuller collection might make their position stronger. As at present presented, it seems extremely weak. The trouble seems to have arisen partly from insufficient regard to the Homeric narrative, and partly from a misappreciation of the Homeric way with similitudes—if that way is correctly described in a host of treatises. In a sentence that has often been quoted since, Pope wrote that Homer, "secure of the main likeness, makes no scruple

to play with the circumstances." See Jebb *op. cit.* 28, and Green *op. cit.* 5 and 21. There is one main point of resemblance—generally a point or crisis in the action (Finsler *Homer* 497); for the rest the poet, "in the joy of his heart" (Cauer *Grundfragen*[1] 263), gives free rein to his fancy. And the question always should be, "not so much whether the simile be exact, as whether it be happy and effective" (Mure *op. cit.* II, 92). So van Herwerden (*Mnemos.* XIX, 239 f.)—we may certainly require that the image be *apta et perspicua*, and so it always is; but as for complete consistency of details, *hoc sane nemo requirat.* A scene is before the poet in every detail. As he proceeds to illustrate it by a word-picture, his imagination is afire. He revels in details, whether relevant to the comparison or not, that serve to make his presentation of the matter concrete and vivid. When any such feature suggests a new comparison, he seizes it and states it without hesitation. Will anyone find fault with him? Would anyone give up a single detail, or object to the expansion of the simile? There are other instances in Homer, and they have been enumerated by the commentators. Professor Murray admits that there are parallels and that his boar case is not unique. But he thinks it an extreme instance. We cannot see that it is. He finds evidence of the working of him whom the Germans style a *Stümper*. "The last compiler of M found the two similes. Both were too good to lose. He followed the story of the oaks, yet he was reluctant to lose the wild boars. So observe his procedure. He puts in the wild boar, and then, at the end, soothes the imagination of any hearer who is puzzled at the resemblance"—and any such hearer must surely have been as *stümperhaft* as the compiler—"by explaining that the point of similarity lies in the noise. Boars' tusks make a noise, and so do shields struck by spears." But where is the necessity for dragging in a compiler? The passage is clear and easily interpreted without him. It is the same with all the cases which we have brought under review. On a careful and impartial consideration of the text as it stands, not one of them suggests plurality of authors or the intrusion of a harmonizer or compiler. Only the Homeric pessimist, who is too prone to put the most unfavorable construction on small irregularities, could find reason for such a view.

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THE MANUSCRIPTS OF PROPERTIUS

By B. L. Ullman

Propertius has been a very unfortunate poet in numerous ways. Many of his readers have failed to understand either the man or his poetry. He has been acclaimed one of the greatest poetic geniuses of all time, and he has received that most stinging of all criticisms, "the silence." Controversies of various sorts concerning him and his work have been among the fiercest and most prolonged, even if not the most important, in the field of classical philology. After a century's debate, there are still two factions on the question of the division of his poems into four or five books. After more than four centuries of contention about his birthplace, rivaling the ancient controversy over Homer, there seems at last to be a majority agreement. But it is the text of the poems with which we are concerned in this paper. Propertius has had no Ellis, as had Catullus, to publish readings from a large number of MSS so that scholars could form their opinions about them; no Hiller, as had Tibullus, or Schwabe, as had Catullus, to offer a conservative yet progressive text until the MS problem could finally be settled.

The very latest history of Latin literature, the revision of Teuffel by Kroll and Skutsch,[1] contains this statement: "Die einzige kaum verfälschte Ueberlieferung bietet der cod. Neapolitanus, jetzt in Wolfenbüttel, Gud. 224, s. XII/XIII? . . . . Die übrigen Hss entstammen der Humanistenzeit und sind von Baehrens überschätzt worden." I have no quarrel with those who consider the Neapolitanus the best MS of all, but it is not true that all the other MSS belong to the humanistic period, in the ordinary sense of that term: there is one other (incomplete) MS in existence antedating the earliest humanist. The opinion expressed in Teuffel is but an index of the uncertainty which is prevalent concerning the MSS of Propertius. This attitude is largely due to the work of Baehrens, whose critical edition (1880), though long out of print, has not yet

[1] Vol. II (1910), p. 92.

found a successor. His judgment concerning the age and value of N, the oldest MS, has not been accepted by most scholars, and for that reason some of the other MSS which he used have been undervalued. He himself hurt his own case by publishing a hasty collation of F, a difficult MS to collate on account of its numerous corrections by later hands.

In this paper I shall confine myself to a discussion of the following points: the history of the oldest MSS, the relation of A and F, and the views presented in two recent articles on the MSS of Propertius. Perhaps it is well to state on what material I base my conclusions. It consists of photographs, practically complete, of N A F, a collation of F made from the MS itself, and scattered readings from numerous other MSS. After an examination of a large number of MSS, perhaps a hundred or more, I find that none antedates the fifteenth century except the three just mentioned. I hope to examine carefully most of the existing MSS, gathering material for what may some day become a critical edition. The collation of a number of MSS of Tibullus for a similar purpose has delayed the work on Propertius.

The oldest MS of Propertius known today is Wolfenbüttel 224 Gud., called N(eapolitanus) because it was once in the church of S. Giovanni a Carbonara at Naples. A controversy long raged concerning the age of N. Baehrens and others thought that it was a contaminated MS of the fifteenth century, but the judgment of paleographers is now unanimous in favor of the late twelfth or the early thirteenth century. It may be interesting to note that Traube in 1906 expressed to me an opinion in entire accord with this. James[1] stated that he was confident that the manuscript was written in the latter part of the twelfth century and that it was "certainly not of Italian origin." He likewise found on a fly-leaf the word Goeric, the name of a saint whose cult was localized around Metz (where he was bishop in the seventh century), Toul, Verdun, and Épinal (where he was buried). James's conclusion that N was once in some library in or near Metz is highly probable, in fact, almost certain. One point of interest in this connection has not been noticed in N, as far as I know. The only heading in N is "*In*cipit *Pro*pertius" (italics indicate abbreviation) by an early

[1] *Class. Rev.* XVII (1903), p. 462.

hand, though not by either of the text hands. But the early hand wrote "Pertius" and a later hand added the sign for "pro" in the ample space left. The same hand also worked over the curved stroke of the following "p," to make it more like his own. Likewise he worked over the first "i" of "incipit" into a capital letter. This hand was very likely that of an Italian humanist. Hence we have a right to expect that a Propertius is hidden under the name of the well-known Persius in some mediaeval catalogue. It is even possible that a Propertius MS is today masquerading as a Persius in some library. There was a Persius at Verdun in 1070 and another at Schlettstadt (not far from Épinal, near the Rhine) in 1296.[1]

At this point we may leave N temporarily. The next oldest MS is Leyden, Voss. Lat. in Oct. 38, known as A. As to its age and origin James[2] says that it is "certainly not Italian in origin, but most probably French. I should place it early in the fourteenth century: I could even conceive it to have been written in the last years of the thirteenth." E. Maunde Thompson has stated[3] that "the Vossianus was written about 1300 and just as likely before it as after it." I may add that I agree entirely with James that the MS was written in France, as I happen to be somewhat familiar with that characteristic script. Now about the year 1250 Richard de Fournival of Amiens evolved an ideal classification system for a library and entered therein titles taken directly from the MSS. He includes "Propertii Aurelii Naute liber monobiblos."[4] The heading of A is "Incipit monobiblos propertii aurelii naute." I hope to show later that all the MSS having this heading are derived from A. It is tempting to suppose that A, a MS written in France, probably in the thirteenth century, is the one referred to by Richard. I see no objection to this hypothesis, for I think that A may have been written as early as 1250. If A is not the MS mentioned by Richard it is very likely a copy of that MS. It has been suggested that Richard did not own

[1] Manitius *Philologisches aus alten Bibliothekskatalogen*, *Rhein. Mus.* 47 (Ergänzungsheft), 1892, pp. 53–54. Thinking that the Verdun catalogue might have been misread, I examined it, but it has Persius (not Pertius). I have not, however, examined the Schlettstadt catalogue.

[2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] *Class. Rev.* IX (1895), p. 184, n.

[4] Manitius *op. cit.*, p. 31.

all the MSS he names, but copied the titles of books in various libraries,[1] so that it is not certain that the Propertius was ever at Amiens.

On the bottom of the first page of A is the name P. Petauius. Paul Petau lived at Orléans and Paris in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He and Bongars bought a number of MSS from Pierre Daniel of Orléans, who in turn had got them from the monastery of St. Benedict at Fleury.[2] It is altogether probable, then, that A came from Fleury, whence came also the famous Berne MSS of Horace and Valerius Maximus, though it is possible that it is not one of the MSS that Petau bought from Pierre Daniel. Petau's MSS went to his son Alexander, who sold them to Vossius. From the latter they passed into the possession of the University Library at Leyden. The MS now ends with ii. 1. 63, at the end of the second quaternio, but was once complete, as is shown by the fact that the "signature" (the first two words of the next quaternio) is found on the bottom of the last page.

There is no trace of Propertius MSS in Italy during the Middle Ages. The humanists of the first half of the fourteenth century, too, with the sole exception of Petrarch, were unacquainted with our author. The case of Catullus is strikingly different; his poems, a copy of which Petrarch obtained in Verona, were known to Bencius Alexandrinus, Hieremias de Montagnone, Guglielmo da Pastrengo, the author of the Verona Flores, Benvenuto de Campesanis, and others, but Petrarch alone knew Propertius. It is altogether likely, then, that Petrarch obtained his copy outside of Italy. Since he spent many years in France, one naturally thinks first of that country as the source of his MS. A was in France at that time: did Petrarch obtain a copy of A?

In order to answer this question we must see what evidence there s for identifying Petrarch's copy. De Nolhac made the entirely unwarranted suggestion that N was owned by Petrarch,[3] and this suggestion has often been repeated. So for example, Sandys[4]

[1] Manitius *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[2] Cf., e.g., *Valerius Maximus*, ed. Kempf (1854), p. 80.

[3] Most recently in *Pétrarque et l'Humanisme*, ed. 2, I, 172.

[4] *History of Classical Scholarship* I, 621.

speaks of N as a "MS known to Petrarch." It is clear that Petrarch's exemplar belonged to the A F group and it has been generally conceded that it was the archetype of F—which surely was not N. In the margin of his Virgil Petrarch comments on Servius' note in regard to the shortened vowel in words like *cauĕ*, *ualĕ* as follows: "Sic utitur Propertius l. 2° e. 11, et sepe alibi"; he refers to ii. 13, 14 *cauĕ*. According to the division of poems in F, this comes in the eleventh poem, as Petrarch has it, but in N it comes in the tenth. Therefore Petrarch was not using N. Furthermore A shows a marginal numbering of poems by an early hand, and F has a few indications of such a condition in its archetype.[1] There is another kind of evidence. Most of Petrarch's MSS passed into the Visconti library at Pavia, an inventory of which, made in 1426, is still preserved. In it we find the notice:[2] "Monobiblos Propersii Aurelii Naute uolumen paruum in assidibus et fundo corii albi in carminibus. Incipit Cinthia prima suis, et finitur ossa uehuntur aquis." If this were a Virgil or a Cicero, we could not be so sure that it was Petrarch's MS, but considering the great scarcity of Propertius MSS at that time we can confidently assume that it was his. The title agrees with that of A F (except for the misspelling *propersii*). The readings *uehuntur aquis* are found together only in F, of the MSS reported by Baehrens.[3] The history of the MS cannot be traced far after 1426. In a catalogue of the Pavia library made in 1459 appears a Propertius, undoubtedly our MS. It disappeared between 1459 and 1518, for in the latter year an inventory of the library after its removal to Blois was compiled, and our MS does not appear therein.[4]

Lastly, we can gain an idea of Petrarch's Propertius from another source. In 1375 Coluccio Salutati writes to Caspar of Verona "Si prece uel precio Propertium de bibliotheca illius celeberrimi uiri,

[1] iii. 2, title *Ad librum secundum* (sc. *capitulum*). iii. 3, title *Tertium* (sc. *capitulum*) *somnium propertij*. iii. 4, title *De triumpho quartum capitulum*. iii. 11, title *De imperijs feminarum contra* (*contra* is a corruption of 9ª, exactly the form regularly found in A).

[2] D'Adda *Indagini storiche . . . . sulla Libreria Visconteo-Sforzesca del Castello di Pavia* (1875), No. 48. I have examined the original MS catalogue at the Brera in Milan and found d'Adda's report correct.

[3] They occur also in Postgate's L.

[4] The Blois catalogue is now published in Omont *Anciens inventaires et catalogues de la bibliothèque nationale*, t. I, 1908. I consulted the original MS at Vienna.

Petrarce inquam, ... haberi posse confidis, uel ut meus sit, uel ut exemplari queat, deprecor ut procures." He evidently did not get it at once, for in 1379 he writes to Lombardo a Serico, who had charge of Petrarch's library after the latter's death: "De Propertio autem nihil aliud, nisi quod scribis expecto, ut uidelicet exemplatum habeam."[1] From this letter we see that Lombardo was intending to send a copy to Coluccio. As Coluccio quotes Propertius in 1381, we may assume that Lombardo did not delay very long. In 1392–94 Coluccio quotes Propertius again. Now, F (Florence, Laurentianus 36. 49) is the MS that he owned (he signed his name in it), and it agrees in text with these quotations.[2] Yet it is generally spoken of as being written in the fifteenth century ever since Baehrens assigned it to that period. A curious and interesting paper could be written on the misstatements which have been made about this MS. But the one that takes the palm is the following by Plessis:[3] "C'est pourquoi je suis également porté à croire que le Laurentianus, qu'il (Baehrens) dit écrit tout à fait au début du quinzième siècle, pourrait bien, lui aussi, être d'une époque un peu plus récente, et se rapprocher plutôt de 1450 que de 1400." Immediately afterward Plessis mentions the autograph of Coluccio appearing in the MS. Though Coluccio died in 1406, the MS in which his autograph appears was written nearer 1450 than 1400!

But I have discovered decisive proof that F is the MS sent to Coluccio by Lombardo. In the letter to Lombardo just mentioned, Coluccio speaks of a MS of Petrarch's "de viris illustribus" which Lombardo is having copied for him. The MS which was sent to him is now in the Vatican, Ottob. 1883. Most of it was copied by a scribe, but Lombardo's own supplement to Petrarch's unfinished work was written by himself and he also served as technical corrector throughout. At the end is the date: "transcriptus MCCCLXXX die XV nouenbris," followed by the autograph signature of Coluccio. On examining this MS in 1907 for quite another purpose, I thought I saw a resemblance between the hand of Lombardo and one of the

[1] De Nolhac *Pétrarque* I, 89, 90.

[2] Sabbadini also pointed this out, but he has been the only one. *Studi ital. di fil. class.* VII (1899), 106.

[3] *Études critiques sur Properce* (1884), p. 23.

marginal hands in F, which I had examined in the autumn of 1906. In the summer of 1910 I had an opportunity of comparing photographs of Ottob. 1883 with F itself, in Florence, and found not only that the second hand in F was that of Lombardo but also that the copyist of F was the very scribe who copied the most of Ottob. 1883. In this identification I am supported by the most excellent authority of Professor Rostagno of the Laurentian Library. The third hand in both MSS is that of Coluccio. The Propertius, then, was written between 1379 and 1381, probably in 1380. These identifications are of considerable importance for the text. Baehrens lumped the work of Lombardo, Coluccio, and one or more correctors of the fifteenth century under the one term F^2. It is especially important to distinguish the work of Lombardo, for his changes are those of a proofreader correcting from the original. Undoubtedly Coluccio never saw the original, for it went from Padua to Pavia, as we saw above. It will, however, be interesting to examine Coluccio's readings. I had intended to publish a new collation of F (considering only F^1, F^2, F^3) in connection with this paper, but lack of time makes it necessary to postpone this until a later date, though I trust it will not be long deferred.

To come back to our former question: Was Petrarch's MS a copy of A? The history of the MSS themselves offers no objection to an affirmative answer. A was probably in Fleury, Orléans, Paris, or Amiens in Petrarch's time. We know that he was in Paris, and it is quite probable that he passed through Fleury and Orléans on his way to that city. He is also likely to have touched Amiens on his way from Paris to Belgium in 1333.[1] On these journeys he was ever on the alert for MSS, and whenever he saw a monastery that looked old (such a one as that at Fleury) he turned aside to investigate the library.[2]

Since we have shown that Petrarch's MS was the archetype of F it will be necessary to show by internal evidence that F really is a granddaughter of A before we can state that Petrarch's copy was taken from A. That such is actually the relation between A and F is what I believe. But before discussing this question let us look into some other matters.

[1] De Nolhac *Pétrarque* I, 38. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Did A have any influence on the text-tradition except through Petrarch's copy? It does not seem likely that it did. Since it was written in France, and since presumably it was found there by Paul Petau, it is scarcely likely that it was ever out of the country before Petau's time. Nor is it likely that humanists after Petrarch's time copied it, for their own copies (descended from Petrarch's) would be too similar to A to make it worth while, even if they did chance to find it. Unless evidence to the contrary be shown, it is therefore likely that A was not utilized after Petrarch's time.

A MS of interest for the history of the text of Propertius is Paris 7989 (which we will call P), containing, in addition to Tibullus, Catullus, and other writings, the only MS text of Petronius' *Cena Trimalchionis*. The MS has the date November 20, 1423, after the Catullus. Since Poggio in his letters mentions two different MSS of Petronius at about this time, it is very likely that he had the *Cena*, and that the Paris MS is to be closely connected with him or Niccoli.[1] One thing has not been pointed out: the MS was evidently written by a scholar, not an ordinary scribe. This is shown by the nature of the corrections, variants, and notes by the first hand. I have not yet been able to identify the hand, although I have enlisted the aid of Professor Sabbadini, who is the court of last appeal on such matters. The Propertius is closely related to F, but later corrections and variants were added by the first hand, apparently from N. For example: iii. 11. 35, *Hec tibi* F, *Res tibi* L, *Tres ubi* N(DV), *Re tibi* P, i. m. *Tres ubi* P^1.

Now the presence of the *Cena*, as said above, closely associates this MS with Poggio or Niccoli. It is tempting to suppose that the presence of readings from N means that Poggio brought N to Italy from Germany. That it was in Italy in the fifteenth century is certain, for it contains writing by fifteenth-century Italian hands.[2] In May, 1423, a few months before the copyist of P entered the date in his MS, Poggio returned to Rome from England by way of Germany and the Rhine. We have seen that N was in some town on or

[1] A. C. Clark *Class. Rev.* XXII (1908), 178. Both my friend Dr. E. T. Sage and I had arrived at the same conclusion several years before Clark's article appeared.

[2] Cf. James *op. cit.*

near the Rhine. Why may Poggio not have found N, just as he found a MS of Petronius at Cologne?[1]

In 1427 Poggio writes to Niccoli that he cannot send him his Propertius (which Niccoli had requested) because some person—who it was he could not remember—had borrowed it. Two weeks later he writes briefly that he has recovered the MS and that he will send it on at once.[2] Why did Niccoli want Poggio's Propertius? Coluccio's copy (F) was accessible to him in the library of Cosimo de' Medici (whose name appears in F), whose every book was as accessible to him as his own, and it had probably passed through his hands before reaching Cosimo. Petrarch's MS was in Pavia, as we saw above. It is possible that he may have wanted Poggio's MS merely for the latter's emendations, but it is much more likely that it had come from an entirely different source from the one to which he had access. Niccoli was constantly pestering Poggio, while the latter was abroad, to look for MSS, and if Poggio had told him that he had brought a MS from Germany he would be sure to want it. Old and foreign MSS were Niccoli's chief delight.

In 1484 N seems (still?) to be at Rome, in the possession of Bernardino Valla, for in that year Politian saw a "codex vetustus" of Propertius in Valla's possession which had the reading *ocno* in iv. 3. 21. Only N has that reading (Baehrens wrongly reports F: it has *oeno*). Sabbadini has shown[3] that Politian was a good judge of MSS and did not use the terms *vetustus*, *antiquissimus*, etc., as recklessly as most of his contemporaries. It seems altogether likely, therefore, that Valla's codex was N. The claim has been made that N once belonged to the humanist Giannozzo Manetti. That claim is based on certain scarcely legible letters on a fly-leaf of N which have been variously read as Manetti, Mometti, Momett·, Minetti, etc. An argument against this ownership is the fact that most of Manetti's books found their way to Padua, thence to the

[1] For the time being, I am disregarding the possibility, suggested by Postgate (*Trans. Cambridge Phil. Soc.* IV), that L (dated 1421) was copied from a MS in which readings from N had been entered.

[2] *Poggii Epistularum lib. III, ep. XII, XIII*, ed. Tonelli. As Tonelli's book is not accessible to me I quote from Hochart *De l'authenticité des annales et des histoires de Tacite* (1889) 291–92.

[3] *Le Scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli XIV e XV*, p. 169.

Palatinè library in Heidelberg, and finally to the Vatican at Rome together with the rest of the Palatine MSS.

A consideration of the history of the MSS, as outlined above, in connection with internal evidence, leads me to believe that all our MSS are descended from A and N, directly or indirectly; that only Petrarch's lost MS was copied from A; that this lost MS was the archetype of F and other MSS, and that F was the archetype of many more. It is very likely in itself that Coluccio's MS should, through Niccoli and the Florentine circle, become the ancestor of a long line of MSS. Petrarch's MS, too, would be copied by, or for, the group of scholars at Milan and Pavia. When N was brought down from Germany it was perhaps copied to some extent, but more often, apparently, its new readings were entered on the descendants of Petrarch's MS and F.

We have seen that the external history of the MSS makes it possible—perhaps probable—that Petrarch's MS was copied from A, and that, therefore, F is a granddaughter of A. Let us now consider what light the texts of the MSS throw on this point. Ever since Baehrens published his collation of A and F, the close relation existing between these two MSS has been recognized, though, as far as I am aware, they have always been regarded as of independent authority. As A is the older it cannot be descended from F. F cannot be a direct copy of A, as will be seen from the readings quoted below. There are a large number of readings in F which are corruptions of those in A, and some of them are due to a script like that of A, but that is not decisive proof. On the other hand there are certain corruptions in A which do not appear in F. The number is not so large as one would imagine from Baehrens' critical apparatus, because many of the readings there reported as being in F are really due to later hands, while the original text agrees with A.

The following are indications of the descent of F from A. In A the book-heading and title, in red ink by the first hand, is "Incipit monobiblos propertii aurelii naute ad tullum," and a second hand (not much later) added in the margin the words "heroys prima" (in black ink). This hand wrote notes in the margin in various other places, and none of them has the appearance of being drawn from the

archetype of A.[1] F includes the words "heroys prima" in the heading by the first hand. The marginal hand in A likewise numbered the poems. F shows traces of this numbering, as we saw above.

The following cases show how A was misunderstood by the archetype of F:

a. i. 3. 33: *ocellos* A N edd., but in A the word can easily be taken for *ocellis*, as Baehrens wrongly took it; *ocellis* F.
b. i. 5. 3: A has a word probably meant for *meos*, but it is very difficult to make out; F omits, leaving a space.
c. i. 6. 27: *Mult* A *Multi* N edd. *Multum* F (an attempt to make sense out of the queer form *Mult*).
d. i. 9. 11: *munermi* A; F omits, leaving a space. The copyist of the archetype of F could not bring himself to copy the senseless *munermi*.
e. i. 9. 19: *tigres* A N edd., but in A the word is easily taken for *tigies; tigies* F *al'tigres* F[2].
f. i. 13. 9: *illar̄* (=*rum*) A *illarum* N edd. *illaris* F.
g. i. 13. 13: *aug²e* (=*augure*) A *augure* N edd. *augere* F.
h. i. 14. 19: *arabium* A N edd., but in A the word can easily be taken for *arabtum* (as Baehrens wrongly took it); *arabtum* F.
i. i. 20. 21: *h̄oum* (=*heroum*) A *heroum* N edd. *hominum* F.
j. ii. 1. 31: *c̄* (=*cum*) A *cum* N edd. *est* F.
k. ii. 1. 53: *circeo* A N edd., but in A the word closely resembles *cureo; cureo* F.

Particularly convincing are examples *a, e, h, k*. Examples *f, g, i, j* show errors due to misreading of abbreviations uncommon in northern Italy in the fourteenth century.

Still more convincing is the following formidable list, based, it will be remembered, on a re-examination of A and F, and on photographs of these MSS which are before me at this moment. In all of these cases A[1] has corrected an error of his, but so carelessly (generally without erasure) that, without close scrutiny, one would fail to notice the correction at all, or else would mistake the scribe's intention. In fact, in examples *m, p, q* Baehrens reports the original reading for A, not having noticed the correction. In *q* he adds "*o* uix ab *e* discernenda." I submitted photographs of several of these

[1] Some of the marginalia are: i. 3. 37: "consumpsti pro consumpsisti"; i. 3. 43: "Femina cum sola, male cogitat ut dicit seneca in prouerbiis"; i. 22. 3: "perusium mater ciuitas propertii"; i. 22. 10: "nota unde propertius. Umbria est tertia pars lombardie montuose."

passages to a person unacquainted with the relations of the MSS or their readings, and was confirmed in my interpretation of A's corrections.[1]

l. i. 1. 19: *deducto* A F *deducte* A^1 N edd.
m. i. 6. 19: *securas* A F *secures* A^1 N edd.
n. i. 13. 10: *uoces* A F *uices* A^1 N edd.
o. i. 20. 39: *descerpens* A^1 (dot faint), *descerpens* F *decerpens* N edd.
p. ii. 1. 41: *p̄ueniunt* A F *ꝙueniunt* A^1 *conueniunt* N edd.
q. ii. 1. 60: *phillíridos* A *phillirydos* F *phillírides* A^1 N edd.

For the change in example *p*, which at first glance seems to consist of the addition of a line almost parallel to the down-stroke of the *p*, one should compare a similar correction in *cognita* i. 7. 14. The abbreviation for *con* in this MS has far less sweep to the left than in most MSS (cf. e.g. in i. 1. 21). Let no one think that the first readings of A were in its archetype, and that F is independently descended from that archetype; for there is this unanswerable objection: A has been corrected by the first hand in a great many places, but *only* where the correction has been so poorly made as to deceive even a modern reader does F have the uncorrected reading. Very interesting also are the following cases:

r. i. 4. 10: *etas* (?) A *e*≡*at* A^1, but can now easily be taken for *erat; eat* N edd. *erat* F.
s. i. 15. 30: *uicis* A *uices* A^1 N edd., but, as corrected in A, the word looks very much like *uias; uias* F.
t. i. 21: No division A F ℙ in margin A^1 new poem N edd.
u. ii. 1. 56: *funera funera* A F; in A a deleting line was run through the second *funera* by a later hand. Either the archetype of F overlooked this line, or else it was inserted in A after F's archetype was copied.

The following curious readings also support my contention. A^1 changes correct readings to incorrect. In one case, however, the supposedly incorrect reading is supported by N and, therefore, should probably not be included in the list (example *y*). The only plausible explanation for these cases is that A's archetype had the

[1] Another example should probably be added to this list. I have no photograph of A showing i. 17. 19, at which line Baehrens reports *peperissent* AF *sepelissent* A^1 (N edd.). Probably the original writing is still very clear. The fact that Baehrens noticed it points to that, for he fails to report most of the original readings where A has been corrected.

readings to which A corrected, and that A unconsciously emended as he copied, and afterward conscientiously "corrected." The most mechanical scribe might unconsciously emend *timporibus* to *temporibus* (example *w*), but the other changes presuppose that the copyist was following the sense of the passage and was perhaps somewhat of a scholar (Richard de Fournival himself? The mere fact that a work so little known at that time should be copied at all betokens intelligent interest.). All these emendations could very easily be made by an intelligent reader.

v. i. 1. 7: *defic año* A *deficit annis* A¹ F *deficit anno* N edd.
w. i. 3. 22: *temporibus* A¹ *timporibus* F *temporibus* N edd.
x. i. 20. 39: *ungui* A N F *ungui* A¹.
y. ii. 1. 47: *uni* A Baehrens *uno* A¹ N F.

Let us not forget to consider the evidence of the opposition. I will say at once that I expect to use even this evidence to support my case. Differences in spelling may be ignored. Anyone who has become acquainted with the ways of humanistic MSS (such as F) knows that most arguments based on orthography are unsound; that a scribe ordinarily would no more imitate the spelling of his archetype than he would its script. The dropping or adding of *h*, the interchange of *i* and *y*, etc., are due to the caprice or training of the copyist. In addition to orthographical differences easily recognized as such, I believe that we may also classify the following readings under that head:

i. 1. 26: *Qerite* A *Querite* F N; i. 4. 28: *quiquam* A *quicquam* F N; i. 11. 26, ii. 1. 15: *quĩquid* A *quicquid* F N; i. 12. 19: *dissistere* A N, *desistere* F.

The list of passages in which F is apparently superior to A is not nearly so long as one would infer from Baehrens' apparatus.[1]

a. i. 2. 15: *leucippis* F N edd. *leucupis* A.
b. i. 3. 15: *Subiecto* F N edd. *Cubiecto* A.
c. i. 5. 27: *tupotero* F *tum potero* F² N edd. *cum p.* A.
d. i. 6. 4: q$_3$ (=*que*) F N (edd.) *que* (=*quae*) A.

[1] In the following passages Baehrens' apparatus is wrong (I say nothing of corrections later than F²): i. 1. 7: *annis* F; 18 *memini* F; 29 *Forte* F; *fere* F; 30 *semina* F; 31 *remanere* F; 34 *desit* F; 7. 21; *Tu* F; 13. 10: *exhiget* A; 21 *en ipse* F; 15. 7: *hec choys* F; 18. 20: *argadio* F; ii. 1. 59: *philotece* F; 61 *E* F.

e. i. 8. 2: *sum* F N edd. *sim* A.
f. i. 8. 7: *positas* F N edd. *positas positas* A.
g. i. 8. 17: *quocumque* F edd. *quodcumque* A N.
h. i. 8. 23: *nautas* F N edd. *nauitas* A.
i. i. 8. 37: *quamuis* F N edd. *quamuis quamuis* A.
j. i. 12. 4: *ueneto* F N edd. *uenero* A.
k. i. 12. 8: *amare* F N edd. *amore* A.
l. i. 12. 9: *fuimus* F N edd. *sumus* A.
m. i. 15. 6: *querere* F N edd. *quere* A.
n. i. 15. 28: *Si* F N edd. *S* A.
o. i. 15. 31: *mutetur* F N edd. *imitetur mutetur* A.
p. i. 15. 42: *blanditiis* F N edd. *blandicus* A.
q. i. 16. 2: *nota* F N edd. *uota* A.
r. i. 16. 24: q̄ F N (edd.) q̄ (= *quod*?) A.
s. i. 17. 4: q̄ F N (edd.) *que* A.
t. i. 18. 15: *furor* F N edd. *fluor* A.
u. i. 20. 17: *pagasse* F *Pagasae* edd. *pegase* A N.
v. i. 20. 24: *sepositi* F N edd. *se positi* A.
w. ii. 1. 7: *sparsos* F N edd. *sparsos* A.
x. ii. 1. 62: *patriis* F N *patruis* A.

Let us examine this long list. Example *l* should be canceled because i. 12. 9 begins a new quaternio and the "signature" at the bottom of the preceding page has the correct *fuimus*. The archetype of F could have taken his reading from this source. Example *w* is of no consequence. Even an ignorant scribe would scarcely have reproduced the reading of A. Example *h* should surely be stricken out, for a scribe would be very apt to substitute the more familiar *nautas* for the rare *nauitas*. Examples *f*, *i*, *o* prove little by themselves; the right readings could be due to easy mistakes. The authority of A N shows that no value is to be attached to the reading of F in example *u*. We could cut down the list somewhat more, but there will remain a few readings that can be satisfactorily accounted for in only one way—unless we abandon our position that F is a granddaughter of A, and the evidence presented above will not permit us to do that. The way out of the difficulty is to assume that the correct readings were the result of emendation in the archetype of F. In every one of the examples quoted it is quite easy to arrive at the reading of N by emending A. When we remember that the archetype of F belonged to Petrarch, the first of the manu-

script-emending humanists, this assumption becomes most probable. The following facts also tend to show that he emended his Propertius (in margin or text): Lombardo a Serico was the technical corrector (F^2) of F. There is good reason to believe that everything written by him in F is derived from the archetype. He adds comments which no doubt originated with Petrarch; e.g., at iv. 5. 53: "proprie ais, in exitium propera callida lena." F^2 also adds variants which seem to be the result of emendation. So i. 21. 6 *ruis* A F *tuis* N edd. *al' tuis* F^2. i. 12. 19 is interesting: *Mi neque* A N edd. *Minimeque* F *al' me neque* F^2. The reading of F^2 may be explained as a mistake, but a far more satisfactory explanation is that F's archetype had *Mi neque* and Petrarch wrote *me* above (a little to the right, out of the way of the capital *M*) as an emendation for *mi*. F took the whole thing for *minimeque*, and F^2 entered Petrarch's reading, as he usually did. Example *u* above is perhaps to be similarly explained: Petrarch's MS had *pegase* and he wrote *pro* (in abbreviation) *a* above, rather carelessly perhaps, and this was interpreted by F as *pera* to take the place of *pe*. From Petrarch's remark about Propertius, written in the margin of his Virgil (quoted above, p. 286), we see that he scanned his Propertius, at least in part. If he scanned he would be apt to emend. Furthermore, in this same Virgil Petrarch quotes iii. 9. 1. We might expect him to have read rather carefully, and perhaps emended, a poem from which he quotes. There is a trace of his work in the perplexing v. 8. N F have *iugo*, F^1 (*sic*) has *l'rogo* in the margin. *Rogo* (from *rogus*) seems to be an emendation to fit *flamma*.

From the list given above we notice that most of the cases in which F has a superior reading are confined to a few poems: i. 8, 12, and 15. Now Petrarch did not count Propertius among his favorite authors; probably, therefore, he read the elegies hastily, stopping only where he was particularly interested—as he himself tells us he did in the case of certain other authors.[1] This accounts for the many emendations in poems 8, 12, and 15 of the first book. In addition to examples *j* and *k* there are two other probable emendations of Petrarch's in poem 12: *me neque* of vs. 19, which we have just discussed, and in the same verse, the reading *desistere*, which was probably intro

[1] De Nolhac *Pétrarque* I, 188.

duced by Petrarch, even if it is only an orthographical variation, as stated above. There is other evidence that Petrarch paid special attention to the poems mentioned. In six cases A repeats a word (in a somewhat different form in two of these cases).[1] In only three of these cases does F follow A; two of the three cases in which F has the correct (single) form are in poem 8, the other is in poem 15.

In the list given, Petrarch's emendation generally agrees with N. There is no significance in this, of course, as the list is made up of passages in which F agrees with the commonly accepted text based largely on N. But in i. 8. 17 and i. 12. 19 Petrarch's emendations (I think enough evidence has been adduced to show that they were his) disagree with N. No doubt many of the readings of F differing from A are due to Petrarch's attempts at emendation.

Apparently, then, F is of no value for those portions of the text which A still offers us. The remaining problems, which I hope to take up later, are to restore Petrarch's MS from its existing descendants, especially F, in order to supply a substitute for the missing part of A, and, finally, to decide on the comparative value of A (with its substitute) and N.

Two recent articles raise several interesting questions. The first of these, by Th. Simar, deals with the MSS of Propertius in the Vatican.[2] His method is a highly commendable one: he aims to connect the Vatican MSS with various humanists on the basis of handwriting and other indications. But in the few points in which I have tested his work I have found it unreliable to such an extraordinary degree that I am forced to refuse to accept any of his results until they can be verified.

Simar asserts that the sign $\overset{\mathrm{T}}{\underset{\mathrm{A}}{\mathrm{N}}}$ "est l'indice le plus sûr de la provenance napolitaine," decides that a number of MSS containing it were copied in Naples, and concludes that they all are descended from Vat. 3273, which also contains the sign and which, on the authority of Fulvio Orsini, was written by Panormita. But I doubt whether this sign is confined to Neapolitan MSS. Furthermore the authority

[1] i. 5. 6; 7. 18; 8. 7; 8. 37; 15. 31; ii. 1. 56.

[2] Th. Simar *Les MSS du Properce du Vatican*, *Musée Belge* XIII (1909), 80.

of Fulvio Orsini is now largely discredited, and it is very doubtful if Panormita wrote Vat. 3273.

A remarkable statement of Simar's is the following: "Un des sigles les plus fréquents, ce sont les 3 points en triangle ∴ qui indiquent un scribe napolitain." I need give no proofs of the falsity of this statement; anyone who has handled MSS knows that the sign in question is common in all kinds of fifteenth century MSS. On the basis of other signs he attributes a number of MSS to Pomponius Leto and his circle.[1]

But it is his assertions about Vat. 1612 and Barb. viii. 58 that have made me skeptical about all his arguments. I have examined these MSS and found his statements entirely unwarranted. Of Barb. viii. 58 he says: "Par hasard, j'ai pu identifier l'écriture du scribe qui est, je pense, le poète Joannes Jovianus Pontanus." Vat. 1612 he maintains is by the same hand. How any person, with or without a knowledge of paleography, could make such a statement, if he had the two MSS before him at the same time, I cannot understand. I can only believe that Simar was merely trusting to his memory. A comparison with Soldati's[2] facsimile of Pontano's handwriting clearly shows that neither Barb. viii. 58 nor Vat. 1612 was written by Pontano. The reasons that led Simar astray in regard to Vat. 1612 are these. The MS has the following colophon: "Scripsi ego [Gaspar Manius Romanus] et ultro et jocunde Anno MCCCCLXXX Kl's Decembris fauente mihi clarissimo atque sanctissimo uate [Petreio ac Pomponio omnium hominum sapientissimo] principe meo B. M. cuius etiam habui emendatissimum exemplar eius propria manu confectum." The words in brackets are *in rasura*. Simar thought that he could read *Jacobus* under the first erasure. After this subscription there follows a poem of four lines (*Qui nostras placido*, etc.) in the margin of which Simar thought he saw the words *Jacobus Pontanus*. He suggests that Joannes Jovianus Pontanus may have signed his father's name, which was Jacobus (but why should he do so?), or that Jacobus may really have been his name.

[1] Simar says that Vat. 3211, presumably a MS of Propertius, was inaccessible to him because it was "en restauration." Since I had no record of this MS, I investigated in June, 1910, and found that it was a MS of Michelangelo. I may also note here that Simar's report that Cappon. 196 and Vat. 1611 contain Catullus is untrue.

[2] *Pontani Carmina* (ed. Soldati, 1902).

But the facts are against this. Under *Gaspar* I distinctly read *Johannes*. The second word cannot be made out. The third word was clearly *Hyspaleñ*. The subscription is followed by the words *Vale Tridentine*, later erased, then the poem mentioned above. In the margin of verse 2 the name *A. Tridentoni* has been erased and in the margin of verse 4 *Jacobus Bonoñ* (*not* Pontanus) has been erased. There remains absolutely nothing, then, to connect this MS with Pontano. Furthermore, I am confident that I have discovered the MS that he did copy; but I must leave a discussion of this matter for another time. The connections of Vat. 1612 can, however, be traced. After the poem mentioned there follows another, beginning *Incipit a teneris*, in the margin of which the words *Nicolaus Vulpes Vicentinus. A. Tridentoni* have been erased. Jacobus Bononiensis, therefore, sent the one poem to A. Tridenton, and Nicolaus Vulpes Vicentinus sent the other to the same man. Both poems are found also in a Ravenna MS, Class. 277, but the "Incipit" poem follows Tibullus (signed Nicolaus Vulpes Vicentinus), while the "Qui placido" poem (unsigned) follows the Propertius.[1] The MS is dated 1459 and has the scribe's signature: *βαπτήστου Σπελλαιου*. In the last word we see the name of the town Spello, as we do also in the *Hyspalensis* of the Vatican MS. It should be remembered that the people of Spello (Hispellum) took a particular interest in Propertius, claiming him as one of their own.

There is still a third MS belonging to the series, Goettingen Philol. 111. b. It has the poem about Tibullus at the *end* of that author's poems, and so reads *explicit a teneris*, instead of *incipit*. The poem is preceded by the name *Nicolaus Vulpes Vicentinus*, and is followed by a modification of the usual *vita Tibulli*. All of this is in a different hand from the text. The other poem is not found in the MS. Its absence makes it more likely that the Goettingen MS, and not the Ravenna MS (as Sabbadini thought), belonged to Vulpes.[2] The Goettingen MS originally had the date Millesimo CCCCLVIIII at the beginning, but the last three strokes were erased, leaving the date 1456. I cannot account for this.

[1] Sabbadini *Studi ital. di fil. cl.* 7 (1899), p. 106.

[2] It is true that in vs. 3 Goett. (and Vat.) has *decet*, whereas Rav. correctly has *docet;* but this may be a slip even on the part of the author.

Closely connected with Vat. 1612 is Barb. viii. 58 (which too Simar thought was written by Pontano) and Nap. iv. F 22, as is shown by a discussion of the name of Propertius' work which all three have in common. Nap. iv. F 22 was written in Bologna, July 17, 1465 by a "Vicarius potestatis." A Jacob of Bologna wrote one of the poems discussed above, and Nicolaus Vulpes was professor at Bologna for a number of years.[1] Bologna and Spello are the towns, then, that are connected with the MSS that we have been discussing.

Far more pretentious than Simar's article is Richmond's,[2] as he has in mind the preparation of a critical edition. If he is correct in his main conclusions, he has done a most important piece of work, but I must confess that I have not been convinced by the evidence thus far submitted. Briefly, his main argument is that he has unearthed certain fifteenth-century MSS which ultimately go back to an earlier source than any existing MS. Much of his evidence is entirely subjective, depending on his view of the text in any given passage. He uses many readings of the new MSS to support an emendation of his own. This evidence I will not discuss, as such discussion would be entirely fruitless. But the evidence of a more objective nature calls for some criticisms. In the first place, Richmond lays great stress on the dislocations in his new MSS. He argues, plausibly enough, that only an old book suffers dislocations, that, therefore, his new MSS go back to an old source. But that is not necessarily true. Many MSS of Catullus show similar dislocations, MSS which I am convinced are not descended from an ancient archetype, although I realize that Richmond would argue to the contrary. There is another explanation just as plausible. Perhaps the archetypal MS had never been bound, and so was easily disarranged. Furthermore a book but a year old may fall to pieces if it is used much and hard, while another may, if undisturbed, last for centuries. Probably the archetype of these MSS was studied and copied a great deal and suffered much accordingly. Hence it is, too, that it was not preserved to us.

Richmond thinks that c^1 (Voss. 81) was written by a scholar. I should rather say an ignoramus, judging from his text of Catullus,

[1] Sabbadini *op. cit.*

[2] O. L. Richmond, "Towards a Recension of Propertius," *Journal of Phil.* XXXI (1910), 162.

Tibullus, and Propertius. The word scholar is, however, an elastic one. It may be well to state that the text of Tibullus in this MS contains the known interpolations of certain humanists—a fact which throws a shadow of suspicion over the Propertius as well.

Misapplied paleography, I am sorry to say, has affected Richmond's work, as it has that of so many other students of fifteenth-century MSS. On the authority of Bradshaw and Kuno Meyer he asserts that the use of *finit* for *explicit* shows that a MS was copied by an Irish scribe or was descended from an Irish MS. If this were true, all roads would lead to Ireland, for the use of *finit* is exceedingly common. It may be true that in Irish MSS *finit* is always, *explicit* never, used; it may even be true that the use of *finit* arose in Ireland, but its use in fifteenth-century MSS does not prove nor even suggest that these MSS are of Irish descent. I have incidentally noted *finit* in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italian MSS of Tibullus, Tacitus' *Dialogus* and *Germania*, Virgil's *Culex*, Cicero *Ad Familiares*, Persius, Catullus, Paulus Diaconus (Festus), and others, and I am certain that the list could be extended to include almost any Latin work. But I can present decisive evidence against the theory. *Finit* is often found in Italian MSS of works produced by Italian humanists of the fifteenth century. A few examples will suffice:[1] Paris. 5689 has "Dyodori siculi historiarum priscarum a Poggio in latinum traducti liber sextus et ultimus finit." Paris. 6310 (Aristotle *Econ.* and *Pol.* translated by Leonardo Bruno) has "Finit liber secundus," "finit liber octavus."

Richmond's deductions from spelling are also valueless, in my opinion. Even if it is true that the spelling of his MSS shows that they are descended from an Irish ancestor, it is still possible that an Irishman copied the MS in Italy in the fifteenth century from an Italian archetype. But I doubt if even so much can be admitted.

In the same way Richmond's arguments that the errors are most easily explained as being due to an Irish archetype do not convince. *Rasce* from *nisee*, *canna* from *omne*, which he cites as examples, are quite as easily explained from a humanistic archetype, if we assume that the copyist knew little or no Latin.

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[1] They are taken from Mazzatinti *La biblioteca dei re d'Aragona in Napoli*, pp. 7, 37. Other examples may be found there and elsewhere.

THE PRENUPTIAL RITE IN THE NEW CALLIMACHUS

By Duane Reed Stuart

The opening lines of the new fragment of the *Aetia* of Callimachus *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* VII (1910), 15 ff., plunge the reader into the midst of the story. It is the night before the day set for the wedding of Cydippe and the Naxian suitor, the rival of Acontius:

ἤδη καὶ κούρῳ παρθένος εὐνάσατο,
τέθμιον ὡς ἐκέλευε προνύμφιον ὕπνον ἰαῦσαι
ἄρσενι τὴν τᾶλιν παιδὶ σὺν ἀμφιθαλεῖ.
Ἥρην γάρ κοτέ φασι—κύαν, κύον, ἴσχεο, λαιδρὲ
θυμέ, σύ γ' ἀείσῃ καὶ τά περ οὐχ ὁσίη.

Thus read the first five lines of the papyrus. To the variant *αὐτίκα* for *ἄρσενι* I shall subsequently revert.

On the island of Naxos custom ordained that on the eve of the wedding the bride should share the bed of a *κοῦρος*. This, at least, is clear. But who was the *κοῦρος* here alluded to? The absent lover, Acontius, his Naxian rival, or neither? Mr. Hunt and Professor Murray in their interpretations of the passage betray a laudable reluctance to spoil the romance of the situation. The editor of the papyrus regards the words *ἤδη . . . . φασί* as the conclusion of a monologue of the lorn Acontius, who is sorrowing because "Cydippe had not immediately followed up her (unintentional) declaration that she would marry him after the custom of the maidens of her own island." This explanation saves the amenities at the expense of the probabilities and has been accepted by no one. *Κούρῳ* is a very impersonal term for Acontius to apply to himself—we need at least a *τῷδε*. Mr. Hunt translates: "already the maid had been couched with the youth," etc. The aorist *εὐνάσατο* is hard to reconcile with the notion of a lament, since the lover is not narrating what actually occurred but what might have been. The presence of an *ἄν* would do wonders for Mr. Hunt's interpretation—but the *ἄν* is not here. The poet himself is surely speaking. Professor Murray, in the editor's note on the passage,

is credited with a different device for avoiding the embarrassment of a literal explanation. He suggests that the reference is not to Acontius and Cydippe but to the participants in the solemnities of the ἱερὸς γάμος as celebrated at Naxos.

Leo in *Nachr. d. Kgl. Gesells. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Kl.* (1910), p. 57, displays greater hardihood. Callimachus in no equivocal language relates that "Kydippe habe mit ihrem erklärten Bräutigam das in Naxos übliche Brautbeilager in der Nacht vor der Hochzeit bereits gefeiert." Leo admits that this is an unlovely episode in a pretty story and suggests that Ovid and Aristaenetus deliberately omitted allusion to the rite in their versions. Callimachus, on the other hand, had an antiquarian interest in mentioning the rite and tracing it to its αἴτιον. Furthermore, we must remember that Cydippe was not in love with Acontius, hence without heartburning or scruple could conform to the custom of her country.

To these comments we may subscribe, in so far as they characterize the attitude of the poet or relate to the circumstances attendant on the story. However, Professor Leo overlooked a consequence of his view which is, to say the least, disconcerting. If the κοῦρος is the Naxian and if his connection with Cydippe had gone so far as Professor Leo is willing to believe, what are we to think about the following lines (44 ff.) in which is portrayed the final triumph of the love of Acontius?

οὔ σε δοκέω τημοῦτος, Ἀκόντιε, νυκτὸς ἐκείνης
ἀντί κε τῆς μίτρης ἧψαο παρθενίης
οὐ σφυρὸν Ἰφίκλειον ἐπιτρέχον ἀσταχίεσσιν
. . . . δέξασθαι.

In Callimachus παρθένιος has the strict connotation *virginalis castitas*—see Kuiper *Studia Callimachea* (Leyden, 1896), p. 48. Was the "Brautbeilager" a mere form? However, we may excuse Professor Leo from resolving the difficulty. His explanation, as well as those of Messrs. Hunt and Murray, rests on the assumption that κοῦρος means "youth." This view has been challenged, I believe, properly. The case against it, nevertheless, can be materially strengthened.

According to Mr. Housman, in the *Classical Quarterly* IV (1910), 114–15, the correct interpretation of the passage is one which, by

comparison with Leo's, might be inscribed *virginibus puerisque*. Κοῦρος is to be translated "boy." Mr. Housman cites no especial evidence which makes for his opinion but confines himself to the assertion that the retention of ἄρσενι—on which he rightly insists —makes Mr. Hunt's interpretation "more plainly impossible." The last word on the subject is contained in an article by M. Puech in the *Revue des Études Grecques* XXIII (1910), 260. The author, reiterating Housman's view, recalls the well-known fact that κοῦρος, κούρη, and the cognate κουρίζειν frequently refer in Callimachus to babies or young children. See Kuiper *Studia Call.* 112.

Now, all will acknowledge that the linguistic evidence by itself is not final. Of course κοῦρος, in Callimachus as well as elsewhere, *may* mean "infant." In applying the word to the unborn Apollo, *Hym. ad Del.* iv. 214, Callimachus had the high authority of the Homeric poems to sanction the usage. In *Iliad* vi. 58 we read: ὅν τινα γαστέρι μήτηρ | κοῦρον ἐόντα φέροι, where, in Mr. Leaf's note, "the use of κοῦρος to signify 'babe' is quite unique; it elsewhere connotes rather a man in the prime of life," we are, of course, to insert after "elsewhere" the phrase "in Homer." Other apposite instances, which are not cited in Liddell and Scott but have been encountered casually in reading, are Theocritus *Id.* xvii. 66, where the word is used of the new-born Ptolemy, who has been called βρέφος in the preceding line, and Nonnus, *Dionys.* ix. 26–27, where, as is also plain from the context, κοῦρος connotes βρέφος. This use of the word was evidently approved by the poets, at least by those of the high style, from early times to late.

On the other hand, as we should naturally expect, Callimachus did not use the word in this sense only. Lads of school age, boys old enough to inspire the ardent admiration of their elders of the same sex, are called κοῦροι in frags. 107 and 169. In other fragments it is difficult to fix the age to which the term has reference, although in this connection it is interesting to note that the older critics hazarded the suggestion that the κοῦρος of frag. 169 is Acontius. At all events, it is certain that, since the use of the word in the sense of *adulescens* was part and parcel of the diction of Greek poetry, Callimachus would have applied the epithet to youths and young men as freely as does Theocritus. Hence, as I have before

said, it is necessary to reinforce the linguistic evidence in order fully to justify the assertion that κοῦρος in l. 1 of the papyrus *must* mean βρέφος or παιδίον. Παῖς in l. 3, it is quite superfluous to say, is no more definitive than κοῦρος.

To be sure, M. Puech goes a step beyond Mr. Housman by citing Pollux iii. 39–40. The passage mentions a day of the Greek wedding festivities which was called ἀπαυλία . . . . ἐν ᾗ ὁ νυμφίος εἰς τοῦ πενθεροῦ ἀπαυλίζεται ἀπὸ τῆς νύμφης. Below there follows this surprising information: καὶ τῷ μὲν νυμφίῳ τότε (on the occasion of the ἀπαυλία) ἐν τοῦ πενθεροῦ παιδίον ἀμφιθαλὲς θῆλυ συγκατακλίνεται, τῇ δὲ νύμφῃ ἐν τοῦ γαμβροῦ ἄρρεν (supp. παιδίον ἀμφιθαλές). Unfortunately, this entire context, as much of what the lexicographers have to tell about Greek marriage rites, is somewhat of a puzzle. As far as the reference to the custom goes, the statement of Pollux is unique. From other lexicographers we get little or nothing beyond a confusion of ἐπαυλία and ἀπαυλία. Hesychius *sub* γάμοι has ἡ δὲ δευτέρα (ἡμέρα τῶν γάμων) ἀπαυλία. Deubner, in an article entitled Ἐπαύλια, *Jahrb. des D. Arch. Inst.* XV (1900), 147, takes the ground that ἀπαυλία in this passage is a textual error and unhesitatingly substitutes ἐπαυλία. This procedure is open to some criticism. I am not certain that Hesychius did not write ἀπαυλία, since it is clear that he was not aware that there was any vital distinction between the two words. For, in a previous passage which Deubner seems to have overlooked, ἀπαυλία and ἐπαυλία are defined as synonyms: ἀπαυλία καὶ ἐπαυλία διχῶς λέγεται ἡμέρα ἐν ᾗ . . . . ἐπαυλίζεται τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἡ νύμφη (*sub* ἀπαυλία). What the *Etymologicon Magnum* has to say about the word ἀπαυλία is of no independent value. As in Hesychius, the origin of the term is connected with the departure of the bride from the house of her father to the home of her husband, whose bed and board she is henceforth to share: . . . . ἄρχεται ἡ κόρη χωρὶς τοῦ πατρὸς αὐλίζεσθαι ἢ τότε ἐπαυλίζεται τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἡ γυνή.

Modern criticism has necessarily been hampered by the unsatisfactory character of the data furnished by the lexicographers as to the ἀπαυλία. A glance at the handbooks will show that there is agreement on one point, namely, that the ceremony was observed on one of the days following the marriage. See, for example, Becker-

Göll *Charicles* III, 378–79; Hermann-Blümner *Griech. Priv. Alt.* 277, and n. 5. Deubner, in the paper just referred to, p. 147, n. 18, repeats the traditional view, suggesting that the sojourn of the bridegroom apart from his bride in the house of his father-in-law took place on one of the later days of the nuptial festivities. The order of definition in Pollux, *προαυλία*, *ἐπαυλία*, *ἀπαυλία* might seem to favor this explanation. However, if the passage in Pollux is to have the validity as a parallel which Puech accords it and is to be utilised in interpreting the text of the papyrus, the *ἀπαυλία* should be a prenuptial rite. Of this difficulty Puech did not take cognisance.

Now, there is an array of evidence, bearing on this point, which has been entirely overlooked by those who have busied themselves with the new Callimachus. This evidence is to be found neither in Greek authors nor in Latin, but in the nuptial *mores* of many peoples, civilized and uncivilized. In this day and generation, when Mannhardt and Frazer have shown the way, the classical philologist need present no apology if, in quest of light upon a religious usage or a social custom of the ancient world, he indulges in divagations into the realm of folk-lore. Here, in the present instance, we shall find the proof so evidently desirable that *κοῦρος* means *parvulus*. Incidentally, we shall learn what the primitive significance of this Naxian marriage custom was.

A fundamental tenet of folk belief is that the downfall of an enemy may be compassed or the heart of an obdurate lover melted if an image be subjected to the fate which it is desired shall befall the object of incantation. We can hardly overestimate the potency attributed to this process of imitative magic or simulation, as it is called, by all races of the olden times and by savage peoples today. Such practices as figure in the *Pharmaceutria* have been a favored theme in poetry and imaginative literature from the *Idylls* of Theocritus down to Rossetti's *Sister Helen*. A few examples out of many are Vergil *Ec.* 8. 75–82; Horace *Epod.* 17. 76; *Sat.* i. 8. 30 ff.; Ovid *Am.* iii. 7. 29 and *Her.* 6. 91. For a graphic picture of the prevalence and the persistence of mimetic rites it will suffice to refer the reader to *The Golden Bough*, I², 9 ff.

Simulation is likewise regarded as an efficacious means of curing

barren women. Among savage peoples a doll, fashioned from wood, cloth, or some other substance, is the *sine qua non* of the process. This puppet is carried about, fondled, and treated as if it were a child, or, as in the classic instance reported from the Babar Islands in the Malay Archipelago and described by Frazer (*op. cit.* I, 19; Ploss *Das Weib* I, 688, rev. ed.; Hartland *Primitive Paternity* [London, 1909–10] I, 146), may figure in an elaborate ritual in which the mimicry is even more realistic. Frazer cites only two examples of this use of simulation, but these are by no means isolated phenomena. By consulting Ploss and Hartland, the reader will discover that analogous practices are world-wide in extent. Their existence among African tribes, in Mexico, among the Eskimos of Behring Strait, and in Japan has been recorded by ethnologists and travelers.

This superstition does not manifest itself merely in the naïve usages of savage and non-European races. We find traces of it in much higher strata of civilization. This difference, however, is observable. By primitive man the process is resorted to as a remedy for proved sterility. Peoples of more advanced culture tend to act on the principle that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" and, therefore, to utilize simulation as a prophylactic. Consequently, the custom appears as a prenuptial rite or as a feature of the ceremonies of the wedding day. Furthermore, a flesh-and-blood child takes the place of the doll.

In a frequent form of the ceremony a male child is put on the lap of the bride at the wedding. Students of marriage customs have long since shown that this procedure is widely prevalent among Aryan peoples and that it may possibly have formed a part of the Indo-Germanic marriage ritual. It is prescribed in the *Āpastambīya-Gṛihyasūtra* as follows—I quote from the version of Winternitz given in "Das altindische Hochzeitsrituell," *Denkschrf. der Wien. Akad., Phil.-Hist. Kl.*, XL (1892), 23: "Nun setzt er [der Bräutigam] . . . . den Sohn einer [Frau] welche nur männliche Kinder geboren hat und deren Söhne am Leben sind, auf ihren Schoss, gibt diesem [Knaben] . . . . Früchte und murmelt die beiden folgenden [Ṛig-verse]." In an exhaustive note on this passage (p. 75), Winternitz collects from Indian literature other allusions to the custom and

cites references which prove that it exists, or at least existed in the Punjab in modern times.

Among the Slavonic peoples of eastern and southeastern Europe, in Servia, Galicia, Bulgaria, and parts of Russia, the custom is well-nigh universal, as is shown by data collected by Leopold Schroeder, *Die Hochzeitsbräuche der Esten und einiger anderer finnisch-ugrischer Völkerschaften in Vergleichung mit denen der indogermanischen Völker* (Berlin, 1888) 123 ff., and Mannhardt, *Mythologische Forschungen* (Strassburg, 1884) 357. This material has been rendered easily accessible by Hartland, *Primitive Paternity* I, 141 ff.; see also by the same author *The Legend of Perseus* (London, 1894–96) I, 178. As we should expect, there are local variations in respect of the period in the wedding festivities at which the child is introduced and of the treatment accorded to it. The child may be handed to the bride while she sits her horse or rides in a wagon in the nuptial procession, or when she enters the house of her future lord, or as she foots it in the dance. Often the child is not held, but is merely kissed and handed back. Again, the child is put on the bride's lap while she sits at the wedding feast. Other places in Europe in which the rite appears are Finland—in Finnish there is a special word for *Schoossknabe*—and Corsica, where the bride receives the child from the hands of her husband's nearest relative and kisses it, while her kinsfolk wish her happiness, "tre di maschi e femmin' una."

My desire to emphasize the prevalence of this usage, and to show how deeply rooted in folk consciousness is the belief of which this rite is the outward manifestation, has led me to reproduce here some things that to the student of folk-lore are commonplaces of information. I must, however, call attention to a further variant of the ceremony. As recently as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, custom in Sweden prescribed that *on the night preceding the wedding* the prospective bride should sleep with a boy baby. If she did so, her firstborn would be a son; see L. Lloyd *Peasant Life in Sweden* (London, 1870) 85. Schroeder, p. 126, is authority for the statement that this is a prevalent superstition throughout Scandinavia. One is tempted to conjecture that, in the form of simulation practiced by the northern Teutons, the original rite has

survived in its primitive simplicity, whereas, among the Hindoos and the Slavs, there has developed a modified form in which the symbolism is, to our taste at least, more delicate. Such is the ordinary law of evolution in folk usage. On the other hand we should expect to find, as we climb the ladder of civilization, that less of the original realism remains. This is apparently not true in the present instance. Perhaps the safer course is merely to observe that we have to do with separate manifestations, more or less vivid, of the same folk concept and to deposit the question of origin and evolution in the laps of the anthropologists. At all events, we see that the Scandinavian form of the rite possesses for us great significance and brings us around to our point of departure, the papyrus.

The character and the purpose of the Naxian rite are now clear, it seems to me, beyond all peradventure. On the night preceding her wedding day, Cydippe took to her bed a boy of tender years, and this was the custom of the place. The act took its rise in the desire to render the forthcoming marriage fruitful and to enable the bride to become the mother of sons, "the pillars of the house." Simulation was the means by which the end wished for was to be attained. The lines of the papyrus thus take on a new importance. As I have previously remarked, students of marriage customs have suggested the possibility that the ceremony of the *Schoossknabe* is to be viewed as a part of the Indo-Germanic marriage ritual. However, no evidence for the existence of the rite among the Greeks or the Romans seems to have been cited. The passage in Pollux, owing doubtless to the lack of cognate testimony, has received only passing notice from those who have written about the marriage rites of the ancient Greeks and has been, I believe, quite neglected by the anthropologists. Now we find in some stray leaves from the works of a famous poet, whom the Egyptian dust-heaps have treated in a fashion all too niggardly, data which students of primitive culture will be glad to add to their store.

The maidens who participated in the rite were doubtless quite in the dark as to its real significance. Callimachus himself was ignorant of the original purpose of the ceremony, as was also the author of the Townley scholium on the *Iliad* xiv. 296, quoted by

Hunt and referred to by all who have concerned themselves with this part of the papyrus. For convenience I quote the comment of the scholiast:

> εἰς εὐνὴν φοιτῶντε φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας· . . . . διὸ καὶ μέχρι νῦν ὑπόμνημα φυλάσσεσθαι παρὰ Ναξίοις καὶ τὸν ἀμφιθαλῆν τῇ τάλι[1] συγκατατεθεῖσθαι· ἄλλοι τὸν Δία φασὶν ἐν Σάμῳ λάθρα τῶν γονέων διαπαρθενεῦσαι τὴν Ἥραν. ὅθεν Σάμιοι ζήλῳ τῆς θεοῦ μνηστεύοντες τὰς κόρας λάθρα συγκομίζουσιν, εἶτα παρρησίᾳ τοὺς γάμους θύουσιν.

That impulse which moved the Greeks to throw the vesture of poetry about anything in cult usage or social custom that seemed to them to exhibit unattractive bareness has been operative here with an almost fatal facility. Callimachus or some predecessor fixed the *αἴτιον* of an incomprehensible rite in the clandestine union in which Zeus and Hera consummated their love. The Naxian prenuptial ceremony, therefore, was regarded as the local type of a set of ritual observances, commemorating the *ἱερὸς γάμος*, which existed in one form or another in many Greek lands. This explanation was repeated by the author of the scholium, which is, as Wilamowitz has pointed out (see Hunt *ad. loc.*), based directly on our passage and which contains a citation of l. 3.

The Samian marriage custom to which the scholiast alludes must be carefully distinguished from the Naxian ceremony. These are not parallel rites, although Wilamowitz regarded them as such in his article entitled "Hephaistos," *Nachr. der Gött. Akad. Phil.-Hist. Kl.* (1895) 236, n. 43. However, the discovery of the papyrus had not then rendered a different interpretation of the Naxian usage possible. Puech, with less justification, refers to the Samian rite as an analogy. We cannot in this case go beyond the scholium and discover the source from which the comment is derived. We must, therefore, take at its face value the story that Samian suitors were granted conjugal rights before marriage. We are here confronted with a totally different sort of folk usage, that is, the trial marriage, an institution which has existed in simple or modified form, at different periods and in many climes—in early days even in our own country. But it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion

[1] τῇ Ἰτάλῃ, Maass.

of this subject here. I wish merely to emphasize the fact that the scholiast's sole aim was to cite two customs which he believed commemorated the *ἱερὸς γάμος* of Zeus and Hera. We have, therefore, no right to infer that he viewed these ceremonies as identical in kind, but only in origin.

If, as I venture to hope, new light has been thrown on the original significance of the Naxian rite, *nous autres modernes* should not be hoodwinked into accepting as gospel truth the aetiological fancies of a poet or the secondhand knowledge of a scholiast. Is it a meticulous distinction to insist that one should not hereafter write, as does Housman, "We know . . . . that the Naxians had a marriage custom commemorating the old scandal that Hera was not a virgin when she wedded Zeus"? What we know is that the Naxians had a marriage custom which they, or the poets for them, *thought* took its rise in the *furtum* of the Olympians—a conclusion which was naturally suggested by the frequency of ceremonies in which divine unions were symbolically depicted. I must likewise take issue with M. Puech, who, accepting literally the explanation of the poet, remarks that the rite was a *simulacre*, intended to recall the secret loves of Zeus and Hera: "le fiancé (!) est donc représenté par un tout jeune garçon." A symbol the child certainly was, but not of the husband-to-be. The rite was symbolical, but its symbolism was of a practical sort, not mimicry of a *chronique scandaleuse*. The child should be regarded as a harbinger, and not as a *succedaneum*.

I am loath to leave this subject without a word about the passage cited above from Pollux, which now has new claim for consideration. The lexicographer's account of the *ἀπαυλία* is not to be viewed in the future as an isolated reference, but must be scrutinized in the light of what we have learned about simulation in general and the Naxian rite in particular. There can be no doubt that what Pollux tells us about the bride's part in the observance of the *ἀπαυλία* is based on a substratum of truth. We cannot, however, blink the fact that the bridegroom is said to have performed, *mutatis mutandis*, a like ceremony. I know of no parallel in folk-lore which would corroborate this statement. In the simulative ritual of the Babar Archipelago the husband takes a prominent part, and Winternitz mentions a tribe of Southern India in which the bride hands the

child to the bridegroom, who kisses it, then hands it back. These usages, of course, have not the force of analogies. Everywhere, as we should expect in the nature of the case, when simulation is resorted to as a prophylactical or a remedial measure against sterility, it is the woman on whom the magic influence is centered. So the assertion of Pollux that the bridegroom figured as prominently as the bride in the rite of the *ἀπαυλία* is, to say the least, surprising. At any rate, I am not persuaded to grant to the passage the merit of preserving independent information concerning the practice of simulation in ancient Greece merely because it adds this feature to the description of the rite contained in the papyrus. I am inclined to think that the lexicographer's account simply incorporates a tradition of the Naxian custom with various embellishments as to details, the source of which it is impossible to fix. Common to both the lexicographer and the poet is the ritualistic prescription that the child shall be *patrimus et matrimus*. This point is not without significance. The fact that Pollux does not restrict the ceremony in locality cannot be cited as proof that the custom was generally in vogue, or was even observed sporadically, in Greece. It is typical of the methods of the lexicographers not to descend to such minutiae but to endow the particular with the currency of the universal. Especially is it true that much of what we find in all the sources on the subject of Greek wedding ceremonies has only a local application.

I have previously referred to the theory set forth in the handbooks that the *ἀπαυλία* was a term applied to one of the days which followed the wedding. If the results of our study are accepted and the custom which Pollux describes is to be classed with the Naxian rite and with the kindred usages which have been mentioned, the *ἀπαυλία* can only have been a prenuptial ceremony. This explanation of the word, which is the time-honored one found in Liddell and Scott, should be rehabilitated. A little reflection, I think, will show that the opinion advanced in the handbooks, to the effect that the *ἀπαυλία* was observed after the marriage had been consummated, is based on evidence that will not stand scrutiny. There is nothing inherent in the meaning of the word to restrict its application to the period subsequent to the wedding. Unlike its analogues, *προαυλία*

and *ἐπαυλία*, *ἀπαυλία* does not define a time but describes an act—"a sleeping apart." We have, therefore, no right to infer, because the order of definition in Pollux runs *προαυλία*, *ἐπαυλία*, *ἀπαυλία*, that the term last named designated a day subsequent to the wedding, as did the second. Pollux was giving an account of a ceremony which, for all we are told to the contrary, may well have taken place on the night of the *προαυλία*.

It is easy to reconstruct the notion that inspired the statements of the later lexicographers quoted in part on p. 305. They assumed, as a matter of course, that the withdrawal implied in *ἀπαυλία* could only refer to the departure of the young wife from her father's house to take her place in the abode of her husband. Any other interpretation save the obvious one would naturally not have occurred to them, uncritical compilers as they were of facts foreign to their own experience. They could have had no personal knowledge of such an obscure, if not unique, folk custom as was the Naxian rite. Explaining *ἀπαυλία* in terms of the probabilities as a post-nuptial ceremony, they merged it with the familiar *ἐπαυλία* and gave it the same wide currency. Hence the identification of the two words by Hesychius and the absurd comment in the *Etymologicon Magnum:* *Ἀπαυλία· ἑορτὴ παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις κ.τ.λ.*

A word as to the right of *ἄρσενι* to its place in l. 3 of the papyrus and I am done. Leo, I believe, is the only one who has followed Hunt and adopted the variant *αὐτίκα* found in the scholium on Soph. *Ant.* 629. Consequently, *ἄρσενι* perhaps needs no lengthy justification, especially in view of Housman's strong defense of the reading on formal grounds of criticism. I wish simply to add, as an argument for the retention of *ἄρσενι*, a point which the line of study followed in this paper has suggested. Among peoples where the custom of the *Schoosskind* has survived, it is a rule well-nigh universal that the child must be a boy. Schroeder mentions only two districts in which the sex of the child is a secondary consideration. There can be no doubt that in the primitive ceremony no deviation from the niceties of the ritual would have been permissible. Now, in ll. 2 and 3 we have a poetic version of the folk ordinance which governed the procedure. The clause *τέθμιον ὡς ἐκέλευε* is a proof of this and l. 3, with the quaint *τᾶλιν*, seems to

echo the conventional, ritualistic phraseology. Ἄρσενι is the all-important prescription and must necessarily have been emphasized, especially because without it παιδὶ σὺν ἀμφιθαλεῖ would be quite ambiguous and hence out of keeping with the minute precision of expression essential to the rituals and formulae of all times. Ἄρσενι is, therefore, indispensable.

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THE LATIN CONFIXES *-ĒDON-*, *-EDNO-*, 'EATING'

By Edwin W. Fay

1. The reproach of not being able to see the forest for the trees was perhaps first addressed to a scholar. But the opposite vice is also to be shunned, of not examining the trees for looking at the forest. In linguistics this fault seems to me not infrequently caused by collecting a large statistic for a suffix without a close analysis of the meaning of individual words exhibiting the suffix—to say nothing of the not infrequent treatment of a suffix with entire neglect of chronology. I propose to reverse this proceeding by the analysis of some of the more characteristic words in *-do*, *-dinis*, and I shall start with *uredo*, a passing glance at which set me to studying the group to which it belongs.

uredo

2. Used by Cicero (*N.D.* 3. 86) of 'blast, blight,' by Pliny (*N.H.* 9. 147) of a 'burning itch.' I see here a compound, with prius *ur-* : *urit* 'burns,' posterius *-ēden-* : *edit* 'eats' (cf. *far-edo*, of a [corn-like?] abscess). The meaning of *-ēden-* may be illustrated by Eng. *fret* 'herpes, tetter,' Germ. *fresser* "name einer krebsartigen baumkrankheit," cf. also Eng. *mange* from Lat. *manducata* and *scurf* : OE. *sceorfan* 'rodere.' As to formation, the pair *ēden-* : *edit* may be matched with Skr. *rājáṅ-* 'auctoritas' : Lat. *regit* 'rules,' cf. also *offendo* 'offensio' : *offendit*. To be sure, we may be dealing with a root vowel originally long, cf. *inēdia*, Lith. *ėdmi* 'edo,' and the schwa-vowel in *ὠμ-άδιος* 'raw-eating' (: *ad-ep-s* 'fat,' with *ep-* : *opīmus* 'fat'?).[1] In Plautine *absumēdo*, even though it be a merely momentaneous invention of humorous intent, *-ēden-* 'eating' is clear beyond doubt, cf. *edo* | *comedo* (gen. *-ōnis*) 'eater, devourer.'

[1] With *ad-eps* also compare Skr. *ápsas-*, name of a part of the body which a chaste woman hides (*RV*, 1, 124, 7; 5, 80, 6), quasi 'abdomen.' In *RV*, 8, 45, 5, Indra's mother proudly likens his enemies afight with him to "a <cloud-> belly at war with a mountain" (*girā́v ápso ná* = 'in-montem abdomen velut <pugnans'>). Perhaps *abdomen* is also tautological, *ab-* : the posterius in *ad-eps*, + *-dōmen* | *-dūmen* : *δημός* 'fat': the root *dāw-* 'urere' (so Prellwitz).

dulcedo

3. That *dulcēdo* is a compound of *-ēden-* 'taste' has, I doubt not, been long suspected. At any rate, though without remarking on the derivation, Lewis and Short have defined it as literally 'a sweet taste'; cf. the late forms *acredo* 'a sharp or pungent taste,' *salsedo* 'a salt taste.' The force of *-ĕden-* is also sensibly retained in *putredo* (Apuleius) 'festering,' but for a word so late to emerge analysis may well be waived. In *mulcedo* (Gellius) we see an instance of irradiation from *dulcedo*.

gravedo

4. I am not immediately sensible of the force of *-ĕden-* 'eating' in *gravēdo* 'catarrh,' but the names of diseases, passions, pains (cf. *curae edaces*) so commonly end in *-εδων -ηδων* in Greek that *-ēdĕn-* may be said to have come to signify 'disease' (cf. OHG. *magabizzado* 'magen-krampf,' *-bizzado* : Eng. *bites*). I note the following from Brugmann's list (*Grund.*[2] II, 1, § 363), viz.: *τηκεδών* 'consumption,' *ἀκηχεδών* 'cura,' *σηπεδών* 'putredo' (cf. *φαγέδαινα* 'krebsartiges geschwür,' tautological), *πρηδών* 'inflammation' (i.e., '*uredo*,' § 2), *ἐδηδών* 'greediness,'[1] *μελεδών* 'cura' (cf. *μελεδώνη* and, for the sense, Vergil's *dolor edit*), *ἀχθηδών* 'pain' (cf. *dolor* : *dolat* 'hacks'), *ἀλγηδών* 'pain' and the counterterm *χαιρηδών* 'joy.'[2]

5. With these Greek names of diseases, disease-like passions, pains before our eyes, *gravēdo* becomes clearer, for *gravēdo* belongs to the group of "coughs, colds and consumption," just as does *τηκεδών*, which contains in its prius the semantic note of phthisis, viz., emaciation, while *-εδων* tells how the disease feeds upon its victim. By

[1] This reduplicated form is to be compared with *ἐδηδώς* (pf. ptc.), if we consider it solely as to formation. Incidentally it reveals how, in Sanskrit, a *-van-* stem became contaminated with the *-vas-* stem in the pf. ptc. suffix *-vāṁs-* (cf. Fay, *AJP*, 31, 425).

[2] Brugmann's remaining examples less obviously exhibit *-ēden-*. They are *τῡφεδών* 'vapor' (? cf. *Aen.* 5, 682 "lentusque carinas | *est* vapor"), *κλεηδών* 'omen, fama' (? from *κλε[-ϝο]* +*ϝηδών* 'singing': *ἀϝηδών* 'luscinia'), *πεμφρηδών* 'wasp' (*-ηδών* 'singing' if, as Brugmann thinks, the wasp was named from his humming; <but cf. *ἀνθηδών* 'bee' =flower-eating ?>), *χελῑδών* 'swallow' (with *-δων* by irradiation from *ἀηδών*); unless to be divided into onomatopoetic *χελιδ-*+[*σ*]*ϝών* 'sonans'; cf. Aetol. *χελιδϝών*. Further, *κοτυληδών* may mean 'cup-eater,' not a bad description of the octopus's suction-feet (cf. Germ. *saugnapf*). There remain *σχαδών* 'larva' *σταδών* 'tear, cramp' which I feel to be genuinely conglutinata, with "determinative" *δ*+the suffix *-er-*, cf. Hesychian *κλαδών* 'bough,' blended perhaps from *κλάδος* and *κλών*.

irradiation from *gravedo* we account for *tussedo* (Apul.) and perhaps for *frigedo*, though in its solitary occurrence only 'coldness' and not 'a cold' is attested.

THE SUFFIX *-ēdo*

6. From *dulcēdo*—wherein the sense of 'taste' may still be felt in the posterius—and *gravēdo*—wherein, by the citation of Greek parallels, and especially of τηκεδών, the devouring of disease may be realized— *-ēdo* was separated as a general termination for abstracts, as in the following list (for the most part late), to some of which the original force of *-ēden-* may be restored, viz., *albedo*, *aspredo* (Celsus), *claredo*, *crassedo*, *nigredo* (Apul.), *pigredo*, *pinguedo* (Pliny), *putredo* (Apul.), *raucedo* (Isid.), *scabredo* (Apul.).

SUNDRIES

7. There remains a considerable number of words that invite special explanation.

a) *oscēdo* 'yawning'—which I suspect of belonging to the *oratio scurrilis* (cf. Gell. 4. 20)—may have started as 'mouth-yielding' (*-cēdo* : *cēdit*); cf. *oscito* 'I move my mouth,' i.e., 'yawn.'

b) *arundo*, compounded of *aro(n)-*+*na^{z}den-*; *aro-* is either (1) an imitative (symbolic) song sound (cf. Prellwitz^{2}, *s.v.* ἄραβος) or (2) it designated a species of reed (cf. ἄρον); while *na^{z}den-* either means (1) 'sonans' (: Skr. *nádа-ti* 'sonat') or (2) designated a (? sounding) 'reed'; cf. Skr. *nadá-s* : Lith. *néndre*.[1] Or is *arundo* cognate with Skr. *arundhatī*, the name of a creeping plant (with *-ndh-* : the root *nedh-* 'vincire,' cf. Fay, *TAPA*, 41, 53) ?

[1] The *-nd-* of *arundo* has nothing to do with the Latin gerundials. Neither has the *-nd-* of *rotundus*, if Sütterlin's recent derivation of *-ndo-* from *-modo-* be admitted for *rotundus*—as it possibly may, but for no other word in *-ndus* save, by way of irradiation from *rotundus*, for *volvendus* (why not **volvundus* ?) *labundus*, *secundus*(?). In *oriundus* (see *AJP*, 20, 447) I now see a clear case for the composition type **oriom* (acc.) +*d*(*h*)*os*. I suppose *oriundus* to have kept the meaning it had when used in an interchange of civilities between stranger knights, a Diomede and Glaucus, say—cf. Plautus, *Poen.* 1053 ff. Pride of birth is connoted, so that *oriundus* = qui facit (cf. ὄνομα τιθέναι) se ortum esse; cf. *Aul.* 541–42, "pro re nitorem et gloriam pro copia | qui habent, meminerunt sese unde oriundi sient" = who dress to suit their means, who've pride proportioned to their purse, 'tis they that show <true> pride of birth. [If we read imperatival *meminerint* the sense is "let men show their consciousness of birth by dressing within their means."]

c) *unedo* 'arbute shrub,' derived by Pliny (*N.H.* 15. 98) from *unum*(?) and *edendi*. I do not understand Pliny's derivation, and have none to offer.

d) *teredo*, a gnawing worm, contains in the Greek original, τερηδών, the root *ter-* 'to bore'+*-ēden-*.

e) *torpēdo*—if the original sense is 'numbness,' note the proportion *gravidus* : *gravedo* = *torpidus* : *torpedo* (see §4). But if the original sense was 'giving-numbness,' then the division *torpe-do* commends itself.

f) *hirundo* 'swallow.' Here *-do* can hardly have come by irradiation from ἀηδών. But we may take (*h*)*iro*(*m*) as imitative of the bird note (cf. §4, fn. on χελιδών) +*naᶻden-* 'canens' (cf. on <*h*>*arundo*).

g) *alcēdo* 'kingfisher'; either with suffix from **ficēdo* | *ficēdula* (v. Niedermann, ap. Walde; Martial, 13, 49), or with *-ēdo* from ἀηδών.

h) *testūdo* 'turtle' = schal-wasser-thier, from *testu* 'shell'+*ŭden-* : ὕδρα 'wasser-thier.'

i) *hirudo* 'leech' may also contain in *-udo* a word for 'wasser-thier,' for at least one variety was λιμναία (cf. the glosses).[1] Perhaps in *hir-*, to the root *ĝher-*, we have the sense of 'grasping'; then *hirudo* is from **herúdo*, with pretonic vowel weakening.

j) *unguedo* (Apul.) can hardly be anything more than a pretentious expansion of *unguen*.

k) *capedo* = patera quae *capit edulia*(?).

l) *capūdo* = patera quae *capit uvida*(?).

m) *intercapedo* 'intervallum' (cf. *capedo* 'spatium inter parietes'), perhaps from *-ca*[*pi*]*-pēdo* = spatium quod capit pedes (= fundamenta) muri.

cuppedo; THE ABSTRACTS IN *-ido*

8. The analysis of *cuppes*, quasi 'gourmand, gourmet,' as a compound whose posterius is *-ed-* 'eating' and its prius *cūpa*, quasi 'trencher' (lit. 'trough'), proceeds from Walde, and is undoubtedly

[1] The Sanskrit word for 'leech,' *jalŭkā* | *jalāukā* | *jalāukas-*, with perhaps a dozen other variations with *jal-*, meant, according to indigenous interpretation, 'aquam-habitans.' But because of Ir. *gel*, Cornish *ghel* (glossed by *sanguisuga*), the indigenous interpretation has been challenged (e.g., by Brugmann, *ALL*, 15, 3 fn.). There is a root *gʷel-* 'consumere' (see cognates in Fick-Stokes, *Wtbch.*⁴ II, p. 112, *s.v. gelō;* cf. also Lith. *gélti* 'stechen'), and *consumens* is no bad description of a 'leech.' Still, a

correct in principle. It may be asked, however, whether *cūp(a)* is not rather a dialectic form for *copa* (: *caupo*) 'hostess.' Then *Cupedo*, the proper name, was derisive (cf. on Dossennus, § 20) = qui copam comedit, unless *cupa* = *caupona* 'cook-shop.' But for *cuppedo* 'tidbit' we have to ask what was its relation to *κοπάδιον* (*?κοπ-αδιον* = 'morsel-bite'; cf. *ὠμάδιος* 'roh-essend,' § 2). The forms *cupp-ēdia* and *cupp-edium* leave no doubt as to their posterius.

9. In *cuppedo* I see the source of *cupīdo*, and it is curious that Lucretius uses *cuppēdo* for *cupīdo*. This was certainly either by way of refreshment of the etymology as Lucretius conceived it, or by way of restoration of a genuine old form known to him, though among his predecessors from Plautus on the form *cupido* is alone in use.

10. Given a name *Cuppedo* felt as "Mr. Greedy" and *cuppedo* as 'greediness'—a form which, under the influence of the "law of *mam(m)illa*," would tend to *cŭpēdo*—the proportion *cupēdo* : *cupidus* = *gravedo* : *gravidus* could hardly have failed to suggest itself. By the influence of *cupītum*, so far as a dialectic interchange of *ē* | *ī* be not reckoned with, the shift of *cupēdo* to *cupīdo* was fostered. Besides, Etruscan influence apart, the proper name *Cupiennius*, if from **cupi-ednios*[1] 'qui cupit *ἔδανα*,' would warrant a form *cupi-eden-*, contracted to *cupīden-*.

primitive compound **gʷelŭkā*, from *gʷelu-* 'water' (in OIr. *gil* . i . uisge) + *ŭkā* 'wohnend' (: Goth. *bi-ūhts* 'gewohnt'), after coming to be felt as 'leech,' was liable to conception as a diminutive, with subsequent reduction to a non-diminutive *gʷel(ŭ)-*.

[1] The *d* of **cupi-ednios* is not a mere shot in the air but is to a certain extent warranted by Oscan *Perkedne[is* 'Percennii,' which I have before now adduced by way of confirming my explanation of Plautine *soci-ennius* as 'qui socium edit' (see *AJP*, 28, 417), a definition certainly apt for the interpretation of the passage in which it occurs (*Aul.* 659). The definition of *Σύσσιτος* might also hold good. In a Greek vase painting reproduced by Gerhard *Auserles. Vasenb.*, pl. CLV (known to me from Duruy's *History of Greece*, Eng. transl., Boston ed., I, 416), the flute-player in an altar-scene is named *Σ<ύ>σσιτος*, and one can but fancy that the name is chosen ironically to indicate the rôle of the musician in the feast to follow the sacrifice (cf. *ἱερεύειν* 'to sacrifice for a feast' and the other general matters I have noted in *Cl. Rev.* 18, 461). The availability of *-ednios* for use in compounds is seen in nick-names like our American Bean-eaters, Garlic-eaters, Macaroni-eaters to designate Bostonians, Frenchmen, Italians. In the Rig Veda, epitheta in *-ād-* 'eating' are numerous, and may be controlled by Grassman's contrarindex; cf. also Lith. *žmog-ėdys* 'menschenfresser,' OBulg. *medv-ědĭ* ('Honigesser') 'Bär' (Brugmann *Gr.*[2] II, 1, p. 62) MHG. *brot-ēzzi* 'diener, gesinde'; and, with passive relation to the prius, OHG. *swalmenāz* ('swallow-food') 'musca,' *hund-āz* ('dog-food') 'furfur.' For the explanation of Lat. *Dossenus*, the name of a stock character in the farce, as 'Back-eater' (cf. Eng. 'back-biter') see below, §12 ff.

libido, formido

11. We sufficiently account for *libido* by assuming irradiation from *cupido*, but there is great difficulty with *formido*, for which I entirely repudiate the connection with *μορμώ* 'bogey.' The idea of 'fear' is naturally developed from words meaning 'to strike,' as I have claimed for Skr. *bhάyate* (: OBulg. *biti* 'caedere') and for Lat. *pavet* (:*pavit*), cf. *ἐκ-πλαγείς* 'smitten' <with fear>, and Fr. *frayeur* = Lat. *fragorem* (see *AJP*, 26, 180 and fnn.). Accordingly I would analyze *for-mido* as a compound, with (-*s*)*mīden-* : Eng. *smites* (primary sense 'strikes,' and not 'smears' as Skeat has it; cf. Germ. *streicht* = [1] 'strikes,' [2] 'smears'), unless the sense was 'shrinking' (: Germ. *meiden*, root *mei-t-* | *mei-dh-*). Two explanations suggest themselves for the prius, *for-*: (1) *for-* : *ferit* 'strikes,' which would make *formido* a tautological compound, 'strike-smiting,' (2) *for-* (? *fort-*/*ford-*) to the root of Eng. *dread* (OE. *on-drœdon* 'timere,' OSax. *ant-drādan*), which would make *for-mido* mean 'dread-smiting.' An ultimate cognate perhaps in *θρησκεία* 'religio' (=religious practice, while *dread* = religious awe). Also cf. *θράσσει* 'vexat' and, for the sense, Eng. *awe* 'dread' : Goth. *agis* 'anguish.'

Dossennus

12. The common interpretation of the name of the farce character *Dossennus* is briefly stated in the lexicon of Stowasser as follows: "der Bucklige, eine stehende Maske der italischen Posse (Atellane), Typus der Pfiffigkeit, verbunden mit dem der Gefrässigkeit." But so far as the material at my disposal permits me to judge, the notion that the Dossennus was a hunchback lacks Latin literary evidence, and is a mere inference due to the etymological connection of the word with *dorsum* 'back.' Given a name *Dossennus* of other provenience and popular etymology would connect it up with *do*(*r*)*sus*. The best support of this interpretation lies in the proper names *Dorsus*, *Dos*(*s*)*us*, and Kiessling in his note on Horace *Epist.* 2. 1. 173 mentions a family of Fabii Dorsuones to which the Fabius Dossenus of Pliny, *N.H.* 14, 92, may have belonged.

13 *a*) The literary evidence for the gluttony of the Atellan Dossennus is very clear:

1) Varro, l. l. 7, 95, dictum mandier a mandendo, unde manducari a quo in Atellanis Dossenum (MS ad obscenum) vocant Manducum, cf.

2) Plautus, *Rud.*, 535–36, quid si aliquo ad ludos me pro manduco locem? :: qua propter? :: quia pol clare crepito dentibus.
3) Horace, *Epist.* 2. 1. 173, (adspice Plautum) quantus sit Dossennus edacibus in parasitis. This means, I take it, in the form of a statement: Plautus Dossennus est Dossennorum = parasitus est parasitorum.
4) Pomponius ap. Non. 513. 11, publicitus | dantor Dosseno et fullonibus cibaria.
5) Novius, Fullones Feriati, ap. Non. 81. 25, vortit se in omnis bestias; comest quicquid tetigit tantum.
6) Festus, 536. 1 (de Pon.), Novius in duobus Dossenis, sequimini preminate†, sequere temeti timor.
6*a*) There is less reason for supposing that a Dossenus, qua glutton, is depicted in the following, Pomponius ap. Charisium 1, p. 101, P.: "nam cibaria | vicem duorum me comesse condecet | solum."

14 *β*) From the following passages we may infer the cunning (*Pfiffigkeit*) or, as I rather suspect, the malice (note *indica*) of the Dossennus:

7) Novius, ap. Non. 514. 23.
ergo, mi Dossenne, cum istaec memore meministi, indica
qui illud aurum abstulisti? :: non didici hariolari gratiis.

In Seneca (*Ep.* 89. 7), there is no certainty that the reference is to a typical Dossennus, rather than to an individual of that name:

8) hoc verbo (*sc.* *σοφία*) Romani quoque utebantur, sicut philosophia nunc quoque utuntur. quod et togatae tibi antiquae probabunt et inscriptus Dossenni monumento titulus, hospes resiste et sophian Dossenni lege.

15 *γ*) In another group of passages the Dossennus is characterized by lewdness, viz., in

9) Pomponius ap. Non. 516. 24.
praeteriens vidit Dossennum in ludo reverecunditer
non docentem condiscipulum, verum scalpentem natis.[1]

[1] In the light of this passage I would emend the Novius line cited in (6) above as follows:
sequimini pr<a>emi nateseque [re] temeti timor.
I interpret *praemi nateseque* and *temeti timor* as derisive nicknames of the two Dossenni. The complex *praemi nateseque* is a parody of something like *virtutis pediseque* (Auc. ad Her.) or *eloquentiae pediseque* (Cicero). Should one question the propriety of halving a proceleusmatic word between the tread (thesis) and the take-up (arsis) of a dactyl followed by an anapaest in the senarius he should not forget that the compound *nate-seque* has all the prosodic privileges of two pyrrhic words, and that words of the type ⏑⏑⏑⏑—at least in Plautus—were pronounced with accent on the initial syllable: thus *nāteseque* exhibits conformity of accent and ictus.

A similar note perhaps in

10) Pomponius ap. Non. 515. 5, ... nolo parciter tamquam frater mihi sis; medium abdomen tecum dividam,

though *abdomen* may here mean *pinguedo carnis* and refer to gluttony.

In the following a combination of glutton and rake:

11) Pomponius ap. Non. 477. 5, - nescioqui, asellam urget quasi asinus, uxorem tuam ita opertis oculis simitu manducatur ac molit.[1]

16. At the end our net gain concerning the Dossennus is small: (*α*) He was certainly a glutton. (*β*) He was perhaps a malicious informer or a prater of a "philosophical" turn of mind (cf. the character of Castell in Valdés' *El Capitan Ribot*, which combines "philosophy" and malice in a high degree). (*γ*) He was sometimes, at least, a lewd libertine. So much for the literary evidence for the character of the Dossennus. We have nothing further in the way of evidence for fixing the significance of this name. All the evidence we have is compatible with the following derivation, from *dorso-* 'back'+*ennos* (from *-ednos*) 'edax.' This definition is applicable (*α*) to the glutton, he who actually feeds upon the back; (*β*) to the malicious informer, or 'back-biter'; (*γ*) to the libertine, *nates scalpens* (cf. no. 9, above).

17 *α*) The glutton. The back was an epic delicacy, awarded as a mark of distinction to Homeric heroes (H 321, *ξ* 437), and fed upon by Aeneas and his soldier boys (8, 183, "vescitur . . . . | perpetui tergo bovis . . . ."). In Plautus the back, usually in the form *tegora*,[2] was one of the delicates; cf. Eng. *bacon*, ultimately the same with *back*. I find no literary instance of *dorsus* in the sense of 'bacon,' but we have the gloss *dossum* 'lumba, *ἰσχίον*' (=ham), and *dorsus* is often glossed by *νῶτος* (*νῶτον*), which Homer used,

[1] In the equivoques here *manducatur* may be taken literally of a glutton, the ass with blinkers, managing to get something to eat while grinding, but the suggestion of 'fumbles' (*manu ducit*) may lurk in the equivoque, and the equivocal sense of *molere*, *permolere* is well attested in erotic poetry. There is also an equivoque in *asellam* (=*μύλη* 'the nether millstone') roughly fashioned as a counterterm to *asinus* =*ὄνος* 'the upper millstone.' But those who bethink themselves of the Pompeian millstones will note the queer functional inversion of the —*asella* and *asinus*. Is *manducatur* allusive to the love bite (see Fay *TAPA* 37, 20)?

[2] *Capt.* 902, 915 *tegoribus* (dat.), Ps. 108, *tegoribus*(abl.). This is an interesting instance of the allocation of a special meaning to a special flexion (*es*-stem), reinforced by a dissimilation whereby the first *r* of *terges-* is dropped. Further citations are Ovid *Met.* 8. 649 (*tergore*, of a chine of bacon), *Phaedrus* 2. 1. 9, *diviso tergore* (of the cutting up of a bullock).

both in the singular and plural, to describe the best pieces of meat at a feast. So buffalo-rump was the delicacy of our plains hunters. But in the compound Dossennus the stem *dorso-* may well exhibit a sense lost to the simplex. The case is as though we had a name **Arm-ennus* without the Horace and Ovid instances of *armi leporis*.

18 β) The malicious informer. The literary evidence for this definition is not strong, but so far as it goes it is bound to suggest to English folk our word backbiter, and the specific character of Sir Benjamin Backbite in Sheridan's *School for Scandal*. If the qualification of hunchback be added—and a literary type is extremely tenacious of life, extremely prolific—we may think of the treacherous and malicious hunchback of Boker's *Francesca da Rimini*, or of that pander and libertine, the hunch-backed father of Gilda in Verdi's *Rigoletto*. Such parallels imply the survival through the centuries of the literary tradition of the Dossennus. But if *Dossennus* started life as 'back-eater,' the qualification of the bent back must have been added subsequently by a popular etymology.

19 γ) The libertine. In no. 9 above *scalpentem natis* may be a translation, as it were, of the foregoing *Dossennum*. For other tautological definitions of this kind cf. the Homeric examples I have collected in *AJP* 25, 172.

20. *Doss-ennus* is precisely parallel in its makeup with compounds like Skr. *Ukṣánna-s* 'ox-eating' (cf. Wackernagel, ai. *Gram.* II, § 22, p. 53) and *vaçánna-* 'cow-eater,'[1] and with Plautine *pulti-fagus* 'pulse-eating.' See further instances above (§ 10, n.), where I have explained *soci-ennius*.

21. For composition with the root *ĕd-* 'edere' I also cite δειπνητός and δορπητός 'mealtime.'. Indeed, a rather close relation may exist between δορπ-ητός and *Doss-ennus*, for the comparison of δόρπον 'supper' with Alban. *dorkɛ* justifies a base *dorkʷ-* (cf. G. Meyer *Alb. Woert.*, p. 61), doubtless an extension by a root determinative of the root *der-* as it appears in Germ. *ver-zehr-en*. It is

[1] The Roman names *Vaccaena* (CIL vi, 13858) <*Vac*>*aenia*, and *Vacaenius* (x, 3034) may also be derived from **wakă* 'cow'+*ĕdno-* 'eating.' It has lately been pointed out that Lat. *vacca* : Skr. *vaçā* owes its *cc* to use in a call (cf. our cow call "Bossy").—The rule should be stated as applicable to cries and calls, which means that in most cases consonant gemination is due to the vocatival initial accent, as to which in Latin cf. Nigidius, ap. Gell. 13. 26. 1.

permissible to derive *Doss-* from *dorqu-(e)s-*, and then *Doss-ennus* will mean 'supper-eater.'

22. In proper names *-ennus* is a common Latin ending, often of Etruscan derivation, and was perhaps felt as a sort of patronymic, in token whereof Schulze (*Lat. Eigennamen*, p. 283) has brilliantly and definitively accounted for *levenna* (Laberius, ap. Gell. 16. 7. 11) as 'levis ἐκ τριγονίας.' But the Oscan name *Perkedne[is* 'Pescennii' cited above in § 10, n. seems a very valid reason for challenging the Etruscan origin of every name in *-enn(i)us*. Schulze's index (*op. cit.*) gives the following in *-ennus: Bag(i)enni, Dercennus, Passennus, Percenn-, Peucennus, Sebennus*, all of which, save the first, seem to consist of names of things edible (*Derc-* : δόρπον, see above) followed by *-ennus*. Examples were given above of nicknames that characterized individuals or groups by their food, and to these I add the name *Eskimo*, derived from *Wiyaskimo-wote* 'raw-(flesh-)eaters' (cf. ὠμηστής, Vedic *āmād*, with the same sense), a derisive name bestowed upon the Innuit people by their Cree neighbors. To the class of derisive nicknames Dossennus 'back-eater' (or 'supper-eater') will belong.

AUSTIN, TEXAS

CONCERNING THE ORATORY OF BRUTUS

By Edward J. Filbey

Did Cicero in his *Brutus sive de claris oratoribus* attribute to Marcus Junius Brutus the views which the latter actually held regarding oratory? The testimony to be obtained from various sources—including other works of Cicero—relative to the general opinion held by Roman critics in regard to Brutus' oratorical style would seem to be somewhat at variance with Cicero's representation of Brutus in this treatise.

Evidence external to the *Brutus* is first offered:

§ 1. Cicero and Brutus differed in their respective views of what constituted the best oratorical style. Each felt free to criticize the oratory of the other. Quintilian says that Brutus thought Cicero's composition somewhat unfinished: 12. 1. 22: "Quamquam neque ipsi Ciceroni Demosthenes videatur satis esse perfectus . . . . nec Cicero Bruto Calvoque, qui certe compositionem illius etiam apud ipsum reprehendunt." Tacitus represents Aper as saying, *Dial.* 18: "Legistis utique et Calvi et Bruti ad Ciceronem missas epistulas, ex quibus facile est deprehendere . . . . Ciceroni visum . . . . Brutum otiosum atque diiunctum; rursusque Ciceronem . . . . male audisse a Bruto . . . . ut ipsius verbis utar, tamquam fractum atque elumbem." Although Aper is here openly assailing these orators, his statement is apparently confirmed by an allusion to these letters in Quint. 9. 4. 1: " . . . . nisi et eiusdem aetatis homines scriptis ad ipsum [Ciceronem] etiam litteris reprehendere id collocandi genus aussi fuissent." Quintilian makes mention also (3. 6. 93) of a difference between Cicero's and Brutus' manner of defending a case. But the difference seems to have consisted not in the style of oratory so much as in the principle to be followed in the pleading. In the concluding sections of the *Orator* Cicero gives unmistakable evidence of the fact that Brutus' views and his own are not in harmony: *Or.* 237, 238: "Habes meum de oratore, Brute, iudicium; quod aut sequere si probaveris, aut tuo stabis si aliud quoddam est

tuum. In quo neque pugnabo tecum neque hoc meum de quo tantopere hoc libro asseveravi umquam affirmabo esse verius quam tuum." In the year 44 B.C., Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, shows not only that a general difference existed between his own style and that of Brutus, but also that his anticipation of Brutus' disapproval of his views as expressed in the *Orator* was realized: *Att.* 14. 20. 3: "Quid tu Bruto putas et ingenioso et erudito? De quo etiam experti sumus nuper in edicto. Scripseram rogatu tuo. Meum mihi placebat, illi suum. Quin etiam, cum ipsius precibus paene adductus scripsissem ad eum 'de optimo genere dicendi,' non modo mihi sed etiam tibi scripsit sibi illud quod mihi placeret non probari."

§ 2. This difference of view was fundamental. Brutus' style was dull, serious, and blunt, and was lacking in ornament, variety, and spirit. In Tac. *Dial.* 21, Aper says: "Brutum philosophiae relinquamus; nam in orationibus minorem esse fama sua etiam admiratores eius fatentur." In the sentence following he speaks of Brutus' speech for Deiotarus as characterized by "lentitudinis ac teporis." He had already said (§ 18, *supra*) that to Cicero, Brutus seemed "otiosum atque diiunctum." In 25 Tacitus has Messalla say in the course of his defense of Cicero and the other orators of his period, Brutus included: "iure et prioribus et sequentibus anteponuntur. Nec refert quod inter se specie different cum genere consentiant . . . . gravior Brutus, vehementior et plenior et valentior Cicero; omnes tamen eandem sanitatem eloquentiae prae se ferunt. . . . . Solum inter hos arbitror Brutum non malignitate nec invidia, sed simpliciter et ingenue iudicium animi sui detexisse." Quintilian intimates that Brutus' style was suited to philosophy, but was not eminently oratorical: 10. 1. 123: "Supersunt qui de philosophia scripserint. . . . . Egregius vero multoque quam in orationibus praestantior Brutus suffecit pondere rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit." Again Quintilian says, 12. 10. 11: "efflorescat . . . . oratorum ingens proventus. Hic . . . . sanctitatem Calvi, gravitatem Bruti . . . . reperiemus." In the *Silvae* of Statius, the recipient of a present complains of the poor taste exhibited in sending him the "dull speeches" of Brutus: 4. 9. 20: "Bruti senis oscitationes." Plutarch, *Brutus* 2, speaks of the sententious and laconic brevity noticeable in the Greek letters of Brutus: ὁ Βροῦτος Ἑλληνιστὶ . . . . τὴν ἀποφθεγ-

ματικὴν καὶ Λακωνικὴν ἐπιτηδεύων βραχυλογίαν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἐνιαχοῦ παράσημός ἐστιν. Cicero complains of the brevity of Brutus' letters: *Ad Brut.* 1. 14. 1: "Breves litterae tuae, breves dico? Immo nullae: tribusne versiculis his temporibus Brutus ad me? Nihil scripsissem potius." Brutus seems also to have incurred the charge of petulance and want of tact in his manner of writing to Cicero: *Att.* 6. 1. 7: "Ad me autem etiam cum rogat aliquid, contumaciter, adroganter, *ἀκοινονοήτως* solet scribere." Seneca hints at something of the same sort: *Suas.* 6. 14: "Ferendam esse . . . . aut Bruti superbiam." When Cicero praises the elaborate Isocrates, Brutus demurs: *Or.* 40: "Horum aetati successit Isocrates, qui praeter ceteros eiusdem generis laudatus semper a nobis, non nunquam, Brute, leniter et erudite repugnante te." In the same treatise there is an implied criticism by Cicero of the constant sameness of Brutus' style: *Or.* 110: "Tu autem eodem modo omnis causas ages? Aut aliquod causarum genus repudiabis? Aut in isdem causis perpetuum et eundem spiritum sine ulla commutatione obtinebis?" In his letters, also, Cicero shows that Brutus' style was less ornate and less impassioned than his own: *Att.* 13. 46. 2: "Legi epistolam: multa de meo Catone, quem saepissime legendo se dicit copiosiorem factum, Bruti Catone lecto se sibi visum disertum." And again: *Att.* 15. 1*b*. 2: "Brutus noster misit ad me orationem suam habitam in contione Capitolina, petivitque a me ut eam ne ambitiose corrigerem ante quam ederet. Est autem oratio scripta elegantissime sententiis, verbis ut nihil possit ultra. Ego tamen, si illam causam habuissem, scripsissem ardentius . . . . corrigere non potui. Quo enim in genere Brutus noster vult et quod iudicium habet de optimo genere dicendi, id ita consecutus est in ea oratione, ut elegantius esse nihil possit. Sed ego secutus aliud sum, sive hoc recte sive non recte."

§ 3. There is some testimony tending to show that Brutus' style was not wholly without vigor, and that he at least recognized the value of ornament, as also of a careful selection of one's language. In Tac. *Ann.* 4. 34, Cremutius Cordus, the historian, is represented as saying: "Bruti contiones falsa quidem in Augustum proba, sed multa cum acerbitate habent." The natural intensity of character which Cicero seems to have attributed to Brutus is indicated in two letters to Atticus: *Att.* 14. 1. 2: "De Bruto . . . . Caesarem solitum

dicere: 'magni refert hic quid velit, sed quidquid vult valde vult': idque eum animadvertisse, cum pro Deiotaro Nicaeae diceret: valde vehementer eum visum et libere dicere." *Att.* 14. 20. 3: "Quod errare me putas, qui rem publicam putem pendere e Bruto, sic se res habet; aut nulla erit aut ab isto istisve servabitur." In the *Orator*, after emphasizing Demosthenes' "figures of thought," and declaring that the essence of oratory is found in the ornamenting of one's sentiments with a kind of brilliancy, Cicero says that of this Brutus is as thoroughly aware as anyone: *Or.* 136: "Nec quicquam est aliud dicere nisi omnis aut certe plerasque aliqua specie illuminare sententias: quas cum tu optime, Brute, teneas. . . . ." A little later, Cicero adds, *Or.* 227: "Nihil enim est aliud, Brute, quod quidem tu minime ignoras, pulchre et oratorie dicere nisi optimis sententiis verbisque lectissimis dicere." In *Att.* 15. 1*b*. 2 (quoted in § 2, *supra*) Cicero testifies that Brutus employed appropriate sentiments and carefully selected words in his address to the people immediately after the death of Caesar. So few fragments of Brutus' oratory remain that no reliable conclusions can be based upon the evidence they offer as to Brutus' usual style. It may be noted, however, that the letter of Brutus and Cassius to Antony, preserved in the correspondence of Cicero as *Fam.* 11. 3, exhibits plainly the qualities of severity, dignity, boldness, and great care in the selection of words. That Brutus strove to avoid a rhythmical style seems certain. Quintilian testifies however that his efforts were frequently unsuccessful: 9. 4. 76: "Itaque et versus hi fere excidunt, quos Brutus ipso componendi durius studio saepissime facit."

§ 4. A summary of the main facts presented by external evidence shows that (*a*) Brutus and Cicero favored different styles of oratory;[1] (*b*) Brutus blamed Cicero's composition;[2] (*c*) Brutus ranked higher as a philosopher than as an orator; in oratory he fell below his reputation;[3] (*d*) Brutus was grave,[4] dull and spiritless,[5] brief and blunt,[6] plain,[7] and monotonous.[8]

[1] Cic. *Or.* 237, 238; *Att.* 14. 20. 3; *Att.* 15. 1*b*. 2; Quint. 3. 6. 93.
[2] Quint. 12. 1. 22; 9. 4. 1; Tac. *Dial.* 18.
[3] Tac. *Dial.* 21; Quint. 10. 1. 123.
[4] Quint. 12. 10. 11; Tac. *Dial.* 25.
[5] Tac. *Dial.* 18; 21; Stat. *Silv.* 4. 9. 20; Cic. *Att.* 15. 1*b*. 2.
[6] Plut. *Brut.* 2; Cic. *ad Brut.* 1. 14. 1; *Att.* 6. 1. 7; Tac. *Dial.* 25.
[7] Cic. *Or.* 40; *Att.* 13. 46. 2.
[8] Cic. *Or.* 110.

The evidence introduced in § 3 offers no serious contradiction to this characterization. The severity attributed to Brutus in Tac. *Ann.* 4. 34 is what might properly be expected when a cold and unexcitable nature was impelled to act with firmness. Brutus seems to have been a man who felt strongly when important interests were at stake. Hence Caesar's opinion of Brutus need occasion no surprise when he says[1] that Brutus insists upon his wishes being carried out. Brutus' speech for Deiotarus, mentioned in the same passage, may have seemed to Caesar, as he says, earnest and bold. But it has been seen that Aper considered the speech dull and languid.[2]

When Cicero writes to Brutus in the *Orator*[3] that Brutus is well aware how necessary an element of oratory ornament is to be judged, it can hardly be considered that Cicero intended to say more than that Brutus knew what emphasis Cicero himself felt should be laid upon ornament. That Brutus scarcely shared this view, Cicero suggests in the same treatise,[4] when he asks Brutus whether he intends to persist in using one style of oratory in causes of every sort.

A careful selection of the sentiments to be expressed, as also of the words to be employed, seems to have been a characteristic feature of Brutus' style.[5] In brief, it becomes apparent that Brutus was one of that numerous class of Roman orators who strove laboriously to acquire a true Attic style, but who took as their model for this style not Demosthenes, but the plainest and most austere of his predecessors. Simplicity of thought, of composition, and of diction; the employment of only such expressions as were in strict accord with propriety; and an air of passionless dignity—these seem to have been striven for by Brutus as conscientiously as by any other of the would-be Atticists of his day.

§ 5. In certain passages from the *Brutus*, Cicero represents Brutus as holding views not greatly at variance with his own. Before the discussion proper, Cicero says that he has heard that Brutus' speech for Deiotarus was characterized by especial ornament and richness: 21: "causam Deiotari . . . . ornatissume et copiosissume a Bruto . . . . defensam"; also that on Brutus' account he lamented the loss of opportunities for public oratory, for which Brutus seemed so

[1] Cic. *Att.* 14. 1. 2. [2] Tac. *Dial.* 21. [3] Cic. *Or.* 136. [4] Cic. *Or.* 110.
[5] Cic. *Att.* 15. 1*b*. 2; *Fam.* 11. 3; *Or.* 227; Tac. *Dial.* 25; Quint. 9. 4. 76.

well fitted: 22: "tua et natura admirabilis et exquisita doctrina et singularis industria." In 118 Cicero represents Brutus as saying: "Quam hoc idem in nostris contingere intellego quod in Graecis, ut omnes fere Stoici prudentissumi in disserendo sint et id arte faciant sintque architecti paene verborum, idem traducti a disputando ad dicendum inopes reperiantur." Cicero replies: 120: "Quo magis tuum, Brute, iudicium probo, qui eorum philosophorum sectam secutus es quorum in doctrina atque praeceptis disserendi ratio coniungitur cum suavitate dicendi et copia." In 125, after Cicero has said, "Sed ecce in manibus vir et praestantissimo ingenio et flagranti studio et doctus a puero C. Gracchus; noli enim putare quemquam, Brute, pleniorem aut uberiorem ad dicendum fuisse," Brutus replies "Sic prorsus . . . . existumo atque istum de superioribus paene solum lego." In 204, Cicero has said that Cotta lacked fire, and Sulpicius humor. "O magnam inquit artem! Brutus: si quidem istis, cum summi essent oratores, duae res maximae altera alteri defuit." In 249 Brutus says that Marcellus' oratory is very like that of Cicero; further, that he, Brutus, is exceedingly pleased with Marcellus. In enumerating the latter's excellences as an orator Brutus declares that in consequence of Marcellus' careful selection of words, his brilliancy of speech and dignity of gesture, all that he says seems beautiful and splendid; that in fact he lacks none of the qualities necessary to an orator: 250: ". . . . fit speciosum et inlustre quod dicit, omniaque sic suppetunt ut ei nullam deesse virtutem oratoris putem." Again, Cicero represents Brutus as enthusiastic over the praise given Cicero by Caesar, and as placing a high estimate upon what Cicero has accomplished in making the Latin language rich and fertile: 254: "Amice hercule, inquit, et magnifice te laudatum puto, quem . . . . principem atque inventorem copiae dixerit. . . . . Quo enim uno vincebamur a victa Graecia, id aut ereptum illis est aut certe nobis cum illis communicatum. Hanc . . . . gloriam testimoniumque Caesaris . . . . triumphis multorum antepono." When Cicero tells how he used the calm delivery of Calidius as an argument against the latter and suggests that there is a question as to whether such calmness is wise or unwise, Brutus is supposed to say: 279: "Atque dubitamus . . . . utrum ista sanitas fuerit an vitium? Quis enim non fateatur, cum ex

omnibus oratoris laudibus longe ista sit maxuma, inflammare animos audientium et quocumque res postulet modo flectere, qui hac virtute caruerit, id ei quod maxumum fuerit defuisse?" After Cicero has said that when Brutus heard Hortensius speak the latter was no longer in his prime, and was lacking in the ornaments that had characterized his oratory, he adds: 327: "Hoc tibi ille, Brute, minus fortasse placuit quam placuisset si illum flagrantem studio et florentem facultate audire potuisses." At the close of the treatise, in an appeal to Brutus, Cicero says: 332: "Tu . . . . Brute . . . . effice id quod iam propemodum vel plane potius effeceras, ut te eripias ex ea quam ego congessi in hunc sermonem turba patronorum. Nec enim decet te ornatum uberrumis artibus . . . . numerari in vulgo patronorum. Nam quid te exercuit Pammenes . . . . si quidem similes maioris partis oratorum futuri sumus?"

§ 6. Somewhat opposed to the general tenor of these passages is a statement of Cicero contained in 309: "dialectica . . . . sine qua etiam tu, Brute, iudicavisti te illam iustam eloquentiam, quam dialecticam esse dilatatam putant, consequi non posse." It may be noticed also that in 250[1] Brutus names as one of the excellences of Marcellus the latter's use of carefully chosen words. His dignity of gesture is likewise emphasized.

§ 7. Summary of the characterization of Brutus' opinions and style, in the treatise, and conclusion:

Cicero says that Brutus' speech for Deiotarus was ornate and rich;[2] that Brutus had been taught sweetness and richness of speech;[3] that Brutus would have been pleased with Hortensius could he have heard the latter when his ornateness and vigor were undiminished;[4] that Brutus is already the foremost orator at Rome, and possessed of all the ornaments the richest arts can offer.[5]

Brutus is represented as saying that the Stoics while good at debate prove dry and meager in a speech;[6] that of the early orators he reads Gracchus most, whose style he considers the fullest and richest;[7] that fire and humor are two of the chief requirements of an orator;[8] that he considers Marcellus—and therefore Cicero—

[1] Cf. § 5, *supra*.
[2] § 21.
[3] § 120.
[4] § 327.
[5] § 332.
[6] § 118.
[7] § 125.
[8] § 204.

a model orator, and thinks it desirable that one's oratory seem beautiful and splendid;[1] that it is a high honor to be the originator of a fulness of style, and that with this richness the eloquence of Rome rivals that of Athens;[2] that a calm delivery is a serious defect, for the chief function of an orator is to inflame his auditors.[3]

On the other hand, Cicero says that Brutus has judged logic to be the foundation of true eloquence.[4] And Brutus lays emphasis upon a careful selection of words and a dignified delivery.[5]

Cicero's statement[6] that Brutus' speech for Deiotarus was ornate and rich was quite certainly no more than a compliment,[7] in spite of the apparent support found in the letter to Atticus already quoted.[8] But the other statements both of Cicero and of Brutus considered in § 5 cannot be reconciled with the external evidence bearing upon Brutus' style and views. If it be accepted from external sources that the oratorical style and the ideals of Brutus were distinctly opposed to those of Cicero; that Brutus was, as an orator, "grave, dull, spiritless, brief, blunt, plain, and monotonous"—the conclusion reached in § 4—it is impossible to believe that he had been taught sweetness and richness of speech, that he would have been pleased with Hortensius' ornateness, or that he was possessed of all the ornaments offered by the richest arts. Nor is it credible that he would declare that the Stoics, whose style was so like his own, failed in a public speech; that Gracchus with his full and rich style was his favorite early orator; that humor was essential to the orator; that the listeners ought to be impressed with the beauty of an oration; that Cicero was for him the model orator; that the greatness of Roman eloquence was attributable to the originating by Cicero of a fulness of style; that a calm delivery was a serious defect; or that the chief function of an orator was to inflame his auditors.

On the other hand, the statement of Cicero that Brutus has judged logic to be the foundation of true eloquence; and Brutus' emphasis upon a careful selection of words and upon dignity in delivery, are each in accord with his gravity, dulness, want of spirit, brevity,

[1] §§ 249, 250. [2] § 254. [3] § 279. [4] § 309. [5] § 250. [6] § 21.

[7] Cf. also Tyrrell and Purser *Correspondence of Cicero* VI, note, p. c: "Terms which it is impossible to regard as anything more than expressions of effusive politeness."

[8] Cic. *Att.* 14. 1. 2; *supra*, § 3.

distaste for ornament, and monotony. It is quite credible that Brutus would have expressed just this opinion.

How much of what Cicero says is to be attributed to politeness and considered but as complimentary to Brutus, cannot be determined. One conspicuous instance of such urbanity has already been noted.[1] It is possible that some of the other apparent inconsistencies are to be accounted for in the same way. However, Cicero took considerable liberty in the handling of the characters in his dialogues,[2] and it is probable that he felt that to give the necessary weight to the expression of the views which he held regarding oratory and which he was endeavoring to emphasize in the treatise, he must represent Brutus' views as in accord with his own, rather than—more truthfully—as at variance with them.

A comparison of the evidence, external and internal, bearing upon the question under consideration seems to point quite definitely to the conclusion that, except in two instances, Cicero's representation in this treatise of Brutus' oratorical style and views does not coincide with the testimony from other sources; and that he does not, therefore, represent correctly the point of view of Brutus.

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[1] Cf. *de* 21, *supra*.

[2] Cf. article on "The Literary Sources in Cicero's *Brutus*," by G. L. Hendrickson, *AJP* XXVII, 184.

THE PROVENANCE OF JEROME'S CATALOGUE OF VARRO'S WORKS

By G. L. Hendrickson

The existence of Jerome's catalogue of the writings of Varro was known before the discovery of the document itself from two sources: from mention by Jerome in his life of Origen (*de viris ill.* ch. 54) and by excerpts preserved by Tyrannius Rufinus (*Apologiae in Hieron.* ii. 20) from the letter which contained the catalogue. In the lively inquiry into Varro's literary work which marked the second quarter of the last century, the loss of this list was frequently lamented, and all hope of its recovery had apparently been abandoned. But in the summer of 1847, L. Urlichs was drawn to the seat of Sir Thomas Phillipps, Middlehill, by the report of his notable manuscript collections, and here, among other things, he was shown and received a copy of a privately printed extract from a MS of Arras entitled, "Preface to Origen on Genesis." It contained Jerome's letter from which the excerpts of Rufinus were drawn, with the complete catalogues of Varro and Origen.

Through his Plautine studies Ritschl had already been drawn to a closer study of Varro, and his famous monographs on the *Libri disciplinarum* and on the *Logistorici* had but recently appeared (1845). To Ritschl, accordingly, Urlichs referred his discovery, and upon the basis of the recovered catalogue Ritschl produced his great essay, "Die Schriftstellerei des Marcus Terentius Varro," Bonn, 1847 (incorporated into *Rheinisches Museum* for 1848 and now accessible with supplementary and related studies in *Opuscula*, Vol. III). The list as edited in the private publication of Sir Thomas Phillipps contains 522 books. It does not contain all of the known works of Varro, and indeed its omissions are very considerable. Ritschl, of course, saw at once the necessity of verifying the printed list by comparison with the MS of Arras, and a few years later this was done for him by August Schleicher (the well-known Sanskritist and comparative philologist), who made an exact transcript

of the whole letter with a facsimile of the Varronian catalogue. This transcript and facsimile were published as a university Program in the autumn of 1849, and may now be found in the volume of the *Opuscula* referred to above. The most essential correction yielded by Schleicher's revision was the number of books for the *Imagines*, viz. 15, which Sir Thomas Phillipps' compositor had inverted so as to read 51. The matter rested here for some years, until in 1856 a French scholar, Chappuis, discovered the same preface to Origen in two Paris MSS. These new sources of the text (apart from other corrections which need not detain us here) revealed a new work entirely omitted in the MS of Arras, an epitome of the *Imagines* in four books. The corrections thus afforded were pointed out by Ritschl and discussed in *Rheinisches Museum* for 1857. Had Ritschl, as he did so carefully in the first instance, now footed up the total number of books in the list as thus revised, he would undoubtedly have made the surprising observation which it has remained for Prof. Alfred Klotz of Strassburg to make—that the sum given by Jerome is four hundred and ninety books.[1]

The significance of this number is revealed by a well-known chapter of Gellius (iii. 10) in which, apropos of Varro's *Imagines* or *Hebdomades*, he discusses the *virtutes potestatesque septenarii numeri*. At the end of the chapter Gellius complains that some of Varro's instances of the significance of the number are farfetched, such as the seven wonders, the seven wise men, and the seven against Thebes:

> Tum ibi addit se quoque iam duodecimam annorum hebdomadam ingressum esse, et ad eum diem septuaginta hebdomadas librorum conscripsisse.

Seventy times seven is four hundred and ninety—the total of Jerome's list!

That this coincidence can scarcely be a matter of chance, everyone, I think, will agree with Klotz. But the meaning of the coincidence remains a matter for interpretation, and it is my belief that the conclusion which Klotz draws will scarcely bear the test of criticism.

[1] Klotz's paper is the first in the current volume of *Hermes* (XLVI). Apart from the striking discovery which is his starting-point, and from his main contention concerning the source of the catalogue which I shall here criticise, his discussion is full of suggestiveness and advances our knowledge in many important details.

His view is stated briefly and positively: the catalogue which Jerome reproduces is derived immediately from the prefatory book of the *Imagines*, where it stood in connection with the passage from which Gellius quotes. That the catalogue is ultimately from Varro's own hand Ritschl had already inferred, but Ritschl thought rather of some such work as the *libri de sua vita* as its source. Klotz's reason, however, for considering the *Imagines* as the necessary source lies in the fact that, in Varro's continuous and prolific literary activity, the point of time obviously did not exist before and could not recur again when the sum of his writings was exactly (*ad eum diem*) seventy hebdomads. But cogent as this reasoning may seem, a moment's reflection will show that it betrays a hint, at least, of the logical circle. In effect he says: Varro is the author of the catalogue. It contains four hundred and ninety numbers. Therefore it must have been compiled at the point of time and in the place when and where Varro reports that he had composed four hundred and ninety books. The defect of this argument lies in the assumption that Varro is the immediate compiler of the list. But how if he be not? How if the words of Varro in the preface to the *Imagines* have merely set a problem for some later scholar to solve?

But before taking up the question of the possible source of the catalogue, let us examine more carefully the assumptions upon which Klotz's hypothesis rests. They are these: (1) That Jerome has given us the total *number* of books in the catalogue which was before him. (2) That since his interest was directed upon the number rather than upon the names of works, his curtailment of the list consists in adding together under one title two or more works which stood adjacent to each other and were related either in content or form. (So, for example, the item *Antiquitatum* 45 consists, as Klotz thinks, of 41, the true number, +4 *de gente Romana* [not named in the catalogue], while in the case of *libri singulares* 10, the compression of a series of μονόβιβλοι into a single item is manifest.) (3) That all of the books in the catalogue were written before the prefatory book of the *Imagines*. (4) That all other works not expressly mentioned in the catalogue or accounted for by the method of curtailment above described were written afterward.

Taking up these assumptions in order, let us note first the language

of Jerome with reference to his curtailment of the catalogue. He concludes his enumeration with these words:

> Et alia plurima quae enumerare longum est. Vix medium descripsi indicem et legentibus fastidium est.

Now, it surely is a very difficult feat of interpretation to make this language coincide with Klotz's theory of curtailment only by suppression of titles. The only natural meaning which the words can bear is, "I have copied off scarce one-half of the list," and so Ritschl understood it (*Op.* iii, 485, 487), allowing, of course, for a large margin of pardonable exaggeration on Jerome's part. *Vix medium* surely can only mean half through, from beginning to end, as when (for instance) Geta says in the Phormio *vix* dum *dimidium* dixeram, intellexerat. We should have to be under some extraordinary compulsion of circumstance (such as Klotz doubtless feels) to grant for a moment that *vix medium indicem* could at one and the same time cover the half, i.e., of the titles, and the whole number of books (which the hypothesis demands). But the point need not be pressed to a decision on the basis of this phrase alone; the words of Jerome which immediately precede settle the matter beyond possibility of cavil. As has been said, and as Klotz recognizes, the interest of Jerome is in bulk or numbers (to contrast the zeal of a former age with the sloth of his own[1]), and after the long list of the works which he does mention he continues, *et alia plurima quae enumerare longum est.* Surely the significance of this can only be that merely as a matter of bulk or numbers many more volumes (*alia plurima sc. volumina*[2]) remain to make the count (*enumerare*) complete. We must conclude, therefore, that Jerome's list contained not only titles but also volumes which he does not record.

With regard to the second of Klotz's assumptions, that Jerome has curtailed the Varronian catalogue by conflation of numbers, with consequent suppression of titles, it is obviously sound with reference to the item *libri singulares* 10. His explanation of the item *Antiquitatum* 45 may be allowed as plausible. But the fact that

[1] Ut intellegamus nos Epimenidis dormire somnium, etc.

[2] Cf. the introductory words: et quia non (?) otiosum est apud Latinos Graecorum *voluminum indicem* texere, de eo qui Latine scripsit *aliqua* commemorabo, etc.

Jerome has not done this in some other cases where it would have been very natural, as, for example, in the two items *de scaenicis actionibus* 3 and *de actis scaenicis* 3, would suggest caution. That the *logistorici*, with the surprisingly large number of 76, should be a pocket from which to exhume works of such character as the *de antiquitate litterarum ad Accium* and the *de utilitate sermonis* is certainly improbable. If conflation had taken place at this point they would much more naturally have followed the related works which stand next—the *de lingua Latina* or the *de sermone Latino*.

Concerning the third of Klotz's positions, it is obviously necessary for him to show that all of the books in the catalogue were written before the prefatory book of the *Imagines*. The main question here touches the relation between the date of the *Imagines* and the *libri rerum rusticarum*, which the catalogue includes. Concerning this latter work our information is specific: annus enim *octogesimus* admonet me ut sarcinas conligam (i. 1.1.), that is, the year 37 B.C., the eightieth of Varro's age. Only a little less specific is Varro's own testimony concerning the completion of the *Imagines*. It has already been cited above (p. 335): se quoque *iam duodecimam* annorum hebdomadam *ingressum* esse. The natural meaning of this phrase is obviously the beginning of the twelfth hebdomad, that is, the seventy-eighth year of Varro's age, which yields the year 39, as Ritschl assumed without question. But Klotz urges with apparent plausibility that the words are indefinite, and he sees no reason why the range of their meaning may not be extended to a point of time which shall include the eightieth year. That this in fact is the case, Klotz says (p. 9), is shown by the inclusion of the *rerum rusticarum* in the catalogue. The logical flaw in this argument (for it assumes the point to be demonstrated) need not be urged, since it is true that, if it were impossible to fix more definitely the limits of fluctuation in Varro's phrase, we should have to admit the *possibility*, at least, of Klotz's contention. But consider for a moment: Varro is dealing with the mysterious significance and coincidences of the number seven, that is, the hebdomad. Applying it to his own life at the moment of writing, he observes that he has just finished a hebdomad and has entered upon another. Now as a matter of fact we have no assurance that Varro was not fibbing to make his case good, but his case

has no point unless he either then was or pretended to be exactly, as he says, at the beginning of another hebdomad. If we are at liberty to stretch the phrase as we like, it is obvious that the statement is at once removed from all relation to seven, and so loses all value as an illustration of coincidence upon seven. To be sure, Varro has already passed the point of coincidence, but he has *just* passed it—*iam* duodecimam annorum hebdomadam ingressum esse et *ad eum diem* septuaginta hebdomadas librorum conscripsisse. It will be seen that in the two co-ordinate sentences *iam* and *ad eum diem* aim to indicate a point of time with precision. *Iam* is not to be rendered with "already"; its meaning is represented rather by the English "just"—the German "eben"—a usage which is abundantly attested.[1] I have dwelt upon this point because it enables us to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the passage of the *Imagines*, which in Klotz's view gave occasion for the catalogue, must have been written some two years earlier than the *libri rerum rusticarum*. But the latter work is enumerated in the catalogue. We must conclude, therefore, that the catalogue did not stand in the *Imagines*. Furthermore, Jerome's list includes an epitome in four books from the *Imagines;* but it need scarcely be said that the existence of such an epitome before the completion and publication of the work epitomized is highly improbable. With regard to the *libri disciplinarum* (also in the catalogue), which Ritschl placed in the year 33 B.C. on the strength of an allusion in the elder Pliny, the evidence is not sufficiently decisive for the purposes of an argument of this kind. Ritschl's conclusion has been challenged, though as Schanz thinks wrongly.

Finally, as the fourth of Klotz's positions, it is necessary for him to assume that all other works of Varro not expressly mentioned in the catalogue were written after the *Imagines*, unless their absence can be satisfactorily accounted for by the theory of curtailment of the original list by conflation of numbers and suppression of titles.

[1] *Ingredior* is inceptive in meaning and *iam* is used with it frequently to mark precisely the point of inception: *iam* ingredientem in navem . . . . retractum esse (*in Verr.* 5.96). Neronem *iam* ingressum iuventam commendavit patribus (*Ann.* 3.29), "who had just arrived at man's estate" (Ramsay). Similarly with inceptive verbs: *iam*que rubescebat Aurora (*Aen.* 3. 521), marking the precise moment at which Italy was first seen by the Trojans.

That in this way the early work *de antiquitate litterarum ad Accium* is accounted for by Klotz, as having been absorbed into the seventy-six books of *logistorici*, I have indicated above, suggesting at the same time a doubt as to the probability of such an explanation. This explanation, however, cannot be employed to account for the absence of the *libri de poetis*, as Klotz frankly confesses: "Nicht zu erklären weiss ich dass auffallende Fehlen des Werkes *de poetis* (p. 15)." Its proper place in the catalogue is indicated by the treatise *de poematis*, on both sides of which are series of works of three books each, a number too small to have absorbed a work which consisted certainly of more than one book. Concerning the date of the *de poetis*, I do not find in Ritschl nor in the manuals of literary history any positive suggestion, and perhaps none is available. But the Brutus of Cicero gives us a *terminus ante quem* which admits of no doubt. The fundamental investigation upon which this conclusion rests is Leo's memorable chapter on the life of Plautus in the *Plautinische Forschungen*. Some supplementary evidence I adduced in my paper on a pre-Varronian chapter of Roman literary history in the *American Journal of Philology* for 1898 (Vol. XIX, pp. 289 ff.). It appears, then, that Jerome's list omits at least one important work in several books which could not reasonably have been omitted from a catalogue of Varro's own making.

To gather up, now, our conclusions in brief summary, this much would seem certain: (1) Jerome's source cannot have been the *Imagines*. For if a list of Varro's writings had stood there it must have consisted of four hundred and ninety numbers—no more, no less. But Jerome's list contained other works which he does not cite, and not only other titles, but other volumes—*alia plurima*.[1] (2) The list of Jerome was compiled at a date subsequent to the completion of the *Imagines*, since it contains one work certainly, the *libri rerum rusticarum* (and probably others), which was written at a later time. (3) The list omits one work, the *libri de poetis* (and

[1] In this connection it should be said that the *Imagines*, so far as we can discern, was a book of popular nature, combining portraits with a descriptive text and a metrical elogium for each portrait. Apart from other considerations it would seem highly improbable that such a work should have been considered a suitable place for minute autobiographical matter, such as a detailed and complete index of the author's works.

perhaps more), which was already written and published at the time of the completion of the *Imagines*, nor can its absence be explained by the hypothesis of conflation of titles.

From these considerations the conclusion is inevitable that the list is not from the hand of Varro—at all events not from the time nor the place which Klotz assigns. That, as Ritschl believed (p. 491), Varro himself in his autobiography (a work presumably of his latest years) had either drawn up a complete list of his own works or had furnished such information concerning them as to afford the basis of a catalogue need not be denied.

As regards Jerome's catalogue—to distinguish it from an hypothetical list of Varro's own making—it would seem rather that the words of Varro had set a problem for some later πινακογράφος or literary biographer; that, undertaking to make a complete list of Varro's writings, he had used as a point of reference Varro's own testimony. He thus put together a number which should yield[1] a total of four hundred and ninety volumes down to the publication of the *Imagines*, and then with indication of this division line he continued and added others, which were still numerous. That errors of chronology (as in the case of the *rerum rusticarum* or the *de poetis*) or carelessness of double inclusion (as with the *de valetudine tuenda*[2]) must be charged to the compiler of the list will scarcely invalidate such an hypothesis. Perhaps someone better versed in the pinacographic literature of

[1] Is it not possible that some trace of this method of construction may be discerned in the entry *de valetudine tuenda* 1? The surprising character of this item Ritschl noted (p. 440): "es beruht gewiss auf irgend einem Versehen oder Zufall, sei es des Hieronymus oder schon seiner Quelle," because it violates the manifest rule of the compiler not to enumerate separately and with title works of one book. The other μονόβιβλοι are put together without titles into the item *singulares* 10. But furthermore, unless all signs fail, this work must be identical with the work which is very accurately cited in the learned note of *Probus ad Ecl.* 6.31: Varro in *logistorico*, quem inscripsit *Messalla de valetudine*. That is, not only is the entry of a μονόβιβλος unique in our catalogue, but also this particular work, as being a *logistoricus*, has already been included presumably in the 76 books assigned to the *logistorici* as a whole. What, then, shall we say? Is it *purely* oversight or accident, as Ritschl held? Or did the compiler need another number to make up his total? A similar question might be raised in regard to the surprisingly small number of *libri singulares*, viz. 10. One has only to compare other lists of famous polygraphs to see how surprising it really is, and for my part I should hesitate to subscribe to Ritschl's conclusion (p. 441): "daraus folgt aber für uns dass . . . . diese Form (sc. μονόβιβλος) also eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle in der Schriftstellerei des Varro spielte."

[2] See the preceding note.

antiquity may be able to adduce a parallel or analogue to the division of the catalogue such as I have suggested. It would seem, however, that it might have arisen very naturally from the autobiographical item which Varro recorded in the *Imagines*. But we cannot disguise the fact that the material for constructing a positive theory of composition is very meager. We can only affirm with confidence that Jerome's list contained more volumes than the number adduced, and that therefore some division line within the complete catalogue afforded Jerome a natural stopping-point at which to break off his enumeration.

We may now contemplate the list, essentially as Ritschl did, as the work of a subsequent biographer or literary antiquarian. We shall grant readily that it depends on information derived from autobiographical sources (such as this very item of the seventy hebdomads) and so may include titles which no one but Varro himself was in position to afford, that is, works which were written but never published.[1]

With reference to the possible time of the compiler's labors a slight but not wholly negligible clue is afforded by the two titles *satyrarum* and *satyrarum Menippearum*. For in the light of our present knowledge of the history of the word *satura*, and of the recognition of a form of literature bearing this name, it is doubtful whether we can credit its use to Varro at all. Certainly its employment as a title would imply a currency of usage which we can scarcely place earlier than the second half of the first century A.D.[2] To be sure, the word had come into use in the later years of Varro's life, when the *libri de sua vita* were presumably written, but inasmuch as the Menippean satires go back in their origins to his early years I venture to doubt whether the name *saturae* was ever attached to them by Varro himself. It represents rather, I suspect, an interpretative classification of a later time. Nonius cites them uniformly by specific titles (e.g. *Varro Marcipore*), and not once, I think, uses *satura* or *saturarum*. Even the passage of Gellius, upon which the usual designation rests, is less valuable as evidence than is com-

[1] Gell. *loc. cit.*: aliquam multos, cum proscriptus esset, direptis bibliothecis suis non comparuisse.

[2] See Marx *Proleg. in Lucil.*, p. xv extr., and the writer's paper in the last number of this Journal (pp. 129 ff.).

monly assumed: Menippus cuius libros M. Varro *in saturis* aemulatus est, quas alii cynicas, *ipse appellat Menippeas* (ii. 18; cf. xiii. 31). From this earlier editors constructed the title *saturae Menippeae*. Bücheler with characteristic reserve uses only *Menippeae*. In the language of Gellius, however, *saturis* need be only the descriptive terminology of his time,[1] and grammatical congruence would then yield inevitably *cynicas* and *Menippeas*. But another form of title is suggested by such citation as Macrobius' *Varro in Menippeis suis* (v. 20, 13) or Probus' *Varro in cynicis* (*ad Ecl.* vi. 31), which I take it would in themselves be interpreted most naturally as standing for *Menippea* or *cynica*, following the analogy of *Empedoclea* or *Aratea*. From the statement of Gellius we should then conclude that *Menippea* was Varro's own term, and we should infer that *cynica* was an interpretative addition, or perhaps a popular title of later time. The form *Menippea* would apply very accurately to Varro's statement in the pages of Cicero of his relation to his cynic predecessor—*Menippum imitati, non interpretati*—and it would account most adequately for the various allusions to him as *Varro Menippeus*. The designation and classification of his Menippean writings as *saturae* then followed upon the general recognition of a category which could receive them, and so they appear in the preface of the elder Pliny and in Quintilian's survey of Roman satire.

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[1] Just as Apuleius (*Flor.* ch. 10) uses *saturas* to characterise and classify the Greek writings of the Cynic Crates of Thebes, pupil of Diogenes and predecessor of Menippus. On the text of Apuleius see Susemihl I, 30, n. 87.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

NESTOR'S SON PEISISTRATUS IN HOMER

Von Christ in his *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*[4], p. 33, adds to the arguments for the difference between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* advanced by early Chorizontes this sentence: "Auffällig auch ist, dass die *Ilias* von dem oft in der *Odyssee* genannten Sohne des Nestor, Peisistratos, nichts weiss." Schmid has printed this sentence, with evident approval, in his revision of this work, so that it deserves the notice of those interested in Homer.

A simple answer to this argument is there was no occasion to mention Peisistratus in the earlier poem; the fact that a character was prominent in the *Odyssey* furnished no reason for naming him in the *Iliad;* even Penelope is not mentioned there, but as Odysseus is twice referred to as the father of Telemachus we can hardly doubt that the name of the mother was well known. There was rarely an opportunity for referring to the children of a Greek leader; Orestes is named but once, i. 142, repeated in 284, where Agamemnon promises that he will honor the reconciled Achilles as his own son, Orestes—a most natural reference. Diomede, Idomeneus, and Ajax probably left families at home, yet no son is named. Nestor was far more inclined to refer to the days of his childhood than to those of his children.

However, these are general arguments, but in this particular case there is a most cogent reason for not naming Peisistratus in the *Iliad*, and that reason is he was born to Nestor after the departure of the Greeks for Troy. He was a young man of about the age of Telemachus, as the words of Peisistratus show:

γ 49: ἀλλὰ νεώτερός ἐστιν, ὁμηλικίη δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ.

These words refer to Telemachus. We know that Telemachus was an infant when the Greeks departed. Cf. the words of Menelaus,

δ 112: Τηλέμαχός θ', ὃν ἔλειπε νέον γεγαῶτ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

However young Telemachus may have been it is evident that Peisistratus was somewhat his junior; when they were mourning in the palace of Menelaus for the lost and absent friends and kindred Peisistratus said:

δ 199: καὶ γὰρ ἐμὸς τέθνηκεν ἀδελφεός, οὔ τι κάκιστος
'Αργείων· μέλλεις δὲ σὺ ἴδμεναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ γε
ἤντησ' οὐδὲ ἴδον· περὶ δ' ἄλλων φασὶ γενέσθαι
'Αντίλοχον.

His youth and his failure to have seen his brother, Antilochus, furnish their own explanation, hence to mention him in the *Iliad* was not only unnecessary but impossible.

The wide limits of disintegrating criticism are shown by the fact that von Christ and Schmid found it "auffällig" that Peisistratus was not named in the *Iliad*, while Peppmüller, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* (1891) 231, condemned the same poem for naming Telemachus.

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MARGINALIA ON APULEIUS'S *METAMORPHOSES*[1]

P. 17. 9 (Helm) = i. 19: "sic denique eum vitalis color turbaverat. . . . ." Helm wisely relegates to his apparatus his own emendation *mutatus* for *vitalis*, and all the other various changes (*tum* for *eum*, *calor* for *color*, *turpaverat* for *turbaverat*). As Oudendorp sanely observes: "immo sic mutando omnia dubia possimus quidem intellectu facilia reddere; sed et simul novos excudimus auctores." He rightly defends the MSS, quoting Plautus *Epid.* 560: "quid est quod voltus te turbat tuos,"[2] and Gellius XIX. i. 6: "coloris et voltus turbatione." Still, even if "vitalis color turbare ipsum dicitur cui turbatur pallore vultus" (Oudendorp), it is not easy to see why Apuleius did not express the idea as clearly as he does in 244. 7 (H.) = x. 10: "ingens exinde verberonem corripit trepidatio et in vicem humani coloris succedit *pallor infernus*" (quoted by Oudendorp). Perhaps wrongly we expect *letalis color*, which Markland proposed to read. I have wondered, though admitting the boldness of the suggestion, if *vitalis color* must not be added to three curious examples of *vitalis* that have not been mentioned in this connection: the funeral couch is called *vitalis lectus* in Petronius 42, grave-clothes are *vitalia* in Petronius 77, Seneca *Epist.* 99. 22, and in Lucretius iii. 820 the MSS give nothing but *vitalibus* in spite of the *letalibus* found in several modern editions since Lambinus. As a similar euphemism Friedländer quotes the use of *salutaria* in place of *funeraticia* (cf. his note on Petr. 42, and on euphemism in this connection Keller, *Gramm. Aufsätze* 154 ff., collects interesting evidence).

P. 34. 11 (H.) = ii. 11: "et perinde in eius faciem oculos meos ac si in Avernum lacum formidans deieceram." Readers of Herondas iii. 17 (the

[1] A slight correction of my note on Apul. *Metam.* ii. 29 in this volume, p. 90: the substance of the interpretation ascribed to Oudendorp appears in his note, but the form of statement is quoted from the Delphin edition. Had I known it at the time I should have added that Soping suggested *scatebris* for *salubris*.

[2] It is very singular that while the editors of Apuleius have long used the passage of Plautus to support the text of Apuleius, to the present day the passage of Plautus is rudely emended (Goetz, Leo) or marked corrupt (Lindsay), apparently in ignorance of the Apuleian phrase.

incorrigible schoolboy's treatment of his slate: *κἦν μήκοτ' αὐτὴν οἷον Ἀΐδην βλέψας | γράψῃ μὲν οὐδὲν καλόν, ἐκ δ' ὅλην ξύσῃ*) may like to use this passage to support the interpretation "scowling at it as though it were Hades" as against the interpretation "looking as grim as the god of death."

P. 35. 4 (H.) = ii. 12: "qui dies copulas nuptiarum adfirmet, qui fundamenta moenium perpetuet, qui negotiatori commodus, qui viatori celebris, qui navigiis oportunus." Helm rightly rejects such changes of *celebris* as *salubris* and *celeris*, but inasmuch as the *Thesaurus* neglects to pigeonhole Apuleius's *celebris* I venture to reprint four passages that illustrate its development as a synonym of *commodus* and *oportunus:*

Plautus *Poen.* 255: "diem pulchrum et celebrem et venustatis plenum, dignum Venere pol, quoi sunt Aphrodisia hodie"; *ibid.* 758: "die festo celebri nobilique Aphrodisiis."

Cicero *de amicitia* iii. 12: "ex multis diebus quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse cum. . . . ."

Panegyr. (ed. Baehrens) ii. 1: "celeberrimo isto et . . . . laetissimo die. . . . ."

P. 51. 11 (H.) = ii. 32: "inprovidae noctis caligine liberati . . . ."; cf. 65. 20 (H.) = iii. 18: "inprovidae noctis deceptus caligine." In the former passage the torch is blown out by a gust of wind, and the passive force of *inprovidus* has consequently been favored; so Butler translates "sudden darkness," and Hildebrand tries to defend the passive usage. But I agree with certain unnamed predecessors of Pricaeus, whose note runs: "exponunt *obscurae*, ego *improvisae*"; for the passive force he quotes Pliny *Epist.* iv. 22. 5 and Apuleius's *fortunae inprovidos casus* (*de Platone* i. 12 = p. 96. 17 Thomas). The fact seems to me clear that *nox inprovida* = *nox caeca*. In the first place, in 65. 20 = iii. 18 (cf. above) the context does not require or suggest a passive force. Secondly, *inp[e]ro[r]vidae voluptatis* (184. 9 = viii. 9), *inprovido saltu* (169. 12 = vii. 20), *inprovida malitia* (277. 12 = xi. 15), *inprovidi sermonis* (47. 6 = ii. 27) all point to the active force of the adjective in the sense of "blind, reckless"; in fact there is no example in Apuleius in which the passive force is needed: for the *inprovidos casus* of Fortune in *de Platone* (cf. above) are as easily "blind" as "unforeseen." Thirdly, Apuleius does not need to use *inprovidus* with a passive meaning; for he has *inprovisus* six times. Finally, Latin usage clearly substantiates *inprovidus* as a synonym of *caecus:* "festinatio improvida est et caeca" (Livy xxii. 39. 22), "caeci atque improvidi" (Curt. viii. 13. 25), "amorem rerum suarum caecum et improvidum" (Seneca *Dial.* vii. 10. 2), "caecum veteres pro improvido dixerunt" (Non. 525. 14 M.), "caecus atque improvidus futurorum" (Aug. *Civ.* iii. 30); nor will it be possible in view of such passages to agree with Pricaeus that *tela . . . . caeca et improvida* in Pliny, *Epist.* iv. 22. 5 is a case of the passive force, unless one wishes to take the poetry out

of Pliny's phrase: for in most of the passages quoted *caecus* and *inprovidus* endow inanimate things with human attributes.

P. 65. 3 (H.) = iii. 17: "priusque apparatu solito instruit feralem officinam, omne genus aromatis et ignorabiliter lamminis litteratis et infelicium [n]avium durantibus, damnis defletorum, sepultorum etiam cadaverum expositis multis admodum membris." This difficult passage suggests various comments.

Helm's critical apparatus is worthy of all praise because it so often interprets. Among his excellent contributions to interpretation are various notes on collocation. So, for example, the peculiar collocation of the adverb and the other word syntactically connected with it is admirably illustrated in various examples scattered through Helm's notes:

ignorabiliter lamminis *litteratis* (above)
coram magiae *noscendae* (66. 14 = iii. 19)
temere fascem lignorum *positum* (72. 16 = iii. 27)
probe calicibus *exfricatis* (79. 26 = iv. 7)
oppido formido *cumulatior* (45. 17 = ii. 25, after Leo)

To these I may add:

aliquanto propheta *commotior* (49. 4 = ii. 29)

But the reason for such dislocation of the adverbial modifier is more significant than the fact itself: it is hardly accidental that in every case the dislocation results either in the formation of an alliterative pair or of homoeoteleuta, or in the avoidance of hiatus.

These peculiarities of style an editor should consider, and in the present passage it seems to me that Helm (following Leo's interpretation) has disregarded the balancing, which his punctuation destroys. My understanding of the structure may be indicated roughly in this separation of the balanced elements:

omne genus aromatis
et ignorabiliter lamminis litteratis
et infelicium [n]avium durantibus damnis
<>defletorum, sepultorum etiam cadaverum expositis multis admodum membris

There is variety within the symmetry, but the balance is marked: note *lamminis litteratis, durantibus damnis, expositis . . . . membris*, and the alliteration in the first two pairs in connection with *multis . . . . membris* in the next phrase; note also the balanced genitive modifiers, *infelicium [n]avium* and *defletorum, sepultorum etiam cadaverum* with varying homoeoteleuta. The balancing of the sentence that follows our passage may serve to show that our author is here as conscious of his manner as of his matter.

In brief, I think that the style demands a comma after *damnis*, not before it. Whether or not an <et> must be supplied before the last member can hardly be determined until Apuleius's practice in the use of polysyndeton is carefully studied, but the supplement is easy if necessary. Nor is there any difficulty in the interpretation: Abt (*Die Apologie und die antike Zauberei*, p. 222, n. 3=p. 148, n. 3) has interpreted *Apol.* 35=p. 41. 1 (H.) in a way that will make future editors hesitate to change *navium* to *avium*[1] (but for the latter cf. *Apol.* 58=p. 66. 5 and p. 66. 14 H.): he refers *resticulas* in *Apol.* 35 to shipwrecked vessels, quoting *Pap. Lond.* 121. 657 W.: ποίησον ἐλλύχνι[α ζ' ἀπ]ὸ πλοίου νεναυαγηκότος. And the *Thesaurus* (V, 28, 18) brings into connection with *damnis* in our passage Lucan ix. 440 with a scholium thereon. The distinction in the last phrase between *defletorum* and *sepultorum* is made clear by Leo's reference to 43. 8 (H.)=ii. 21, 50. 5 (H.) =ii. 30, 41. 12 (H.)=ii. 20.

P. 89. 17 (H.)=iv. 20: "scaenam denique, quem sponte sumpserat, cum anima retinens nunc fugiens nunc resistens . . . . domo prolapsus est." A robber, disguised as a bear, is endeavoring to escape his pursuers, who do not yet know that he is a human being and are the more cautious because they imagine him to be a bear. What does *cum anima* mean? *Scaena* clearly means his "rôle" (cf. Oudendorp and Hildebrand). Helm interprets *cum anima* as *dum spirat*, referring to *illo spiritu expugnato* in the description of the robber's death on the next page (90. 14); from this interpretation I can extract only the meaning "he preserves his rôle as long as he lives," and Butler translates accordingly. H. Bluemner (*Mélanges Nicole*, p. 30) remarks: "man wird nicht umhin können *cum animo* zu lesen, da auch bei Apuleius *anima* meines Wissens niemals in der Bedeutung 'Mut,' die hier erforderlich ist, vorkommt." This simply begs the question at issue. We may agree that *cum anima* cannot mean "spiritedly," but we do not admit that "spiritedly" is the meaning required.

The force that makes the phrase really effective is secured simply by taking *scaenam . . . . cum anima* in the sense of *scaenam et animam*, just as in 92. 19 (H.)=iv. 23 *crines cum veste=crines et vestem*. The robber keeps his rôle of bear along with his life; that is, he keeps his rôle, and in so doing, saves his life for the time being.

P. 90. 22 (H.)=iv. 21: "nisi . . . . quidam lanius . . . . utero bestiae resecto [ursae] magnificum despoliavit latronem." The robber is caught at last; a butcher rips him open, and discovers that he is only skin-deep a bear. Helm follows Roaldo in ejecting *ursae* as a gloss on *bestiae;* such a gloss presupposes a singular degree of ignorance on the part of the readers for whom the gloss was intended. Floridus tries to make *ursae . . . . latronem* mean "bear-robber," which Oudendorp rightly rejects as absurd.

[1] Cf. Petschenig *Wien. Stud.* IV, 145.

Pricaeus emends to the ablative *ursa*, Hildebrand keeps *ursae* as a Greek genitive of separation (cf. 99. 8 [H.]=iv. 31: "quem et dignitatis et patrimonii simul et incolumitatis[1] ipsum Fortuna damnavit," though hardly a perfect parallel), Petschenig (*Wien. Stud.* IV, 147) regards *ursae* as a dative of separation, comparing "laevae . . . . dependebat" 269. 6 (H.)=xi. 4, "quieti revulsum" 52. 7 (H.)=iii. 1. To these three efforts, which seem to me in the right direction, Helm objects: "spolia adimuntur latroni, non latro spoliis." The only answer that any reader of Apuleius can make to Helm is that fortunately Apuleius or his Greek model had more sense of humor than some of his modern editors. When Lucius finally returns to his human form, does he say "as soon as I was rid of the ass' skin"? No, but on the contrary, "me cum primum nefasto tegmine despoliaverat asinus" (276. 26 [H.]=xi. 14). This passage should save *ursae*, whether it be genitive or dative, or the emendation *ursa* if it is necessary, from matter-of-fact treatment by a modern editor: the butcher robbed the robber—of the bear!

P. 113. 3 (H.)=v. 12: "dies ultima et casus extremus <immin>et: sexus infestus et sanguis inimicus iam sumpsit arma et castra commovit et aciem direxit et classicum personavit." Again the editor seems to me singularly insensitive to Apuleius's fondness for balance and symmetry. In this, however, he simply follows others: his textual apparatus reports various efforts to secure the same result. Must we supply a verb for the first two subjects, or in some way separate them from the next two subjects? Apparently the basis of such changes as Michaelis, Rohde, Kronenberg, Traube, and others make, is the feeling that there is something discordant in the combination of the more abstract *dies* and *casus* with the more concrete *sexus* and *sanguis*, as well as in the combination of the figurative military expressions with the subjects *dies* and *casus;* some scholars seem also to require an echo of *venit summa dies et ineluctabile tempus* (Verg. *Aen.* ii. 324). But he undertakes a heavy responsibility who removes from the text of Apuleius such perfect symmetry as the MSS offer:

dies ultima et casus extremus et sexus infestus et sanguis inimicus
iam sumpsit arma et castra commovit et aciem direxit et classicum
personavit.

Perfect symmetry, except that we have *sumpsit arma* instead of *arma sumpsit*, perhaps to avoid the cacophonous *iam arma*.[2]

[1] These genitives are strangely called causal in the *Thesaurus* V, 17, 43.

[2] I should have withheld this note after reading Petschenig, *Ztschrft. f. oesterr. Gym.* XLII, 748: " . . . . nach der Ueberlieferung entsprechen vier Subjecte, vier Prädicatsverben, von denen wieder jedes ein Object bei sich hat," but since Helm makes no reference to Petschenig, it seems worth while to emphasize the reasonableness of Petschenig's comment.

P. 181. 18 (H.) = viii. 7: "sed Thrasyllus . . . . illum amicum, coaetaneum, contubernalem, fratrem denique addito nomine <voce> lugubri ciere. . . . ." Thrasyllus, in love with the wife of Tlepolemus, has foully murdered the husband, and now hypocritically mourns his victim's death, according to the MSS *addito nomine lugubri*. Pricaeus thereon exclaims: "quid hic *nomen lugubre?* aut quid ratio epitheti illius?" He reads *lugubriter* with a comma after *nomine*. Oudendorp assents to the objection of Pricaeus, and suggests inserting *voce* (which Helm adopts) or *sono*. By what flight of fancy Hildebrand reaches the conclusion that the *nomen lugubre* is that of Thrasyllus I must leave to some more ingenious reader to discover.

But I fail to see what is wrong with the reading of the MSS. Thrasyllus exclaims over the corpse: "amice, ... , frater Tlepoleme." Considering the circumstances of Tlepolemus' death—Tlepolemus bravely faced a wild boar, hurled his spear at him, Thrasyllus thrust his spear at the horse of Tlepolemus, the horse threw Tlepolemus to the ground, the boar attacked Tlepolemus, gored him, then Thrasyllus, not content, thrust his lance into Tlepolemus—what under these circumstances could be more truly a *nomen lugubre* than the victim's name, "Tlepolemus," "sturdy fighter," in the mouth of the murderer? The sensitiveness of Apuleius or of his Greek model to the meaning of proper names needs no comment; cf. the next page 182. 14 (H.) = viii. 8, and Helm, *Praefatio* to the *Florida*, p. xxxii.

P. 209. 15 (H.) = ix. 9: "et identidem urgenti sermone comprimunt, promerent potius aureum cantharum. . . . ." The mendicant priests have stolen a golden goblet, and are urged to give up the stolen property. The adverb *potius* is left without any explicit second member in the comparison. Very likely Apuleius intended us to supply the missing member (cf. Hildebrand's note). Helm, in his apparatus, suggests inserting <lamentantes> before *comprimunt* to make the implication easier. But if any change is needed, which I doubt, an emendation of *potius* to *protinus* (written *ptinus?*) might be a simpler way out of the difficulty.

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NOTES ON LUCRETIUS

1. 321: "invida praeclusit speciem natura videndi"; cf. Hilary *Trac. in Psalm.* lv. 5: "naturam videndi caecis ab utero."

3. 42: "infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti"; cf. Apul. *De Deo Socr.* 129: "terrae tartara."

3. 198: "at contra lapidum conlectum."

The manuscripts have *coniectum*, which may be defended by Cic. *Att.* iv. 3. 2: "domus fracta coniectu lapidum ex area nostra."

3. 235: "rara quod eius enim constat natura"; cf. Tert. *Marc.* ii. 8: "aura vento rarior."

5. 1408: "unde etiam vigiles nunc haec accepta tuentur"; cf. Macaulay *Hist. England* II, 489 (ed. 1849). "Wharton's celebrated song, with many additional verses, was chanted more loudly than ever in all the streets of the capital. The very sentinels who guarded the palace hummed, as they paced their rounds, 'The English confusion to Popery drink, Lillibullero bullow a la.'"

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EMENDATIONS OF PORPHYRY *de Abstinentia*

I. 12 Nauck², p. 94: *αἴτιον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον· ὥστε τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι πᾶν τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν νενομοθετημένων, ἡλιβάτου τινὸς γέμειν εὐηθείας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχον τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συμφερόντων, οἷον ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ ἑτέρων μυρίων εἰδῶν, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν τε κοινῶν ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν ἰδίων· καὶ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*

For *ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν ἐν πυλλοῖς*, which is obviously corrupt, we should read *πολλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν* or perhaps *πολλῶν* or *πολλοὶ*.

The elliptical logic of this Epicurean argument runs: Our principle of utility (rightly understood) refutes the skeptical doctrine that right and wrong are matters of opinion depending solely on the positive enactments of law. It is not so but [the diversity of customs that lends plausibility to this view is due to the fact that] just as men err in their estimates of what is advantageous in respect of health, etc., so the many make many mistakes in the general and particular application of the principle of utility. Illustrations follow, introduced by *καὶ γὰρ*. The idea that the multitude are bad judges not only of the right and honorable but even of their own advantage is found in Isocrates *Or.* i. 45; ii. 45–46; viii. 109.

For the rhetorical turn *πολλὰ . . . . ἐν πολλοῖς* cf. Plato *Rep.* 467D, *πολλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο* and Blaydes on Aristophanes *Eq.* 411, *πολλὰ δὴ 'πὶ πολλοῖς*, and *Vesp.* 1046.

I. 30 Nauck², p. 107: *ἐοίκαμεν γὰρ τοῖς εἰς ἀλλόφυλον ἔθνος ἥκουσι*—the reading of Cobet *Mnem. Nov.* XI, 424. The MSS have *ἢ ἐκοῦσιν ἀπεληλυθόσι*. Hercher deletes *ἢ ἐκοῦσιν*. Valentinus reads *ἥκουσιν ἢ ἀπεληλυθόσιν*. Cobet assumes that an older Codex had ЄKOYCIN, from which a "sleepy scribe" extracted the erroneous *ἢ ἐκοῦσιν*. He therefore would restore *ἥκουσι* and delete *ἀπεληλυθόσι*. A better remedy is to read *ἢ ἐκπεσοῦσι ἢ ἐκοῦσιν ἀπεληλυθόσι*. The eye of the scribe passed to the second *ἢ* and omitted the *ἐκπεσοῦσι* which yields a neat and familiar alternative to *ἐκοῦσιν ἀπεληλυθόσι*. Cf. Plato *Rep.* 565B *ἐκπεσὼν μὲν καὶ βίᾳ κατελθών* and, with slightly different meaning, *Rep.* 497B, *ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν*.

The idea that life is an exile and the true home of the soul is elsewhere can be traced back to various passages of the *Republic* and even to Empedocles. Below, Nauck, p. 108, l. 6, instead of *ἐπαναμμνήσκει δ' ἑαυτὸν ὧν ἔχων ἐπελάθετο* we should probably read *ἐκὼν ἐπελάθετο*. Cf. Aeschyl. *Ag.* 39 and Herod. 4. 43. This suits the thought, for the exiled soul was drawn down to this lower world not only by fate but by its own fault—*διά τινα μοχθηρίαν τῆς ψυχῆς*, *ibid.* l. 26.

PAUL SHOREY

NOTES ON TWO COMPOUNDS OF *FIGO*

I. *Praefigere.* Ps.-Quint, *Declam.* x. 8. Among the uses of *praefigere* Forcellini, *s.v. praefigo*, Harper, and Georges give "enchant, bewitch, bezaubern," referring only to a passage in one of the Declamations attributed to Quintilian (Ps.-Quint. *Declam.* x. 8), Harper marking it with the asterisk that denotes the meaning as of a single occurrence. The subject of the declamation is "The Enchanted Tomb," *Sepulcrum Incantatum*, and the case is this: A woman saw in sleep every night a son whom she had recently lost by death. She told of this to her husband. He called in a professional magician and had him stop these visitations by incantations over the tomb. The wife brings suit against her husband for cruelty. The grief of the mother when her son does not appear in the night as usual is expatiated upon in the declamation. Finally she goes to the tomb, and *quam tum illa praefixum clausumque tumulum nudis cecidit uberibus! Praefixum* is translated in these lexicons "enchanted." The tomb is enchanted beyond any doubt, and the reader knows it; but does *praefixum* contain that idea in itself? Are not both *praefixum* and *clausum* used with but a slight figurative extension of their ordinary significance, receiving purely from the context whatever other connotation they may suggest to a reader who knows the circumstances of the treatment of the tomb? I should be inclined to place this reference under the heading "close, block up," a well-attested meaning of *praefigo*, and to think the claim for "bewitch, enchant," on the strength of this passage, quite untenable.

II. *Configere.* Prov. 22:23. *Configere* is used several times in the Vulgate in a literal sense, "to pierce, nail together": John 19:37; Zech. 12:10; 13:3. There is, however, another use that seems quite distinct from this. In the Vulgate, Prov. 22:23, we have, to translate in part, "thou shalt not do wrong to the poor man nor oppress the needy, for the Lord will plead his cause," *et configet eos qui confixerunt animam eius.* The meaning of the Hebrew word Ḳābha' translated by *configet* and *confixerunt* is uncertain. A recent Hebrew dictionary, that of Brown-Driver-Briggs, says that it meant perhaps "rob, injure, wrong generally." An older one of somewhat less authority (Fuerst *Hebrew Lexicon*) gives "intertwine, plan cunning device, defraud, disappoint." A modern Hebrew word

derived from it means "deceive." The Greek versions are as follows: Septuagint, *καὶ ῥύσῃ σὴν ἄσυλον ψυχήν;* Aquila, *καὶ καθηλώσει τοὺς καθηλώσαντας αὐτόν;* Symmachus, *καὶ κολάσεται τοὺς κολαζομένους ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ.* The King James version translates "and spoil the soul of those that spoiled them," for which the Revised Version substitutes "and despoil of life those that despoil them."

Again in Mal. 3:8, the Vulgate has *Si affiget homo Deum, quia vos configitis me? Et dixistis in quo configimus te? In decimis et in primitiis,* where the Hebrew word translated by forms of *configo* is the same as in the other passage. In Greek we have: Septuagint, *μήτι πτερνιεῖ ἄνθρωπος θεόν; διότι ὑμεῖς πτερνίζετέ με;* Aquila and Symmachus, *μὴ ἀποστερήσει ἄνθρωπος θεὸν; ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἀποστερεῖτέ με.*

There is also an Itala version which used *fraudavimus et configimus, fraudatis et configitis* for the *configimus* and *configitis* of the other translation. The King James and Revised Versions are in accord with "rob" for each occurrence of the word. From these passages the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* and before it Weitenaner's *Lexicon Biblicum* and Forcellini give as a meaning of *configere,* "defraudare, privare, cheat, rob." The divergence of the Greek texts plainly shows that the Hebrew was obscure at an early date. In the passage in Proverbs the Septuagint in particular admits its obscurity by translating the idea which must be contained in the passage rather than the words themselves, "And will preserve his soul inviolate." Most interesting is Aquila: *καθηλόω* means "nail or fasten down," and, as far as I can find, nothing but that (Liddell and Scott; *Thes. L. Gr.*, "*clavis defigo, configo*"). The passages evidently demand a word with the meaning of "rob" or the like. The context in itself would be sufficient to tempt a translator or commentator who did not understand the word used to translate or interpret it as though that were what it meant. This is one way of handling such a problem. Another is to give the general sense and let the words go as the Septuagint did. But there is a third way possible. If he does not understand the significance of a word, but knows, or thinks he knows, the literal meaning, a conscientious man will probably use that word in his own language that seems closest, and leave the difficulty of interpretation just as he found it. It is barely possible that Aquila with *καθηλόω,* the Itala with *fraudare et configere,* and St. Jerome with *configere* alone, followed independently the third method and came to conclusions so strikingly similar. But we know that St. Jerome had the Greek versions as well as the Hebrew before him in his work, and it seems improbable that the author of the other Latin text did not also use them, even, possibly, without the Hebrew. Aquila had the reputation in antiquity, and deservedly, of a careful and exact translator. St. Jerome himself in his *ep. ad Damas,* 12, says of him "non contentiosius ut quidam putant sed studiosius verbum interpretatur ad verbum." So it seems to me that Aquila's version of Prov. 22:23 is the source of the use of *configo* in both

versions and in both passages of the Latin. The Itala would seem a compromise (in itself implying that even in such a context *configere* could not carry the meaning *fraudare*) between a sense of duty to literalness and a desire to have the passage make sense, a compromise to which St. Jerome evidently did not feel impelled. At any rate it seems impossible, other evidence failing, to accord credence to the interpretation given almost without question by the lexicographers, that *configere* has the meaning "fraudare, rob."

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[Miss Thompson has shown that "cheat, rob" should not be admitted as a meaning of *configo*, and has offered the attractive suggestion that the use of *configo* in the passages from which this meaning has been deduced is in imitation of καθηλόω in Aquila's version of Prov. 22:23. How did Aquila come to use καθηλόω? In the obscure Hebrew word there appears to be nothing which could have suggested to him καθηλόω as a literal translation. He must have intended to render the phrase as a whole (in our Revised Version "despoil of life") with some notion of violent injury, as did other translators into Greek with κολάσεται or βιάσεται. Compounds of ἥλόω are occasionally used figuratively in classical times, and especially an ecclesiastical writer of the second century A.D., like Aquila, for whom καθηλόω had the special connotation "nail to the cross, crucify," might well employ it in the sense "cause to suffer," or "destroy." Cf. the figurative use of σταυρόω in Gal. 5:24: ἐσταύρωσαν τὴν σάρκα κτλ., "crucified the flesh with the passions and the lusts thereof."

The Septuagint, Ps. 118:120 has καθήλωσον ἐκ τοῦ φόβου σου τὰς σάρκας μου, ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν κριμάτων σου ἐφοβήθην. But the Hebrew means, according to the RV, "my flesh trembled for fear of thee; and I am afraid of thy judgments." The verb which is rendered "trembled" is given in the last edition of Gesenius-Buhl (1910), p. 541, as probably related to a modern Hebrew word meaning "nail." Whether or not the verb is actually related to this word for "nail," the translator's acquaintance with the latter may be confidently assumed and will account for his hitting upon καθηλόω. (Aquila also has ἠλώθη.) But as regards the sense, the clause, especially with its shift to the imperative construction, cannot correspond even remotely to the Hebrew original, and does not go well even with the concluding clause in the Greek. Did it mean anything to the translator? Not necessarily, and perhaps we should do well to drop the matter at this point. But if we may venture to correct to καθήλωσα and assume a figurative meaning, either "constrain" or "crucify," we secure at least a consistent sentence: "I have constrained (or crucified) my flesh from fear of thee, for of thy judgments I was afraid."—C. D. BUCK.]

BOOK REVIEWS

Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates. Von M. ROSTOWZEW. (Erstes Beiheft zum Archiv für Papyrusforschung.) Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. Pp. xii+432.

In Ptolemaic times the king was owner of all the land in Egypt. He disposed of it by giving it by auction in various forms of leasehold. Generally speaking it was of three kinds: garden lands, grain lands, and lands which through lack of water needed to be reclaimed for either of these uses. The bulk of the soil of Egypt belonged to the second of these groups, and to it the name γῆ βασιλική was given. Upon it lived the βασιλικοὶ γεωργοί. These leased their holdings from the king or subleased them from his tenants, the contract ("offer": ὑπόσχεσις) being revocable at the king's pleasure, but not at the will of the tenants. These could be dispossessed for failure to pay their taxes (ἐκφόρια), or when the king found anyone who would pay him higher taxes. Whether the land yielded them or not, the taxes had to be paid. The only course open to the tenants when their situation became intolerable was to "strike," that is to say, leave their villages in a body and scatter about in other villages. They were under the jurisdiction of the administrative and not of the judicial officers.

The management of these lands presented relatively few difficulties to the Ptolemies and to the Romans, their successors. Under the latter the tenants appear as δημόσιοι γεωργοί or βασιλικοὶ γεωργοί, the difference being one of the status of the land on which they lived (*ager publicus* vs. *patrimonium principis*). Their condition became worse rather than better with the change of masters; for the Romans made the strike ineffective by abolishing the right of sanctuary, and by constantly driving refugees out of Alexandria, whither they tended to flee. The greatest hardship of the γεωργοί arose in both epochs through the constraint put upon them by the officials to till, in addition to the land of their own village, portions of the *ager rudis* or *derelictus* in their vicinity. They formed usually a village community with elders (πρεσβύτεροι) at their head; but since these were appointed by the officials their benefit to the peasants was problematical. The only effective way of escape open to the latter from official oppression was for them to put themselves either as individuals or as villages under the patronage of the *potentes*, or great landed proprietors. The formation of this class is the most striking phenomenon in the agrarian history of Egypt between the fourth and the sixth century A.D., as has been shown by Zulueta

(*De patrociniis vicorum*, Vinogradoff's "Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History" 1, 2) and by Gelzer (*Studien zur byzantinischen Verwaltung Aegyptens*, "Leipziger historische Abhandlungen" XIII), to whom Rostowzew refers.

The Ptolemies gave part of their arable land (γῆ ἐν ἀρετῇ) for the use of the priests (γῆ ἱερά). These grants the Romans revoked, but the lands thus confiscated they relet to the priests, who subsequently either tilled them themselves on much the same terms as the δημόσιοι γεωργοί, or sublet them to δημόσιοι γεωργοί, contenting themselves with the small gain made on the transaction. Their tenure was, generally speaking, less precarious than that of the ordinary tenants of the state, but not essentially different.

Three serious difficulties both the Ptolemies and the Romans had to encounter in Egypt: (1) to bring under cultivation areas not regularly watered and fertilized by the annual overflow of the Nile, (2) to get something tangible by means of which to hold the vast army of officials—whose public services were always *liturgical* in character—to their contracts or their obligations, and (3) to strengthen the foreign element or interest in the country. The only way they found of solving these difficulties was to abandon the precarious tenure maintained by them in the case of the old grain lands (γῆ ἐν ἀρετῇ). The Ptolemies accordingly gave considerable tracts to their friends, the so-called γῆ ἐν δωρεᾷ, not as freehold, but in *Erbpacht* and with the important privilege of exemption from ἐκφόρια. These estates were confiscated at the time of the Roman occupation, but were given anew by the early *principes* to members of their families, Roman senators, or favorites of Roman, Greek, or Egyptian nationality. Thus arose the οὐσίαι, which were confiscated again and made into royal lands by the Claudian emperors and constituted by Vespasian as a special category, this great agrarian organizer having established the λόγος οὐσιακός for their management. (The λόγος διοικήσεως cared for the γῆ βασ. and δημ., the γῆ ἱερά, and the γῆ ἐξ ἀξίας.) This γῆ οὐσιακή was given to contractors on *zeitlich begrenzte Misthoseis*. The μισθωταί, however, usually sublet it to ὑπομισθωταί on terms regulated by the state. The rents were paid to the state directly, so that the μισθωταί did little more than go as sureties for their payment. The tendency was for the leases to become indefinite and obligatory. Much of this land was reclaimed land which needed constant watchfulness to be kept fertile.

The regular method of dealing with the *ager rudis* in Ptolemaic times was to give it for an initial sum (payable in three or four instalments) and with *ateleia* for five years followed by *kuphoteleia* for three further years, in a form of hereditary leasehold, which was substantially private ownership, to men ordinarily Macedonians, Greeks, Jews, and Levantines who came to Egypt with some capital after the foreign occupation. The land thus held was termed γῆ ἐν ἀφέσει, and it was held by *kleruchi*, *katoeki*, and

others. Their lots were their private κτήματα, as were the houses and gardens or orchards generally in Egypt. From this class came the government officials whose services were thus insured by the private property they were bound to sacrifice in case of neglect, inefficiency, or dishonesty. The Romans confiscated much of the γῆ ἐν ἀρετῇ of the Macedonian *kleruchs* and *katoeki* and added such of it as was under grain cultivation to the *ager publicus*, but sold the rest, together with ordinary *ager rudis*—the so-called γῆ ἐξ ἀξίας, for what could be got for it, as γῆ κληρουχική, κατοικική, and ἰδιόκτητος respectively. Thus arose in the first century A.D. *eine gewaltige Armee von meistens kleinen Grundbesitzern*. The position of these property holders was anything but an enviable one in the third century A.D. They seem to have been usually in arrears to the government (p. 140). On the foreclosure of the mortgage the land became γῆ προσόδου, and paid a new tax as interest on the debt—sureties (ἐπιτηρηταί) being demanded, perhaps from the owners. After a time, on failure to pay the sum due, the land was sold and passed into whatever category it had belonged in before becoming γῆ προσόδου. The position of the landowners was made still worse when the Severi introduced the municipal system into Egypt; for this had as its net result to place the responsibility for the payment of the ἐκφόρια and the polltax and all the other burdens of the δημόσιοι γεωργοί upon the shoulders of the proprietors. Henceforth they had to be held to their ἰδία or *origo*, just like the γεωργοί (who are the *dediticii* of Caracalla's edict); and, in fact, their status did not differ essentially from that of the ordinary tenants. To them too the patronage of the *potentes* was the only escape from an intolerable position. Hence the feudalization of Egypt between the fourth and the sixth centuries A.D.

The above is an abstract of the first half of Rostowzew's work. As can be readily seen, two things are attempted in it: to define the technical terms for land tenure used in the papyri (on p. 220 ff. is a beautiful elucidation of the curious term *homologi* [it equals *dediticii*] contributed by Wilcken, who has given most generous aid to the author in this part of his book), and to sketch the agrarian history of Egypt from the Ptolemaic occupation to the third century A.D. The same dual tendency is observable in the second half, where Sicily, Asia Minor, and Africa are treated in succession (the inscriptions being, however, a poor substitute for the papyri); and in addition the effort is there made to trace and estimate the influence upon Rome of the Hellenistic methods of dealing with the public domain. In this portion the sections devoted to Asia Minor are particularly instructive. Nowhere else can one find so good an orientation on the agrarian problems and policies of the Seleucids. We see them breaking down the power of the noble or priestly families to whom the most of the interior of the peninsula belonged at Alexander's conquest by founding new cities, disposing of portions of the public land—λαοί and all—to old and new urban centers, and substituting themselves as overlords in place of the nobles and

priests. The Roman senators in the first century B.C., through acquiring by gift or purchase vast estates in Asia Minor, threatened to feudalize this region once more, but the confiscatory policy of the Claudian emperors checked this tendency, and from the time of Vespasian to Hadrian the attempt was made here, as in Africa, to create on the public domains a class of *laoi* whose first loyalty would be given to their feudal lord—the emperor himself. A whole series of general enactments was issued (e.g., the *lex Mamaea* and the *lex Hadriana de agris rudibus* in Africa) to effect this purpose, the net result being, however, to substitute, in the third century A.D. and thereafter, for a senator of the old style an imperial official as feudal lord between the λαοί and the emperor.

Rostowzew's *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates* is one of the most illuminating works on ancient history which has appeared in recent years. It is bound to be fundamental for all future studies on the economic history of Hellenistic and Roman times. The *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* is to be congratulated on the character, if not on the style, of its first *Beiheft*.

WILLIAM SCOTT FERGUSON

Syntax of Classical Greek from Homer to Demosthenes. Second Part, "The Syntax of the Simple Sentence Continued, Embracing the Doctrine of the Article." By BASIL LANNAU GILDERSLEEVE with the co-operation of CHARLES WILLIAM EMIL MILLER. The Doctrine of the Article Elaborated, by PROFESSOR MILLER.—New York: American Book Co., 1911.

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One may concede the a-priori historical probability of this thesis and yet distrust it as a working hypothesis either for the philological study or the philosophical interpretation of Plato. In the one case, it will mislead because the evidence needed to verify it is lacking. In the other, it is a dangerous guide because the assumptions of modern scholarship make us more likely to miss the incalculable superiority of Plato to his contemporaries and predecessors than we are to overlook parallels and anticipatory suggestions in pre-Platonic literature. In the lack of space to apply these principles to the detail of Professor Taylor's book, I can only give a summary of its content and indicate a few reserves.

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Chap. iii, the διττοὶ λόγοι is a study of the Διαλέξεις undertaken mainly for the purpose of showing that the eristic type of Sophist sometimes supposed to be characteristic of the later Platonic dialogues goes back to the fifth century. The essay on the Phrontisterion attributes to the historical (and Pythagorean) Socrates the main contents of the *Clouds* and the *Phaedo*. Despite Xenophon, Socrates was a student of natural philosophy. The burning of the Phrontisterion is an allusion to the burning of the Pytha-

gorean *συνέδρια*, a suggestion not original with Professor Taylor, as he himself observes in a postscript.

The valuable concluding study on the words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in pre-Platonic literature rests on a complete collection, we are told, of every occurrence of the words down to Aristotle. Here again the object is to show that the philosophic use of these words was familiar not only to Socrates but to Pythagoras and the pre-Socratics. In *Timaeus* 51C: *ἦ μάτην ἑκάστοτε εἶναί τί φαμεν εἶδος ἑκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ'οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος*; Professor Taylor thinks that Socrates' use of *φαμεν* includes the Pythagoreans of *Magna Graecia* among the "we" to whom Plato attributes the doctrine. This is to press "*φαμεν*" too hard. It is obviously used as in *Laws* 821B in a loose colloquial way merely to include the interlocutors or people in general in the recognition of a familiar doctrine or a natural tendency. The famous sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1078*b* 30, *ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς· οἱ δ'ἐχώρισαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν*, Professor Taylor interprets not as a distinction between Socrates and the Platonists, but between the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues and the *εἰδῶν φιλοι* of *Sophist* 248A, who he thinks must be the Eleatics. I have given my view of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* elsewhere (cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 433). But apart from that, the Greek will hardly bear Professor Taylor's interpretation. No Greek reader would have understood *οἱ δ'ἐχώρισαν* in its entire context to be a reference either to the Eleatics or to the representatives of some extreme form of the doctrine of ideas rejected by Plato. The words plainly refer to *οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι*. They mean simply that *χωρίζειν*, which Aristotle everywhere attributes to "the dear men" who introduced the ideas, that is to Plato and his school. Professor Taylor's collections lay all students of Plato under obligation. But a sound "semantic" of the word *εἶδος* demands more discrimination than he has yet found time to bestow upon the subject. His contention is that the philosophic meaning of the word goes back through rhetoric and medicine to Pythagorean geometry. He holds that in Plato it is usually synonymous with *φύσις*, and even thinks that it is worth while to raise the question whether in Plato *εἶδος* ever means "class" at all—a question which a re-reading of the *Euthyphro* and the *Meno* surely will answer, if it be borne in mind that Greek logic is generally expressed in terms of intension rather than extension. What his examples establish, I think, is simply that *εἶδος* in ordinary Greek normally means "form," or "animal body," or "beauty," but that it might mean a little more abstractly and, in the infancy of abstraction, somewhat vaguely "kind," "mode," "manner," "species." The transition from "kind" to a particular kind, substance, element, or nature is no more surprising than the shift in modern times from species to spice. Professor Taylor properly emphasizes the significance of the Hippocratean corpus for the study of Greek philosophy. But I think he makes too much

priests. The Roman senators in the first century B.C., through acquiring by gift or purchase vast estates in Asia Minor, threatened to feudalize this region once more, but the confiscatory policy of the Claudian emperors checked this tendency, and from the time of Vespasian to Hadrian the attempt was made here, as in Africa, to create on the public domains a class of λαοί whose first loyalty would be given to their feudal lord—the emperor himself. A whole series of general enactments was issued (e.g., the *lex Manciana* and the *lex Hadriana de agris rudibus* in Africa) to effect this purpose, the net result being, however, to substitute, in the third century A.D. and thereafter, for a senator of the old style an imperial official as feudal lord between the λαοί and the emperor.

Rostowzew's *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates* is one of the most illuminating works on ancient history which has appeared in recent years. It is bound to be fundamental for all future studies on the economic history of Hellenistic and Roman times. The *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* is to be congratulated on the character, if not on the style, of its first *Beiheft*.

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Chap. iii, the διισσοὶ λόγοι is a study of the Διαλέξεις undertaken mainly for the purpose of showing that the eristic type of Sophist sometimes supposed to be characteristic of the later Platonic dialogues goes back to the fifth century. The essay on the Phrontisterion attributes to the historical (and Pythagorean) Socrates the main contents of the *Clouds* and the *Phaedo*. Despite Xenophon, Socrates was a student of natural philosophy. The burning of the Phrontisterion is an allusion to the burning of the Pytha-

gorean συνέδρια, a suggestion not original with Professor Taylor, as he himself observes in a postscript.

The valuable concluding study on the words εἶδος and ἰδέα in pre-Platonic literature rests on a complete collection, we are told, of every occurrence of the words down to Aristotle. Here again the object is to show that the philosophic use of these words was familiar not only to Socrates but to Pythagoras and the pre-Socratics. In *Timaeus* 51C: ἦ μάτην ἑκάστοτε εἶναί τί φαμεν εἶδος ἑκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ'οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος; Professor Taylor thinks that Socrates' use of φαμεν includes the Pythagoreans of *Magna Graecia* among the "we" to whom Plato attributes the doctrine. This is to press "φαμεν" too hard. It is obviously used as in *Laws* 821B in a loose colloquial way merely to include the interlocutors or people in general in the recognition of a familiar doctrine or a natural tendency. The famous sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1078*b* 30, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς· οἱ δ'ἐχώρισαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν, Professor Taylor interprets not as a distinction between Socrates and the Platonists, but between the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues and the εἰδῶν φιλοι of *Sophist* 248A, who he thinks must be the Eleatics. I have given my view of the εἰδῶν φίλοι elsewhere (cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 433). But apart from that, the Greek will hardly bear Professor Taylor's interpretation. No Greek reader would have understood οἱ δ'ἐχώρισαν in its entire context to be a reference either to the Eleatics or to the representatives of some extreme form of the doctrine of ideas rejected by Plato. The words plainly refer to οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι. They mean simply that χωρίζειν, which Aristotle everywhere attributes to "the dear men" who introduced the ideas, that is to Plato and his school. Professor Taylor's collections lay all students of Plato under obligation. But a sound "semantic" of the word εἶδος demands more discrimination than he has yet found time to bestow upon the subject. His contention is that the philosophic meaning of the word goes back through rhetoric and medicine to Pythagorean geometry. He holds that in Plato it is usually synonymous with φύσις, and even thinks that it is worth while to raise the question whether in Plato εἶδος ever means "class" at all—a question which a re-reading of the *Euthyphro* and the *Meno* surely will answer, if it be borne in mind that Greek logic is generally expressed in terms of intension rather than extension. What his examples establish, I think, is simply that εἶδος in ordinary Greek normally means "form," or "animal body," or "beauty," but that it might mean a little more abstractly and, in the infancy of abstraction, somewhat vaguely "kind," "mode," "manner," "species." The transition from "kind" to a particular kind, substance, element, or nature is no more surprising than the shift in modern times from species to spice. Professor Taylor properly emphasizes the significance of the Hippocratean corpus for the study of Greek philosophy. But I think he makes too much

of the anticipation of the terminology of the doctrine of ideas in section 15 of the treatise περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς. The phrase αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ is normal Greek idiom, as is the use of κοινωνεῖν with the dative. The use of εἶδος in the sense of element is, as we have seen, a perfectly natural extension of meaning, and early Greek thought would not distinguish sharply an element from an elementary quality. All of Plato's language is anticipated in this way by earlier writers. He was too great an artist in style to coin a Kantian technical terminology. His originality consists in the use of these and other expressions to denote the substantive reality which he ascribed and was the first consciously and consistently to ascribe to all concepts. Isocrates' use of the words εἶδος and ἰδέα may be partly dependent on Gorgias and other lost rhetoricians. But it is in the main an unintelligent imitation of Plato, an attempt to transfer to his own "philosophy" his rival's terminology. Professor Taylor speaks in such cases, e.g., *Helena* 10. 45, of "anticipations" of Platonic phraseology. But his entire treatment of Isocrates needs revision. For example, commenting on 12.132, he says, "the object of the passage is to argue that men in general are wrong in confusing aristocracy with a government ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. But the correct interpretation, as rightly given by Blass (II, 85) is that men are wrong in counting both aristocracy *and* a government ἀπὸ τιμημάτων among the primary forms of government." This inadvertence is an *obiter dictum*, and does not affect the argument. But when Professor Taylor goes on to say that "we have an opposition of ἰδέα and φύσις, not, as in Plato, an identification of them," the matter is more serious. I do not propose to argue the point here. It is a mere question of the correct interpretation of a half-page of normal Greek and a recognition of the transitional force of μὲν οὖν. If Professor Taylor will re-read the passage carefully, I am confident that he will be of my opinion that there is no opposition between ἰδέα and φύσις here, but that they are virtual synonyms in Isocrates as they often are in Plato.

PAUL SHOREY

Jacques de Tourreil, Traducteur de Démosthène. Thèse de doctorat présentée à la faculté des lettres de l'universtié de Lyon. Par GEORGES DUHAIN. Paris: Champion, 1910. Fr. 6.

This excellent dissertation is an example of a type which I could wish were more frequently represented in our own universities. A minor chapter of the history of the national literature and the national tradition of classical scholarship, thoroughly and intelligently studied, is a far more profitable piece of work than are half of the desperate attempts to prove something which isn't so which go by the name of "investigations."

But who is Jacques de Tourreil? And why should anybody turn aside at this date to make a study of him? Jacques de Tourreil was a minor literary celebrity and academician of the latter half of the age of Louis XIV

whose reputation was made by a translation of Demosthenes of which he lived to publish a third revised and greatly improved edition. Boileau once said of him, "That man is no fool, far from it—and yet what a monster he has made of Demosthenes." This censure referred to the turgid and periphrastic diction of the first edition of his translation, which was undertaken with the laudable purpose of forming the translator's own oratorical style. M. Duhain shows in detail how in successive editions these redundancies were pruned away and how De Tourreil, warming to his task, was led on to study his author seriously and, for that age, critically, until he merited the praise of being the first French translator who made any effort to establish the text with which he was dealing.

In addition to this, his main theme, M. Duhain enlarges his subject to include a history of the art of translation in France, a study of seventeenth century scholarship, a biography of De Tourreil, setting forth his relation to the leading literary men of the time, to the French academy, and to the famous "quarrel of the ancients and the moderns." A useful bibliography is appended. It is, I repeat, a solid yet readable piece of work of a type which may be commended to American candidates for the doctorate.

PAUL SHOREY

The First Grammar of the Language Spoken by the Bontoc Igórot, with a Vocabulary and Texts, Mythology, Folk-Lore, Historical Episodes, Songs. By DR. CARL WILHELM SEIDENADEL. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. $10\frac{3}{4}\times 8\frac{1}{2}$, pp. xxiv+588, 13 plates.

The speech of the Bontok Igórot is one of the numerous Philippine languages belonging to the Indonesian branch of the great Malayo-Polynesian family which extends from Madagascar eastward through the East Indies to Hawaii and the Marquesas Islands of the eastern Pacific.

The best known and most widely spoken of the Philippine languages are the Tagálog, Bikol, and Iloko (Luzón Island), and the Bisaya of the southern islands of the group. Of the many others may be mentioned Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Ibanag, spoken on Luzón, and Sulu, spoken in the Sulu Archipelago. But no less important to the student of linguistics are the minor speech groups of the more primitive hill tribes including the Bontok Igórot of North Luzón.

Some very creditable work in comparative Philippine studies has in recent years been done by Blake, Scheerer, Saleeby, and others, and a few vocabularies of little-known tribes have been collected in connection with ethnological research, but the first scientific treatise of the facts of a Philippine language as a whole is that of Dr. Seidenadel, a Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Chicago and a former member of its faculty in the departments of Greek and Latin.

The material for the book was gathered entirely from the lips of the native Bontoks with whom the author was in daily contact for a period extending over ten months. Especial care was taken to record each word and sound accurately and to note dialect differences in pronunciation, meaning of words, and sentence structure. In the complete absence of a written language, Dr. Seidenadel was compelled to devise his own system of sound symbols and orthography, a task which only those who have done similar work can fully appreciate.

In classifying the grammatical facts chief stress is laid upon the treatment of the verb (pp. 51–148). The old classification of "the three passives" is discarded and all verbs are treated as either (1) *personal*, those emphasizing the condition or state of the subject or the action performed by the subject, or (2) *possessive*, those having the character of verbal nouns, *nomina actionis*, in which the action affects a definite object of considerable importance. The *personal* verbs include all of intransitive force and those transitives in which the subject or its action is especially emphasized. The *possessive* verbs are all of transitive force and include the traditional "three passives" of the Spanish grammarians. The voice of the personal verb is always active, while the possessive verb may be either active or passive, the active construction being much the more common. The passive is formed by the adjectival prefixes *ma-* (for the present), *na-*(for the preterite), and *adma-* (for the future). These passives are therefore properly considered as verbal adjectives (p. 93).

Much attention is also given to the various particles and phrases of adverbial, prepositional, and conjunctional force, seventy pages (196–266) being devoted to these very important matters.

One of the most useful chapters deals with the different negatives, whose use in Bontok and in most other Indonesian languages is determined by very strict rules.

The vocabulary (pp. 281–475) is not merely a list of English-Bontok equivalents, but is rich in examples showing the Bontok word or phrase employed to express the various shades of meaning of the English word according to its application.

Of special interest to the general reader will be the excellent collection of Bontok folk tales and songs with which the book concludes (pp. 486–583). These are provided with an interlinear English translation and explanatory notes. The variety of subjects touched upon in these texts gives an insight into many of the customs and psychological traits of these primitive, straightforward, and industrious dwellers of the hills.

Those who have to make frequent use of the book will certainly regret the lack of an index, notwithstanding the copious Table of Contents at the beginning of the work. It would even have been a help had the subject-matter been indicated at the top of each page in place of the title of the work.

The remarks on phonology (pp. 6–11) fail to cover several phenomena of interest that appear in the texts and in examples given elsewhere in the book. The statements made in paragraphs 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, and 20 should have been accompanied by illustrations. The absence of examples here is in strong contrast to their copiousness in other parts of the grammar. But the author has purposely laid little stress upon rules of phonology and has entirely abstained from the alluring occupation of comparing Bontok with other Philippine languages.

As an intensive first-hand study and exposition of the phenomena of a single Philippine idiom, Dr. Seidenadel's work stands unique, and sets a standard of thoroughness and accuracy for which all scholars will be grateful and which may well be followed in future monographs on individual Philippine languages.

C. E. CONANT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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Syntax of Early Latin. By C. E. BENNETT. Vol. I, The Verb. New York: Allyn & Bacon; Leipzig: Theodor Stauffer, 1910. Pp. 506. $4.00.

Professor Bennett's book deals with a field which has long been crying for cultivation. Its predecessor, Holtze's *Syntaxis Priscorum Scriptorum Latinorum*, is now fifty years old (published in 1861–62).

Professor Bennett is to be congratulated on having accomplished a heavy and important task. The mass of material covered is large. A great many opinions are passed in rapid review. The discussions are on the average as full as could be hoped for in a general volume of such compass. The bibliography given is considerable, and well chosen. The style is lucid, flowing, and interesting, as always in Bennett's work. The points of view are a great improvement over Holtze's—to whom, however, now that we are parting with him, it ought to be said that many a man has had reason to be grateful. The store of examples is extensive. The book deserves wide reading. The publishers, with their usual excellent taste, have done their part to make this easy.

Having thus summed up my general opinion, I must hold myself free to express assent or dissent in detail. This is facilitated for me by the fact that Bennett in a large number of places cites my monographs and the syntax of the Hale-Buck Grammar, with assent often, to be sure, but also with frequent dissent, and the discussion of his reasons. His work and mine have, in fact, lain largely in the same field. We are thus natural critics, the one of the other.

The general plan is indicated by the chapter headings, which are as follows: I, "Agreement, Voices, Impersonal Verbs, Omission of Verbs";

II, "Tenses of the Indicative (Especially in Principal Clauses)"; III, "The Indicative in Subordinate Clauses"; IV, "The Subjunctive in Principal Clauses"; V, "The Subjunctive in Subordinate Clauses"; VI, "The Imperative"; VII, "The Infinitive"; VIII, "Participles, Gerund, and Supine, etc."; IX, "The Sentence-Question."

Already, the headings betray a lack of architectonic care. IV and V correspond. To these, again, III corresponds. But II does not. Further, it turns out that II deals not "especially," but *only* with the indicative in principal clauses, and that the important subject of the behavior of the tenses in subordinate clauses is not treated anywhere in the book. The same lack shows itself in the treatment of the subjunctive. There is no general statement of the tense-forces in the independent uses. There is no discussion of the *rationale* of the phenomena known as the "sequence of tenses," such as I gave in my "Sequence of Tenses," *A.J.Ph.* IX, No. 2 (1888). For this important and much-discussed field, too, a single reference only is given, namely to Wetzel, *De consecutione temporum Plautina et Terentiana*, 1888.

To my mind, a general discussion of tense should precede the detailed discussion of the moods. There are certain powers which are common to many parts of the verb. For example, there is clearly a use of the perfect to express energy, promptness, decision, and the like, through the representation of the act as a finality. I agree with Bennett that Elmer has not made out his point against Madvig; but it seems to me nevertheless sure that the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions originally expressed energy, etc. (Bennett seems to take it as merely aoristic.) But the same energetic power is possessed by the perfect subjunctive in statements, the perfect indicative, the future perfect indicative, the perfect passive participle, and the perfect passive infinitive. Thus *perii*, *Trin.* 1081 (p. 45), *periisse*, *Most.* 349, *perieris* (a wish), *Men.* 295 (p. 195). The use of the perfect participle and infinitive in this sense (thus *monitos*, Cic. *Cat.* ii. 12, 27, and *interfectum esse*, Cic. *Cat.* i. 2, 4) is very common in all periods. These identical phenomena should be brought together, as I have brought them in half a page in the Hale-Buck *Grammar*, § 490. Bennett speaks of the tense nowhere except for *perii*, where the explanation that it is like *memini* and *odi* seems to me to miss the very point for which the tense was used.

I do not in the least agree with Bennett's treatment of *eras*, *erat* (p. 34) as aoristic. Of course there is, quite as he says, no "continued action" in *erat;* but neither is there in any other tense of *sum*. *Sum* is not a verb of action. But *erat* expresses *situation*, as the imperfect of *any* verb regularly does. There is no better touchstone of tense-feeling than in these same *erat* sentences and clauses. Your Italian washerwoman of today still has it, using *era* and *fù* just as the Romans used *erat* and *fuit*.—Neither do I in the least agree with Bennett's view (which is the general one) that the aoristic perfect of verbs in general is "momentary" (pp. 10–17). It simply presents

an act in *summary*, in *the lump*, without any question of "duration" or "momentariness" (neither of which terms has any proper place in grammar).

The conception of parataxis is employed, without explanation, on p. 60, at the opening of the treatment of the indicative. On pp. 208 and 209, under the heading "subjunctive in subordinate clauses," it is fully discussed. Under the imperative, where it is important to notice it, it is not mentioned. The general statement should be given where the conception is first employed.

The treatment of the subordinate indicative clauses begins with one of the most complex of all, the "conditional sentence." There is no treatment at all of the indicative *qui*-clauses, except incidentally under the subjunctive (pp. 137, 142) in the use which I have noted and named (*Cum-Constructions*, pp. 104 and 113–119), the "tacit causal or adversative *qui*-clause." These are the only indicative constructions referred to in the index under the heading "relative clauses." Yet a clear comprehension of the indicative relative clauses is a great help in the comprehension of many of the indicative clauses with conjunctions. I miss, too, a treatment of the generalizing indicative clause (H.-B. *Gr.*, § 579, n. 1), the lack of an understanding of which common construction causes many a writer to go astray, as Lindsay, who (note on *Capt.* 462) is surprised at a construction which is not only regular but constantly occurring (indicative *qui*-clause, in spite of a causal implication, because the clause is generalizing, and so, in effect, an *assumption*, not a predication). So much must suffice as regards the general structure of the book.

We come now to some of the controverted points at which I agree with Bennett. I have already spoken with approval of his rejection of Elmer's treatment of the prohibitive. The same holds for his retention of the category of the potential of possibility (I have thus to employ tautology because Bennett follows the almost universal but entirely unscientific and altogether inconvenient practice of naming two quite distinct forces of the subjunctive by the one term potential[1]) against Elmer's attack; though I do not, with Bennett, limit the use to examples like *videas*. I agree with his opinion that a true indirect indicative question exists in early Latin (as also, here and there, in the later poets). I take pleasure in his demonstration that Morris is wrong in explaining the first subjunctive in combinations like *velim eas* as due to the attraction of the second; though he might well have added that Greek has the exactly corresponding *βουλοίμην ἄν* (with infinitive always), for which Morris' explanation is of course impossible.[2] I

[1] The necessity of having two potentials, a "can-could potential" and a "should-would potential" (Bennett, *passim*) is a practical confession that "potential" will not serve, and that some such term as my "ideal certainty" is necessary for the "should-would" idea. And, in any case, imagine a naturalist using the same name for types as far apart as these ideas generally are!

[2] Morris, *Principles and Methods in Syntax*, discusses with great fullness the proper methods of procedure. In the entire book, he offers an explanation of his own in only one case—the one referred to—where he seems to be quite wrong.

Nothing better illustrates the weakness of Morris' opposition to the comparative

am glad that Bennett agrees with me as against Elmer that the subjunctive of the first person with *opinor* is volitive. I of course heartily agree with his direct acceptance (p. 303) of my doctrine with regard to the *cum*-clauses, and (p. 338) of my explanation of the "iterative" subjunctive as descended from *cum*-clauses with the subjunctive; though I differ with regard to some of the examples cited. I am pleased that he accepts and employs my term "descriptive clause" as better than "clause of characteristic"; though he does not point out the strongest reason for it, namely that the clause in question frequently states, not something permanent, as a clause of "characteristic" should, but a merely temporary condition. I am glad that he also, for the commonest type (that which corresponds to an independent statement of fact) accepts and uses my term "descriptive clause *of fact*." I am glad that he uses my term "determinative clause," just as I was sorry to see that in the last edition of his *Appendix* (under the title of *The Latin Language*) he omitted the chapter which Elmer had supplied, from my teaching at Cornell in the days when Elmer was my younger assistant, upon indicative relative clauses—including the "determining" clause.[1] I was also glad to see that Bennett, in treating the descriptive clause, recognized that my *Cum-Constructions* dealt almost as fully with relative clauses as with *cum*-clauses, and accordingly gave my book as his principal reference ("see especially," etc.). And I am particularly glad to see that he recognizes my tenet that a number of the subjunctive constructions are of composite origin—a tenet which has not appeared in any of his writings hitherto. I also agree that his distinction of the "stipulative" subjunctive (p. 263, from *Trans. A.P.A.* XXXI, 223 ff.) as a development of the volitive subjunctive (as in *Aul.* 458, *lege agito mecum, molestus ne sis*, "on condition that you only let me alone," p. 265, bottom) is sound and helpful.

I am most heartily in accord, too, with Bennett, in that he treats syntax in this book, as he always has treated it, as a matter of psychology, and not of metaphysical categories.[2] He cites with approval (p. 147) my "A Century of Metaphysical Syntax," Congress of Arts and Sciences, St. Louis Universal Exposition, 1904, Vol. III of the *Proceedings*, to which might be added my

method than the fact that, in this case, he would have to explain a Greek (and an English) construction by the very way which he rejects for an apparently exactly corresponding clause in Latin.

[1] On p. 288, Bennett rightly expresses my conception of the determinative clause: "Hale . . . . defines the determinative clause as one telling what person or thing is meant." But the phrase just preceding, "'determinative' clauses, which simply add another fact or item with regard to a person or thing," is not accurate. Thus the *qui*-clause in *Cicero, qui* . . . . , adds something, but is not determinative. A proper name is *self*-determined.

[2] Yet his category of "contingency" as explaining the "can-could potential" and the "should-would potential" (p. 205) is a metaphysical one, established in our grammars by the application, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, of Wolff's categories, in the Ontology, to the moods of the verb.

"The Heritage of Unreason in Syntactical Method," address before the English Classical Association, 1907, Vol. V. It was not previously understood how deeply conceptions derived ultimately from Hermann's application (1801) of Kant's modal categories to the moods of the Greek verb are still imbedded today in the grammatical consciousness of the great majority of workers in mood-syntax. Bennett's predecessor Holtze is full of this metaphysical syntax. Thus (II, 142) he explains *non . . . . redderem? Trin.*, 133, as *rem tanquam cogitatam.*

Bennett, like others except myself, has hitherto always treated all subjunctive questions as deliberative, while I have distinguished deliberative questions, questions of obligation or propriety, potential questions, etc. He now, without mention of my procedure, condemns the idea that all subjunctive questions are deliberative, and has "questions of duty or fitness."

I have pointed out (H.-B. *Gr.* 502, 1) the existence of a volitive descriptive clause. Bennett, without mention of this, now has a jussive descriptive clause (p. 294), as well as (quite rightly) an "optative descriptive clause" (p. 295), which also I have included in syllabuses for class use. For the former, of which he says the material is scanty, he cites M.G. 140, Cat. *Agr.* 21. 1 and 2, and, "less certain," Bacch. 67. I should put only the two examples from Cato here. The last is possibly volitive, but I should incline to take it as an anticipatory descriptive clause. The first I should call a "clause of plan" (our common phrase "clause of purpose" gets us into trouble by its narrowness).

The general introduction upon the mood-forces of the subjunctive (pp. 145–61) is good; though I was sorry not to see a mention of Delbrück's explanation (*N. Jahrbücher*, 1902, pp. 33 ff.) of the rise of the "potential" power out of the optative, or of my view, of which I shall speak presently. The summary of Stahl's general reasoning is well included.

One of the leading forces in my mood-system is that of obligation, propriety, or reasonableness. I find that the subjunctive has it in Latin, and that the optative has it, in large use, in Greek, with the subjunctive in much smaller use. I believe the Latin use to be mainly of optative origin, but partly of volitive. The category goes much beyond Delbrück's "prescriptive," not being confined to *general* expressions, and appearing often with ἄν. I find abundant examples of the latter type in Greek, as well as with the bare optative. A force of this kind has been recognized in the past tenses in Latin, being explained as a "jussive" thrown back into the past. I find that it is used freely in the present also. The category was first laid down by myself, but is commonly spoken of as Elmer's (who gave it a different origin). As he has explained in print, he heard it spoken of so frequently in my classroom that he supposed it to be a commonly recognized category.

Bennett has never had this category in his writings. Nor has he now in the new book. But he has the same thing under another name, "the subjunctive of duty or fitness." Moreover, in his translations of examples

under it (p. 180), he says, "in the third person" (why this person only?)[1] "the meaning often is . . . . is it natural that he should do" or "be," . . . . "how is he likely to know me?" . . . . "what is it 'natural' or likely to be except this?" This is nothing in the world but another of the leading forces of my system, namely the subjunctive of natural likelihood—with the exact adjectives corresponding to the two parts of the name which I have given to the construction, and the exact derivation. Bennett's book has completed the process of making me orthodox, without any change of opinion on my part!

The importance of the two forces lies partly in the fact that they make the bridge between the optative force and the "potential" force—wish to obligation (or possibly the opposite), obligation to natural likelihood (compare English "should" and "ought," which are used to express both ideas), natural likelihood to possibility in the one direction, and to ideal certainty in the other. This I have shown in the paper entitled "Leading Mood-Forces of the Subjunctive and Optative in the Parent Speech," *P.A.P.A.* XXXII, 1901, and in the Hale-Buck *Grammar*, 459. Bennett has not mentioned either of these, or my categories or views on the subject.

He regards the declarative form in the imperfect or past perfect as a "jussive" thrown back into the past. The interrogative uses in the present (he sees no others) he traces to the deliberative, which of course we agree is of volitive origin. The corresponding question in the past he makes to be an outgrowth of this. The interesting result is that in *Trin.* 133 the question and answer have different names, the question *non redderem* being one of "duty or fitness," while the answer *non redderes* is one of "past obligation."

I also assign to the subjunctive of obligation or propriety clauses like those in *nihil est iam quod tu mihi suscenseas, Merc.* 317, *non iusta causa est quor curratur, Poen.* 533, *non iusta causa est ut vos servem, Capt.* 257, *ego te meruisse ut pereas scio, Poen.* 1407, and the *dignus qui* construction, as in *est digna res ubi nervos intendas, Eun.* 312 (originally from a type like "it is a worthy thing; you should put out your best efforts upon it"). Bennett calls the first example interrogative (p. 241), and the second a substantive clause developed from the deliberative (p. 248), puts the third under "miscellaneous" substantive clauses, under the more general heading "expressions developed from the volitive" (p. 242), calls the fourth a substantive clause developed from the volitive (p. 240), and calls the last a clause of purpose (p. 260). My treatment appears to me both truer and simpler.

Some of the principal points where we differ more radically are as follows:

Bennett, in taking up the subjunctive, gives a number of examples, without citation, from Sanskrit, Greek, Germanic, and Slavic. This looks as if he were really going to employ the comparative method for possible light upon

[1] *SE:* Ecquid sentis? *MED:* Quidni sentiam? Non potest haec res ellebori iungere optinerier (*Men.* 912); *CV:* Nostin? *LY:* Quidni noverim? (*Curc.* 423). Similarly with *ubi* (*Amph.* 748).

Latin. But nothing of the sort is done. Only one subordinate example from any of these languages is mentioned by him (p. 271, from Delbrück *Vergl. Synt.* II, p. 401). The results which Bennett reaches at many points are in direct opposition to the facts in the languages that possess two distinct moods, as against the Latin mixed mood called the subjunctive. I will point out some of these contradictions, confining myself to Greek.

It should be borne in mind that volition is expressed in Greek by the subjunctive, without ἄν or κε; "futurity" (anticipation, as I have called it) by the subjunctive with or without ἄν or κε; wish (when without any introductory word) by the optative without ἄν or κε; and the potential idea (which in Bennett means the "can-could" idea or the "should-would" idea), by the optative with or without ἄν or κε.[1] In what I say below, the word "optative," unless otherwise modified, will mean "expressing a wish."

Bennett makes the clause of purpose of volitive and optative origin, adding that "the share of the optative in the development of the purpose clause is also probably as great as that of the volitive" (but the optative is rare in this clause in Greek[2]); the subjunctive after *antequam* and *priusquam* the result of attraction after an imperative, subjunctive, or infinitive (the corresponding construction in Greek is the subjunctive, with ἄν or κε, which is thus anticipatory; and attraction into the subjunctive is not a recognized or probable usage); the subjunctive with *dum*, "until," an optative (the corresponding construction in Greek is the subjunctive with ἄν or κε, which is thus anticipatory); the subjunctive of indirect discourse an extension from the deliberative question (Bennett rightly makes the deliberative question to be a volitive subjunctive, while the mood of indirectness in Greek is the optative); the subjunctive of the indefinite second person singular the result of attraction in combinations like *quos quom ferias, tibi plus noceas*, *Pseud.* 137, the second verb being a potential (the construction, as far as it goes, looks like the generalizing construction in Greek, for which the mood is the subjunctive, not the "potential"). The clause of fear he makes to be optative. Against my view of its volitive origin (thus originally, "I don't want you to have an accident; I am afraid," which comes to mean "I am afraid that you may have an accident"), he says, "this view seems psychologically less natural than the one above indicated. A state of fear is quite compatible with a wish, but hardly with a peremptory order." But he himself tells us, on p. 162, that "often the force [of the volitive] is so weakened or modified as to convey simply a warning, admonition, or request." At any rate, what would he do with Greek, in which the clause of fear is regularly, not in the optative, but in the subjunctive, without a modal particle, and thus surely volitive in

[1] Bennett speaks of the particles under the Greek subjunctive, but not under the optative.—My statement above is meant to conform to the freedom of Homeric Greek.

[2] There are but three cases in Homer attested by the MSS. I accept them. Stahl, with most Homeric workers, emends the first two, and explains the third as indirect. But the number is in any case very small—three against hundreds.

origin? He would have to show us why that which was psychologically unnatural in Italy was psychologically natural in Greece.

Clauses like those in *nihil est quo me recipiam*, *Capt.* 103, and *est unde haec fiant*, *Ad.* 122, Bennett calls relative clauses of purpose (p. 259), and argues against my view that they are mainly of potential origin. But clear potential clauses of this type are frequent in Greek. Thus ἵπποι δ' οὐ παρέασι καὶ ἅρματα, τῶν κ' ἐπιβαίην, *Il.* 5, 192; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν ναῦς ἔστιν, ᾗ σωθεῖμεν ἂν φεύγοντες, Eurip. *Hel.* 1047; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλους ἔχετε οἵστισιν ἂν δοίητε αὐτούς, Xen. *Cyr.* 4, 5, 47.

I should not agree with Bennett's readings at every point. Thus he reads *ostentat* in *Enn. Ann.* 262 (414 Müller). The indicative does not make easy sense. The weight of MS authority is heavily for *ostendat*, which (*The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin*, University of Chicago Press, 1904, p. 66) I take as anticipatory, "this is the day when the greatest glory shall reveal itself to us, whether we live or whether we die." Cf. "now the day was come when the queen should bear a child," Malory *Morte d'Arthur* 1, iii. But in Bennett's system there is no anticipatory subjunctive.

A number of examples seem to me to be placed under wrong categories. Thus (p. 164) *velitis iubeatis* in the formula for the adrogatio in Gell. v. 19. 9 I should take as interrogative, corresponding to the ordinary *velim*, "I should like," *velis*, "you would like." Note the *ita vos rogo* at the end. *Vel illud perdas vel amicum amiseris*, *Trin.* 1054, belongs, not on p. 166 ("jussive"), but on page 200, for which it is a perfect example, illustrating my theory ("An Unrecognized Construction of the Latin Subjunctive," *Class. Phil.* I, 21 ff.) that there is a generalizing second person singular subjunctive of *statement*, corresponding to an indicative second singular (*perdas* = *perdis*, except that the mood of the former calls *attention* to the idea of generality). It is balanced against *fit* in 1051, and *exoritur* in 1053 (I miss also in the list on p. 200 the example *invenias* of 1052, in the same context in Plautus, as also *bibas*, etc., Ter. *Ph.* 342). Bennett, let me say in passing, really accepts the new category, translating, p. 200, by "you never do hear," "you scarcely ever find," while appearing, p. 201, to give a different solution for it. But he mistakes mine, which includes his, speaking of it as "formal assimilation." The explanation which I gave, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 ff., was twofold. First, through use in the generalizing second singular indefinite the mood had come to seem the *sign of universality*, and so seemed appropriate here. Secondly, it often occurs, in the same second singular indefinite, in subjunctive questions of perplexity, in questions of obligation, propriety, or reasonableness, and in statements of natural likelihood, possibility, or ideal certainty (Bennett's "potential"). My explanation then *includes* his, namely that the construction is "simply an attenuated 'should-would' subjunctive."

Bennett says, Preface, p. III, "figures in parentheses indicate the number of occurrences of the usage which they accompany. Examples without figures, unless accompanied by 'e.g.,' are intended to represent the com-

plete material under the given topic." If so, there are errors. Thus three examples of the future indicative with *antequam* or *priusquam* are given from Cat. *Agr.* on p. 105, without an "e.g." But there are 4 (add 161, 2). Again, 7 examples of the subjunctive with the same connective are given from the same work. But there are at any rate 10 (add 143, 2, a second example from 53, and again a second from 113, 1). Similarly, p. 305, Bennett gives 6 examples of *dum* with the subjunctive from Cat. *Agr.* But there are 7 (add 103). On p. 97 he gives 15 for the number of examples of the future indicative with *dum* "so long as." But his own citations count up 16. They include Cat. *Agr.* 30, *usque dum habebis, praebeto.* To this should be added *usque dum habebis, dato, ibid.* (Further, *dum poterit,* 90, given on p. 97, under "as long as," seems to belong under "until," p. 98.) It is impossible to collect and handle so large a mass of material without mistakes. But omissions so considerable as these somewhat shake one's confidence. Yet they may all be due to some accident within the limits of a single general group of constructions.

The remaining chapters must be left without notice.

The book is very free from misprints. I have noted only *intercedit* for *intercedet* (p. 98, near bottom) and *argentun* for *argentum* (p. 35, near top).

WILLIAM GARDNER HALE

Index Verborum Vergilianus. By MONROE NICHOLS WETMORE. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Henry Frowde, 1911. Pp. x+554. $4.00.

In 1904, Professor Wetmore published a Doctor's dissertation entitled *The Plan and Scope of a Vergil Lexicon,* a work which was widely distributed and favorably reviewed in various periodicals. In 1909, H. Merguet, the well-known compiler of lexicons for Cicero and Caesar, who had been sent a copy of the above dissertation in 1905, proceeded to publish a *Lexikon zu Vergilius.* It is a pity that the elder scholar had not indicated his intentions, for he would either have spared Professor Wetmore the trouble of preparing some thousand pages for the press or, by collaboration with him, would have produced something far better than the present *Lexikon zu Vergilius.* No law compels courtesy on the part of competing scholars; still, there is no law against it. Kalinka, in a not altogether favorable review of Merguet (*Berl. Phil. Woch.* [1910] 1038) expresses the wish that Merguet and Wetmore would join forces and give us a perfect lexicon of Virgil. But the time for such a wish was the past.

Despite Merguet's publication, Wetmore's *Index* fills an important gap. The old index of Erythraeus (1583), appearing after various revisions in Vol. VI of Heyne's edition, can no longer, after a century of work on the text of Virgil, hold the eel of science by the tail. Besides, it is extremely defective, especially in citing the minor words, whereas Wetmore registers all

the occurrences of every word. Merguet likewise professes to give "sämmtliche Stellen," but one may wonder, after the example cited below, whether he succeeds. Besides the acknowledged works of Virgil, Wetmore includes those poems of the *Appendix Vergiliana* which can by any chance be genuine, namely *Culex*, *Ciris*, *Copa*, *Moretum*, *Catalepton* (including *Priapea*), *Dirae* and *Lydia;* the line is drawn just at the right place. Merguet treats all these works except *Priapea*, *Dirae*, and *Lydia*, but the omission of the first two is most untimely, as they have recently been claimed for Virgil with no little plausibility; the value of the *Lexikon* for investigations of the genuineness of the minor poems is thus distinctly diminished. The text chosen by both scholars is that of Ribbeck's *editio minor* (1895), but while Merguet refers, in a rather general way, only to variants in other editions, Wetmore records minutely and skilfully every important deviation in the MSS as well as the editions, and indicates by a dagger the presence of an unimportant variant; the user of the *Index* can feel sure, as he cannot from the citations in the *Lexikon*, that all necessary evidence for the text is before him. Word-headings are printed in the *Index* in small capitals if the form actually occurs in Virgil; otherwise italics are used. A figure following the heading shows how many times the word occurs in the poems treated. Under the word, forms are given in the order of the paradigm. Substantival and adjectival uses of adjectives and pronouns are distinguished, and so are the moods and tenses used with conjunctive adverbs. Set phrases are conveniently indicated, e.g., under *aut*, the correlative use of *aut* . . *aut;* under *non*, such combinations as *non aliter*, *non dum*, *non iam*, *non minus*, *non secus ac*, etc. Useful classifications are given to meet a special demand; thus the combinations of *sic* with verbs of saying are grouped together. All this is done with great dexterity and accuracy. No human work is without flaws, so there must be at least some errors of citation in this; but the reviewer has found none, after a somewhat persistent search.

While a lexicon is, for general purposes, a more useful work than an index, this index, with its scrupulous exactness, is indispensable in many ways. In some cases it is even more convenient than a lexicon. For instance, there are two minor features of Virgil's style which had interested the reviewer for some time, and on which he consulted the *Index* at once. One is the use of a monosyllabic conjunctive adverb at the end of a verse in which the particle occurs in the first part; e.g., *Georg.* 3. 133: "*cum* graviter tunsis gemit area fungitur et *cum* | . . . iactantur." This is Lucretian (cf. 3. 221); in a very few minutes it was possible to discover, in the case of the particles *cum* and *dum*, that Virgil has the usage only in the *Georgics*, except for *cum* . . . *cumque* in *Ecl.* 6, the most Lucretian of the *Eclogues*. In Merguet the mass of citations with their classes and subclasses is effectually deterrent; in the *Index*, the word *bis* after a line reference assisted the reviewer to his goal in short order. Again, how often does Virgil employ anaphora of

the preposition at the end of a line? This is likewise a Lucretian device (6. 229: *per* saxa, *per* aera). It took only a short time to run down some twenty prepositions and find that Virgil has the usage only with *per*, and that this time the instances are all in the *Aeneid*. The author of the *Pervigilium Veneris* rings similar changes on *de* (l. 20), but this preposition is not so treated in Virgil.

An article abhorrent at first sight is *et*. One queries what use any reader of Virgil will find in the twelve columns of numerical references or the information that *et* occurs 3,159 times. An investigator of Virgil's use of *et* would turn to the text, finding valuable assistance in the classifications of Merguet. But the article in the *Index* is important too. For, first, we find separate treatment of the correlative uses, of *et*=*etiam*, and of phrases like *nec non et* and *quin et*. Further, it is no great task, with the references thus presented, to ascertain the relative proportions of *et*, *que*, and *atque* in the *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Aeneid*, a matter almost as difficult to dig out of Merguet as out of the text itself. The reviewer will not claim authority for a rapid count, but the result seems to be that while in the *Eclogues et* is far more frequent than *que*, in the *Georgics* it only slightly preponderates, and in the *Aeneid*, *que* has distinctly the upper hand. If there is a real development here, further investigation of the matter might profitably be applied to the question of the genuineness and the chronology of the *Minor Poems*.

Other evidence on the same important problem should be forthcoming. Thus the interjection *a* (*ah*) is found in the *Minor Poems*, but not after the *Georgics*, while *aliter* occurs in the *Georgics* and the *Aeneid*, but not before. *Itaque* appears only once, and that in *Catal.* 9, the only poem in that collection which Birt in his recent edition believed spurious. The instances cited mean nothing until the whole array of such evidence is presented and Virgil's practices in such matters are discovered, but we may infer at least that further examination of the material now accessible may yield significant results. If the reviewer is correctly informed, Professor Wetmore himself is contemplating studies of this kind.

Further, it is needless to say that the emender will be steered from many a pitfall by the *Index*. Supposing for the moment that *Catalepton* and *Culex* be proved early works of Virgil, Ribbeck's *pariter* (*Cul.* 3) seems dubious when we note that Virgil does not use the word till the *Georgics*. On the other hand, the *Index* may encourage the critic to boldness. As *ita* has apparently the same history as *pariter* in Virgil's poetry, we may incline to follow the inferior MSS and Ellis in reading *ista* instead of *ita* in *Catal.* 2. 5.

Of course such information will be accessible in Merguet's *Lexikon* when all parts of it have appeared. But we may query whether it is conveniently and completely presented there. For example, let us turn to *anne*, which

particle, as well as *an*, is not cited at all in the index of Heyne. Merguet has the following: "*Anne* s. *an* I, 1 (VI, 719, Copa 36) 2*a* (VI, 864) 2*b* (G II, 161) i.e., like II, 2*b*."

This does not look simple. Why does not the cross-reference suffice? If references to the text should be given here, it would save space to give them all and omit those to the subdivisions of *an*. We have to turn to *an* eventually, since the last instance (II, 2*b*) does not include a reference to the text; this is on the principle that there is only one instance under the subheading in *an*. Turning then to *an*, we find the instances (35 in Merguet, 37 in Wetmore) classified into I, direct; II, indirect; II being subdivided into 1 and 2, and 2 into *a*) and *b*). The sub-classifications are induced, if I have divined the reason, by the different verbs on which *an* depends; whatever the principle, it hinders, not helps, in so short an article as this. In Wetmore, after the instances of *an* alone, references are given for *an . . . an, an . . . anne . . . an, ne . . . an, ne . . . an . . . an, ne . . . an . . . anne*, which is certainly information worth having. It may be gathered from Merguet, but not completely. In both *Aen.* 7. 363 and 10. 89, *ne . . . an* occurs, but in neither place does Merguet include *ne. An . . . an* occurs in *Aen.* 10. 681, 683, but here Merguet omits the second *an* altogether. In *Catal.* 13. 35, where the text is most dubious, Wetmore indicates, after Benoist, that there may be an *an* in the line; Merguet does not include the reference.

Perhaps this article is not typical. The reviewer has worked through others, however, and has found in nearly every one some omission or false reference. None of these is serious enough to spoil the value of the article as a whole, but the sum of them arouses suspicion. Wetmore's references have stood the test in every case. Had his *Lexicon* been printed, the reviewer would use it first every time. It would doubtless assume the prior rank could it be printed now. But as Merguet's book, whatever its defects, is of undoubted value, Wetmore's material could be put to better use in a *Concordance* of Virgil. The reviewer believes, despite Wetmore's arguments and because of Merguet's practice, that for a lexicon, the "logical" arrangement is preferable to the "formal." The former involves a study of the meanings of words, and that is the chief end of a lexicon. A many sided and impressionistic poet like Virgil colors his words with delicate shadings, but categories of the definite could be established, and a general rubric include the indeterminate. But it is better still, if the material does not bulk too large, and in Virgil it does not, to let an author's words speak for themselves in the order of chapter and verse. The reader can then make his own studies of meaning or form, unimpeded by divisions or subdivisions.

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Papers of the British School at Rome. Vol. V. London: Macmillan, 1910. Pp. 471, plates xlvii. 42*s*.

Of the eight papers that make up this volume, the longest and most important is the continuation of Dr. Ashby's work on the "Classical Topography of the Roman Campagna" (*Class. Phil.* II, p. 487), which describes the Via Latina and adjacent territory from the tenth milestone to its junction with the Via Labicana. This is one of the most interesting parts of the Campagna, for it includes the district of ancient Tusculum, which was perhaps more intimately connected with the life of the capital itself than any other Latin city. The amount of labor involved in the preparation of this work is enormous, both in the investigation of documentary material and in the actual exploration of the country itself. The time, patience, and skill required for such exploration can hardly be appreciated by one who has not tried his hand at it himself. No praise can be too great for the quality of Dr. Ashby's work, and while he expresses again his conviction of the impossibility of attaining finality in dealing with the Campagna, it is safe to say that many years will elapse before a greater degree can be reached.

Two papers deal with prehistoric remains in the Mediterranean basin: one by Dr. Duncan Mackenzie, of the British School, on "The Dolmens, Tombs of the Giants, and Nuraghi of Sardinia," and the other by Mr. T. E. Peet, also of the British School, entitled "Contributions to the Study of the Prehistoric Period in Malta." Both of these scholars are already favorably known for their earlier work along the same lines. Dr. Mackenzie has found several new tombs and Nuraghi in Sardinia, and has been able to add important evidence in support of the theory of Montelius that the dolmen on Sardinian soil became gradually transformed into the so-called tomb of the Giants, and that this latter was the family tomb of the people of the Nuraghi during the Bronze Age. In his discussion of recent discoveries in Malta, Mr. Peet combats the conclusions drawn by others, and especially by Mayr, in regard to the strength of the Aegean influence in that island. For any such conclusions, Mr. Peet believes that there is practically no evidence, and he bases his position on an exhaustive study of all the remains found in the recent excavations. To the reviewer he seems to have the better of the argument.

A contribution to the study of Roman sculpture, a subject which has of late occupied a large place in archaeological investigation, is made by Mr. A. J. B. Wace, formerly librarian of the School, who discusses the development of landscape motives in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman reliefs, and then proceeds to a detailed study of the eight reliefs now in the Palazzo Spada, together with some others akin to these that are scattered in different places. To all of these he assigns definite dates, 130 A.D. to six of the Spada reliefs, and 160 to the other two. His analysis strengthens still more the position of Wickhoff and his followers, who believe that these

reliefs are to be considered as Roman, and not as due primarily to the Alexandrian art of the Hellenistic age.

In another paper dealing with Roman reliefs, Mr. H. Stuart-Jones, formerly the director of the School, gives a "Historical Interpretation of the Reliefs of Trajan's Column," and reaches conclusions differing more or less from those that have been brought forward by Cichorius and Petersen, and especially by von Domaszewski and Weber, whose views he regards as marking a distinct retrogression. It is not possible here to give even an outline of the author's conclusions, but the reader's attention may be called in particular to the itinerary of Trajan's march from the Adriatic to the Black Sea in his second campaign. On the whole it seems to the reviewer that the evidence of these reliefs, even with the help derived from literary sources, is too meager to justify any certainty in many of the details.

Mr. C. L. Woolley writes on an ancient site called La Civita, in the valley of the Sabato near Serino, and effectually disposes of the conjectures of Cluver that it might have been the site of the chief town of the Sabatini, and of Orilia that it was that of the capital of the Picentini, by showing that the remains of fortifications are of late date, probably belonging to the early centuries of our era, and perhaps connected with the invasion of Alaric.

The shortest paper in this volume consists of a series of drawings and colored plates by Mr. F. G. Newton, a member of the School, and the accompanying text by Dr. Ashby, illustrating the interesting columbarium of Hylas on the Via Latina.

There is one paper that deals exclusively with a philological subject, the text of the *Odyssey*, by Mr. T. W. Allen, of Oxford, in which the author lists and describes all the known MSS of the *Odyssey;* divides them into seventeen families, with the exception of six which resist classification; assigns to these families their relative importance; and gives those variants from the papyri that seem deserving of notice. He also discusses the omissions of lines and the extent to which Alexandrian readings have made their way into our MSS, and finally the origin of variants in general, and of Alexandrian variants in particular. The reviewer is not competent to pronounce judgment upon Mr. Allen's conclusions but he may venture to express some doubt as to the validity of "the purely arithmetical system" which is definitely adopted (p. 17) as "the only one by which families of MSS can be made out."

This volume is fully up to the high standard of excellence and value that was set by its predecessors. S. B. P.

Select Letters of Seneca. Edited, with Introductions and Explanatory Notes, by WALTER C. SUMMERS, M.A. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. cxiv+383.

This edition appears very opportunely. We have long needed such a book, both for general literary purposes and for a medium in which the

essentials of Seneca's literary *moralia* may be presented to college men. Macaulay, Landor, and others, when the nineteenth century was young and lusty, gave Seneca such a fillip that he disappeared below the literary horizon, in spite of Sainte-Beuve's and Matthew Arnold's commendations; but now that we are renewing our interest in the subjects that Seneca represents, he will come to his own again. A glance at such recent publications as R. Waltz's *Vie de Sénèque*, R. Pichon's "Philosophe ministre sous l'empire Romain" (*Revue des deux Mondes*, September 15, 1910), A. P. Ball's *Essays of Seneca*, and the work of Mr. Summers makes for the truth of this statement. The drama has acknowledged the tragedian's influence; we need just now a full account of our debt to the philosopher.

The preface shows that this idea is fully present to Mr. Summers; for the third section contains an interesting essay on "Seneca's Prose: Its Critics and Its Debtors." In spite of the fact that no attention is paid to Thomas à Kempis, who undoubtedly reflects Seneca both in admiration and in disapproval (see, for example, *De Imitatione Christi*, Book I, chap. ii, sec. 1; and Bigg *The Imitation* 34), and to the newly discovered *Centuries of Meditations*, by Thomas Trahearne, in spite of this, the fact that there are so few important omissions proves a wide range of reading and culture. We doubt the truth of the statement in this section about the scarcity of Seneca tradition in seventeenth-century England, after finding in John Dennis' *Impartial Critic*, Dialogue 2 (see Spingarn *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century* iii, 167) such words as these: "Have you forgot since you grew drunk in Hampshire in extolling the dogmas of Seneca? When the company laughed to see the speculative Stoic a practical Epicurean!" This would seem to imply familiarity with the works of the author, if not close study of him.

The first section of the introduction, "The Pointed Style in Greek and Roman Literature," rather sends philosophy to the wall in favor of rhetoric. Most of this can be found in Norden's *Antike Kunstprosa*, as the editor himself remarks. We confess a curiosity to know more *en bloc* about Roman *moralia*—for Seneca is primarily a moralist—and such subjects as present themselves so richly in Gellius (see *N.A.* 9, 8; 12, 5, etc.). Besides, Mr. Summers does not sufficiently emphasize the paradox of Fronto, Atticist as he was, who is just as full of stylistic vagaries as the author whom he criticizes so severely. Section B, on Seneca's style and language, is masterly.

The notes are illuminating; although that on *Ep.* 87, sec. 10, *tolutariis*, hardly squares with the *tolutares* of Fronto (*ad Ant. de Orat.* 1), as interpreted on p. 97 of the introduction. And it would be useful to see more made of the authors discussed in Section C, as Petrarch, whose *De remediis* is adminiculated by Seneca's *Letters*, Erasmus, Montaigne, and Burton.

As far as the selection of letters is concerned, we should have appreciated the inclusion of 2, On Concentration in Reading; 30, an attractive mono-

graph on the heroism of Bassus; 41, the almost Christian *sacer spiritus*; 100, on Fabianus, Seneca's master; 104, Ill-Health, Independence, and Philosophy—somewhat autobiographical, and 115, On Over-Care of Style. Many of the conjectural readings are bold, but they have the merit of at least being reasonable.

The volume is well written, and a pleasure to read. Mr. Summers deserves our hearty thanks for the words on p. 9 of his preface: that Seneca's teachings are honorable and valuable, and "the clearness of his style compares favorably with that of some philosophers of more recognized standing." If it is still the fashion to ridicule Seneca, that fashion ought to change.

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February 25, 1911

Τὸ Θεμιστόκλειον. By ΙΑΚ. Χ. ΔΡΑΓΑΤΣΗΣ. Athens: Ῥαφτάνης-Παπαγεώργιος, 1910. Pp. 39. Δρ. 2.

Among the ancients the most desired boon at the end was to pass away surrounded by one's kith and kin and to find a tomb in one's native land. To Athens' greatest admiral, dying the death of an exiled traitor, this boon was, in part at least, denied. He died and was buried in Magnesia, and yet his tomb was pointed out in Attica. Analyzing the testimony of Thucydides, Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, Nepos, Pausanias, Aristotle, and Plato Comicus, we are led to the following simple conclusions: (1) Themistocles died and was buried in Magnesia; (2) his bones were later removed to Attica, either (*a*) by his kinsmen without the knowledge of the Athenians, or (*b*) with the approval of the people, who repented toward their great commander; (3) they were buried near the entrance to the Piraeus harbor; (4) there his grave was pointed out in after-times; and (5) grave and environment bore the name *Themistocleum*.

Where was this tomb of Themistocles? Following Diodorus the Periegete (*ap. Plut. Them.* 32: Περὶ τὸν μέγαν λιμένα τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἄλκιμον ἀκροτηρίου πρόκειταί τις οἷον ἀγκών, καὶ κάμψαντι τοῦτον ἐντός, ᾗ τὸ ὑπεύδιον τῆς θαλάττης, κρηπίς ἐστιν εὐμεγέθης καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ βωμοειδές, τάφος Θεμιστοκλέους), and misinterpreting κατὰ τὸν Ἄλκιμον and πρόκειται, topographers have usually located the tomb in the bend (ἀγκών) of the shore outside the entrance to the Piraeus away off to the right as one sails in. And there, where there is no possible ὑπεύδιον τῆς θαλάττης (unless the whole sea is calm) and where no one ever κάμπτει ἐντός, we have often looked into a grave cut, with several others, in the rock of the shore where each breaking wave rolls into it, and we believed that there we were standing by the tomb of the victor of Salamis. But Diodorus was clearly sailing in the direction of Salamis and Eleusis when he wrote ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ Ἄλκιμον ἀκροτηρίου πρόκειταί τις οἷον ἀγκών, and we trans-

late with Holden "from the head-land opposite Alcimus there juts out an elbow, as it were." And there, on the side toward Salamis, in 1897 were found on the shore the remnants of a circular, altar-like basis 6.40 m. in diameter. In the center is a cavity 0.77 m. in depth and 0.75 m. in diameter, well adapted to receiving, not an entire body, but bones only or a cinerary urn.

The topography is in perfect accord with all the testimony of antiquity concerning the Attic tomb of Themistocles; and what is left of the structure points to a tomb. It has undergone many transformations: in Roman times a column was set up upon it—perhaps to carry a beacon light to guide sailors into the harbor; this easily took the place of the original trireme's prow on which stood the trophy-bearing hero of Salamis.

The new location of the tomb of Themistocles on the left as one approaches the entrance to the Piraeus harbor is in every respect (save possibly the application of Aristotle *An. Hist.* vi. 579, 9) the most plausible one that has yet been suggested. The theory is not new. It was suggested even in Holden's edition of Plutarch, *Themistocles* 32 (1881). But the discovery of the tomb and its round, altar-like base makes an exact location of it possible, if not quite probable.

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The Article in Theocritus. By WINFRED GEORGE LEUTNER. Baltimore: J. H. Furst Co., 1907. (Johns Hopkins University Dissertation.) Pp. 80.

Dr. Leutner's careful and scholarly monograph well deserved prompt attention from this Journal; for the delay in noticing it, the reviewer, not the editorial management, is responsible.

The work is preceded by a bibliography; then follows a brief preface in which the author explains that his investigation "embraces the thirty idylls of Theocritus found in the edition of Fritzsche, and the nine epigrams accepted as genuine by both Ahrens and Fritzsche." In view of the brevity of the epigrams, the author's observations as to the usage of the poet would scarcely be affected at all if he admitted more of them as genuine; but it is a little odd to find the question of genuineness raised here, but virtually left out of consideration in the longer poems.

The introduction (14 pp.) is devoted to a brief account of the history and development of the article, its use in other authors, and some general observations upon its use in Theocritus. Comparison is facilitated by tables on pp. 19–20. The author directs special attention to the marked difference between the epic and the Doric idylls with regard to the use of the article, and in general he is careful, in drawing his conclusions, to observe the character and atmosphere of the individual poems. But in his comment

(p. 23) upon the description of the prize cup (i. 29–56), I doubt whether Dr. Leutner is right in regarding the small number of articles as due so largely to epic influence. In any description of objects unfamiliar to the hearer, anarthrous nouns naturally predominate. Still, the absence of the article with several nouns of definite reference is significant.

The remainder of the work consists of a detailed analysis of Theocritus' use of the article, under the grand divisions "Substantive Article" (demonstrative and relative) and "Adjective Article." The minute subdivisions of the uses of the adjective article cannot even be enumerated here, still less is discussion of them possible. The work is done with great accuracy, and after testing several lists I have found no false references. Furthermore, an agreeable disappointment awaits those readers who might expect from the title of this work merely an elaborate discussion of the article for its own sake. In reality, this examination of Theocritus' use of one part of speech throws much light upon many interesting passages, so that the investigation becomes a valuable aid to the interpretation and illustration of the poet's work. Dr. Leutner's judgment of disputed passages is very sound. He shows thorough familiarity with the literature, and steers wisely among conflicting opinions. In the matter of critical readings, he is in the main very careful. Perhaps, however, it is worth while to call attention to the paragraph on the third attributive position (p. 63), where three out of a list of eleven examples have been very plausibly emended away (xxi. 8; xxv. 27; xxix. 19). On p. 54 one misses a citation of the Homeric original of τὸ κρήγυον (xx. 19; cf. *Iliad* i. 106).

I have noted these misprints: p. 17, n. 4, edyllia; p. 47, patronimic; p. 64, second paragraph, ταὶς; p. 75, right-hand column of the table, 3 should be 13.

Much learning about the article seems to have perverted the author's judgment of an English idiom. In the sentence "Following examples occur" (pp. 28, 63, 73), "following" should not be "anarthrous." Perhaps this is a German reminiscence, like the use of "to" (*zu*) in citing an editor's comment on a passage (p. 29, n. 1, and elsewhere).

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KELTS AND LIGURIANS

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In my paper entitled "Race Mixture in Early Rome" (*Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.* XL, 1910, pp. 63–81) I held in connection with the extant Ligurian inscriptions that "by far the greater part of what is called Ligurian is strictly Gallic, and what is not Gallic is not Indo-European. The language of the country of the Ligurians became largely Gallic, after the coming of Gallic tribes to Italy." It was also suggested that a distinction should be made among the Gallic tribes migrating to Italy, and that those tribes which preserved original *kᵘ* in the form *qu* became located in the western and coast regions of Liguria, while those which changed original *kᵘ* to *p* settled in Italy farther to the north and east. In the present paper I shall give what evidence is available to determine the time of these migrations, and the routes taken by the migrating tribes. By this means I hope to show that the statements and assumptions made in the earlier paper had a genuine foundation in evidence.

The fullest and most systematic account we have of the coming of the Gauls into Italy is that of Livy (v. 34–35. 3), whose story runs as follows: In the reign of Tarquinius Priscus at Rome, prior to 578 B.C., the Bituriges held sway over a third part of Gaul, called Celticum. Their king Ambigatus, seeing that the country could no longer support the increasing population, sent out two hordes to find new homes under the guidance of his two nephews Segovesus and Bellovesus. The latter set out for Italy, accompanied by large

numbers of the tribes of the Bituriges, Arverni, Senones, Aedui, Ambarri, Carnutes, and Aulerci. While delaying among the Tricastini, in despair of being able to cross the Alps, they learned that some Phocaeans had just landed near the mouth of the Rhone, where they were attempting to found a city, later Massilia. In this the Phocaeans were opposed by a neighboring tribe of Ligurians, the Saluvii, who were overcome by the Phocaeans with the aid of the horde of wandering Gauls. Thereupon the Gauls crossed the Alps and made their way down the Duria through the Ligurian tribe of the Taurini. Not far from the river Ticinus they encountered the Etruscans, who were then in possession of the valley of the Po, and defeated them. Here they heard that the name of the district was something that to them sounded like Insubres, the name of a canton of the Aedui, and taking this as a good omen, they founded there the city of Mediolanium. Later came another migration, of Cenomani, who settled farther east. These came by the same route as the first swarm. They were followed closely by two Ligurian tribes, the Libui and the Saluvii. A third host, composed of Boii and Lingones, entered Italy by the Pennine range, therefore passing through the Ligurian tribe of the Salassi, turned east no doubt through the territory of the Lepontii, and finally settled to the south of the Po. Finally the Senones came, and settled still farther south in the country of the Umbrians, from the river Utis to the Aesis, along the Adriatic. (In giving this summary I have adopted the text of Weissenborn in his annotated edition.)

It is important to note the location of these tribes in Gaul prior to their migration. (In general, see Desjardins *La Géogr. de la Gaule Rom.* II, 462–97; Kiepert *Lehrb. d. alten Geogr.* 444, 446). The Bituriges were divided into two sections. One branch, called the Bituriges Vivisci, dwelt near the mouth of the Garumna (Pliny *NH.* iv. 108; Strabo iv, p. 190; Ptolemy *Geogr.* ii. 7, 8), and the other, the Bituriges Cubi, west of the upper part of the Liger (Pliny iv. 109; Strabo iv, p. 191; Ptolemy iii. 7, 13). As the other tribes moving toward Italy surrounded the Bituriges Cubi almost to the extent of a semicircle, it cannot be doubted that these are the Bituriges referred to by Livy. We have no information except from this passage in Livy that the Bituriges had ever been in control of the central part of Gaul, and

not the slightest evidence for the belief of D'Arbois de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe* II, 297–305) that they were in possession of a large continental Keltic empire. In the time of Caesar they were subject to the Aedui (*BG.* vii. 5. 2), but in the general revolt of the year 52 B.C. headed by the Arverni under Vercingetorix, the Bituriges took a prominent part (*BG.* vii. 5. 7; 8. 6). Twenty of their cities were burned to prevent the advance of the Romans (*BG.* vii. 15. 1). Their greatest city, Avaricum, which is described as the most beautiful city in Gaul (*BG.* vii. 15. 4), was made the object of Caesar's attack (*BG.* vii. 14–28). It would appear, therefore, that notwithstanding their subjection to the Aedui they were still a vigorous and flourishing tribe.

The Aulerci were divided into three pagi, the Aulerci Brannovices (Caes. *BG.* vii. 15. 2), the Aulerci Eburovices (*BG.* iii. 17. 3; vii. 75. 4), and the Aulerci Cenomani (*BG.* vii. 75. 3; Pliny *NH.* iv. 107; Ptol. *Geogr.* ii. 8. 9). Caesar uses the word Aulerci by itself four times, but he does not use the names of the pagi without prefixing the general name of the tribe. The Cenomani, the largest of the three, became known, especially in Italy, only by their cantonal name. Thus Livy probably means that in the earliest migration people of the two smaller cantons came to Italy, while later the third came in a movement by itself.

Livy does not here mention the nationality of the Saluvii, but it is clear from Epitome LX that he believed them to be Gauls, *Fulvius Flaccus primus Transalpinos Ligures domuit bello, missus in auxilium Massiliensibus adversus Saluvios Gallos, qui fines Massiliensium populabantur.* But Pliny (*NH.* iii. 47) includes them among the *Ligurum celeberrimi ultra Alpes*, and that the Romans considered the Saluvii to be Ligurians is shown by the triumphal inscription of Fulvius and Sextius, *CIL.* I, 460, DE:LIGURIB:VOCONTIEIS: SALVVIESQ. However, Strabo in three passages contrasts the Saluvii with the Ligurians in such a way as to indicate that he regarded them as Gauls. Thus he says: *ἡ ἐφεξῆς παραλία, ἣν ἔχουσιν οἵ τε Μασσαλιῶται καὶ οἱ Σάλυες μέχρι Αιγύων ἐπὶ τὰ πρὸς Ἰταλίαν μέρη καὶ τὸν Οὐᾶρρον ποταμόν* (iv, p. 178); and *οἱ Μασσαλιῶται . . . . παρέδοσαν . . . . τὸ δὲ Ταυροέντιον καὶ τὴν Ὀλβίαν καὶ Ἀντίπολιν καὶ Νίκαιαν τῷ τῶν Σαλύων ἔθνει καὶ τοῖς Αἰγυσι*

τοῖς τὰς Ἄλπεις οἰκοῦσιν (iv, p. 180), and finally πρώτους δ' ἐχειρώσαντο Ῥωμαῖοι τούτους (Σάλυας) τῶν ὑπεραλπείων Κελτῶν, πολὺν χρόνον πολεμήσαντες καὶ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς Λίγυσιν (iv, p. 203). Strabo explains why he calls the Saluvii (or Salyes as the Greeks called them) Kelts, for he says: καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς Σάλυας οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Λίγυας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἣν ἔχουσιν οἱ Μασσαλιῶται, Λιγυστικήν, οἱ δ' ὕστερον Κελτολίγυας ὀνομάζουσι, καὶ τὴν μέχρι Ἀουενίωνος καὶ τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ πεδιάδα τούτοις προσνέμουσιν (iv, p. 203). Livy also contrasts them with the Ligurians, *et P. Cornelius . . . . profectus ab urbe sexaginta longis navibus praeter oram Etruriae Ligurumque et inde Saluvium montis pervenit Massiliam* (xxi. 26. 3). From these several passages Long draws the following reasonable conclusion: "This shows that the Ligurians of Gallia, or the country west of the Var, became known to the Roman by the name of Salyes. Strabo's remark that these Salyes, whom the early Greeks named Ligures, were called Celtoligyes by the later Greeks may explain how Livy or his epitomizer has called the Salyes both Ligurians ('Transalpinos Ligures,' Epit. 47) and Galli (Epit. 60). They were a mixed race of Galli and Ligures" (Smith *Dict. of Class. Geogr., s.v.* "Salyes"). D'Arbois de Jubainville breaks away decidedly from the belief of the Romans, and certainly misinterprets Strabo, in holding that the original Ligurian inhabitants of this territory were conquered by the Gallic Salyes, and that the word Celto-Ligurian indicates a condition of Gallic supremacy on Ligurian ground (*Les premiers habitants* I, p. 373). If the early Greeks called the Salyes Ligurians, it must mean that at the time of the founding of Massilia there was such a tribe of Ligurians in the vicinity. But with the first southern movement of Gallic tribes, as the Allobroges, Volcae, and others, the earlier people were largely subdued and mingled with the newly arrived Gauls. However their former fame as the opponents of the attempt to found the Greek city of Massilia would justify Pliny in calling them *celeberrimi*, and in classifying them as Ligurians. Such a mistake could easily be made, for without doubt Latin was the only language used in this part of the Provincia in Pliny's day. But there is equally little doubt that prior to the use of Latin, the Keltic of the moving Gallic tribes had prevailed over the still earlier Ligurian

spoken there. The degree to which Gallia Narbonensis was romanized is shown by Strabo's statement in regard to the Cavares, that they had become Roman in language and life, and some of them even in their form of government (iv, p. 186; cf. Budinsky *Die Ausbreitung der lat. Sprache*, pp. 102 ff.). It is noteworthy that all the inscriptions found in the province are written in Latin, except eight, which, although using the Greek alphabet, are in a Gallic dialect. No Ligurian inscriptions have yet been found in this section. Further, it is significant that Varro calls the Massilians trilingual, *hos* (*Massilienses*) *Varro trilingues esse ait, quod et Graece loquantur et Latine et Gallice* (Isidor. *Orig.* xv. 1. 63). They did not speak Ligurian, and therefore their neighbors, the Salyes, must have spoken Keltic and not Ligurian. This is the first clear instance of my contention that the Keltic of the moving Gallic tribes largely superseded the Ligurian of southern Gaul and northern Italy.

How the Boii happened to be concerned in this migration is by no means clear. The first record we have of their appearance in Gaul is in connection with their participation in the movement of the Helvetii in 58 B.C. Apparently they had but recently appeared in Noricum when they received the invitation to go along with the Helvetii (Caes. *BG.* i. 5. 4). Caesar says that they had lived *trans Rhenum*, but this is so indefinite that we must fall back upon the statement of Tacitus (*Germ.* 28): *Igitur inter Hercyniam sylvam Rhenumque et Moenum amnes Helvetii, ulteriora Boii, Gallica utraque gens, tenuere. Manet adhuc Boihemi nomen, signatque loci veterem memoriam, quamvis mutatis cultoribus.* It can scarcely be that this home in Bohemia is that referred to by Caesar in the words *trans Rhenum*, for they must at that time have lived even west of the Rhine. They seem to have been very nomadic in their tendencies, for they participated in almost all the various Gallic movements for several centuries. Niese (*Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum*, NF. 30, p. 149) very plausibly suggests that in the war against the Cisalpine Gauls after the close of the Second Punic War it was the Boii who suffered most heavily from the revenge of the Romans. They were driven from their homes, and many of them forced out of the country. They took refuge among their former allies, the Taurisci, and finally after a further defeat at the hands of the Dacians, settled in Bohemia,

where they remained until driven out by the Marcomani. In the uncertainty surrounding their early location, it is very unsafe to build up a theory from the brief statement of Caesar, as Müllenhoff does, that the whole movement of the Gauls started from the vicinity of the Rhine rather than from central Gaul (*Deutsche Altertumskunde* 2, 265–69).

These are the only tribes requiring special mention, but there are some facts in connection with the relation existing among them all which should be understood. With the exception of the Libui, the Saluvii, and the Boii, they dwelt in the central part of Gaul, in that third section of the country inhabited by those *qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur*. More particularly, they represented all the principal tribes between the Sequana and the Liger rivers, and two powerful tribes just to the west of the Liger. In the revolt of Vercingetorix, the Arverni, Bituriges, Senones, Aulerci, Aulerci-Cenomani, and Mandubii were closely allied (Caes. *BG.* vii. 4 ff.). The Aedui and Ambarri remained faithful to Caesar, although after some hesitation. In fact, from the reading of Caesar one gains the impression that these two tribes were of different mold from their neighbors. They were always at odds with the Sequani and the Arverni. Thus Diviciacus the Aeduan once told Caesar *Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Aeduos, alterius Arvernos* (*BG.* i. 31. 3). Diodorus claims to have unusually accurate information, for he tells us something which, he says, is unknown to many, that the people living in the southern part of Gaul, both those toward the Alps and those toward the Pyrenees, were called Κελτοί, while those living farther north (adopting the generally accepted reading ἄρκτον for νότον of the MSS) and toward the Hercynian forest were called Γαλάται, but that the Romans incorrectly grouped all of them together under the common name of Γαλάται (v. 32. 1). This distinction has been felt by the majority of modern writers to have a strong foundation in fact. (A short history of the discussion to 1885 is given by Czoernig *Die alten Völker Oberitaliens*, pp. 150 ff.)

In recent years the discussion of the relationship of the tribes in central Gaul has had its basis in the interpretation of their linguistic remains. (The best treatments of these are Rhŷs *Celtae and Galli*,

1905; Rhŷs *The Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy*, 1906; Nicholson *Keltic Researches*, 1904, pp. 117–67.) Our knowledge of their language is of the meager and unsatisfactory kind, usual among the European peoples who did not early come under Greek and Roman influence. We possess a fairly large number of names of persons and places, and a few words cited by Roman writers. In addition there are the charms in Marcellus of Bordeaux, the Coligny Calendar, the Rom Defixiones, and forty shorter inscriptions, eight of which are suspected. While this is not the place for an extended examination of the language of these inscriptions, it is worth while to mention that the eight suspected inscriptions bear some remarkable resemblances to the inscriptions from Pisaurum in *CIL.* I, 167 ff., which make it a certainty that these eight are Keltic, and that those from Pisaurum are largely Keltic, with a slight mixture with Latin.

We possess inscriptions from the majority of the tribes under consideration, and, apart from the Aedui, the Ambarri, and possibly the Lingones, linguistic evidence links all of them closely together. With them are also to be grouped the Sequani, probably the Parisii, the Allobroges, the Caturiges, the Volcae, and other tribes to the south. A close scrutiny of the linguistic remains shows that there was a decided dialectic cleft in central Gaul. The fundamental differences depend upon the treatment of original *p* and original *kᵘ*. Adopting the names given by Diodorus it is seen that the Celtae retained original *p* much later than did the Galli, e.g., in the tribal names *Parisii* and *Pictones*, together with several Sequanian and Biturigan words. In all other Keltic dialects it was lost early, leaving only a possible trace in the form *h* in some dialects. In the treatment of original *kᵘ* the Celtae correspond to the Goidelic branch in Scotland and Ireland by preserving it in the form *qu* or *c*, e.g., *Sequani*, *Sequana*, *quimon*, *qutios*, *equos*, etc. In the remainder of the continental Keltic groups this sound early became *p*, e.g., *epos*, *Petrucorii*. Thus between the Sequani on the east and the Arverni and Bituriges on the west, a group of Galli, composed of Aedui, Ambarri, and Lingones, had pushed their way south, the advance guard of the invading Galli.

The earliest Kelts who inhabited Gaul were those who have been called Celtae. They seem to have moved westward from the region

of the Danube to the Rhine, both sides of which they occupied for some time. Thence they moved into Gaul and covered the whole of the territory north of the Garumna. These were the Q-Kelts. related to the Goidels of Ireland, who retained original *kṷ* unchanged. The date of their arrival in Gaul is still much in dispute. Some scholars, particularly in France, do not admit that the Kelts reached Gaul until shortly before the year 400 B.C. (Bertrand *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, p. 254; Sophus Müller *Urgeschichte Europas*, pp. 54 and 154 ff.). D'Arbois (*op. cit.* I, pp. 262, 338) thinks they reached Gaul in the seventh century, while Salomon Reinach ("L'Étain Celtique" in *L'Anthropologie*, 1892, pp. 275 ff.) and Siret ("Les Cassitérides" in *L'Anthropologie*, 1908, pp. 129 ff.) date their arrival before the time of Homer. The difference of opinion is due to the fact that while there is an almost total lack of archaeological evidence for a Keltic culture in Gaul prior to 400 B.C., the conclusions drawn from historical documents are strongly in support of their earlier coming.

The Celtae were followed westward by the P-Kelts, those who changed original *kṷ* to *p*. These are the Galli, related to the Brythons of the British Islands (Rhŷs *The Welsh People*, pp. 5 and 11). When this second mass entered Gaul we have at present no means of knowing exactly. Their coming dislodged many of the Celtae, and drove some of them southward, while others took refuge in the distant British Islands. This is usually regarded as the cause of the passing of the Goidels to England (Oman *England before the Norman Conquest*, pp. 9–10, 16; Rhŷs *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1900, p. 896; Holmes *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar*, p. 455).

Following the crowding-in of the Galli several southward movements, chiefly of Celtae, took place, going along three distinct lines. It is hard to trace these chronologically, but it seems that the earliest led ultimately to Spain, and established a number of Celtae there, where they mingled with the Iberians and formed with them the Celtiberians. Some of them were prevented from entering Spain by the Aquitani, a division of the Iberians, and were forced to remain between the Rhone and the Cevennes, e.g., the Volcae and the Helvii (Strabo iv. 1. 1; Livy xxi. 26). That a second attempt to enter

Spain was frustrated and turned west seems evident from the presence of a section of the Bituriges at the mouth of the Garumna. The third movement led against the Ligurians to the south and east of the Rhone. Here we meet the Keltic names Cavares, Tricastini, Graioceli, Ceutrones, and Caturiges, whom Pliny calls Insubres (iii. 17. 125). It may have been in this movement also that the Allobroges crossed the Rhone. The invasion of Spain is usually placed somewhat subsequent to 600 B.C., but no definite date can be assigned. The earliest reference to their presence there is by Herodotus, who about 445 speaks of their being in the southwest corner of Spain (iv. 49; cf. ii. 33; Avienus *Ora Mar.* 205; Justin. 44. 4). But there seems to be no evidence to support the statement of Siret that an invasion of Spain by Kelts in the eleventh century put an end to the Phoenician empire there.

It has been shown above that Livy expressly states that the Gauls were near the mouth of the Rhone at the time of the founding of Massilia, and that the Phocaeans invited these Gauls to help them drive back the threatening Ligurians, that is, the Saluvii. This would place the final southern movement of the Gauls not far from the year 600. That this is a not unreasonable conclusion is clear from a statement made by Hecataeus, writing about 500 B.C.: *Μασσαλία, πόλις τῆς Λιγυστικῆς, κατὰ τὴν Κελτικήν, ἄποικος Φωκαέων* (Fr. 22, *FHG.* I, p. 2). When, therefore, Hecataeus wrote, it was still felt that the country near Massilia could be called Ligurian, but that the Gauls had encroached upon Ligurian territory until they were now not far from the city itself. However, according to our best authorities, the horde that helped the Phocaeans turned east and eventually found a home in northern Italy. Considering their location in Gaul, as well as the dialect they spoke, the conclusion is inevitable that repeated advances of the invading Galli forced the Celtae from their home in Gaul. As the Galli kept coming into Gaul in increasing numbers, the earlier inhabitants were confined within ever narrower limits, which is the explanation of Livy's statement that they left their homes on account of their *abundans multitudo.*

The account given by Livy seems very clear and straightforward, but unfortunately the question is complicated by three considerations.

First, Livy's statements have been thought to be inconsistent in some particulars. Second, certain other ancient writers do not agree with Livy as to the date of the migrations. Third, it is difficult to locate the migrating tribes in Italy after their arrival there.

Livy states clearly (v. 34) that in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus the Gauls made their first appearance in Italy, i.e., shortly after the year 600. But he tells us that there was another story current (v. 33. 1–5), that a certain Arruns, a citizen of Clusium, induced the Gauls to migrate to Italy, and to make an attack upon the city of Clusium in 391, and thence the Gauls marched to Rome and burned it in 390 (traditions differ slightly as to the exact year). This story Livy mentions only to express his disbelief in it: *equidem haud abnuerim Clusium Gallos ab Arrunte seu quo alio Clusino adductos; sed eos, qui oppugnaverint Clusium, non fuisse qui primi Alpes transierint, satis constat. Ducentis quippe annis ante quam Clusium oppugnarent, urbemque Romam caperent, in Italiam Galli transcenderunt* (v. 33. 4–5). In several other passages Livy seems to imply that the Gauls were new arrivals at the time of the siege of Veii in 396. Thus he says: *maxime in ea parte Etruriae gentem invisitatam novos accolas Gallos esse, cum quibus nec pax satis fida nec bellum pro certo sit* (v. 17. 8). The important thing here is not that he calls them *novos accolas*, but that he characterizes them, as if the people of Etruria had never heard of the Gauls prior to this time, or at least had never known anything definite about them. He makes similar statements also in two other passages (v. 35. 4; v. 37. 2).

Müllenhoff assumes (*Deutsche Altertumskunde* II, 251) that, apart from the account of Livy, there is a somewhat uniform tradition among the ancients that the Gauls entered Italy shortly before 396, and almost immediately afterward made their attacks upon Clusium and Rome. But instead of this we find that the authorities are fairly evenly divided. Thus Pliny (*NH.* iii. 17. 125) says that the Etruscan city of Melpum was captured on the same day as that on which Camillus captured Veii. And Appian (*Celtica* ii) gives an exact date, 392, for their coming. Dionysius also (*Ant. Rom.* xiii. 10. 14–17) informs us that the Gauls crossed the Alps in the expectation of attacking Clusium. On the other hand, Polybius (ii. 17–18) and Plutarch (*Camillus* 16–17) are in agreement with

Livy in stating positively that the Gauls made their attacks upon Clusium and Rome long after they had first entered Italy. Livy and Appian are the only writers who attempt to assign an exact date for their arrival. Justinus (xx. 5. 8; xxiv. 4. 2) contradicts himself, and may therefore be neglected. Livy explains his several statements that the Gauls were a new and strange race to the Etruscans by the use of the phrase *maxime in ea parte*, by which he means new in the neighborhood of the fanum Voltumnae, situated not far from Volsinii. And he interprets this later by saying: *nec cum his primum Etruscorum, sed multo ante cum eis, qui inter Appenninum Alpesque incolebant, saepe Gallici pugnavere* (v. 33. 6). Livy represents that five successive migrations took place, and Plutarch gives the information that the Gauls subdued eighteen different cities belonging to the Etruscans in the valley of the Po. Certainly no small amount of time was necessary to drive back the powerful Etruscans from this large territory. Livy may have placed the date a little too early, he probably makes a slight error, but without doubt he is closer to the truth than Müllenhoff and others who assume the later date for the first inroad of the Gauls. (Cf. D'Arbois *op. cit.* I, 166; Lavisse *Histoire de France* I, p. 25; Hirschfeld *Timagenes und die gallische Wandersage;* Czoernig *Die alten Völker Oberitaliens*, pp. 158–66; Skutsch, in Pauly-Wissowa VI, 750). Müller-Deecke (*Die Etrusker* I, pp. 144 ff.) and Desjardins (*Géographie de la Gaule Romaine* II, pp. 204 ff.) argue for the accuracy of Livy.

The arguments for and against Livy's narrative may best be given by an examination of the last thoroughgoing and hostile criticism. Niese (*Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum*, NF. 30, pp. 129 ff.) holds that this account of the migrations is unworthy of credence on the following grounds: (1) The assumed connection of the wandering Kelts with the founding of Massilia is a mixture of two distinct stories. Thus Plutarch (Solon ii), Justinus (xliii. 3. 6), and Aristotle (Fragm. 508) tell of the friendship existing between the Phocaeans of Massilia and the Kelts. Livy without justification assumed that these Kelts were the ones who finally settled in Italy. That Müllenhoff (II, 252) is right in believing that the Kelts moved after the time of Herodotus, and that Müller-Deecke are wrong in their statement that the Etruscans were driven back

from northern Italy prior to 524, based upon a misinterpretation of Dionys. 7. 3. (see Müllenhoff I, 179). (2) The names of the tribes of Gaul were unknown before the time of Caesar, and Livy derived his names from Caesar's *Commentaries* (cf. D'Arbois II, 301–4; Hirschfeld 331 ff.). Further, that when the Gauls reached Italy these names disappeared. That Livy, in saying that Ambigatus was king of Celticum, knows only of Caesar's section of central Gaul, whereas there was a kind of political unity among the Kelts extending from western Spain to the Scythians, and Ambigatus could properly be called king of this whole territory (D'Arbois II, 303, n. 2, and 301). But what right have we to assume that tribal names were unknown before Caesar's campaigns? Any one of a large number of ancient historians whose works have been lost may have mentioned them. And what right have we to assume that there ever was a political unity that would justify the name Celticum, as applied to the whole Keltic continental territory? The sole evidence, upon which D'Arbois lays so much stress, that of similarity of language, is trifling. And since he wrote, this is materially weakened by the discovery of strong dialectic variations, which, as indicated above, lend valuable support to Livy's narrative. His meaning is perfectly clear, that the migrating tribes belonged to the section of Gaul where, in his own time, these tribes lived. It should be stated that if the relation I have assumed between the Celtae and the Galli is correct Livy should not have included the Aedui and the Ambarri. (3) The names Ambigatus, *the very wise*, Segovesus, *having knowledge of victory*, and Bellovesus are poetical names, which Livy in accordance with his tendency took from some Gallic poem. Others have raised the same objection, but it is well to say that no trace of any such Gallic poem exists, nor are the names more fictitious, on the ground of their appropriateness, than are Pericles, Sophocles, Alexander, Hilarius, and Prudentius. (4) Taking a great multitude across the Alps is a story in imitation of the journey of Hannibal. But they certainly got across the Alps, as did many others.

These objections to the story of Livy are of no great importance, except the first, which has to do with chronology, and does not invalidate the remainder of the story to the slightest degree. And even on this point Livy is the only writer who does not palpably con-

tradict himself. Pliny confuses three swarms of Gauls in the attack on Melpum. Nor do we know where Melpum was. Modern guesses have placed it near Milan, yet it might as well be anywhere else. The four successive migrations occupied much time, and the last, that of the Senones, may not have been much earlier than 400, but the first long antedated that time. If we were obliged to give up the story told by Livy, where should we turn for information? Niese replies by pointing to a passage in Polybius (ii. 17), where it is said that the Gauls looked with envious eyes upon the fertile land of the Etruscans, and finally with but slight provocation moved against them and drove them from the valley of the Po. This is repeated by Dionysius (xiv. 113). These must replace Livy and others as authorities. The only place where the relation mentioned by Polybius could exist is to the north in the valley of the Etsch. It could not have been in the northwest, where Ligurians and not Kelts would have been their neighbors. It was the Galatae (Diod. v. 32. 5) of the north and east who captured Rome and robbed Delphi. Later Gauls followed the tracks of the earlier by this route, says Polybius (ii. 18. 4; 19. 1).

Niese thinks there is one piece of evidence to show that Polybius is correct. The Gauls in Italy needed help against the Romans, and at the battle of Telamon they were allied with the Taurisci, a tribe from the north (Polyb. ii. 28. 4; 30. 6; cf. 15. 8). But their especial allies were the Gaesatae (Polyb. ii. 22. 1; cf. 28. 3; 34. 2), who came from the valley of the Rhone. These facts show that all connection of the Italian Gauls with their kinsmen was toward the north, and not toward the west. The Taurisci certainly came from the north, but we have no knowledge elsewhere of the Gaesatae. Niese further mentions that when Hannibal entered Italy he was opposed by the Gauls on the western side of the Alps, although he was in alliance with the Insubres and Boii in Italy, and therefore there was no connection between the Kelts of Italy and those of Gaul. But Niese forgets that this alliance was made after Hannibal reached Italy, and only after consideration as to whether it would be advisable to help the Taurini or the Boii in their quarrel (Livy xxi. 39. 6). It is interesting also to notice that Niese's main argument depends upon a passage in Polybius that has materially damaged his reputa-

tion as a geographer. His ideas of the position of the Alps and the Rhone display such ignorance as to discredit utterly his authority in regard to this event. Again, his statement of the envy in the minds of the Gauls because of the possession by the Etruscans of the fertile valley of the Po sounds like a rationalizing of the old story of the wine and the oil (Livy v. 33. 1–5; Pliny xii. 2. 5; Dionys. xiii. 10. 14). Against such paucity of genuine information, the reasonable account given by Livy must still be credited. And yet Hirt is carried away by the arguments of Niese, and feels them to be so cogent that he would follow Niese even if he did not have the support of Polybius (*Die Indogermanen* I, 171). It is noticeable that E. Meyer does not follow the lead of Niese, but accepts the story of Livy, except for the date, which he places extremely late (*Gesch. des Altertums* I, 2, p. 794).

Coming next to the question of the routes followed in the four successive migrations to Italy, it is to be noted, as even Niese points out, that the earliest writers state that the Gauls in most ancient times had their home in the extreme west, or northwest, of Europe. These are Heraclides Ponticus (Plut. *Cam.* 22), Clitarchus (Strabo vii. 293), and Callimachus (Hymnus in Delum 174). Their stories coincide with Livy and Pausanias (i. 4. 1), who represent the Gauls as coming from the ocean and the ends of the world. This is indeed very indefinite, but it assures us that the most ancient writers were unanimous in thinking that the Keltic migrations originated in Gaul. The first horde was composed of Bituriges, Arverni, Senones, Aedui, Ambarri, Carnutes, and Aulerci. Of these, the Aedui and Ambarri were Galli, the others were Celtae. (It was pointed out above that Livy is probably in error in including any Galli in the first migration.) Livy says that they made their way through the Taurini, and, according to the carefully considered last edition of Weissenborn, by way of the Duria. The farthest point reached eastward was where Mediolanium was founded, and without doubt all followed closely behind. Nicholson (*Keltic Researches*, p. 166) gives an interesting etymology for *Mediolanium*, which makes it clearly Keltic. The names *Rigomagus* and *Bodincomagus* in the heart of the district of the Taurini prove the presence of Kelts among the Taurini. The route by way of the Cottian Alps has also left

its trace in the names *Quadiates* (*CIL.* V, 7231, 3) and *Quariates* (*CIL.* XII, 80; Pliny iii. 35), preserved today in the name *Queyras* in the department of the Hautes-Alpes. The gentile name *Quiamelius* occurring among the Deciates (*CIL.* XII, 226) has the same origin. The two modern villages Quarlasco and Quassasco, the first near Turin and the second near Ivrea, indicate the presence of the same tribes. In these names, therefore, both those with the very common Keltic suffix *-magus*, and those with the *qu* of the Celtae, we have the best of proof that the Celtae of the first migration settled among the Ligurians from the pass of Mont Genèvre eastward. If there is need of further evidence, we have the name of *Semigalli* applied to the Taurini by Livy (xxi. 38), although the Taurini in the estimation of the ancients represented the true old Ligurian stock, *antiqua stirps* (Pliny iii. 123, etc.; see *TAPA.* XL, p. 74). It is impossible at present to do more than guess why the names of the Keltic tribes were not preserved.

The second migration of Gauls was that of the Cenomani, a division of the Aulerci, followed by the Libui and the mixed race of the Saluvii. These, according to Livy, took the same route as the earlier movement. This harmonizes with the statement of Cato, to the effect that the Cenomani had once lived in the vicinity of Massilia: *auctor est Cato, Cenomanos iuxta Massiliam habitasse in Volcis* (Pliny iii. 19. 130). We must assume that the Cenomani followed the route of the earlier tribes south almost to Massilia, then turned east over the Alps by Mont Genèvre, along the Duria, and eventually settled north of the Po, where they founded the cities of Brixia and Verona. About forty-five inscriptions come from the territory occupied by them in Italy (Pauli *Die Inschriften nordetruskischen Alphabets*, nos. 38–85). The Libui seem to be mentioned only twice in addition to the present passage, and both times by Livy. Here he says they settled behind, that is west of the Cenomani, implying also that they were near the Ligurian Laevi, who lived at the junction of the Ticinus with the Po. Pliny (iii. 124) tells us that the Laevi and Marici founded Ticinum. The situation compels us to place the Libui and the Saluvii north and west of these, and that is the exact situation of the tribe known to the Romans as the Libici. Now Pliny in the same passage says that Vercellae was in the terri-

tory of the Libici, and was founded by the Saluvii. This makes the Libui but a pagus of the Saluvii, who as we have already seen were a Ligurian tribe largely mixed with Kelts. So Livy calls the Libui Gauls (xxi. 38) very properly, and contrasts the Libui and the Laevi with the true Ligurians (xxxiii. 37. 6). In this connection it is necessary to notice also a further fact told by Pliny, that Novaria was founded by the Vertamacori, a pagus of the Vocontii, and not, as Cato thought, by Ligurians (iii. 124). This is important, in view of the fact that one of the longest Keltic inscriptions of Italy was found near Novaria, and belongs rather to the Celtae than to the Galli (in Pauli *op. cit.*, no. 25; Rhŷs *Celtic Inscriptions*, no. XXXIV).

The third migration was that of the Boii and the Lingones, who entered Italy by the Pennine Alps. This necessarily brings them through the valley of the Aosta, along the river Duria. Here the Salassi lived, and the inference is fair that when these migrating tribes found the valley of the Po already thickly settled by Gauls they moved slowly onward to their final home south and southeast of the Po. There cannot be much doubt that many of them remained behind among the Salassi, and from these the Salassi derived the many Keltic elements in their language. This is the situation that caused the Roman writers to hesitate as to whether they should class the Salassi among the Kelts or among the Ligurians (*TAPA*. XL, pp. 74, 75, 78, 81).

We have no evidence as to the route taken by the Senones, the last of the migrating tribes. Their ultimate home was in the east of Umbria, where they were known by the Romans for many years. An important Keltic inscription has been found at Todi, the ancient Tuder, which probably originated with this tribe (Conway *The Italic Dialects* II, p. 528; Pauli *op. cit.*, no. 26). There are some very archaic inscriptions from the vicinity of Pisaurum, which are commonly said to be early Latin, but under some other influence. Conway is inclined to think the peculiarities are Umbrian, owing chiefly to the fact that the Senones were subdued by the Romans, and the colony of Sena Gallica was planted among them as early as 283 B.C. But the planting of a colony does not stop the speaking of the native tongue, and this fact in addition to the finding of a Gallic inscription not far away makes it almost certain that the influ-

ence upon the inscriptions of Pisaurum was that of the Senones. Some remarkable forms of verbs and nouns link them closely with inscriptions found in southern France. Kiepert (*Lehrb. der alten Geogr.* 341) holds that *Bononia* is the only city south of the Po having a Keltic name, but it is not at all improbable that names current among the Senones, e.g., *Pisaurum, Sena, Aesis, Sarsina, Suasa,* are also Keltic. Certainly they are not Latin. Schulze (*Lat. Eigennamen* 569) thinks Sarsina is of Etruscan origin. The history of the others is not available, but they are too old to be called Umbrian.

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THE PRENUPTIAL RITE IN THE *AETIA* OF CALLIMACHUS

By Campbell Bonner

In an interesting paper published in the last number of this journal (pp. 302 ff.), Professor Duane Reed Stuart has proposed to interpret the ceremony described in the *Aetia* 1–3 by means of the marriage customs of other peoples than the Greek. With Housman and Puech, he rightly retains ἄρσενι, and understands κούρῳ to mean a boy of tender years.[1] He then adduces from the folk-lore of India and of various European peoples a number of marriage-customs in which a male child is in some way or other brought into contact with the bride; it is handed to her, kissed by her, or held upon her lap at some point in the wedding festivities (pp. 307 f.). In one case, cited from Lloyd's *Peasant Life in Sweden*, "custom prescribed that on the night preceding the wedding the prospective bride should sleep with a boy baby. If she did so, her firstborn would be a son."

The common principle involved in these marriage customs is that of sympathetic magic, which is well known in Hellenic folk-lore; and their object is to insure the fertility of the union, and especially the birth of male children. Hence Mr. Stuart concludes that the Naxian rite performed at Cydippe's wedding "took its rise in the desire to render the forthcoming marriage fruitful, and to enable the bride to become the mother of sons, 'the pillars of the house.' Simulation was the means by which the end wished for was to be attained."

This article has rendered no small service in showing the possibility of interpreting the obscure Naxian ceremony by anthropological methods. But I believe that Mr. Stuart's theory is wrong, notwithstanding its general plausibility, and in spite even of the extraordinary neatness with which the Swedish custom just mentioned fits into it and seems to support it. At any rate my own reading in the field of primitive custom has led me to take another view of it.

[1] Since the body of this paper was put into type, I have seen K. F. W. Schmidt's discussion of the *Aetia* in *Gött. Gel. Anzeigen* for July, 1911, pp. 449 f. Schmidt interprets the παῖς ἀμφιθαλής as Eros, citing Ar. *Birds* 1737. This does not seem possible. Von Arnim's treatment of the *Aetia* in *Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad.*, 1910, is not yet accessible to me.

That view I will state as briefly as possible, then consider some doubtful points in Mr. Stuart's explanation, and, finally, offer in such detail as seems necessary, the evidence upon which I propose another interpretation of the rite in question.

The Naxian custom which directed that on the night before her marriage the bride should sleep with a young boy, or possibly a mere infant of male sex, is a rite of precautionary character, probably designed, in its beginnings, to protect the bridegroom against an evil influence to which he might else be liable. It is possible to hold different views as to the exact character of this evil influence, and its source. But it seems most probable that the ceremony, involving, as it does, the substitution of another male person in the place of the real bridegroom, is a harmless survival from the barbarous custom of ceremonial defloration of the bride by another than her future husband—a custom which has been widely practiced among savage peoples.[1] In the Naxian custom, the important point is not merely the contact of the boy with the bride, but their *συγκοίμησις*—a mimicry, probably a survival, of prenuptial commerce with another than the husband to be. We have learned not to shrink from the discovery of crude relics of savage *mores* among the customs of the Greeks; and while such an observance as this may have no perfect analogue in Hellenic usage, it is certainly not more isolated than it remains if viewed merely as a charm to obtain male offspring.

In three important points the theory of Mr. Stuart seems to fit the facts less accurately than that which I have just offered. These difficulties, it will be seen, have not all been overlooked by Mr. Stuart himself, who has throughout conducted his investigation with admirable candor.

In the first place, among the illustrations cited by Mr. Stuart, there is only one custom which prescribes that the bride shall sleep with the child—the Swedish instance given on the authority of Lloyd. The sleeping together is therefore not an essential feature of these magical methods of obtaining male children; for it is quite

[1] The resemblance of the Naxian marriage-rite to primitive customs that involve ceremonial defloration had been observed independently by my friend Professor George L. Hamilton of Cornell University, recently of the University of Michigan, with whom I discussed the substance of this paper. He has kindly called my attention to several important articles, notably Herts's "Die Sage vom Giftmädchen."

unsafe, as Stuart recognizes (p. 309), to assume that the Swedes of the nineteenth century have faithfully preserved in its original frankness a custom which was modified in the direction of delicacy by the Slavs and the Hindus, whose folk-lore is, to say the least, not prudish. On the other hand, the explanation which I suggest has the advantage of taking this feature as the central point of the Naxian rite.

Secondly, the relation of the custom to the *αἴτιον* is far from satisfactory if Stuart's view is accepted as the right one. Nobody who has attentively studied the relation of custom and myth can seriously maintain that the observance was really intended to commemorate an incident in the life of the immortals; Stuart's condemnation of such errors is as just as it is emphatic. Yet one may reasonably expect a certain pointed appropriateness in the fitting of a myth to a curious custom. What, after all, is the story of Hera which Callimachus will not tell? Not, I think, the stolen amour with Zeus in Samos, which story has its proper correlative in the Samian trial marriage (cf. Nilsson *Griechische Feste* 40, 47); and I agree with Stuart (p. 310) in thinking that that institution should be distinguished from the Naxian ceremony, at least in the present state of our knowledge. But another point is to be considered. In the *Musée Belge* XV, 55 f., M. Paul Graindor rightly observes that Callimachus' reason for interrupting himself is quite inadequate, if he is alluding to the secret loves of Zeus and Hera from which Homer had long since lifted the veil of mystery (*Iliad* xiv. 296). M. Graindor is inclined to think that Callimachus is simply advertising his learning by the device of feigning reluctance to display it inopportunely. This seems to me a last resort. On the other hand, I attach more importance to his alternative suggestion that there may be an allusion to the obscure relations of Hera and Heracles. The indications of an amorous relation between Hera and the great hero, to whom most legends represent her as bitterly hostile, have been worked out (after Tümpel and Miss Harrison) most fully by A. B. Cook in *Classical Review* (1906) 365 ff., 416 ff., and the theory has been recently accepted by Jules Prickartz (*Musée Belge* XIV, 315, 327). I am not prepared to indorse all the views of these scholars with regard to the puzzling relations of the goddess and the hero, and I am particularly skeptical

as to the "matriarchal" aspect of Hera. However, it seems to me that an ancient amour of Hera and Heracles may be fairly derived from the evidence. "Cette hypothèse," remarks M. Graindor, "expliquerait mieux la réticence de Callimaque, et surtout le rapprochement du cas d'Héra avec la coutume Naxienne." The correspondence of *αἴτιον* and custom would be complete if, against a story that Heracles was the earlier mate of Hera, we place a ceremony which simulated the prenuptial intercourse of a bride with another than her future husband.

My third objection to interpreting the Naxian rite in the light of sympathetic magic has to do with the passage in Pollux (iii. 39–40) which Puech first cited in connection with the ceremony at Cydippe's wedding. The sentences in question are as follows: *ἀπαυλία . . . . ἐν ᾗ ὁ νυμφίος εἰς τοῦ πενθεροῦ ἀπαυλίζεται ἀπὸ τῆς νύμφης.* And further: *καὶ τῷ μὲν νυμφίῳ τότε ἐν τοῦ πενθεροῦ παιδίον ἀμφιθαλὲς θῆλυ συγκατακλίνεται, τῇ δὲ νύμφῃ ἐν τοῦ γαμβροῦ ἄρρεν.* In treating this passage Mr. Stuart (pp. 305 f., 311 ff.) rightly insists upon the distinction between *ἀπαυλία* and *ἐπαυλία*, and holds that the *ἀπαυλία* refers to a prenuptial ceremony. Furthermore, he recognizes (pp. 311 f.) that the part played by the bridegroom in the notice in Pollux is not easily brought into agreement with his interpretation of the Naxian rite. For, as he truly observes, "when simulation is resorted to as a prophylactic or a remedial measure against sterility, it is the woman on whom the magic influence is centered." I may add that the pairing of the bridegroom with a female child speaks emphatically against the interpretation of the Naxian rite as a magical means of obtaining male offspring. Here Mr. Stuart is "inclined to think that the lexicographer's account simply incorporates a tradition of the Naxian custom with various embellishments as to details, the source of which it is impossible to fix." But, on critical grounds, such a treatment of the passage should be adopted only when all other expedients fail.

The theory which I have proposed above can be more easily brought into harmony with the statements of Pollux. As he describes the *ἀπαυλία*, I should be disposed to interpret it as follows: In order to avoid certain dangers which threaten them, especially at the time of first sexual contact, both bride and bridegroom go through a sort of

proxy wedding, each with a child of the opposite sex. These children are immature, hence harmless; and being ἀμφιθαλεῖς, their presence betokens long life and general good fortune for the bridal pair (cf. Frazer *Adonis*[2], p. 423). It is quite true that the danger, in so far as it is connected with conjugal intercourse, usually directs itself against the man, a circumstance which has been referred to physiological causes (Crawley *The Mystic Rose* 188–91, 307, 347; Reinach *Mythes, Cultes, et Religions* I, 88, 115; cf. Hertz "Die Sage vom Giftmädchen," p. 212 [in *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* 156–277]). But we shall see presently that vague dangers are sometimes imagined to hang over both parties, who therefore make use of proxies to evade them. And besides, the notion that the marital approaches of some men may be dangerous seems to be attested among the Greeks by certain curious legends about Minos (Anton. Lib. 41, § 4 f.; Apollod. *Bibl.* iii. § 197 f. Wagner).

Such, then, are the reasons why another explanation seems preferable to Mr. Stuart's. It is now necessary to discuss the alternative theory somewhat more fully, and set forth the grounds upon which superstitions such as would give rise to the Naxian rite may be assumed to have existed among the Greeks in remote times. It should be stated in advance that we are not to suppose that the Greeks, at the time when we know them, were obsessed by such ideas of "sexual danger" as are to be discovered among savage tribes; and the custom of ceremonial defloration would undoubtedly have seemed barbarous to them. Of the Naxians the most that can be said is, that they thought it luckier that the bride should pass the night before her marriage with a young boy; and perhaps they added "as Hera had shared her couch with Heracles before she became the wife of Zeus."

A few scattered passages may perhaps be used to show that the idea of peril from the contact of the sexes was not unknown to the Greeks. Thus Artemidorus in his *Dream-Book* (ii. 65) says γαμεῖν παρθένον τῷ νοσοῦντι θάνατον σημαίνει· ὅσα γὰρ τῷ γαμοῦντι συμβαίνει, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τῷ ἀποθανόντι. Of course we are not obliged to accept the reason he assigns. One may also refer to Pindar's allusion to the death of Hymenaeus at his marriage. But this mutilated fragment (139) can hardly be used as evidence.

Crawley thinks that the stealthy manner in which the Spartans visited their wives under cover of night was prompted by a desire to lessen a possible danger (*The Mystic Rose*, p. 328; Plut. *Lyc.* xv. 4–6).

But on the whole, we are forced to look abroad for evidence. The material illustrating the superstition in question is best collected in the treatise of Hertz which has been already cited (195 ff.); see also Frazer *Adonis*[2], p. 52, n. 2. Hertz has shown that the fear of danger from the woman led to various practices of having her deflowered by another than her husband; but he is careful not to assign this fear as the actuating motive in all cases. This same superstitious awe is given an important place in Crawley's *The Mystic Rose* (chaps. viii, ix, xiv, especially pp. 320–49).

Indications of this superstition among the more civilized peoples of Western Asia, who came into contact with the Greeks, are not free from ambiguity. Traces of it have been found in certain customs which required a surrender of virginity to a stranger in connection with religious observances, as in the Babylonian rite in the temple of Mylitta (Herod. i. 199), at Heliopolis in Syria, in Armenia, and apparently in Cyprus (cf. Nilsson *op. cit.* 365 f.). But the authorities are not entirely clear about certain critical points, and these customs may have been confused with continued religious prostitution at temples, which is probably of different origin. In consequence, these strange rites have been the subject of a vigorous controversy, into which space does not permit, nor does the occasion justify, our entering. Those who are curious about the origin and development of the customs in question must be referred to the investigations of professed students of anthropology. In addition to the works of Hertz and Crawley, the following discussions are of special importance: Farnell in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* VII, 74, 86–88; Nilsson *op. cit.* 365 ff., Frazer *Adonis*[2] 32 ff., 50 ff., Hartland "Concerning the Rite at the Temple of Mylitta," in *Anthropological Essays Presented to E. B. Tylor* 189–202.[1]

I must content myself with adopting the view conveniently stated by Farnell (*op. cit.*, p. 88): "The explanation that fits the facts far

[1] Gruppe's remarks (*Griech. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, p. 916) about the origin of the sacrifice of virginity are not convincing.

better is that we are here [referring to the Babylonian and similar rites] dealing with a special modification of a widespread custom, the custom of destroying virginity before marriage so that the bridegroom's intercourse should be safe from a peril that is much dreaded by men in a certain state of culture; and here as in other ritual it is the stranger that takes the peril upon himself." This view is accepted by Nilsson (*loc. cit.*) and Cumont (*Les religions orientales dans le paganisme Romain* 286 ff.), and more recently by Samter (*Geburt, Hochzeit, und Tod* 113) and Fehrle (*Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum* 41). Hartland (p. 201) finds the theory of the danger of sexual contact questionable, and treats ceremonial defloration as a puberty rite, a formal introduction into sexual life. This, however, does not account so well for the delegation of the act to a stranger. Frazer's two most valid objections, namely the religious connections of the custom, and the payment of money by the stranger, are met by Hartland (pp. 195 and 198) and Nilsson (p. 367).

Assuming, now, that a superstition which had its outcome in ritual defloration existed among peoples in close touch with the Greeks, we may find a softened form of the savage custom in the Cretan observance of first putting the bride to bed beside an image (Anton. Lib. 17. 6).[1] Nilsson (p. 367, n. 2) calls attention to the use of a phallic symbol in Roman marriages. It is another form of softening the ancient and barbarous custom when, as in Naxos, the bride sleeps with a male child.

One word more regarding the account of the *ἀπαυλία* in Pollux, according to whom in some part of Greece, we know not where, the bridegroom, on the occasion of the *ἀπαυλία*, slept with a female child. The theory which I have adopted in explaining the Naxian rite lays special stress upon the danger apprehended from the bride, so there remains a difficulty in explaining the bridegroom's part in the notice of Pollux. One might perhaps argue that it is a double precaution—while the boy is supposed to remove the danger that attaches to the bride, the bridegroom by intimate proximity to an

[1] Simulated intercourse with a god may reasonably be interpreted as a magic rite with fertility as its object. So Dümmler *Philol.* LVI, 22–32, Gruppe *op. cit.*, p. 856, n. 3, Fehrle *op. cit.*, p. 10. Nor is it impossible that a human being might be imagined to represent the god. But as Fehrle saw (p. 10, n. 4, p. 41), when the rite involves or implies devirgination, the explanation is probably different.

immature, and so harmless, girl, is rendered less vulnerable to the influence proceeding from the mature woman. Crawley, however, contends that sexual danger affects both parties, and instances the Hindu ceremony by which both bride and groom are previously married to inanimate objects, especially trees (*op. cit.* 340 f.). An interesting account of these tree-marriages is given by Crooke in his *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India* II, pp. 115–21. In some of them Crooke recognizes a fertility charm, the couple taking to themselves the vigor and fecundity of the tree. In others there is clearly indicated an effort to transfer to the tree an evil influence—bad luck, the evil eye, etc.—especially when it is said that the tree dies after the marriage (Crooke II, 120 f., and so Frazer *Golden Bough*[3] II, 57, n. 4). The double proxy in the rite described by Pollux might thus be explained as a substitution for the real parties, who are especially liable to evil influences, of children who, being ἀμφιθαλεῖς and lucky, are able to bid défiance to demonic terrors. Certainly the common custom of substituting some disguised person for the bride, or (less commonly) for the bridegroom is rightly regarded as a means of misleading demons or ill-disposed people who might cast a malignant influence upon the real bridal pair. See Crooke *op. cit.* II, 6–8; Reinach *Mythes, Cultes, et Religions* I, 117; Samter *op. cit.* 98–108, especially 105 f. and 218. But the simulated cohabitation which is indicated by the Pollux passage does not appear, I believe, in any of the "false bride" customs, and the analogy of the tree-marriage is imperfect here. Hence Crawley's idea that both parties are dangerous to each other seems best to explain the Greek ceremony.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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THE HEROIC CLAUSULA IN CICERO AND QUINTILIAN

By F. W. Shipley

In their discussion of the theory of prose rhythm Cicero and Quintilian agree in insisting upon the avoidance in prose of combinations of feet which would produce the effect of verse. Their remarks upon the heroic clausula – ⏑ ⏑ – ⧖ seem, however, to be contradictory. Cicero, if the text is correct in *Orator* 217, apparently approves of the combination; Quintilian, on the other hand, explicitly condemns it: ix. 4. 102, ne dactylus quidem spondeo bene praeponitur, quia finem uersus damnamus in fine orationis. In practice it is used by Quintilian, who condemns it, with relatively greater frequency than by Cicero, who apparently approves of it. The combination is, however, comparatively rare in both. In the speeches of Cicero[1] there are 107 period clausulae of the form – ⏑ ⏑ – ⧖ out of a total of 17,092 = .6 per cent; in the first three books of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*,[2] there are 23 examples out of a total of 1,233 clausulae = 1.9 per cent.

The passage in Cicero *Orator* 217 reads as follows: ne iambus quidem, qui est e brevi et longa, aut par choreo, qui habet tris brevis, *trochaeus*, sed spatio par, non syllabis, aut etiam dactylus, qui est e longa et duabus brevibus, si est proximus a postremo, parum uolubiliter peruenit ad extremum, si est extremus choreus aut spondeus. Zielinski remarks (pp. 59–62) that it is surprising, to say the least, that Cicero has grouped among the clausulae of the second class the form 1, which is the most common of his clausulae, the cadence of 3^3, and the clausula heroica; and on p. 167 he says that

[1] The figures are from Zielinski *Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden*, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 163–70. Fifteen of the examples given occur in passages in which the reading is doubtful. If these are deducted the percentage would be reduced considerably. Zielinski's figures are confined to period clausulae. Laurand, *Etudes sur le style des Discours de Cicéron*, Paris, 1907, p. 167, gives 74 additional examples from membra and cola; but as he does not say how many membra he considered in his investigations, no ratio is possible.

[2] The figures for Quintilian are from the dissertation of Joseph Gladisch *De clausulis Quintilianeis*, Breslau, 1909, p. 42. His study covers the first three books. I have added one example which he apparently overlooked.

Cicero has through an oversight classed the clausula heroica among the permissible clausulae. Laurand, also recognizing the discrepancy between Cicero's theory and his practice, states (p. 167) that, if one considers the text of *Orator* 217 as complete, it is clear that Cicero recommends the clausula heroica. He deems it best, however, to suppose a lacuna in the passage and to regard as a separate sentence "Dactylus qui est a longa et duabus brevibus, si est proximus postremo, parum uolubiliter pervenit ad extremum, si est extremus choreus aut spondeus." This would bring Cicero's statement into harmony with that of Quintilian. But this solution fails at a very crucial point, namely, that if Cicero had intended to condemn in prose the heroic clausula, he would not have used the words *parum uolubiliter*. The end of the hexameter can scarcely be said to be deficient either in "roll" or in "rapidity."

The apparent discrepancy between Cicero's statement and that of Quintilian, and between Cicero's own theory and practice, may, I think, be satisfactorily explained without emending the text of *Orator* 217, by comparing the prose clausulae of the type – ⏑ ⏑ – ⧻ with the types of hexameter endings employed by the poets. Not all combinations of – ⏑ ⏑ – ⧻ necessarily form the heroic clausula. In Virgil, for instance, the end of the hexameter is practically limited to two forms: *moenia Romae* and *adire labores* (with which may be reckoned *primus ab oris*). The reason is that Virgil, in the last two feet of the hexameter, observes the harmony between verse ictus and word accent, viz., ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⧻. The other combinations occur so rarely as to be practically negligible. On the other hand, Horace, who, as he himself says, writes in his *Satires* but versified prose, makes use of verse endings like *quid faceres cum*, *ingluvie rem*, *est femur aut crus*, *Sarmentus equi te*, which, if taken out of their context, would never be recognized as heroic endings at all. One cannot read them as verse without doing violence to their ordinary accents.

The same meter, measured solely by the standard of longs and shorts, may, with change of accent and of word division, give rhythms totally different in their effect, e.g., ⏑ ⏑ | ⏑ ⏑ ⧻ or ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ | ⏑ ⧻, the two favorite forms of the heroic clausula, on the one hand and ⏑ | ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⧻ or – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⧻ on the other where the accent falls naturally upon one of the short syllables of the dactyl. For the sake of illustration I

have given in the accompanying table the relative frequency (expressed in percentages) of the various combinations with the metrical value – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ in the clausulae of Cicero's *Orations* (col. I), in the verse endings of his translation of the *Phaenomena* of Aratus (col. II), in the verse endings of Catullus lxiv (col. III), of Lucretius, 500 ll. of Book i (col. IV), and of Horace *Satires*, Book i, Satires 2 and 5 (col. V). In this way Cicero's usage in prose is compared with the technique of his own hexameters, and with that of the hexameters of contemporary writers, including those whose subject-matter was essentially prosaic, as was the case with much of Lucretius and the *Satires* of Horace. In col. VI, I have given the clausulae of this type in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, Books i–iii. The figures for Quintilian are based upon the dissertation of Gladisch, with one addition which he seems to have overlooked. The number of cases, 23 in all, is here too small to give a satisfactory percentage table; e.g., 3.6 per cent represents but a single instance.

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
	Cicero *Orationes*. Period clausulae 107 examples	*Phaenomena Arati* 540 ll.	Catull. lxiv., 407 ll.	Lucretius 500 ll.	Horat. *Sat.* i. 2 and 5. 238 ll.	Quintilian, Books i–iii. 23 clausulae
– ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ commemorare	30.	.9	.7	4.	2.1	39.
– | ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ non uideatur	40.	.5	.5	2.8	2.	34.
– | ⏑ ⏑ | – ⏓ Roman]i grave fatum	.9	4.2	....	2.2	8.2	7.2
– | ⏑ ⏑ – | ⏓ id(em) aditus sunt	.9	....	....	.2	1.2	....
– | ⏑ ⏑ | – | ⏓ quae data non sunt	1.9	.2	....	....	.4	....
– | ⏑ | ⏑ | – ⏓ ip]sum sed ab uno	.9	....	....	....	....	....
– | ⏑ | ⏑ – ⏓ bo]nis ut haberet	1.9	....	....	.6	.2	3.6
– ⏑ | ⏑ – ⏓ uelle uidebam	*14.	29.	34.	47.6	34.5	3.6
– ⏑ | ⏑ | – ⏓ huius in illum	1.9	3.3			4.2	....
– ⏑ | ⏑ – | ⏓ dex]terque simul pes	....	.3	.2	1.6	.8	....
– ⏑ | ⏑ | – | ⏓ usus in hac est	....	.2	....	....	.8	....
– ⏑ ⏑ | – ⏓ foedere cautumst	* 4.6	60.	62.	39.8	38.3	3.6
– ⏑ ⏑ | – | ⏓ corpore prae se	....	.2	....	.6	4.1	....
– ⏑ ⏑ – | – impositae sunt	1.9	.7	....	.6	1.6	....

* Including corrupt passages.

It is evident at a glance that the forms which occur most frequently in prose are rarest in poetry, and that the forms which are most frequent in poetry are relatively rare in prose. We

have here an inverse ratio. The types *commemorare, non uideatur*, which together form over 70 per cent of all the types occurring in prose, fall to less than 1.5 per cent in the *Arati Phaenomena*, and in Catullus, and to 6.8 and 4 per cent respectively in Lucretius and Horace's *Satires*. (The relatively high ratio in the two latter is due to the prosaic character of their subject-matter.) Conversely, the two favorite forms of poetry, *uelle uidebam, foedere cautumst*, are relatively rare in prose. The type *foedere cautumst*, which ranges from 62 per cent to 38 per cent in poetry, falls in prose to 4.6 per cent in Cicero and to 3.6 per cent in Quintilian. The type *uelle uidebam* (to which should be added *huius in illum*, as giving the same accentual and metrical value) ranges in poetry from 47.6 per cent to 32.3 per cent. In prose it falls to 3.6 per cent in Quintilian, and to 15.9 per cent in Cicero. The figure in Cicero is here larger than that in Quintilian, but a number of corrupt passages are included, and, as I shall show later, the rhythm in all the remaining cases is broken by a sense pause after the trochee, forming a marked caesura which is alien to the heroic clausula.

The normal accentuation of words of the type *uideatur* is in prose *uídeatur*. Words of this type cannot be adapted to verse without having the secondary accent upon the first syllable reduced. Hence such words are avoided by the non-didactic poets. The relative frequency of the type in Cicero is due to the fact that with its normal accentuation it does not suggest the heroic clausula. The words of this type used in Cicero's orations in the combination ⏑ | ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ are:[1] uideatur 2, uideamus, potuisse, potuissem, potuisset, potuissent, potuerunt, potuisti, numerare, numerasse 2, dubitavit 2, adierunt, fateatur, revirescent, reticere, recitavit, repetebant, violasti, tribuatur, veniebat, loqueretur, referatur, cumulasti, revocabunt, morientem, uolitarunt; alienum, alieno, legione, regionem, inimicum, decumano, popularis, populare 2, Casilinas, Leterensis.[2] The examples consist largely of verbs. In Quintilian, Books i–iii, there are the following:[3] loquerentur, referantur 2, tueatur, Theodectes, puerorum, monumentis, *περίεργον*. The examples from the *Arati*

[1] The numeral after a word indicates the frequency of its occurrence.

[2] For the citations see Zielinski *Das Clauselgesetz*, pp. 163–66.

[3] For citations see Gladisch *loc. cit.*

Phaenomena consist entirely of proper names: Capricornum, Capricorno, Aquilai.

The examples of the type *commemorare* in Cicero's *Orations* are:[1] commemorare, commemorabo, commemoravit, commemoratur, transigeretur, Siciliensi, conficiuntur, surripiatur, corripiendum, eripiatis, proposuerunt, discruciatur, composuisses, flagitiorum, restituatur, continuabunt, applicuisti, implicuisses, confiteantur, deficiebant, inferiores, consuluisses, splendidiora, polliceantur, suscipiendi, invenietis, aedificatam, coniiciebant, iudiciorum, suppeditatam, significarent. Those from Quintilian are:[2] accipiamus,[3] impediatur, composuerunt, conciliandus, instituatur, accipienda est, iudiciorum, utilitates, dissimulator. It will be noted that in Cicero and Quintilian most of the examples of this type, as in the case of the type *uideatur*, consist of verb forms.

The five examples from Cicero's translation of the *Arati Phaenomena* are: Taygeteque, Cassiepia, Cassiepiae, Anguitenentis, posteriores. There are here no verbal forms at all.

The ratios for words of the type *commemorare* are almost identical throughout with those for the type *non uideatur*. The type is nearly as frequent in prose, and is even rarer in poetry than *non uideatur*. This would be exceedingly difficult to explain, if, as Zielinski states,[4] the accent was *còmmemorâre*. In this case one would expect the usage to be frequent in poetry, as giving ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑. But the examples in poetry are exceedingly few, and there are no forms of compound verbs. This fact, and the frequency of the type in prose, would indicate that the accent was not *còmmemorâre*, as Zielinski thinks, but *commèmorâre*. The retention of the second syllable in compound verbs of this type in Old French indicates that this syllable retained a secondary accent in vulgar Latin. Words of the type *commémoro*, when increased by conjugation, tended, then, to retain a secondary accent on the syllable which in the shorter forms had held the primary accent. The accentuation *commèmorâre* explains the frequency of the form in prose, and its rarity in the hexameter of even the Ciceronian age, which was much less perfect in its technique than the Virgilian.

[1] For the citations see Zielinski *op. cit.*, pp. 163–66.
[2] For citations see Gladisch.
[3] Not given by Gladisch.
[4] *Das Clauselgesetz* 235.

If we interpret the heroic clausula as including only those combinations of the dactyl and spondee which have the form ⏑̆ – ⏑̆ – ×, that is to say, those combinations which have no accent upon either of the short syllables of the dactyl, e.g., *moenia Romae, adire labores, primus ab oris,* and as excluding those forms which have an accent upon the first short syllable of the dactyl, the discrepancy between Quintilian and Cicero and between Cicero's theory and practice is easily explained away. When Cicero says (*Orat.* 217), "ne iambus quidem . . . . aut . . . . *trochaeus,* aut etiam dactylus . . . . parum uolubiliter pervenit ad extremum, si est extremus choreus aut spondeus," it is not unlikely that he had in mind such types as *compòsuísse, nòn uìdeătur,* which, by reason of the accent, would not suggest the cadence of the hexameter. That he did have in mind the avoidance of the recognized type of the heroic clausula is indicated by the qualification expressed in *etiam,* "or *even* the dactyl." One might have expected, in his reference to the combination of dactyl and spondee, some comment upon the avoidance in prose of the heroic clausula, but the convenient footnote had not yet been invented, and his sentence was already overloaded with parentheses. Quintilian, on the other hand, has the end of the hexameter definitely in mind in ix. 4. 102, *quia finem versus damnamus in fine orationis,* and in ix. 4. 75, *Peius cludit finis hexametri.* He here gives as an example a clausula from a letter of Brutus, *placuisse Catoni* = ⏑̆ – | ⏑̆ – –, which gives the accentual as well as the metrical cadence of the hexameter. Another passage, ix. 4. 101, throws some light upon the question. Quintilian is here speaking of the double spondee: "duo spondei non fere iungi patiuntur, quae in versu quoque notabilis clausula est, nisi cum fieri potest ex tribus quasi membris: cur . . . . *comparant contra nos?* una syllaba, duabus, una." In other words, two spondees may be used when the word division does not suggest poetry. This is precisely what the examples show for the use or avoidance in prose of the various combinations of dactyl and spondee.

Having limited the heroic clausula to the prevailing usage of poetry, viz., ⏑̆ – | ⏑̆ – ×, ⏑̆ – ⏑̆ – | ⏑̆ – ⏑̆ (and ⏑̆ – | ⏑̆ – | ⏑̆ – ⏑̆), let us now consider the clausulae in Cicero and Quintilian which are of these types.

Examples of ⏑ ⏑ | ⏑ ⏑:

1. *Rosc. Com.* 37. Fannium . . . . testimonium contra se dicere | cogo.

2. *Agr.* ii. 58. Atque etiam est alia superiore capite, quo omnia ueneunt, quaestuosa exceptio, quae teget eos agros de quibus *foedere* | cautumst.

3. *Phil.* viii. Senatus | haec uerbis, *Opimius* | armis.

4. *Phil.* xi. Summa in filio spes, summa ingenii indoles, summaque uirtus.

5. *Phil.* xiii. Est etiam ibi Decius ab illis, ut opinor, muribus, itaque Caesaris munera | rosit.

6. Quint. *Inst. Orat.* i. 6. 3. Consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone ut nummo cui *publica*| forma est.

Of these, (4) is corrupt and may therefore be dismissed. The enclitic *que* is practically never added to trochaic adjectives ending in a vowel unless the next word begins with a vowel and there is elision.[1] The passage should be emended by omitting *que*. All the other examples have a sense pause between the dactyl and the spondee.[2] The pause after *Opimius* (3) was recognized by Zielinski, and is made necessary by the balance between *senatus* . . . . *Opimius* and *verbis* . . . . *armis*. In (1) *dicere* phrases more closely with *testimonium contra se* than with *cogo*, and there is a phrase pause. In (2) a pause is necessary to bring out the emphasis upon *foedere*. A pause is also necessary after *munera* (5) to bring out the force of the pun; and in (6), the example from Quintilian, to bring out the emphasis upon *publica*. In hexameter verse there is ordinarily no pause after the dactyl in the fifth foot, and a pause in that position in prose serves to break up the heroic rhythm.

Turning now to ⏑ ⏑ | ⏑ ⏑ ×, if we omit *Quinct.* 28, *esse uidetur*, *Cat.* i. 9, *quam rem publicam habemus*, *Pis.* 95, *poena remansit*, where the text is uncertain, the examples in Cicero and Quintilian are as follows:

1. *Rosc.* 30. Quid ab his tot maleficiis sceleris abesse | uidetur?

2. *Div.* 8. Tamen nihil aeque in re publica atque illam ueterem iudiciorum uim gravitatemque | requirit.

3. *Act.* i. 19. Indignum iis, qui altius perspiciebant et hanc gratulationem ad iudicium corrumpendum spectare | uidebant.

[1] This is discussed in a paper on the "Treatment of Dactylic Words in the Rhythmic Prose of Cicero," *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.*, Vol. XLII.

[2] This is discussed in the paper mentioned in note 1.

4. *Verr.* iii. 24. Satisne uobis magnam pecuniam Venerius homo. . . . . Veneris nomine quaesisse | uidetur?

5. *Verr.* iii. 199. Quid aratorem ipsum arationis nomine muneris in rem publicam fungi ac sustinere | uelitis?

6. *Verr.* v. 59. Praeclara illa non populo Romano reddita | biremis, sed praetori donata | cybaea.

7. *Cluent.* 202. Nemo huic tam iniquus . . . . fuit, cuius non animum expletum esse | putemus.

8. *Flacc.* 57. Tamen quantos fluctus excitari in contione | uidetis!

9. *Balb.* 22. Tum, utrum fundi facti sint annon quaerendum esse | uidetur.

10. *Planc.* 101. Hos pro me lugere, hos gemere, hos decertare pro meo capite vel uitae periculo uelle | uidebam.

11. *Rab. Post.* 39. An, cum credebat inductus usuris, id agebat, ut haberet quam plurimum; postea quam exegit, quod crediderat, ut *existimaretur* egere.

12. Quintilian i. 4. 25. Et ex iis qui post natos eveniunt, unde "Vopiscus."

In the hexameter, as I have already said, the last two feet ordinarily belong to the same word group, and there is no caesura. In all of the examples in the above list, a pause before the final bacchius of longer duration than is usual in the hexameter is demanded by the sense. In each case (except No. 11, where *existimaretur* is strongly emphatic) the word which forms the trochee is grouped more closely with the word or words which precede it than with the bacchic word which follows. This caesura, which I have marked in the examples,[1] serves to break the flow of the clausula as in the previous class, and the combination in question would probably not have been recognized as a heroic clausula in actual delivery. In the passage from Quintilian there is an ellipsis (unde est illud verbum "Vopiscus"), and a pause is again necessary to the sense.

To summarize, there is no real discrepancy between the statements of Cicero and Quintilian; the prevailing types in prose, *compòsuísses* and *nòn uìdeátur*, were not regarded as types of the heroic clausula, on account of the accent upon the first short syllable of the dactyl; and, in the rare cases where the heroic clausula $\acute{} \breve{} \breve{} \acute{} \breve{}$ is used in prose, the rhythm is usually broken by a caesural pause after the first short of the dactyl, or by a diaeresis pause after the second short

[1] See note 1, p. 416.

syllable, whereas the heroic clausula has in verse no such pause. In prose rhythms accent and the place of the caesura play even a larger part than mere quantity,[1] and, where the accent fails to suggest verse, or a caesura is introduced which is foreign to the hexameter, meter alone is not sufficient to produce the effect of the heroic clausula.[2]

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[1] See Draheim *Wochenschrift für klass. Philologie*, 1910, nos. 47, 49.

[2] In the discussion of clausulae of the type $- \smile \smile - \asymp$ I have purposely refrained from using the terminology of the writers on rhythmic prose, for the reason that they do not agree. Zielinski calls it the cadence of P 3, and regards it as a pathological form of the cadence of the ditrochaic rhythm $- \asymp - | - \smile \smile - \asymp$. Gladisch, on the other hand, regards it as a form of 1 ($- \smile \smile - | - \asymp$), with a dactyl substituted for a cretic. Lack of space will not permit me to discuss the question of classification in the present article. I hope to revert to it at another time.

ATHENIAN INTERPOLATIONS IN HOMER

PART I. INTERNAL EVIDENCE

By John A. Scott

Diogenes Laertius *Solon* 57, *μᾶλλον οὖν Σόλων Ὅμηρον ἐφώτισεν ἢ Πεισίστρατος, ὥς φησι Διευχίδας ἐν πέμπτῳ Μεγαρικῶν. ἦν δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ἔπη ταυτί· κτλ.* Ritschl, *Opuscula* I, 54, detected the omission of an explanatory phrase after the word Peisistratus and added: "Offenbar war diess nichts Anderes, als die mehrbezeugte Interpolation unächter Verse zu Gunsten der Athener, und Diogenes schrieb ungefähr so: *Πεισίστρατος, ὅσπερ συλλέξας τὰ Ὁμήρου ἐνεποίησέ τινα εἰς τὴν Ἀθηναίων χάριν, ὥς φησι Διευχίδας κτλ.*" Rothe accepts the theory of interpolation in the interest of Athenian vanity; *Ilias als Dichtung*, p. 11:

> Die Beeinflussung, die der Text im Attischen Interesse erfahren hat—ich rechne dahin nicht bloss die bekannten Verse *Il.* ii. 558 und *Od.* xi. 631, sondern auch die Hervorhebung des attischen Führers Menestheus, und ganz besonders die Verherrlichung der Stadtgöttin Athene in der *Ilias*, mehr noch in der *Odyssee;* ja die Verse *Od.* vii. 79–81 erwähnen hier in höchst auffälliger Weise ihr Heiligtum auf der Akropolis. Vielleicht geht auch die Einführung des Peisistratus, des Nestorsohnes, im 3. u. 4. Buche der *Odyssee* erst auf attische Rezension zurück.

The theory of Athenian interpolations is not supported by any conclusive historical authority, but rests chiefly on the evidence furnished by the poems themselves. Dieuchidas of Megara, a comparatively late writer, is the authority quoted by Diogenes Laertius for the statement that verses were added to Homer in the interest of the Athenians, and, even in his case, it seems to have been simply the conjecture of a political enemy. Wilamowitz accepts to the full the theory, yet admits that it is only a conjecture; *H.U.* 243: "Was Dieuchidas gab, die behauptung der attischen interpolation, war nichts anderes als seine vermutung. Mag sie gut oder schlecht sein, conjectur ist es, aufgebaut auf demselben texte der Boiotia, den Herodot las und den wir lesen. Wir sind vollkommen in der lage die richtigkeit seiner conjectur zu prüfen." It is the purpose

of this paper to test the plausibility of Athenian interpolation by the study of internal evidence, reserving the external evidence for later investigation.

The chief grounds for the assumption of such interpolations would, I presume, be (1) the assignment to Athens of a more prominent place than her historical position in the Mycenaean Age would warrant; (2) appeals in such passages to Athenian vanity similar to those found in Athenian literature; (3) the conformation of minute points of legend and mythology to Attic tradition.

Athens, we know, was one of the centers of Mycenaean culture; Tsountas and Manatt, *Mycenaean Age*, p. 364, give a list of the four largest Mycenaean citadels, giving the one on the Acropolis as second only to Mycenae, and on p. 386: "But the most important result of recent excavations is that they enlarge our view of the wide diffusion in Attica of Mycenaean culture at its meridian prime." Drerup in his *Homer* repeatedly refers to the importance of Athens in the Mycenaean Age, naming it on p. 54 "one of the most important Mycenaean centers." Hence any poem dealing in a large way with a general Greek expedition of this period must assign a part, presumably a prominent part, to Athens.

What part does Athens play in Homer?

This will be treated under four heads: Athenian heroes in Homer, Ajax and the Athenians, direct references to Athens, vague references.

1. In A the poet introduces Achilles, Agamemnon, Ajax, Idomeneus, Menelaus, Nestor, Odysseus, and Patroclus, while Diomede is seen early in B. It is not until the Catalogue that an Athenian appears; having described the forces from Boeotia and after naming intervening or adjoining regions, the poet passes to Athens, then to Salamis, and on to Argos and Tiryns. Certainly Athens could not have been omitted in this general geographical description. Athens is represented by a single leader, a leader in whom the Athenians in their own writings took little pride, Menestheus.

B 552:

τῶν αὖθ' ἡγεμόνευ' υἱὸς Πετεῶο Μενεσθεύς.
τῷ δ' οὔ πώ τις ὁμοῖος ἐπιχθόνιος γένετ' ἀνὴρ
κοσμῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας·
Νέστωρ οἷος ἔριζεν· ὁ γὰρ προγενέστερος ἦεν.
τῷ δ' ἅμα πεντήκοντα μέλαιναι νῆες ἕποντο.

Menestheus does not appear again until the Epipolesis, where he is standing inactive and is, with Odysseus, severely chided by Agamemnon.

Δ 338:

> ὦ υἱὲ Πετεῶο, διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος
> καὶ σὺ κακοῖσι δόλοισι κεκασμένε, κερδαλεόφρον,
> τίπτε καταπτώσσοντες ἀφέστατε, μίμνετε δ' ἄλλους;

to which Odysseus replies, but Menestheus is mute.

His next appearance is in M 331, where, terrified by the approach of the Lycian leaders, he sends for a helper, Ajax, who comes and rescues him. It seems odd that the Athenians, who laid claim to the Island of Salamis because of their relations with Ajax, should have interpolated these verses in which their own hero or champion was a coward rescued by the leader of the very island over which they asserted leadership. Why did they not reverse it, and have Ajax in distress rescued by Menestheus? They could then fortify their claim by an epic obligation. If this scene was added for no other motive than to gratify Athenian vanity, the Athenians were easily satisfied!

A second Athenian appears in N 195, Stichius, who, with Menestheus, carried the slain Amphimachus to the line of the Achaeans. N 685 pictures the failure of the Greeks, especially the Athenians, to keep Hector from the ships.

N 687:

> οὐδὲ δύναντο
> ὦσαι ἀπὸ σφείων φλογὶ εἴκελον Ἕκτορα δῖον,
> οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίων προλελεγμένοι· ἐν δ' ἄρα τοῖσιν
> ἦρχ' υἱὸς Πετεῶο Μενεσθεύς, οἱ δ' ἅμ' ἕποντο
> Φείδας τε Στιχίος τε Βίας τ' ἐύς·

In O 329 ff. Menestheus fails utterly as a warrior, being unable to save Stichius, an Athenian, from Hector, and Iasus, also an Athenian, from Aeneas. Menestheus is not referred to again in Homer, not even appearing at the games in honor of Patroclus.

These three generals, Stichius, Iasus, and Menestheus, are the representatives of Athens in the *Iliad;* the first two are introduced only to be slain, and have no voice nor part in the poem. Menestheus is never consulted, is addressed but once, and then with a severe

rebuke; he speaks but once, and then as a coward; sees his companions fall at his side, helpless to save them; does no act of valor, however slight; and is saved only by the help of another. Does this seem too prominent a part for the leader from one of "the chief centers of Mycenaean culture"?

Athenian prominence is not only attested by archaeological evidence but also by independent literary tradition. The *Ilii Persis* is supposed to have been the work of Arctinus of Miletus, whose floruit is placed at about 650 B.C. Of this poem Kinkel gives four verses, two of which are:

Frag. 3:

> Θησείδησι δὲ δῶρα πόρε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
> ἠδὲ Μενεσθῆι μεγαλήτορι τομέϊ λαῶν.

Evidently the Athenians played a more important part in this poem than in the *Iliad*. Since the discovery of certain papyrus fragments of Dictys of Crete there is no longer any doubt that the Latin version depends on a Greek original. This Dictys' version shows such an essential difference from the tradition in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that Mr. T. W. Allen in the *Journ. of Phil.* 62, 207 ff., has presented the conclusion that we have in Dictys a chronicle of the Trojan affairs uninfluenced by Homer. Cf. p. 225: "Dictys follows in his Cycle a real tradition, a tradition coinciding with the Epic Cycle, but non-Homeric for the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In other words, the disappearance of the heroic chronicle was not complete: it remains to us in Dictys and the Cycle." If this theory be true, we have in Dictys a tradition far older than Solon or Peisistratus, and in any case we have here an independent version. Does Menestheus have any part in this independent version? Shortly after the events which vaguely correspond with the beginning of the *Iliad*, the Trojans rush out on the plain; Dictys ii. 36: "Quod ubi nostri animadvertere, in campum progressi, more militiae aciem ordinant, magistro ac praeceptore componendi Mnestheo Atheniensi." Here Menestheus is given a prominence unknown in Homer, unknown yet hinted, since this tradition is doubtless the explanation of B 552 f.:

> τῷ δ' οὔ πώ τις ὁμοῖος ἐπιχθόνιος γένετ' ἀνὴρ
> κοσμῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας·

Similar survivals from earlier tradition are to be found in the application of *ἐυμμελίης* to Priam, *ποδώκης* to Achilles, *οὖρος Ἀχαιῶν* to Nestor; since no one of these epithets finds its explanation in the action of the *Iliad*. The part played by Menestheus in Arctinus and Dictys makes it impossible that the scant and slighting mention of him in the *Iliad* had its origin in Athenian vanity.

2. Ajax and the Athenians:

B 557:

> Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας
> στῆσε δ' ἄγων, ἵν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες.

The second verse is referred to as genuine by Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 15; Dieuchidas of Megara claimed it was a forgery inserted to strengthen or decide the claims of the Athenians; Zenodotus and Aristarchus appear to have passed in silence the charge of Athenian interpolation, even if they did not admit the verse into their text.

The verse is apparently inconsistent with other descriptions in the *Iliad*, since, Λ 5, Ajax drew up his ships at the end of the camp and not near the Athenians. Mr. T. W. Allen has shown, *J.H.S.* III, 293, that the arrangement of the peoples in the Catalogue has nothing whatever to do with the manner in which the ships were drawn up on the shore; "the Catalogue, being geographical, entirely ignores the military element."

Homer consistently keeps Ajax near the Athenians. The hard-pressed Menestheus and his men are rescued by Ajax, M 339 ff. In the fight between Hector and Ajax, N 185 ff., Amphimachus is slain, and his body is rescued and carried to the line of the Achaeans by two Athenians, Stichius and Menestheus. The same Athenians, N 685 ff., try in vain to restrain Hector in his attack on Ajax. In the great struggle between Ajax and Hector, O 334 ff., Stichius and Iasus, the two Athenian companions of Menestheus, are slain. Once only is Menestheus apparently away from Ajax, and that is in the Epipolesis, where Agamemnon upbraids him and Odysseus; but in verse 489 Antiphus hurls at Ajax, misses him, and hits a companion of Odysseus; now Menestheus and Odysseus entered the fight together, hence Ajax even here was fighting near the Athenians. Such a hidden proof of the close relations existing between Ajax and the Athenians is not due to an interpolator but to the original poet. The

Athenians in the *Iliad* never appear apart from Ajax, so the verse supposed to have been interpolated in the interest of Athens adds nothing to the argument. This harmony is not that of an addition, but the hidden harmony of the whole. The poet who wrote the verse στῆσε δ' ἄγων, ἵν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες had the same idea when he pictured the Epipolesis, the Teichomachia, and the fighting between Hector and Ajax at the ships.

3. Athens itself is mentioned in but one passage in the *Iliad:*

B 546:

> αἳ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνας εἶχον, ἐυκτίμενον πτολίεθρον,
> δῆμον Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος, ὃν ποτ' Ἀθήνη
> θρέψε Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος ἄρουρα,
> κὰδ δ' ἐν Ἀθήνῃς εἷσεν, ἑῷ ἐνὶ πίονι νηῷ·
> ἔνθα δέ μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἀρνειοῖς ἱλάονται
> κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν;

to which Wilamowitz *H.U.* 247:

> Athen heisst δῆμος Ἐρεχθῆος und es wird die heilige sage von Erectheus erzeugung und erziehung angedeutet und die grossen feste und opfer zu ehren desselben erwähnt. Einen solchen cult, überhaupt heroencult, kennt Homer nicht. Jährliche feste vollends sind dem epos fremd und sind etwas relativ junges. Die uralten heiligen göttertage sind monatstage, das jahr ist jünger als der monat.

We are not concerned in Homer with "die uralten," but with the description of a civilization which marks the advances of thousands of years; the knowledge of the month may precede that of the year, yet the latter may have been celebrated in festivals centuries before the composition of the *Iliad.* The common Homeric word for year, ἐνιαυτός, by virtue of its derivation carries its own proof of annual festivals; while the word ἔτος is of Indo-European origin.

The great Babylonian festival was annual. Cf. Sayce *The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, p. 473: "In the old days of Gudea of Lagas, *circa* 2500 B.C., the year commenced with the festival of the goddess Bau, in the middle of October." This was the great festival of the Babylonians. The chief festivals of the Hebrews were also annual and are of great antiquity; Benzinger *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, p. 1510: "The foundation of the Passover is earlier than the Exodus; even before Moses the Hebraic pastoral tribes were accustomed to celebrate a spring festival with offerings

from their herds. The ancient Arabians observed a similar festival in the spring." Wellhausen *Proleg. Hist. Israel*, p. 89: "It is out of the simplest, most natural, and most wide-spread offerings, those of the first-fruits of the flock, herd, and field, the occasions for which recur regularly with the seasons of the year, that the annual festivals took their rise." It is just this simple annual festival in honor of a patron or founder of agriculture which is described in Homer, a festival originating in the early pastoral days of Attica; Peisistratus in later ages merely glorified and dignified an existing institution. Nothing in the Homeric description hints at more than a comparatively simple celebration.

There is no further mention of Athens in the *Iliad*.

Athens is mentioned in the *Odyssey* as follows:

γ 278:

ἀλλ' ὅτε Σούνιον ἱρὸν ἀφικόμεθ', ἄκρον Ἀθηνέων.

Sunium must have been a prominent mark to all sailors of the Aegean, so that it could hardly fail in a description of a voyage along the eastern shores of Greece.

γ 308:

ἦλυθε δῖος Ὀρέστης
ἂψ ἀπ' Ἀθηνάων.

This is at variance with Attic tradition, since in it Phocis is the seat of Orestes' youthful exile. If Athenian pride inserted Athens here, why did that same pride retain Phocis in tragedy? If Athens ever controlled Homeric tradition, why was the word Athens not changed in conformity with Attic tradition? The answer seems to me simple: the word was in Homer in spite of Athenian tradition, and no man in Athens had power to change it.

η 80:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσασ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη
πόντον ἐπ' ἀτρύγετον, λίπε δὲ Σχερίην ἐρατεινήν,
ἷκετο δ' ἐς Μαραθῶνα καὶ εὐρυάγυιαν Ἀθήνην,
δῦνε δ' Ἐρεχθῆος πυκινὸν δόμον;

to which Seeck *Quellen der Od.*, p. 335:

Dass die Göttin von Scheria, also aus dem äussersten Westen kommend, zuerst an die Ostküste von Attika gelangt, ehe sie ihr Haus auf der Akropolis aufsucht, ist höchst widersinnig. Wenn der Dichter trotzdem hier Marathon nennt, so kann es nur aus einem persönlichen Grunde geschehen sein; *vermutlich war es seine Heimat.* [The italics are his.]

That is to say, the poem contains a serious geographical blunder in regard to Attica; hence the passage must have been written by an inhabitant of Attica to please his own fellow-citizens. This very misstatement shows that it was composed by a poet with only a vague idea of the relative position of Athens and Marathon for an audience with the same vague ideas, hence it cannot have originated in Attica. This vagueness in geographical matters is of a piece with the statement of Nestor, *Od.* γ 321, that birds of passage could not cross the Mediterranean in a single year, or the belief of Menelaus, δ 355, that the island of Pharos is a long day's voyage from the mouth of the Nile.

λ 323: In the "Catalogue of Women" Odysseus tells that he saw Ariadne whom Artemis slew while going from Crete to Athens. There are no other verses which contain a direct mention of Athens. Such vague allusions as the mention of Theseus, A 265, or as Γονόεσσα for Δονόεσσα, B 573, or an Aethra the daughter of Pittheus as the attendant of Helen, Γ 144, or a Pandion as bearer of the bow for Teucer, M 372, or the mention of Hebe as the child of Zeus and Hera, λ 604, or an allusion to Theseus and Peirithous, λ 631, seem hardly qualified to satisfy the vanity of such people as the Athenians, especially if they had so complete a control of the poems that they could change or expand them.

The second count in the indictment given above is that Peisistratus the son of Nestor was added to the *Odyssey* in order to flatter the tyrant; this presupposes complete control of the poems, so that changes could be made at will.

Peisistratus is one of the least prominent actors in the *Odyssey;* he was created to accompany Telemachus to Sparta, and when that is done he is completely ignored. After he and Telemachus part, ο 215, he is forgotten; no mention is made of his reception by his father, and there is no account of his version of the trip to Sparta. Far more striking is the fact that when Telemachus tells his mother of the trip to Pylos, and of that from Pylos to Sparta, ρ 107 ff., he never mentions Peisistratus nor refers to him in any way; clear proof that he was a person in whom the poet and hearer had but a secondary interest. Such a character is the creation of the original poet, not of a flatterer. How ready the critics are to grasp at every

name in Homer which reappears as the name of some character in Attic history or tradition! Suppose Eumelus of Corinth had been from Athens; then nothing would be easier than to assume that Eumelus and his fine steeds were added to the *Iliad* in order to flatter that city.

The assumption that Athena owes her prominence in Homer to Athenian influence is far bolder and assumes that the poems themselves were written in the interest of Athens, since the part taken by that goddess, even if not the leading part, is so vital and fundamental that we can scarcely conceive of an *Iliad* or *Odyssey* in which she is not prominent.[1] Athena took no especial interest in Menestheus, and the epithets Ἀλαλκομενηΐς, τριτογένεια show she was no local goddess; while the recurring phrase Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον has all the marks of an old religious formula. The Boeotian poet Hesiod makes Athena, not the subordinate of Zeus, but his equal in might and in wisdom, *Theog.* 896. Now Professor Hempl in *Harper's Magazine*, January, 1911, and Miss Stawell in *Burlington Magazine*, April, 1911, see in the Phaistos Disk a song in honor of Athena, thus making her one of the great, if not the greatest, early Greek divinities. There is no reason for assuming that Athena is more prominent in Homer than in the life and religion of the peoples he describes. Whoever wrote Athena into the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* wrote the poems; her part does not show any traces of a later hand.

An examination of all references to Athens and the Athenians gives no warrant for the assumption of interested interpolations.

These are negative proofs; the positive are many. A few only will be given: Oedipus died at Thebes, Ψ 679, quite contrary to Attic tradition; Tydeus was buried at Thebes, Ξ 114, while the Athenians prided themselves on his burial at Eleusis; Philomela is the daughter of Pandareus, τ 518, not of the Athenian Pandion; B 107 shows no traces of the strife between Atreus and Thyestes; Π 718, Hecuba is daughter of Dymas, in Attic tradition of Cisseus; H 392 and N 626 seem to show that Homer knew nothing of the relations

[1] Even in the *Iliad*, Athena is subordinate to both Zeus and Hera, whose commands she frequently follows. In the *Iliad* Zeus speaks 39, Hera 33, Athena 20 times.—Elderkin *Aspects of the Speech in Later Greek Epic*, p. 30.

existing between Theseus and Helen before her marriage with Menelaus; γ 307, Orestes returns to his home from Athens, not from Phocis; I 145 gives names for the daughters of Agamemnon different from the names given by the Athenians. How easily an Athenian could have substituted Iphigeneia for the form Iphianassa! Bellerophon has no help from Pegasus, and Cassandra is no prophetess. The hero of the *Odyssey* reappears as the villain; while the kindly, gentle host and friend, Menelaus, becomes almost inhuman. See on this subject Lang *The World of Homer* 154 ff.

Is it reasonable to suppose that the Athenians had such control of these poems as to insert Peisistratus and to glorify Athena, yet never took the pains to reshape these traditions, so easily changed?

To see how an Athenian who really had a free hand dealt with the Homeric tradition we must turn to Euripides, who in *Iph. in Aul.* 247 substitutes another leader for Menestheus and in spite of the fifty ships of the Catalogue increases the Athenian contingent to sixty, while Argos is made inferior by changing her forces from eighty ships to fifty.

How faint the praise of Athens in Homer! Yet even this faint praise is turned into a paean in the presence of the men of Syracuse, Herodotus vii. 161, and engraved on a monument near the Strymon, Plutarch *Cimon* vii. This was for foreigners. How little the praise in Homer satisfied the Athenians when among themselves is shown by the fact that Euripides changed both the numbers and the leader, and also by the significant boast of Pericles, Thuc. ii. 41. 4, that Athens needs no Homer to sing her praises. Evidently Pericles failed to recognize *τινα εἰς τὴν Ἀθηναίων χάριν.*

CONCLUSION

The prominence of Mycenaean Athens, the few and colorless references in Homer to Athens or the Athenians, and the differences between Homeric and Attic tradition warrant the belief that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were never under the control of the Athenians, and hence there are no interpolations in the interest of Athens.

The vast literature on this subject is given by Mr. A. Shewan in his *Lay of Dolon*, pp. 131 ff.; the discussion of which properly belongs to a study of the external evidence of Athenian influence and will be a part of the second paper.

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THE OMEN OF SNEEZING

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Of the numerous folk-customs and beliefs traceable from ancient to modern times few are more persistent or more widely diffused than those connected with sneezing. Among several short discussions[1] of the ominous sigificance of this act, there is, so far as I am aware, none that is based upon any very extensive collection of the instances in Greek and Roman literature. In this article I shall attempt to classify such data as I have been able to collect and to offer some suggestions as to their interpretation, frankly admitting at the outset that, in such a question as this, which extends through the folk-lore of many nations, it is well-nigh impossible to frame any certain theory of the ultimate origin of the beliefs under discussion, yet hoping that the explanations to be here offered may cast some light upon the attitude of the Greeks and Romans toward these rather interesting customs.

The belief that sneezing possesses an ominous significance appears very early in literature. In the *Odyssey*,[2] Penelope, at the end of a speech to Eumaeus, declares:

> "εἰ δ' Ὀδυσεὺς ἔλθοι καὶ ἵκοιτ' ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
> αἶψά κε σὺν ᾧ παιδὶ βίας ἀποτίσεται ἀνδρῶν."
> ὣς φάτο. Τηλέμαχος δὲ μέγ' ἔπταρεν, ἀμφὶ δὲ δῶμα
> σμερδαλέον κονάβησε· γέλασσε δὲ Πηνελόπεια,
> αἶψα δ' ἄρ' Εὔμαιον ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
> "ἔρχεό μοι, τὸν ξεῖνον ἐναντίον ὧδε κάλεσσον.
> οὐχ ὁράᾳς, ὅ μοι υἱὸς ἐπέπταρε πᾶσιν ἔπεσσιν;
> τῷ κε καὶ οὐκ ἀτελὴς θάνατος μνηστῆρσι γένοιτο
> πᾶσι μάλ', οὐδέ κέ τις θάνατον καὶ κῆρας ἀλύξοι."

Among the Greeks of the classical period and even long after the spread of Christianity this belief in ominous sneezes remained in force. Protests against it by Greeks are comparatively few. The

[1] Especially Bouché-Leclercq *Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité* I, 160 ff., and Baehrens on Catullus 45. 8–9. M. Schookius *De Sternutatione* (Amsterdam, 1664) has not been accessible to me.

[2] xvii. 539 ff.

Roman writer Frontinus[1] tells us that Timotheus, the Athenian commander against Corcyra in 373, when he found that his pilot, alarmed by a sneeze of one of his rowers, had sounded a retreat, exclaimed, *miraris . . . . ex tot milibus unum perfrixisse?* A fragment of the comic poet Philemon[2] says:

> ὅταν δὲ παρατηροῦντ' ἴδω τίς ἔπταρεν
> ἢ τίς ἐλάλησεν, ἢ τίς ἐστιν ὁ προϊὼν
> σκοποῦντα, πωλῶ τοῦτον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀγορᾷ.[3]
> αὐτῷ βαδίζει καὶ λαλεῖ καὶ πτάρνυται.
> ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, οὐχὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει.
> τὰ πράγματ' ὡς πέφυκεν οὕτω γίγνεται.

And Plutarch, in his treatise *De Genio Socratis*,[4] after one of his speakers has related a theory (to which I shall later recur) that the δαιμόνιον of Socrates was only a sneeze, represents that speaker as feeling wonder that Socrates should have confused a divine spirit and sneezing, or that so reasonable and truth-seeking a man should have allowed his conduct to be influenced by anything so fortuitous.[5] But the general attitude of the Greeks was apparently more credulous, and even Aristotle, with the utmost gravity, describes and tries to explain the omen of sneezing. The hold which the custom had among the Romans is somewhat hard to estimate. Catullus,[6] Propertius,[7] and Ovid,[8] in passages in lighter vein and perhaps in imitation of Greek models,[9] refer to it but not in a way that necessarily implies belief upon their own part. That Pliny the Elder in several places[10] catalogues sneezing among omens, of which he is an assiduous collector, indicates comparatively little for the belief of the educated, except in one passage,[11] where, by the use of the first person plural, he includes himself or his social class in the number of those who salute one who sneezes. But Cicero in his treatise *De Divinatione*[12] shows clearly that belief in sneezing as an omen was not only something which he and his friends[13] did not hold, but also a thing which it

[1] *Strateg.* i. 12. 11. [2] 100 Kock.
[3] I.e., "I think him the equal of a mere slave." [4] 581B.
[5] For conflicting views as to the seriousness of sneezes cf. Plut. *op. cit.* 582B, 589F.
[6] 45. 8–9, 17–18. [7] ii. 3. 24. [8] *Heroides* 18. 151.
[9] Cf. Theocr. 7. 96 and perhaps 18. 16.
[10] ii. 24; vii. 42; xxviii. 23, 26. [11] xxviii. 23. [12] ii. 84.
[13] Except the Stoic ones (?).

would be preposterous to expect them to adopt. For the attitude of the common people, on the other hand, we have the testimony of Petronius[1] and Apuleius,[2] as well as the cases collected by Pliny, and we may assume that the real belief in sneezing as an actual omen lived and throve, at any rate among the less sophisticated, all through the classical period. In the postclassical period it is also evident, and, not unnaturally, becomes the object of ecclesiastical censure. Thus St. Basil[3] mentions sneezing along with attention to ominous words, stumbling, etc. A sermon attributed to St. Ambrose[4] predicts the damnation of those who believe in phylacteries, written charms, sneezings, the song of birds, divinations, astrologers, or any other evil arts whatever. St. Augustine censures a form of the belief in sneezing.[5] Much later, in 743, at a church council at Lestines in Belgium, the practice was condemned.[6] A passage of doubtful authenticity in a letter of Alcuin[7] advises his correspondent, an unknown bishop, to protect his flock from auguries, the songs of birds, sneezings, and many things of that sort. But superstition here, as on many other occasions, maintained itself against ecclesiastical censure and the ridicule of reason, and beliefs in the prophetic or ominous value of sneezing are at the present time widely diffused and very varied. I shall here, however, touch upon such only of these present-day beliefs as seem to have some bearing upon the explanation of Greek and Roman practice.

An analysis of the material at hand appears to show that the significance and interpretation of sneezing depended chiefly upon one or more of the following factors: the position of the sneezer, especially with reference to the person who receives the sneezing as an omen; the time of the sneeze; and, in certain cases, the physical condition of the sneezer.

The value attached to the position of the sneezer at the moment of the act, on which little stress is laid in modern practice, is without doubt due to the significance attributed by the ancients to left and

[1] 98. 4–5.
[2] *Metam.* ix. 25.
[3] *ad Is.* 12, quoted by Moser on Cic. *De Div.* ii. 84.
[4] Appendix, *Sermo* 24. 6 (Migne *Patrol. Lat.* XVII, 653).
[5] *De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20.
[6] Smith *Dict. Christ. Antiqq.* 1545*b*.
[7] *Ep.* 179 (Migne *Patrol. Lat.* C, 450).

right in the observation of many other kinds of omens, such as thunderbolts, flights of birds, etc. The particular force of right and left varied with the omen itself, with the nationality of the observer, and according as he employed the popular or the official augural prescriptions.[1] In the greater number of cases of ominous sneezing known to us the position is not indicated, and we may believe that it was often disregarded. The difficulty of applying this principle when a person sneezed in the midst of a crowd surrounding him on all sides has been remarked by Bouché-Leclercq,[2] who also shows[3] that position in space can have no meaning when the sneeze is to be considered an omen for the sneezer himself. In certain cases, however, where some omen was especially looked for and where the direction allowed of no ambiguity, attention was paid to the quarter from which the sneeze came. Cases of sneezing on the right appear, in Greek usage at least, to have been lucky,[4] and to this direction Plutarch[5] adds as favorable signs sneezes from in front or from behind, while his disputant represents Socrates as considering sneezes from the left as unfavorable or deterrent.[6] The most famous passage bearing upon this question is found in Catullus,[7] and upon the famous *crux* there presented many scholars have come to grief. I must regretfully admit that for the textual and exegetical difficulties of the passage I have found no satisfactory solution, but one or two inferences which may be safely drawn from the text in its present uncertain state I shall later notice. With this notion of position, though by a rather different principle, may be classified a curious poem in the *Palatine Anthology:*[8]

Ἔπταρον ἄγχι τάφοιο, καὶ ἤθελον αὐτόθ' ἀκοῦσαι
οἷάπερ ὠϊσάμην, μοῖραν ἐμῆς ἀλόχου·
ἔπταρον εἰς ἀνέμους· ἄλοχον δέ μοι οὔ τι κιχάνει
λυγρὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, οὐ νόσος, οὐ θάνατος.[9]

[1] For a very brief summary of some of these customs see A. P. Wagener *Popular Associations of Right and Left in Roman Literature* (*Notes from the Classical Seminaries, Johns Hopkins University* [1910], 31–34).

[2] *Op. cit.* i. 162. [3] *Ibid.*

[4] Plut. *De Gen. Socr.* 581B; *Themist.* 119A.

[5] *De Gen. Socr., loc. cit.* [6] Cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 48. [7] 45. 8–9, 17–18. [8] xi. 375.

[9] In the island of Cos, at the present day, sneezing in the presence of a dead body portends the death of the sneezer and the freedom of the corpse from decay. W. R. Paton in *Folk-Lore* XVIII (1907), 331.

The temporal significance of sneezing appears especially at the beginnings of enterprises, as is clearly shown by Aristotle,[1] who says:

Διὰ τί οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ μέσων νυκτῶν ἄχρι μέσης ἡμέρας οὐκ ἀγαθοὶ πταρμοί, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ μέσης ἡμέρας ἄχρι μέσων νυκτῶν; ἢ ὅτι ὁ μὲν πταρμὸς μᾶλλον δοκεῖ ἐπισχεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ; διὸ ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀρχομένοις συμβῆναι, μάλιστα ἀποτρεπόμεθα τοῦ πράττειν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἠὼς καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ μέσων νυκτῶν οἷον ἀρχή τις· διὸ εὐλαβούμεθα πταρεῖν, μὴ κωλύσωμεν ὡρμημένον. πρὸς δείλης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μέσας νύκτας οἷον τελευτή τις καὶ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ὥστε ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ ταὐτὸν αἱρετέον.

Several other passages in ancient authors attest this connection of sneezing and beginnings, a notion exactly paralleled by the extreme regard paid both in ancient and modern superstition to other kinds of omens observed at the commencement of any undertaking, particularly a journey.[2] Thus the sneeze identified by the speaker in Plutarch[3] with the *δαιμόνιον* of Socrates is said to have confirmed him when hesitating (a positive character not usually assigned to this enigmatical spirit) or to have dissuaded and prevented him if he had begun. Among favorable omens immediately preceding the battle of Salamis and during the preparations for it Plutarch[4] mentions a sneeze on the right; to the unfavorable interpretation of a sneeze just at starting in the case of the fleet commanded by Timotheus[5] I have already referred. The famous Catullus passage[6] draws a favorable omen from a sneeze occurring at the commencement, or, as some infer, at the renewal of the love of Septimius and Acme. St. Augustine[7] mentions the custom of returning to bed if one sneezes while putting on his shoes. So at the present day in Persia a single sneeze at the beginning of a journey is considered a bad omen.[8] The same ominous relation between sneezings and

[1] *Probl.* 33. 11.

[2] *Cumque in omnibus rebus vim haberent maximam prima et extrema.* Cic. *N.D.* ii. 67. For the connection of sneezing with other parts of journeys than the beginning see G. Taylor on the folk-lore of aboriginal Formosa in *Folk-Lore Journal* V (1887), 149.

[3] *De Gen. Socr., loc. cit.* [4] *Themist.* 119A.

[5] Frontinus *loc. cit.* [6] 45. 8–9, 17–18. [7] *De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20.

[8] "Persians in such a case will stare hard at the sun in order to induce a second or third sneeze. If they are unsuccessful in doing this they can betake themselves to repeating a certain invocation to Allah; but most Persians will give up the expedition. My brother's Persian secretary always attributed a bad accident to the fact that someone had sneezed just as he was mounting his horse." Ella C. Sykes in *Folk-Lore* XII (1901), 266–67. It may here be remarked that the method of producing

beginnings is found in various German folk-beliefs, as, for instance, that according to which if one of the couple at a wedding sneezes during the ceremony the match will be unlucky,[1] or that which asserts that a child who sneezes before baptism will be clever.[2] Various modern customs connect favorable or unfavorable sneezings with the different days of the week[3] or hours of the day.[4] To the age, sex, or personality of the sneezer, upon which modern folk-lore lays some emphasis (references to the sneezes of children being especially frequent[5]), I find no clear allusion in ancient customs.[6]

To a somewhat different category belong cases of sneezing in illness. Here the belief in the ominous meaning of the sneeze is modified by its symptomatic tendency. Moreover while ominous sneezing in other cases usually points toward the future of someone else than the sneezer, that of a sick person is invariably indicative of the fortune of that person alone. Aristotle in his *Problemata*

a sneeze by gazing at the sun, due to the strong stimulation of the optic nerve, is recognized by Aristotle, who says: *ἀνακύπτομεν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ὅταν βουλώμεθα πταρεῖν.*—*Probl.* 33. 15. It would be interesting if we could know whether this voluntary sneezing, for which it is a little difficult to find a reason, may not be due, in Aristotle's case as in the Persian example, to the desire to produce an omen ready to order for some particular occasion.

[1] A. Wuttke *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart*, 3d ed. by E. H. Meyer, 304.

[2] *Ibid.* 316.

[3] *Ibid.* 287; P. Drechsler *Sitte, Brauch und Volksglaube in Schlesien* II, 195; W. H. Babcock in folk-lore notes collected near Washington, D.C., in *Folk-Lore Journal* VI (1888), 92.

[4] Article "New England Superstitions" in *Folk-Lore Journal* II (1884), 24. Compare also Aristotle's description cited above (p. 433).

[5] E.g., Wuttke *op. cit.* 287; R. Wossidlo *Mecklenburgische Volksüberlieferungen* 366; J. Sibree, Jr., in *Folk-Lore Record* II (1879), 36, for a custom in Madagascar; B. C. A. Windle in *Folk-Lore* XVII (1906), 250, for a Basuto custom, in which the child at birth is held in the smoke of a slow fire till it sneezes to show that it is not bewitched; cf. the sneeze of a new-born child received as an omen that it will live, noted by G. H. Kinahan in his remarks upon Connemara folk-lore in *Folk-Lore Journal* II (1884), 257. Does Propertius ii. 3. 24 perhaps belong here? For the sneezes of women see *Folk-Lore* XV (1904), 210 (a custom among the negroes of Jamaica). There may also be cited here the cases of unlucky sneezes noted by Pliny, *N.H.* vii. 42, and repeated by Gellius, iii. 16. 24.

[6] The reference in Photius to the sneeze of a woman (cited by Hübner and Jacobitz on Diog. Laert. vi. 48) is probably not intended to emphasize the sex of the sneezer. Nor is importance to be attributed to the age of the tyrant Hippias at the battle of Marathon where he sneezed out one of his teeth and was unable to find it in the sand, though Herodotus (vi. 107) assigns his age as the reason for his sneezing so hard, a cause discussed by Aristotle (*Probl.* 33. 12) and Pliny (*N.H.* xxviii. 57), who inquire why old men have such labor in sneezing.

gives much physiological information in regard to sneezing, and among other things the statement[1] that while coughing and catarrh are naturally found in the sick, sneezing is not. Elsewhere[2] he adds:

ὅταν γὰρ κρατήσῃ ἡ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ θερμότης τὴν ὑγρότητα, τὸ πνεῦμα τότε γίνεται πταρμός· διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐκθνήσκοντας κινοῦσι πταρμικῷ,[3] ὡς ἐὰν μὴ τούτῳ δύνωνται πάσχειν, ἀσώτους ὄντας· ὥστε ὡς σημεῖον ὑγείας τοῦ ἀρρώστου καὶ ἱερωτάτου τόπου προσκυνοῦσιν ὡς ἱερόν, καὶ φήμην ἀγαθὴν ποιοῦνται.

Similarly Celsus,[4] speaking of fevers, says: *Sternumentum etiam inter bona indicia est et cupiditas cibi vel a primo servata vel etiam post fastidium orta.*[5] Of course there were exceptions, and Celsus in another passage[6] remarks that in lung diseases coughing and catarrh are dangerous, as is also sneezing, which, in other diseases, is considered a healthful symptom.[7] In Iceland the custom of saluting a sneezer is said to have arisen during the Black Pest, of which, in its victims, a violent sneezing was a premonition, and for which the pious wish "God help you," or "God help me," as the case might be, was devised as a remedy.[8] With this may be compared a similar belief among the Germans in Hungary,[9] and one cannot but recall the description given by Thucydides[10] of the plague at Athens, in which sneezing was one of the earlier symptoms, although this disease appears somewhat different from any now known and is probably not to be identified[11] with the plague of later times. The use of pious

[1] 33. 7. [2] 33. 9.

[3] For various herbs and other remedies used to produce sneezing see Pliny *N.H.* xxv. 52, 56, 135, 173; xxviii. 88; xxxii. 28, and for the clearing effect upon the head Pliny *N.H.* xx. 137; xxi. 142, and elsewhere.

[4] ii. 3.

[5] So in Jerusalem at the present day the sneeze of a sick person is regarded as a favorable symptom. (Mrs. H. H. Spoer in *Folk-Lore* XVIII [1907], 72.) In the case of Elisha and the Shunammite's son (II Kings 4:35) seven sneezes by the child are the sign of his restoration to life. For the method of cure there applied we may perhaps compare Tambornino *De antiquorum daemonismo* 81 *fin.*

[6] ii. 8.

[7] For sneezing at coition see p. 434, n. 5, above. Sneezes are also treated as a bad symptom by Gallaeus ad Lact. ii. 15 (Migne *Patrol. Lat.* VI, 332 n.): *Rabbini volunt plures in sternutatione obiisse mortem, atque hinc natum ut sternutantem salvare (sic) iubebant.*

[8] Powell and Magnússon *Icelandic Legends*, 2d series, 646.

[9] Described by W. H. Jones and L. L. Kropf in *Folk-Lore Journal* I (1883), 357.

[10] ii. 49.

[11] See the review of the question in Busolt *Gr. Gesch.* III, 943 (following Ebstein *Die Pest des Thukydides*).

formulas of address to a sneezing person is one of the most familiar phenomena of folk-lore, though its ancient origin is not, perhaps, very generally appreciated or made allowance for by the Icelandic and Hungarian beliefs already mentioned. The Greek phrase is *Ζεῦ σῶσον*, and is found in a curious epigram in the *Palatine Anthology*:[1]

Οὐ δύναται τῇ χειρὶ Πρόκλος τὴν ῥῖν' ἀπομύσσειν·
τῆς ῥινὸς γὰρ ἔχει τὴν χέρα μικροτέρην·
οὐδὲ λέγει Ζεῦ σῶσον ἐὰν πταρῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἀκούει
τῆς ῥινός· πολὺ γὰρ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀπέχει.

In Latin Petronius[2] seems to point to *salve* as the word used, and Apuleius[3] appears to use a periphrasis for the same word.[4] In modern times the custom is widely diffused, though often with little of its original meaning. In Greece *'γειά σου*,[5] in Italy "Felicità"[6] is said; among German-speaking peoples "Gott hilf dir," "Gesundheit," "Prosit," or an equivalent;[7] in France "Bonne Santé";[8] in Ireland "God bless you";[9] and corresponding phrases in Iceland,[10] Cairo,[11] and Madagascar.[12] In India a wish for one's long life is uttered;[13] among Hebrews some pious wish;[14] among the negroes of South Carolina, "Bless 'em";[15] among those of Tennessee, "Scat."[16]

[1] xi. 268.

[2] 98. 4–5: *Eumolpus conversus salvere Gitona iubet.*

[3] *Metam.* ix. 25; *salutem ei fuerat imprecatus.*

[4] Cf. Pliny *N.H.* xxviii. 23.

[5] Lawson *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* 330. He states that there is sometimes added the facetious variant: *Ψοφήσῃ ἡ πεθερά σου*, "may your mother-in-law die like a dog."

[6] Wordsworth on Theocritus 7. 96.

[7] Wüttke *op. cit.* 768; Drechsler *op. cit.* II, 23; Wossidlo *op. cit.* 366; Schönwerth *Aus der Oberpfalz. Sitten und Sagen* III, 245–46; W. H. Jones and L. L. Kropf in *Folk-Lore Journal* I (1883), 357; Mather and Hewitt on Xen. *Anab.* iii. 29 (p. 347).

[8] Mather and Hewitt *loc. cit.*

[9] B. J. Jones in *Folk-Lore* XV (1904), 339; G. H. Kinahan in *Folk-Lore Record* IV (1881), 105.

[10] Powell and Magnússon *op. cit.* 646.

[11] Sayce in *Folk-Lore* XVII (1906), 198.

[12] J. Sibree, Jr., in *Folk-Lore Record* II (1879), 36.

[13] *Kullavagga* v. 33. 3 (in *Sacred Books of the East* XX, 152–53).

[14] Gallaeus on Lact. ii. 15 (in Migne *Patrol. Lat.* VI, 332n.).

[15] So I am informed by Dr. H. S. V. Jones.

[16] Professor G. R. Throop has communicated this item to me. It is doubtless said in order to drive away the evil influence thought to be at work in the sneezer.

In the island of Cos "people on hearing a sneeze utter some prayer or ejaculation in which the title of *περίδρομος* ('run-about') is given to the Deity."[1] German ghosts, according to Wüttke,[2] often sneeze purposely in order that the pious prayer "Gott hilf dir" may assist to set them free from torment.

To describe and classify the recorded cases of sneezing as an omen, is, of course, far easier than to suggest any general principles by which they are to be explained. I should like, however, to call attention to a point which has appeared but little in the passages thus far quoted, but which may contain a possible clue to the solution of many of the instances before us. In his *Historia Animalium*,[3] Aristotle, speaking of the nose, says:

καὶ ὁ πταρμὸς διὰ ταύτης γίνεται, πνεύματος ἀθρόου ἔξοδος, σημεῖον οἰωνιστικὸν καὶ ἱερὸν μόνον τῶν πνευμάτων.

Elsewhere[4] he asks:

διὰ τί τὸν μὲν πταρμὸν θεὸν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, τὴν δὲ βῆχα ἢ τὴν κόρυζαν οὔ; ἢ διότι ἐκ τοῦ θειοτάτου τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὅθεν ὁ λογισμός ἐστι, γίνεται;[5]

The familiar account given by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*[6] shows how general was the belief in the sacred character of the omen. While Xenophon was addressing the army urging a retreat someone sneezed.

ἀκούσαντες δ' οἱ στρατιῶται πάντες μιᾷ ὁρμῇ προσεκύνησαν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ὁ Ξενοφῶν εἶπε· "Δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐπεὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν λεγόντων οἰωνὸς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐφάνη, εὔξασθαι τῷ θεῷ τούτῳ θύσειν σωτήρια ὅπου ἂν πρῶτον εἰς φιλίαν χώραν ἀφικώμεθα, κτλ.[7]

With this view of the sacredness of the omen Athenaeus also agrees.[8] That the deity which communicated its future designs to mortals through so great a variety of mediums as were recognized by the ancients should have spoken in this particular form also need occasion

[1] W. H. D. Rouse in *Folk-Lore* XI (1899), 181.

[2] *Op. cit.* 768. To the work of Morin: *Sur les souhaits en faveur de ceux qui éternuent* (1712), I have not had access.

[3] i. 11 (p. 492*b*, 5 ff.). [4] *Probl.* 33. 7.

[5] Cf. *Probl.* 33. 9: *ἔστι δὲ φῦσα μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς κάτω κοιλίας πνεῦμα, ἐρυγμὸς δὲ τῆς ἄνω, ὁ δὲ πταρμὸς τῆς κεφαλῆς. διὰ τὸ ἱερώτατον οὖν εἶναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ὡς ἱερὸν προσκυνοῦσιν.*

[6] iii. 2. 9. [7] Cf. Plut. *Themist.* 119A. [8] ii. 66*c*.

us little surprise, and the learned explanations of Aristotle were perhaps sufficient for the curious of his day. I think it possible, however, that a somewhat different explanation may lead us nearer the real truth. The passage in Plutarch's *De Genio Socratis*[1] is of no value to us for determining the nature of the δαιμόνιον of Socrates, and in assigning to that spirit the rôle of a positive as well as a negative mentor the author seems to misunderstand the character of its advice. Yet as showing what others had lighted upon as an explanation of the δαιμόνιον Plutarch's passage is suggestive. In it one of the speakers narrates the view of Terpsion of Megara that the peculiar spirit of Socrates was nothing but a sneeze, either his own or that of another person favorable or unfavorable according to its position, as I have already stated. Now granting that Socrates' demon was not a sneeze, yet does not the passage seem to indicate, from precisely the reverse point of view, that sneezing was recognized as having some connection with—perhaps being the utterance of—a demon? Otherwise the connection between the two things—demon and sneeze—is obscure, but if this view be correct, Terpsion, while trying to explain the demon of Socrates, selected a more or less generally recognized form of demonic manifestation and forthwith identified with it the unique inner voice of the Athenian philosopher. That a demon within the person might, according to certain beliefs, receive outside influences through the nose is shown by Aristotle,[2] who says:

ἐν τῷ Νείλῳ ποταμῷ γεννᾶσθαι λίθον φασὶ κυάμῳ παρόμοιον,[3] ὃν ἂν κύνες ἴδωσιν, οὐχ ὑλακτοῦσι. συντελεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς δαίμονί τινι γενομένοις κατόχοις· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ προστεθῆναι ταῖς ῥισὶν ἀπέρχεται τὸ δαιμόνιον.[4]

That the nostrils are among the usual ways of ingress or egress of demons is perhaps more than we are justified in assuming,[5] though as the principal entrances of breath into the interior of the body they might sometimes be appropriately so considered, and Bouché-Leclercq[6] states that the Zulus explain sneezing as the entry through

[1] 581B. [2] *De Mirab. Auscult.* 166. [3] Probably some kind of fossil.

[4] Many other references to similar customs, especially that of smoking out the demon by burning brimstone and such substances before the nostrils of the possessed person, may be found in Tambornino *De antiquorum daemonismo* 83.

[5] The mouth is the more normal route.

[6] *Op. cit.* i. 163.

the nostrils of a spirit on its way to the breast, this being ordinarily the spirit of an ancestor and a good counselor; but that as the nose is the medium through which influences may reach the demon within so it may also be the route by which the utterance of the demon may on occasion be sent forth seems not to be a harsh assumption, and this view would explain more adequately the sacredness of such an utterance than will Aristotle's connection of sneezing with the mere sanctity of the head. Moreover possession by a demon is constantly used by the ancients as an explanation not only of insanity (which is naturally often associated with and localized in the head[1]) but also of the kindred prophetic frenzy of the *vates* or seer.[2] That its significance might be realized by others or even by the possessed person himself would naturally demand either some duration in time, so that the possessed might gain a reputation for abnormality and his words or actions be consequently regarded as of especial meaning, or else the voluntary and evident seeking of the state of mania by means of some acknowledged method, such as intoxication or orgiastic rites. Neither of these courses would be readily available in the case of a demon who was to make one immediate and isolated prophetic declaration (such as, for example, that at the speech of Xenophon referred to above). What then could be more natural than that, where a single articulate speech of the possessed might pass unnoticed from his not having acquired the character and reputation of a *vates*, the demon should resort to the immediate, conspicuous,[3] and somewhat uncanny device of a sneeze?

Thus far I have discussed the phenomena of ominous sneezing and have suggested a theory which may be adequate to explain many of them. It remains that I should consider the interpretation of these signs. Omens, upon analysis, may be seen to be of two sorts, the one pointing backward and corroborative of what has taken place, the other pointing forward and prophetic of the future. The

[1] Cf. Plato *Tim.* 90A for the demon's dwelling in the head.

[2] For examples of such *ἐνθουσιασμός* or possession by the god see Rohde *Psyche* II, 18 ff.

[3] In this respect sneezing is rather exceptional among the movements of the waking body, which are usually, as Aristotle says (*De Div. per Somn.* 1, p. 463*a*, 7 ff.), less conspicuous than those in sleep. Sneezing never occurs during sleep, according to Aristotle, *Probl.* 33. 15.

former follows, the latter precedes some action or word of especial significance. Furthermore, in order that the act to which the omen refers may be better discerned and appreciated among an infinite number of other acts, the space of time elapsing between act and omen or omen and act tends to be reduced to a minimum, and this is particularly the case with corroborative omens. It very often happens that the corroborative omen, whether thunder or bird or sneeze, follows immediately upon its corresponding act or word, and if that act or word be not a complete whole in itself but a part of a larger and as yet incomplete series of acts, then the omen which is corroborative of the correctness of the single act may become prophetic of the success of the entire policy, and in this way the apparent gulf between omens pointing backward and those pointing forward is easily bridged. Sneezing, like other omens, is found in both of these forms, and in several passages it may be explained as being either one of them. In the *Anabasis* passage[1] the sneeze occurs while Xenophon is speaking, in such a way as to point, as he and the army interpret it, to his words just uttered. But it is also treated by him as an omen of the success of the policy he had been urging upon the soldiers. Again, in the Catullus passage,[2] the sneeze of Love follows immediately after and approves the speeches of Septimius and Acme, but it is also, as Catullus makes clear, a good omen for the continuance of their love, of which these speeches are but a part. The idea of corroborative favorable sneezing is most exactly expressed in Greek by the compound *ἐπιπταίρω*.[3] In German the corresponding word is *beniesen*, and all through Germany the belief is found that if one sneeze while another is speaking the sneeze is a confirmation of what has been said.[4] This idea may be carried a step farther, and the sneeze be regarded as the confirmation of an unuttered wish. "Persians believe," says Ella C. Sykes,[5] ". . . . that if they are desiring anything ardently and someone sneezes at that moment

[1] *Loc. cit.* [2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] Cf. Basil on Is. 12; Theocr. 7. 96; 18. 16; also a parody of the idea in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 294 ff. The custom, though not with this particular word, is found in modern Greece, where, if sneeze be heard as one is speaking, those who are present say ἀλήθεια λές (or λέτε). Lawson *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* 330.

[4] Wüttke *op. cit.* 309; cf. Drechsler *op. cit.* II, 23.

[5] *Folk-Lore* XII (1901), 266-67.

their wish is sure to be granted. My brother's Persian secretary . . . . assured me that he owed the schooling he had had in England to the fact that when, as quite a child, he was wishing to go to that country, someone had sneezed." The same notion is to be seen in the epigram from the *Palatine Anthology*[1] already cited, where the wish of the husband to hear of the death of his wife is connected with his sneezing near a tomb and into the wind, though whether the wish is antecedent or consequent to the sneeze is not absolutely clear. It may perhaps be that the idea of corroborative sneezing will explain the view of Aristotle[2] already cited that sneezes between midday and midnight are lucky, because that part of the day is associated with the end rather than the beginning, and, consequently, a sneeze at that time marks approval of what has been done.[3]

When we turn to omens that point forward we find an even greater interest on the part of the observer, a greater uncertainty as to the meaning of the omen, and, quite naturally, more apprehension of evil and tendency to interpret the omen in an unfavorable sense. Like all other forms of divination these omens of sneezing were largely determined in their meaning by the mental attitude of the observer. Quick-wittedness and cleverness on the part of an interpreter could often turn an ambiguous omen into one clearly good or clearly bad.[4] To determine to what person's words or actions the chance sneezes of a third person might refer would at times demand a large degree of penetration, but this difficulty is not one peculiar to the omen of sneezing.

Carelessness or undue haste or neglect in observing an omen sometimes led to a special significance in its repetition. Petronius[5] refers to sneezing thrice in succession; Apuleius[6] to a sneeze repeated again and again till it excited alarm.[7] In Germany at the present time ghosts are said often to sneeze thrice.[8] In Persia, by a principle

[1] XI, 375. [2] *Probl.* 33. 11.

[3] Here should perhaps be classed the belief found in South Germany (according to Wüttke *op. cit.* 287) that if the youngest child in the house sneezes in bed on Saturday night a lucky week will follow. In this case the prediction would be a consequence inferred from the confirmation of the week just ended.

[4] Pliny *N.H.* xxviii. 16. [5] 98. 4–5. [6] *Metam.* ix. 25. [7] Cf. also Photius *loc. cit.*

[8] Wüttke *op. cit.* 768; cf. also Drechsler *op. cit.* II, 268; Goodrich-Freer in *Folk-Lore* XIII (1902), 50.

I have not elsewhere noted, repetitions of sneezes negative the bad omen of a single sneeze.[1]

Through many of these omens of the future we find recurring an undefined dread, for there is always the chance that by the misinterpretation of the observer that may be considered as favorable which is in reality the portent of disaster. Of such misinterpretations Greek and Roman literature furnish many examples, and they could hardly have failed to awaken fear. Menander voices this apprehension when he says:[2]

λυπούμεθ', ἂν πτάρῃ τις, ἂν εἴπῃ κακῶς
ὀργιζόμεθ', ἂν ἴδῃ τις ἐνύπνιον σφόδρα
φοβούμεθ', ἂν γλαὺξ ἀνακράγῃ δεδοίκαμεν.

Hence, he says, the brutes are far better off than men, for they are free from omens.[3]

The power of analogy in folk-customs is very great, and those cases in which we have seen a considerable extension of the principles of beginnings and of right and left may suggest the possibility that various other modern sneezing customs may be derived by equally natural extensions and admixtures, from the same origins,

[1] E. C. Sykes in *Folk-Lore* XII (1901), 266–67. In Japan, as I am informed by Mr. S. Sekine, one sneeze denotes that someone is praising, two that someone is blaming, and three that someone is loving the sneezer, while four are an indication of a cold in the head! The seven sneezes by the Shunammite's son I have already noted (II Kings 4:35). Aristotle (*Probl.* 33. 3) thinks we normally sneeze twice, rather than once or more than twice.

The term sneezing may also be applied metaphorically to other things than persons, still retaining its ominous force. In the *Palatine Anthology* (VI, 333) is an epigram by one Marcus Argentarius addressed to a lamp and running as follows:

Ἤδη, φίλτατε λύχνε, τρὶς ἔπταρες· ἢ τάχα τερπνὴν
εἰς θαλάμους ἥξειν Ἀντιγόνην προλέγεις;
εἰ γάρ, ἄναξ, εἴη τόδ' ἐτήτυμον, οἷος Ἀπόλλων
θνητοῖς μάντις ἔσῃ καὶ σὺ παρὰ τριπόδι.

With this passage, naturally not to be taken too seriously, may be compared one in Ovid (*Heroides* 18. 151), where Hero writes to Leander:

Sternuit et lumen (posito nam scribimus illo),
sternuit et nobis prospera signa dedit.

For this notion of the ominous sputtering of lamps in Greece today see Lawson *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* 328. The ominous principle in the case of lamps is doubtless different from that of sneezing but has been by analogy and metaphor confused with it.

[2] Frag. 534, 9 ff. Kock.

[3] A hymn in the Atharva-veda (x. 3. 6, in *Sacred Books of the East* XLII, 82) declares that a certain amulet will afford protection to its possessor in case of his beholding an evil dream, seeing an inauspicious animal, or hearing an ominous sneeze or the evil shriek of a bird—a kind of insurance against omens not without parallels among the Greeks and Romans.

to which, in their final forms, their relation appears obscure. We must be on our guard, however, against overlooking the possible influence of the other, symptomatic explanation of sneezing in illness, which may equally well have been extended by analogy. The theory of demonic obsession in illness might be adduced to apply even to these cases and so reduce them to the same fundamental principle as the cases of ominous sneezing, but we shall probably be on safer ground if we are content to suppose that in the eyes of the Greek and Roman medical systems these sneezings of the sick possessed at bottom physiological causes, such as those which Aristotle, in various purely physiological passages which I have not here cited,[1] labors to set forth, or, in the unfavorable cases, such as those which the folk-lore of Hungary and Iceland assigns.[2] From this physiological conception is to be derived, as I have already indicated, the use of prophylactic phrases like *salve*.[3]

In this brief sketch I have attempted to show that belief in the significance of sneezing is a very ancient superstition, appearing in a well-developed form as early as Homer and extending ever more widely to the present day; that its purposes, like those of many other forms of omen, are both corroborative and prophetic; that many of its phenomena may be most easily explained by assuming the temporary presence in the sneezer of a divine power as the agent of the sneeze,[4] whose very presence makes the sneeze, his form of revelation, itself divine; that other cases appear to be drawn from the rather distinct side of therapeutic practice; and, finally, that these notions probably became, in their interpretation, confused, not only with each other, but also with other fundamental conceptions, such as those of beginnings and of right and left.

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[1] See the index by Bonitz, *s.vv.* πταίρειν, πταρμός.

[2] P. 435, notes 8, 9, *supra*.

[3] Certain additional references to sneezing in ancient usage not cited in the pages above are these: Schol. ad Pind. *Ol.* 12. 10; Ar. *Aves* 721 ff.; Dio Chrysost. *Orat.* 33 (vol. II, 19. 5 Dind.); Sen. *De Ira*, ii. 25. 3; Pliny *N.H.* xix. 39; xxviii. 26 (for a custom at banquets). For some additional modern references see the following: Wuttke *op. cit.* 378, 770; Drechsler *op. cit.* II, 268; R. C. Temple in *Folk-Lore* X (1899), 435; *Folk-Lore* XV (1904), 94.

[4] Cf. F. W. H. Myers, "Greek Oracles" (in his *Classical Essays* 77), who does not, however, treat the subject in detail or attempt any proof of the demonic theory as applied to sneezing.

THE STOIC USE OF ΛΕΞΙΣ AND ΦΡΑΣΙΣ

By Ralph Hermon Tukey

In his discussion of the rhetorical theory of the Stoics (*De Stoicorum Studiis Rhetoricis*, Breslauer philologische Abhandlung, Vol. I) Francis Striller has atttemped to show that the Stoics gave to the word λέξις a different meaning from what it had in the writings of the Peripatetics—that among the Stoics it was uniformly used in sense of "word" and consequently was sharply differentiated in meaning from φράσις, which was used to denote expression as a whole. As an illustration of this distinction in the use of the two terms he quotes the Stoic list of the qualities of style given in Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Zeno* (Diog. Laer. vii. 40. 59, quoted below) where φράσις is used in the definition of Ἑλληνισμός, and λέξις in the definition of the other qualities. Recent writers on rhetorical subjects, and notably Smiley in his dissertation on Latinitas and Ἑλληνισμός (*Bull. of the University of Wisconsin*, No. 143), have accepted Striller's conclusions and have used this passage in support of a theory that the Stoics used the word Ἑλληνισμός as a general term to include all the desirable qualities of style and to designate the goal of all of their rhetorical practice and theory. The study of the use of λέξις and φράσις in the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus has led me to doubt the accuracy of Striller's conclusions and to deem it worth while to examine anew the evidence upon which they are based.

A considerable portion of the material that is pertinent to such an investigation is found in the above-mentioned *Life of Zeno* by Diogenes Laertius, sections 56–60. These sections form a part of a larger passage in which he gives a brief statement of the Stoic teaching in the various fields of knowledge. The whole account is largely in the form of definitions and distinctions in the use of related terms, and is derived confessedly from several distinct sources. However, to the compiler at least, it must represent a tolerably consistent treatment of the subjects under discussion, κοινῇ δὲ περὶ πάντων

τῶν στωικῶν δογμάτων ἔδοξέ μοι ἐν τῷ Ζήνωνος εἰπεῖν βιῷ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτον κτίστην γενέσθαι τῆς αἱρέσεως . . . . τὰ δὲ δογματα κοινῶς ἐστι τάδε, vii. 32.38.

The corner-stone of Striller's argument is the definition of λέξις which is here attributed to Diogenes of Babylon: λέξις δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησι ὁ Διογένης, φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον Ἡμέρα, *loc. cit.* vii. 38. 56. From this it is an easy and apparently safe inference that to the Stoics λέξις meant a single word. For this assumption he finds further support in the fact that, while the Peripatetics, e.g., Theophrastus and Eudemus, used the title Περὶ λέξεως, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, used the title Περὶ λέξεων, i.e., "concerning words." Striller then very properly shows that these Stoic works were largely concerned with defining and distinguishing similar terms. At this point, however, he inadvertently introduces evidence that contradicts his own contention as to the Stoic usage of this term. In order to show the nature of the contents of the Stoic works just mentioned, he refers to the Περὶ λέξως (*sic*) of Poseidonius, quoting from that work the distinction between ποίημα and ποίησις as given in Diog. Laer. vii. 41. 60, ποίημα δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τῇ Περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγῇ, λέξις ἔμμετρος ἢ εὔρυθμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα· τὸ εὔρυθμον δ' εἶναι τὸ

Γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ.

ποίησις δέ ἐστι σημαντικὸν ποίημα, μίμησιν περιέχον θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπείων. Here are two instances of the use of λέξις by a Stoic writer that demand explanation. How does it happen that the title of Poseidonius' work reads Περὶ λέξεως instead of Περὶ λέξεων? Surely λέξις cannot be interpreted here as meaning "word." Even more difficult is the task of harmonizing such a definition of λέξις with the other use of the term in the passage quoted, ποίημα δέ ἐστι . . . . λέξις ἔμμετρος ἢ εὔρυθμος, κτλ. What sort of a word would be εὔρυθμος? If ποίημα is restricted to a single word, does it not follow from the definition that ποίησις has the same limitation?

Let us now return to the Stoic definition of λέξις, which we have already quoted, λέξις δέ ἐστιν κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς, ὥς φησι ὁ Διογένης, φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον Ἡμέρα. λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ

σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστί. Evidently it is the example that has given rise to the notion that λέξις is here restricted to a single word. There is no such limitation in the formal definition. The presence of φωνή in the singular number as a predicate appositive is not to be taken as evidence for such a restriction, because it also appears in the same way in the definition of λόγος. In fact, the only distinction between λέξις and λόγος that is suggested by the definitions themselves is qualitative rather than quantitative. This distinction is expressly stated in the succeeding section: λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἀσήμαντος ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Λέξις then according to the Stoic definition is speech without regard to its content, i.e., it may or may not convey meaning. It is speech viewed from its formal side, be it a single word or a group of words. Λόγος is speech considered as a medium for conveying thought. So too ποίημα is metrical speech viewed from its formal side, and ποίησις is metrical speech conveying a certain content of meaning. It is at once apparent that by taking these terms at their *minimum limits* a quantitative distinction may also be drawn. Thus ποίημα will then mean a single line of poetry and ποίησις a complete poem; in like manner λέξις will mean a single word and λόγος a complete sentence. Such in fact is the author's use of the two terms in the definition of barbarism and solecism: ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδαιμονούντων Ἑλλήνων. σολοικισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος, *loc. cit.* 40. 59. But this limitation of meaning does not apply to the use of λέξις in the definition of ποίημα, nor to the use of ποίημα in the definition of ποίησις. In both of these cases the words are free from all quantitive restrictions.

With this extension of the meaning of λέξις we still leave its use in the title Περὶ λέξεως outside of the limits of our definition. For the λέξις that we have defined is a concrete φωνή, be it one word or more, while λέξις as used in the title evidently denotes expression in the abstract, i.e., the use of words. That the Stoics felt no inconvenience in such a twofold use of a single term is well illustrated by the definition of διάλεκτος in this same passage (*loc. cit.* vii. 38. 56.): διάλεκτος δέ ἐστιν λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς

ἡ λέξις ποταπὴ, τοῦτέστι ποιὰ κατὰ διάλεκτον, οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὴν Ἀτθίδα, θάλαττα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰάδα, Ἡμέρη. Here διάλεκτος in the first instance means a dialectical form, and in the second dialectical usage. The first is concrete, the second is abstract. In like manner Herodian entitled one of his works Περὶ μονήρους λέξεως, using λέξις abstractly, but began its opening sentence with τῶν λέξεων αἱ μέν πλήθουσι καθ' ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δὲ οὔ, where λέξεων is used concretely to denote "words."

Inasmuch as the study of grammar was largely developed among the Stoics, it is quite probable that they were the first to use λέξις in the sense of "word"—in order to avoid the ambiguity in the use of ὄνομα, which otherwise denoted both "noun" and "word." Moreover it is not unlikely that some Stoics used λέξις in that sense alone, employing φράσις to express the corresponding abstract meaning. But the assertion that the Stoics as a class used λέξις only in the sense of "word" is not supported even by the evidence presented by Striller himself.

Φράσις as a rhetorical term seems to have been of Stoic origin, and may well have been introduced into their vocabulary in connection with the adoption of λέξις to denote "word." It is not used by Aristotle, Anaximenes, or Demetrius, and appears in Dionysius principally in phrases that suggest Stoic influence. From its use with certain adjectives it would appear that it came into the vocabulary of Dionysius (or of his source) in the technical expressions, κυρία φράσις and τροπικὴ φράσις. While the distinction between simple and metaphorical language was not the invention of the Stoics, it is natural that they should give to it greater emphasis in their rhetorical works and that for this reason their terminology should be accepted by non-Stoic writers.

In the list of the qualities of style given in Diogenes Laertius, to which reference was made at the beginning of the article, φράσις is used in the definition of Ἑλληνισμός, and λέξις in the definition of the other qualities: ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε· Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. Ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ. σαφήνεια δέ ἐστι λέξις γνωρίμως παριστῶσα τὸ νοούμενον. συντομία δέ ἐστι λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δήλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

πρέπον δέ ἐστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι. κατασκευὴ δέ ἐστι λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. Striller, assuming that the presence of the two different terms φράσις and λέξις was due to a desire on the part of the author of the definitions to indicate a fundamental difference between Ἑλληνισμός and the other qualities, states that Ἑλληνισμός was concerned with expression as a whole, while the other qualities had to do with single words. Smiley follows him in differentiating between φράσις and λέξις, but makes Ἑλληνισμός include all of the other qualities here mentioned. Against the latter assertion it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that the author has taken pains to state that there are five qualities, not one with four subdivisions, nor four that make a single composite. Whatever may be the teachings of the Stoics elsewhere, the writer of this paragraph, for the time being at any rate, had five separate qualities in mind, of which Ἑλληνισμός was only one.

There still remains the possibility that Ἑλληνισμός was thought of as being more comprehensive in its scope than the other qualities and that the two terms were used as we find them later in the writers on figures of speech: viz., φράσις referring to a group of words and λέξις to a single word. There is no question but that in an appropriate context λέξις may mean a single word, or the use of a single word, but to give it such a meaning in the definition of συντομία, for example, is absurd. It were better even to reverse the distinction between φράσις and λέξις, and to argue that their presence was indicative of the fact that Ἑλληνισμός is concerned with single words —a thesis for which considerable support might be found—while συντομία and the other qualities are concerned with groups of words. But it is evident that Diogenes Laertius did not understand that any distinction whatever had been intended in the use of the two terms. For otherwise he would have prepared the reader by giving a formal definition setting forth the difference between them. Such, at least, is his practice elsewhere in this passage. He has already distinguished λέξις from λόγος and φωνή (*loc. cit.* 38. 57), but he gives no hint of any distinction between φράσις and λέξις. Moreover where it is essential for him to make the distinction that Striller seeks to find here, we have not φράσις but λόγος contrasted with λέξις, as in the definition of barbarism and solecism, which was

quoted above. The presence of φράσις in the passage under discussion may be explained without assuming any distinction in meaning between the two terms. Ἑλληνισμός as a rhetorical term is undoubtedly of Stoic origin and consequently received its first formal definition from Stoic teachers. The other qualities of style had already been defined by the Peripatetics. In the definitions before us the original terminology has persisted in each case. φράσις and λέξις are here equivalent terms, but are derived from separate sources.

WILLIAM JEWELL COLLEGE

STUDIES IN GREEK NOUN-FORMATION

Based in part upon material collected by the late A. W. STRATTON, and prepared under the supervision of CARL D. BUCK[1]

LABIAL TERMINATIONS

Words in *-φη* or *-φᾱ* (ALSO *-φᾰ*)—in *-φης* or *-φᾱς*, gen. *-φου*—and in *-φος* and *-φον*, gen. *φου*.

BY E. H. STURTEVANT

WORD-LISTS[2]

WORDS IN *-φη* AND *φᾱ*

ἀφή, Hdt.,+
Ἄφη, P.
†βαφά· ζωμός. Λάκωνες, Hesych.
βαφή, Aesch.,+
καταβαφή, Theophil. (Th.).
κιδάφη, Hesych. [p. 201.
σκιδάφη, Herodian 1. 346. 7, 2. 456. 3 L. [p. 201.
κινδάφη, Hesych. [p. 201.
τεάφη, Apocalyps. Anastasiae 9. 9 Homb.,+[p. 207.
κάφα, Hesych.
Καφά, P.
κέρκαφα, Hesych.
σκάφη, Aesch.,+
Σκάφη, P.
σκαφή, App.,+[p. 210.
ἀνασκαφή, Strabo,+
κατα-, Aesch.,+
†ἐκ, pap. Tebt. 2. 342. 27, 28.
†ἀπο-, Choerob. ad Theodos. 103. 12 Hilg.
ὑπο-, Diosc.
†ἀλλάφα = ἔλαφος, Corona Pretiosa (Du Cange).
(ἀ)σκαλάφη, CGL. 2. 209. 39, 211. 56 [p. 201.
ἀνακολαφή, CGL. 2. 191. 14.
Ἀνάφη, P.
-αφή
συν-, Arist.,+
ἐπισυν-, Bacchius Isagoge 311 Jan.
ὑποσυν-, *id. ib.*
†ἐξ-, CGL. 3. 310. 63.
ἐπ-, Aesch.,+
ῥάφα, Epich. 204 Kaib. (?), Hesych. s. v. ῥαφανίς [p. 210.
ῥαφή, Hom.,+[p. 210.
†ἀράφη (or Ἀ-?), Herodian 1. 346. 4 L.
παραφαί, Philes (Koum.).
γραφή, Aesch.,+; γροφά, IG. 4. 1487. 271.
δια-, Plat.,+
†ἀντιδια-, Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 1509, etc.

[1] See introductory note, *CP.* V. 323 ff.

[2] For the method of arrangement, the meaning of abbreviations, etc., see footnote in *CP.* V. 343 f. The only important deviation from the practice there described is the addition of references to the discussion of words in *-φη*, *-φης*, and *-φος*, *CP.* VI. 197–215. These references follow the citations of Greek authors and are set off by the sign [, e.g., κιδάφη, Hesych. [p. 201.

-γραφή
σκια-, Poll. 7. 128.
ἀνα-, Lys. 30. 17, 25,+; ἀγγροφά, IG. 4. 1485. 141, 177, 1492. 10, etc.
παρα-, Dem., Arist.,+
ἀντιπαρα-, CGL. 2. 230. 12.
κατα-, Autolycus Sphaer, 8. 25 Hultsch, pap. Rev. L. 34. 4,+; καγ-, SGDI. 1614. 34.
μετα-, Aristeas ad Philocr. 528. 5 Macauley,+
ἀγ-, see ἀνα-
καγ-, see κατα-
ἐγ-, Dem., Arist.,+; ἐγγροφά, IG. 4. 1485. 136.
ψευδεγ-, Arist. Athen. Pol. 59. 3,+
μετεγ-, Georg. Pachym. 1. 269. 18 Bekk.,+
συγ-, Hdt.,+
παρασυγ-, Dem. ap. Poll. 8. 140, pap. Tor. (Mayser).
ἐπι-, Thuc.,+
†συνεπι-, pap. Oxy. 2. 273. 23, 373.
παρεπι-, Schol. Ar.,+
†μετεπι-, pap. Tebt. 1. 113. 4, 5,+
περι-, Aesch.,+
ἀντι-, Lys. 23. 10,+
†ἐκ-, SGDI. 1615. 5.
ἀπο-, Andoc. 1. 23,+
ὑπο-, Aesch.,+
προϋπο-, Plotin.
χειρο-, VV. LL. (Th.).
προ-, Xen.,+
Ἰσο-, Antisthenes ap. Diog. L.
†ὑπερ-, inscr. in Rev. d. Études Gr. 19. 246 l. 10.
ἐσ-, Cass. Dio.
παρεισ-, Plut. 2. 756 D.
προσ-, SGDI. 304 A 50, pap. Berl. 3. 776. 2. 19, Eust.
ἐπανω-, Du Cange without ref., Modern Gk.
Ἱεράφη, Hecat. ap. Steph. Byz.
κράφα, Hesych.
-ραφή
†δια(ρ)-, Soranus Gynaec. 2. 40, pap. Archiv 2. 2.
ἀναρ-, Aët. (Th.), +
καταρ-, Jo. Lyd. 179. 4,+
†προκαταρ-, Apophth. 192 C Migne.
σακκορ(ρ)άφα, Cosmas Hieromon. (Du Cange), Modern Gk.
ὑπο-, CGL. 2. 190. 58, 191. 13, 467. 34.
συρ-, Ps.-Hipp. 23. 55. 3 Kühn,+
†τράφη=τάφρη, Ditt. Syl. 531. 27.
Τράφη, P.
προσαφή, E.M.
ταφή, Hdt.,+
Τάφη, IG. 3. 4282.
†ἐπιταφή, LXX Sirach (Hatch and Redp.).
ὀσιρεοσ-, Ps.-Appul. (Th.).
ἐν-, SGDI. 311, 3502.
νεκρο-, pap. Grenf. 2. 71. 1. 8, 75. 1. 22.
ψάφα, Hesych.
Τηλέφη, P.
†ἠφά, Aq. (Hatch and Redp.).
ἀκαλήφη, Ar.,+[p. 201.
κνήφη, LXX,+[p. 204.
†ταρήφη, Hesych. [p. 205.
†Ψηφά, Anon. Antiqu. Cpol. (Du Cange).
†? λαῖφα, Hesych.
λαίφη, Call.
?σεῖφα, Hesych.
σκίφη, sign. inc., Crantor ap. Diog. L.
-αλιφή
†περι-, IG. 2. 834 b 61 Add.
συν-, Epiphan. (Th.).
†ἐπισυν-, Donat. 4. 396 K.,+
απ-, CGL. 2. 554. 46, 4. 24.
†κατ-, Ditt. Inscr. Gr. Or. 2. 737. 10.
ξίφη, Hesych.

ἀλοιφή, Hom.,+
συν-, Ps.-Dem. Phal. 70, Dion. H,+
†ἐπισυν-, Diomed. 442. 20 K.,+
†ὑποσυν-, Tryphon. in Nauck Lex. Vind. ix.
ἀπ-, CGL. 2. 232. 47.
†ἐπ-, Moschn. (Soph.).
ὑπ-, IG. 2. 803 f 4.
μυρ-, Poll.,+
†χρυσ-, Liber Chymicus MS. (Du Cange s. v. χολόβαφος), Modern Gk.
ῥιφή, Lyc. [p. 210.
†Ἀγρίφα, Hesych. [p. 205.
ἀγρίφη, Herodian 1. 345. 32, 2. 456. 3,+[p. 205.
Ἐρίφη, P.
διαρριφά, Pratinas 1. 16 Crusius.
ἐπιρριφή, (Tougard, Quid ad Profanos Mores Dignoscendos Conf. Acta SS.).
ἀπορριφή, Schol. Eur. Hec. 673 Schwartz, Theod. Stud. (Th.),+
†? σίρη, Herodian 1. 108. 14.
Σίφαι (Σίφη, Herodian 1. 345. 32 L) = Τίφα, P.
τίφη, a kind of spelt, Arist.,+
τίφη, sign. inc., Ar. [p. 201.
Τίφα = Σίφαι, P.
†Ψίφα, IG. 4. 823. 35, 60.
ἀλφή, Lyc. [p. 212.
τιμαλφή, Gramm. in A.B. 382. 6.
ἀδελφή, Aesch.,+
-αδέλφη[1]
†Τρι-, Mummy-ticket ap. Spiegelberg, Aeg. u. Gr. Eigenn.
γυναικ-, Niceph. Greg. 1. 203. 6 Schopen,+
φιλ-, P.
ἐξ-, Justin M. 584 C Migne,+
δισεξ-, Ps.-Jo. Jejun. 1893 D Migne, Theod. Balsam. 1201 B Migne.
πρωτεξ-, Georg. Acropolit. 98. 13, 100. 12 Bekk.,+
γυναικο-, Eccl. (Th.)
†μοιρο-, Lambros Romans Grecs 4. 355.
ἀνδρ-, Anton. Mon. s. v. γαλοώνη,+
πατρ-, Gl. (Th.).
μητρ-, Gl. (Th.), Manass. Chron. 2619.
αὐτ-, Schol. Eur. (Th.), Anna Comn. 12. 7.
†δυστυχ-, Lambros Romans Grecs 4. 692.
μίλφαι, Diosc.,+
σίλφη, Arist.,+[p. 200.
τιλφη, Luc. [p. 201.
†ἐγκόλφη, Anon. Astron. (Du Cange).
†Ἄμφη, Herodian 1. 345. 21 L.
γαμφαί, Lyc.
?γναμφαί, Lyc. 358, Hesych s. v. γαμφαί.
ῥαμφή, Polyb.,+
ὀμφή, "voice," Hom.,+
ὀμφά· ὀσμή. Λάκωνες; ὀμφή· πνοή, Hesych.
μομφή, Aesch., Pind.,+[p. 212.
ἐπιμομφά, Pind.
νύμφη, Hom.,+
Νύμφη, P.
†παρανύμφη, Isid. Or. 9. 7. 8.
μελλο-, Poll. 3. 45,+
ἀφθορο-, Anon. h. in Virg. (Th.).
†χριστο-, Act. SS. Mai. 6. 365 B.
Τύμφη, P.
Στύμφη, P.
βαιῶμφαι, Hesych. [p. 201.
λοφη, Diod.
γοργολόφα, Ar.
Εὐρυλόφη, P.
γροφά, see γραφή, ἀνα-, ἐγ-.
δροφή, Hom.,+
†στοαοροφή, inscr. BCH. 28. 78.
τροφή, Aesch.,+

[1] The tradition sometimes gives -αδελφή.

-τροφη, oxytone and paroxytone, the latter written out.
δια-, Xen.,+
ἀνα-, LXX Macc. 2. 6. 23,+
†συναν-, Ps.-Dem. Phal. Typi Epistolares 1.
Ἐπιτρόφη, P.
ἐκ-, Eur. fr. 317. 5 Nauck,+
? ὑπερκ-, Eur. fr. 282. 6 Nauck ap. Galen. 1. 23.
συντρόφη, CI. 3857 i Add.
Συντρόφη, P.
ἀπο-, Dion. H.,+
ὑπο-, Max. Tyr.,+
†ζωο-, Du Cange without ref.
στροφή, Aesch.,+
†στροφαί· ἀστραπαί, Hesych.
†Στρόφη, IG. 2. 836. 63.
διαστροφή, Hipp. Fract. 2. 74. 4 Kühlew.,+
προδια-, Clem. Al. 2. 216. 26 Dind.
ἀνα-, Aesch.,+
συναν-, LXX Sap. 8. 16, Macc. 3. 2. 33,+
ἐπαν-, Theon Progymnastica 2. 87. 12 Spengel, Hermog. Rhet. 2. 336. 18 Spengel.
παρα-, Greg. Nyss. (Th.), CGL. 2. 396. 26, 531. 49.
κατα-, Aesch.,+
μετα-, Aesch. (?Meineke, Phil. 19. 224), Plat.,+
Οἰστροφή, P.
ἐπιστροφή, Aesch.,+
Ἐπιστροφά, P.
παρεπιστροφή, Plut.
ἀντεπι-, Plut.,+
περι-, Soph. fr. 399. 8 Nauck,+
ἀντιπερι-, Plut.,+
ἀντι-, Arist.,+
ἀμφι-, Hesych.
ἐκ-, Plut.,+
παρεκ-, Malch.,+
ἀπο-, Aesch.,+
ἀνταπο-, Strabo.
ὑπο-, Soph., Hdt.,+
ἀνθυπο-, Theod. Stud. (Th.), Georg. Pachym. 2. 331. 16 Bekk.
†ἰσο-, Ammonius ad Arist. 71 Busse,+
συ-, Hdt.,+
Σόφη, P.
ἀπφά, Gramm. in A.B. 441. 11, Suidas,+
†Ἄπφη, CIG. 4122.
κάρφη, Xen.,+[p. 214.
Σκάρφη, P. [p. 211.
νάρφη, Hesych.
τάρφη "στοδός, τέφρα," Hesych.
†τάρφη "βλαστός," Hesych.
Τάρφη, P.
Σκίρφαι, P.
μορφή, Hom.,+
†Μορφή, Herodian 2. 1. 8 L.
ὑφή, Aesch.,+
διυφή, Aristeas ad Philocr. 534. 18 Macauley.
κυφά "head" (Cretan), Hesych. [p. 215.
κυφή, a kind of shrimp, Epich. 64 Kaib.,+[p. 201.
σκύφη, Gl. (Th.).
†καλυφή, pap. Berl. 2. 640. 7. [p. 212.
†ἀκαλύφη, Poll. 6. 51, Symeon Seth Aliment. Fac. 126 Lank. [p. 201.
περικαλυφή, Plat.
γλυφή, LXX Ex 25. 6, 28. 21,+
Γλυφαί, P.
διαγλυφή, Aristeas ad Philocr. 531. 4 Macauley,+
ἀνα-, *id. ib.* 530. 3,+
κατα-, Hipp. Art. 2. 229 Kühlew.
†ἐγ-, Philodem. (Gomperz, Philodem u. d. ästhetischen Schriften d. Hercul. Bibliothek 60).
†περι-, Paul. Aeg. (Soph.).
ἐκ-, Ael.
ἀπο-, Alex Trall. (Th.).

?Πολύφη, P.
?γνύφη, Hesych.
συν-υφή, Plat.,+
†καθουφή, Hesych. [p. 201.
παρ-υφή, Plut.,+
δρυφή, Herodian 1. 345. 29 L., Hesych.
†κρυφή, Georg. Pachym. 2. 249. Bekk.
κατακρυφά, Soph.
ἀποκρυφή, LXX,+
κορυφή, Hom.,+ [pp. 204, 214.
Κορύφη, P.
τρυφή, Eur.,+ [p. 198.
Τρύφη, P.
Κοσσύφη, P. [p. 206.
τύφη, Theophr.,+
†στυφη, sign. inc. CGL. 2. 439. 32.
προϋπο-στυφή, Theano Ep. (L. and S.)
ἐφ- υφή, Plat., +
Ἄφφη, P.

WORDS IN -φης AND -φᾶς, GEN. -φου[1]

†Ἄφας, Herodian 1. 57. 15, 2. 654, 32 L.
†κουτάλαφας, Portius (Du Cange) [p. 200.
Ἀνάφης, P.
-δίφης
δικο-, Luc.
νομοδίφας, Galen (L. and S.), CGL. 2. 122. 2.
μηχανο-, Ar.
πραγματο-, Ar.
φιλοίφας, Theocr., Eust., E.M.
†Ματρίφας, IG. 12. 2. 646, 19 [p. 206.
†Ἄλφας, Herodian 1. 57. 15, 2. 654. 32 L.
†Δέλφας, *id. ib.*
Συάμφας, P.
κεμφάς, Hesych. [p. 200.
†Κλιόνφας, IG. 12. 3. 1181 [p. 206.
†Ἐπόνφης, IG. 12. 3. 1187 [p. 206.
ἀπονύμφης, Poll.
-λόφας
γοργο-, Ar.
λευκο-, Eur.
Λευκο-, P.
Ὀνόφας, P. [p. 207.
?ἀπφάς, Herodian 2. 936, 28 L.
Ἀκύφας, Herodian 2. 655. 1 L.
κουκούφας, Horapollo [p. 199.

WORDS IN -φος AND -φον; GEN. -φου

Substantives in -φος are masculine unless otherwise stated

-βαφος, ον, paroxytone and proparoxytone.
ἄ-, CGL. 2. 215. 9.
παρά-, Phot. s. v. παραλουργίς.
χαλή-, Aretae.
δί-, Cic.,+
χαλοί-, Nic.
τρί-, Jo. Lyd.

[1] Not included are words which are clearly *e*-stems with forms showing the well-known transfer to the vowel declension, e.g., Ἑρμοτρέφης, gen., -τρέφου, *Coins Brit. Mus. Ionia*, p. 141, No. 214, or Aeol. εὐρυνέφης, acc. -νέφην, Choerob. 4. 1. 384. 3 Hilg. (cf. Lesb. δαμοτέλην, etc.). Among names in -φας there is danger of including some which belong with Περίφας, gen. -φαντος, and the like, but nearly all those given in the list either occur in the oblique cases with vowel declension or are so classed by Herodian.

Included are a few forms in -φης and -φας which occur only in the nominative and may possibly belong with words in -ης, -ους; or -ης, -ητος.

-βαφος, ον
χρυσέμ-, Cod. Antiq. Cpol. 29, 34, 39 Bekk., Anon. in Combef. Orig. Cpol. (Th.).
ἀνθο-, Plut.,+
†ἀνθό-, Caesarius 981 Migne.
†ἰνδικο-, Christianus Chymicus MS. (Du Cange).
κοκκό-, Simoc. 7. 9. 4.
ψιλο-, v. l. πτιλο-, CGL. 2. 152. 18.
χολό-, Aretae.,+
κοκκινό-, Schol. recent. Pind.
μονο-, edict of Diocletian in CIL. 3 suppl. 3 p. 1951 l. 31.
ὀξόβαφον = ὀξύβαφον, pap. Berl. 781. 1. 3, 17, 3. 5, etc., Phryn. in A.B. 56. 21,+
†φοβερό-, Niceph. Presb. Cpol. in Act. SS. Mai. 6. 18* B.
σιδηρό-, Jo. Lyd. de Mens. 4. 25.
ἐρυθρό, MS. anni 1286 (Th.).
πορφυρο-, Ion ap. Ath. 604 B,+
†καρυό-, Nicolaus Notaras (Du Cange).
ὀψόβαφον,[1] Epiphan. de Mens. et Pond. 263. 27 Hultsch, Suid. s. v. ἁρμονία.
ὀξύβαφον,[1] Cratin. 2. 83 Mein., Ar.,+
† *ἴδαφος, ὁ, [p. 203.
μογισαψέδαφος, α, ον, Luc.
κιδαφος, Hesych. [p. 201.
†ἀμφιδαφος, ον, pap. Oxy. 2. 298. 9, 10 [p. 211.
σκίνδαφος (MS. σκινδακός), ἡ, Ael. [p. 201.
θέαφος (τέαφος in Ducas 273. 11 Bekk., θείαφος [Th.]), CGL. 2. 326. 58, Jo. Camen. 530. 9 Bekk.,+[p. 207.
?ἀλαφοί, Hesych.
?κάφος, E.M. 499. 38 [p. 211.
ἔγκαφος, Philocles 5 Nauck (?), Eupol. 2. 565 Mein. [p. 210.
Κέρκαφος, P. [p. 206.
σκάφος, Hes.,+[p. 210.
-σκαφος, ον, paroxytone and properoxytone.
ἀ-, Strabo,+
ἀνά-, Chron. Pasch. 700, 729 Dind.,+
πυργο-, Lyc.
Φιλόσκαφος, P.
φυτο-, Ps.-Theocr. 25. 27, Philipp. in Anth. P.
φυτό-, E.M. 803. 13.
εὖ-, Hesych. s. v. λάχεια, Apollon. Lex. Hom. 107 Bekk.
?λαφός, Hesych. [p. 203.
κάλαφος, Hesych. [p. 201.
ἀσκάλαφος, Arist.,+[p. 201.
Ἀσκάλαφος, P. [p. 206.
ἔλαφος, Hom.,+[p. 197.
Ἔλαφος, P. [p. 206.
†στραβέλαφος, inscr. Wood Discoveries, etc. Append. 4 No. 13.
τραγ-, Aesch. fr. 444 Nauck,+
ἱπποτραγ-, Philem. 4. 30 Mein.

[1] Ὀψόβαφον and ὀξύβαφον do not harmonise with the other words in -βαφος, all of which show the ordinary meaning of the verb βάπτω, whether active or passive. In fact the meaning of ὀξύβαφον does not fall under any of the types usually presented by compounds with a verbal root as final member. Probably it is a regressive formation from the synonymous ὀξυβάφιον (cf. θεάφη from θεάφιον, *CP.* VI, 207), which is, in that case, a primary derivative in -ιον like ἐμβάφιον. Petersen *Greek Diminutives in -ιον*, p. 125, points out that ὀξυβάφιον seems to have deteriorative force in its one occurrence (Antiphan. fr. 3. 89 Mein.), and consequently he considers it a secondary derivative. That connotation, however, may be due entirely to the attributive κεραμέων, which there accompanies it. In any case ὀψόβαφον was formed on the model of ὀξύβαφον.

Ἔλαφος
†κραδ-, Nicet. Acom. 718. 10 Bekk.
†κρι-, Leont. Byz. 1616 A Migne.
ὀν-, Callixinus ap. Ath. 200 F.
ἱππ-, Arist.
χοιρ-, Cosm. Ind. 444 C Migne.
ταυρ-, Cosm. Ind. 441 C Migne,+
†ἐγκίλλαφον, Hesych. [p. 205.
κόλαφος, Plaut. Pers. 294, 846, etc.,+ [p. 203.
Κόλαφος, P.
ψωμοκόλαφος, Diphil. 4. 399 Mein.
οὔλαφος, Hesych. [p. 205.
γνάφος = κνάφος, Plut. 2. 858 E. [p. 198.
ἄγναφος, ον, N.T. Matt. 9. 16, Marc. 2. 21, pap. Lond. 2. 246,+ [p. 198.
ἐπί-, ον, Poll., CGL. 2. 90. 19, 26, etc.
†πρωτό-, ον, pap. Tebt. 2. 406. 14.
φλήναφος, Menand. Colax 21 Körte, + [pp. 203, 207.
κνάφος, Hdt.,+ [p. 198.
ἄκναφος, ον, Achmet 158,+
ἀνεπισύναφος, ον, Clem. Rom. ap. Orig. 2. 85. B Migne.
Πάφος ἡ, P.
ἀπαφός, Hesych. [p. 199.
Ἔπαφος, P.
ἀνέπαφος, Menand. 4. 189 Mein.,+
Ἐξέπαφος, Epiphan. 2. 141. 4 Dind.
Παλαίπαφος, P.
ῥάφοι, Hesych. [p. 201.
-γραφος, ον, paroxytone and properoxytone; proparoxytones which occur only as substantives are written out; dialectic -γροφος.
ἄ-, Thuc. Andoc. 1. 86, 89,+
†διάγραφον, pap. Oxy. 127. 2, 9, Abbo Floriacensis 559 B Migne.
σκια-, LXX Sap. 15. 4,+
βιβλια-, Cratin. 2. 159 Mein.,+
†ἐπιστολια-, Polyb. 1. 26 ap. Ath. 195 b.
παιγνια-, Ath.
†ἱστορια-, Ditt. Syll. 259. 13, 929. 93, Attici ap. Anton. Mon. Lex.
†ἀνάγραφος, Mart. Cap. 6. 715.
παρα-, CGL. 2. 156. 3, 3. 23. 27, Saimas. Solin. 643.
παράγραφος, ἡ, Hephaest. 73 ff. Consbruch, Herodian 1. 234. 27 L.,+
ἀπαρά-, Polyb.,+
ἀντιπαράγραφος, ἡ, Montefalc. Palaeogr. (Th.).
δυσπαρά-, Polyb.
κατά-, Alex. Mynd. ap. Ath.,+[1]
†ἐγκατά-, Ephraem. 8841 Bekk.
νεοκατά-, App.
ἀμετά-, Theod. Stud. (Th.).
ἔγ-, Arist.,+: ἔγγροφος, ἡ, SGDI. 5101. 43; ἔγγροφον, SGDI. 5149. 16, 31, 35, 36.
ψευδέγ-, Cic.
ἀνέγ-, Schol. Plat. Apol. p. 330 Bekk.
ἐπέγ-, IG. 3. 1112, 1127. 12, 1139. 8, 1144. 10, 1160. 50.
παρέγ, Posidon. ap. Ath. 211 F,+
πρωτέγ-, IG. 3. 1110, etc.
†σύγγραφον, pap. Lond. 2. 162.
σύγγραφος, ἡ, SGDI. 1222. 40, BCH. 21. 575. 16. IG. 7. 3171. 6, 3172, 34, etc.; σύγγροφος, IG. 4. 742. 2, 823. 49, 1485. 159, BCH. 26, pp. 42, 52, 65.
ἀσύγ-, Diod.

[1] Kaibel, Ep. Gr. Add. 459 a 5, reads Κατάγραφος in place of the earlier editor's κατάγραφος. But proper names in -γραφος are unknown, except for Φθειρογράφος, which is also doubtful.

-γραφος, ον
ζωη-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
μελι-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
καλλι-, Ps.-Herodian (Th.)., Simoc. 8. 13. 8,+
† πρωτοκαλλι-, Theod. Stud. 1740 D Migne.
ἡμί-, Menand. 4. 313 Mein.
λεξι-, Lex. in A.B. 1094.
ἐπί-, Greg. Nyss. (Th.), Nemes. 584 A Migne.
ψευδεπί-, SGDI. 3758. 123, Polyb.,+
ἀνεπί-, Tab. Heracl. 1. 84 (-γροφος), Polyb.,+
†περι-, CGL. 3. 327. 37.
περί-, Greg. Naz. 3. 406 A, 1574 A Migne,+
ἀπερί-, Dion H.,+
ἐμπερί-, Ps.-Athan. 4. 45 A. Migne, +
†ἰδιοπερί-, Jo. Damasc. 752 Migne.
αὐτοπερί-, Damascius (Th.).
εὐπερί-, Strabo,+
†κλησί-, S. Methodius ap. Symeon Magist. 643 Bekk., Georg. Cedr. 117 Bekk., etc.
ἀντί-, Dem.,+; ἀντίγροφον, IG. 12. 3. 248, SGDI. 5155.
†λαο-, Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 1052 Suppl., pap. Berl. 2. 14,+
† ?ἀκριβο-[1], Act. SS. Sept. 8. 348 E.
ἰαμβο-, Eudoc. M. 514,+
διθυραμβο-, Tzetz.
λογο-, Thuc.,+
σχεδο-, Euchait. 1149 B Migne,+
κιναιδο-, Choerob. in A.B. 1389,+
εἰδο-, Schol. Pind. Pyth. p. 31. 13 Drachm., E.M. 295. 52.
ἀμφοδο-, pap. Lond. 3. 30, 31.
ψευδο-, Arist.,+
ψευδό-, Hieron. ad Isai. prol. 4. 21. 1 Migne.

[1] The editors write ἀκριβογραφεῖν.

κωμῳδο-, Diosc. in Anth. P.
†θεο-, Pisid. Hexaem. 1816.
θεό-, Philostorg. 513 A Migne,+
νεό-, Mel. in Anth. P.
πεζο-, Diog. L.
φλυζο-, Schol. Nic.
ἠθο-, Arist.
ὀρθο-, Jo. Charax ad Theodos 2. 413. 6 Hilg.,+
†ὀρθό-, Mart. Cap. 1. 65.
ὀπισθό-, Plin. Ep. 3. 5. 17,+
μυθο-, Polyb.,+
γαιο-, Marcian Peripl. Maris Exteri 1. 1, Hesych.
†σκαιο-, Conc. Nic. 2 (Soph.)
κεφαλαιό-, Mauric. Strateg. (Th.).
συμβολαιο-, Aster. 229 C Migne,+
†ὡραιο-, Naucrat. de Obitu Theod. Stud. 1829 A Migne.
ἀρχαιο-, CGL. 2. 21. 8.
ἁγιό-, Epiph. 4. 7. 24, Dind.,+
ἰδιό-, LXX Ps. 151 tit., Gell.,+
τραγῳδιο-, Polyb.,+
†ξῳδιο-, Eust. Ant. 669 D Migne.
κωμῳδιο-, Polyb.,+
?ἰαμβειο-, Dem.
ἐλεγειο-, Anth. P.,+
οἰκειό-, Jo. Hierosol. Vit. Jo. Damasc. 453 B Migne.
σημειο-, Plut.,+
σκιο-, v. l. in LXX Sap. 15. 4, Hesych. s. v. σκιαγραφίαν.
βιβλιο-, Antiph. Com. 3. 114 Mein.,+
σχολιο-, Schol. recent. Ap. Rh.
ἐπιθαλαμιο-, Tzetz.
†ἀξιο-, Theoph. Chron. 440. 8 de Boor.
παροιμιο-, Th. without ref.
ἱστοριο-, Polyb.,+
ἐγκωμιο-, Artemid., M. Aurel. ap. Front. Ep. 31. 5 Naber, IG. 1773. 10

-γραφος, ον
†*ὁμοιο-*, Vett. Val. 74. 19 Kroll,+
ὁμοιό-, Apol. Dysc. 258. 14 Schn.,+
ἱστοριο-, Polyb., SGDI. 3758. 107,+
μυριό-, Jo. Geom.
κακο-, Phot. Bibl. 1092 B Migne.
†*φυλακο-*, Nicon Mon. (Du Cange).
πινακο-, Steph. B.,+
φλυακο-, Ath.
διαθηκο-, CGL. 2. 271. 11.
†*συνθηκο-*, Ditt. Syll. 177. 31, 38.
δικο-, Hyperid. fr. 234 Blass,+
†*φοινικο-*, IG. 12. 2. 96. 10, 97. 2.
λεξικο-, Jo. Lyd. 125. 4 Bekk.,+
†*τυπικο-*, Theod. Balsam. 28. 13, 34. 4 Horna.
μεγαλο-, Did. Al. 396 B Migne,+
†*καλό-*, M. Attal. (Koum.).
πεταλο-, Ephraem. (Th.).
βιβλο-, Phryn. 158 Ruth.
μελο-, Lucill. in Anth. P.,+
ποικιλο-, Diog. L.
κυκλο-, Procl. ad Hes. p. 6 Gaisf.,+
σιλλο-, Ath.,+
ὁλό-, Eus. H.E. 572. 9 Schwartz, Athan. 1. 296 A Migne,+
συμβολο-, Greg. Nyss. (Th.).
ἐπιστολο-, pap. Par. 70, pap. Tebt. 1. 112. 87, CIG. 4896 A, Cyrill. Al. 10. 1037 A.
ὑλο-, Ps.-Manetho.
†*φαυλο-*, Tzetz. in Ritschl Opusc. 1. 211 = Nauck Lex. Vind. XXXII.
†*βωλογράφορ*, SGDI. 1172. 37.
πολεμο-, IG. 4. 1153. 3.
ἀσημο-, Sgurop. (Th.).
ῥυθμο-, Tzetz.
μιμο-, Philodem. (L. and S., Herw.),+
ψαλμο-, Tert. (Saalfeld),+
ἀσματοψαλμο-, Anon. (Th.).
ὁμό-, Ps.-Herodian in Cram. An. Ox. 3. 234. 27.
νομο-, Plat.,+
τομο-, Ps.-Phot. Nomocanon (Koum.).
δασμο-, Greg. Naz. (Th.).
θεσμο-, Apollin. Psalm. 9. 39.
†? *χειρισμο-*, pap. Lips. 102. 1. 9.
κοσμο-, Did. Al. 693 A Migne,+
στεγανο-, Schneider without ref. (Th.).
παιανο-, Apoll. Hist. Mirab. 40.
θρανο-, Polyb., Hesych.
μηχανο-, Tzetz. Hist., 2. 152.
σκηνο-, Diog. L.
καινο-, MS. (Th.).
†*κομβινο-*, Theoph. cont. 198. 19.
κρημνο-, Tzetz. ad Hes. p. 9 Gaisf.
ὑμνο-, LXX Macc. 4. 18. 15,+
†*τυραννο-*, Acta Philippi (3d recension) 54. 23 Bonnet.
εἰκονο-, Arist.,+
μονο-, pap. Magd. 12. 5,+
χρονο-, Strabo,+
πορνο-, Ath.
τεχνο-, Anaximines (Ps.-Arist.) Rhet. Al.,+
παραδοξο-, Tzetz. Hist. 2. 151.
ἀπό-, Cic.,+
ἀναπό-, Hyperid.,+
ἐναπό-, Conc. Chalc. (Soph.), Justinian Novell. 48. 17 Zachariae,+
τοπο-, Diod. Excerpta Vat. 96. 5 Dind., Modern Gk.
ὑπό-, Augustus ap. Donat. Vit. Verg. 12,+
ἀννπό-, pap. Greco-Egizii 1. 16. 38 (?), CGL. 2. 231. 12, Memn. 1465 C Migne.
ἐννπό-, Agatho Epil. ad Conc. 6 (Th.), Theophan. Chron. 390. 12 de Boor,+
ῥωπο-, E.M. 705. 55.

-γραφος, ον
ἀνθρωπο-, Plin. N.H.
ῥυπαρο-, Plin. N.H.
φλυαρο-, Schol. Nic.
ἱέρο-, Caesarius 1100 Migne,+
ἱερό-, Max. Conf. 2. 57 A Migne,+
ἡμερο-, Marin. Vit. Procl. 64. 36 Cousin.
κηρο-, Th. without ref.
ἐρυθρό-, Nicet. Acom. 793. 20 Bekk.,+
†? Φθειρο-, Galen 13. 913 K.
†χειρο-, pap. Tebt. 1. 209.
χειρό-, Polyb., pap. Reinach 7. 8, 14, 22, SGDI. 2146. 6, 7,+
ἀχειρό-, Andr. C. 1304 A Migne,+
†προχειρο-, pap. Tebt. 1. 112. 116.
†ψενδαλληγορο-, Tzetz. (Koum.).
†ψευδυψηγορο, Tzetz. (Koum.).
φορο-, Greg. Naz. 3. 1177 A Migne.
χορο-, Luc. Alex. 6, Modern Gk.
†προγραφον, Lambros Romans Grecs glossaire; προ[γ]ρο[φ]ος? IG. 4. 506 (cf. Am. J. Arch. 1901, p. 170).
ἀπρό-, Hyperid. fr. 231 Blass.
κοπρο-, Tzetz. in Cram. An. Ox. 3. 365. 14.
σατυρο-, Diog. L.,+
ὡρο-, pap. Oxy. 4. 710. 3, Plut.
χωρο-, Strabo,+
†μεσο-, Plut. Marcell. 14.
μεσόγραφον, Eratosthenes Cyr. ap. Eutocius ad Archim. 3. 114 Heib.
†δεησο-,[1] Porph. Cer. 758, 774 Reiske.
ἰσο-, (or ἰσοκράγος?), Timon 30. 2 Diels.
†ἰσόγραφον, Men. P. 364. 7 Nieb.,+
φαλσφ-, Leont. Byz. 2. 1852 A Migne,+
γλωσσο-, Ath.,+
φαμουσο-, Tzetz. (Th.).
χρυσο-, Cedr. 1. 787. 22 Bekk.,+
†συναλλαγματο-, pap. Tebt. 1. 42. 6,+
†συνταγματο-, Vett. Val. 150. 6, etc., Kroll.
†δογματο-, inscr. Mitth. 3. 165. 1, SGDI. 238. 15, 16.
ποιηματο-, Schol. Il.
†γενηματο-, pap. Lond. 2. 320.
ὑπομνηματο-, LXX, pap. Lond. 1. 42,+
ἐπιγραμματο-, Anth. P. (?), Tzetz. Prolog. Lyc.
ὁμματο-, Ion 25 Nauck.
ὀνοματο-, Tzetz. in Cram. An. Par. 1. 62. 2.
ἀσματο-, Theod. Stud. 389 A Migne,+
πλασματο-, Doxopatres in Walz Rhett.
ψηφισματο-, Anon. in Arist. Rhet. 26 Rabe, Argum. Ar. Av.
†ποιητο-, inscr. Mitth. 9. 61 f.
†λιτό-, Mich. Attal. (Koum.).
†πολιτο-, Dittenb. Inscr. Gr. Or. 528. 5, etc.
φυλακτο-, Nicon Mon. (Th.).
δελτο-, Aesch.
ἀναισχυντο-, Polyb.
λεπτό-, Luc.
χαρτο-, CGL. 2. 475. 51.
πλαστο-, Ptol. (Soph.). Artemid., Vett. Val. 16. 11 Kroll,+
χριστό-, Porph. (Th.).
μυστο-, Jo. Lyd. 212. 1 Bekk.,+
θαλαττο-, Tzetz.
αὐτό-, Posidon. ap. Ath. 5. 214 E,+

[1] Koum., *Sylloge*, writes δεησ(ε)ο-; but στασιωτοιός, γενεσιουργός, etc., would suggest δεησ(ι)ο-.

-γραφος, ον
ἐρωτο-, Mel. in Anth. P.
†πρωτο-, Tzetz. in Ritschl, Opusc. 1. 211 = Nauck Lex. Vind. 32.
πρωτό-, Nicet. Byz. 748 B Migne,+
ἀσαφό-, Georg. Plethon in Walz Rhett.
τοιχο-, Edict. Dioclet. 7. 8 in CIL. 3 Suppl. 3 p. 1935, Adam. 204. 10 Bakh.
στιχο-, Anon. Epigr. in Anth. P. append. 321 = Menag. ad Diog. L. 5. 35.
ζωο-, Theocr.
ἠρωο-, Tzetz. (Th.).
πρόσ-, pap. Goodsp. 8. 3, Dion. H.,+
†βραδυ-, Pisid. Heracl. 2. 153.
εὖ-, Paul. Sil.
Εὖ-, P.
πολυ-, Cic.,+
ὀξυ-, LXX,+
συμβολαιου- (= συμβολαιο-), pap. Grenf. 1. 58. 25.
ταχυ-, Origen 4. 108. 5 Preuschen, +
γεω-, Amm. Marcell. 22. 15. 4,+
†ψευδογεω-, Sarisb. (Saalfeld).
ζω-, Hdt.,+
†διαζώ-, Gromat. Vet. 7. 21, 26. 26.
καταζώ-, Lex. MS. (Th.).
ἀρχιζω-, Eust. de Capt. Thess. 512 Bekk.
ἐνζώ-, Epiphan. 1. 69. 11 Dind.
ὑποζώ-, Ps.-Basil. 3. 617 D Paris.
(σ)κέραφος also σχέραφος, Hesych. [p. 198.
†θήραφος, late medic. (Du Cange) [p. 207.
†*εἰραφος, [p. 201.
κίραφος, Hesych. [p. 200.
σκίραφος, Hipponax 86 Bergk,+ [p. 204.
ἠνιο-ράφος, CIG. 9175 (lap., INIO-), CGL. 2. 144. 43, 3. 307. 64.
κόραφος, Hesych. [p. 199.
-ραφος, ον, paroxytone and properoxytone.
†βελο-, CGL. 3, 271. 62.
πελλο-, CGL. 2, 144. 46.
†ἁρμενο-, Porph. Cer. 1. 764. 17 Reiske.
†? κοσκινο-, pap. Tebt. 2. 540.
†βελονο-, CGL. 3. 202. 7.
†κεντρωνο-, CGL. 3. 308. 24, 525. 49.
? Νεβρο-, P.
πραγματο-, CGL. 2. 415. 1.
†σαγματο-, pap. Goodsp. 30. 38. 19.
δερματο-, CGL. 2. 268. 30.
†βαιτο-, CGL. 2. 144. 50.
ἀ(ρ)-, N.T.,+
κατάρ-, Luc.
†ψενδορ , Eust. Ant. 645 C Migne.
παλαιο(ρ)-, Hippol. Haer. 130. 45, CGL. 3. 307. 65.
ἱστιο(ρ)-, Ar.,+
κακορ-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
δικορ-, Poll. 4. 36, Phryn. in A.B.,+
πεδιλορ-, Nicet. Acom. 411. 17 Bekk.
δολορ-, Tzetz.
μηχανορ-, Soph.,+
σκηνορ-, Ael.,+
†καινόρ-, Theo. Stud. (Koum.).
χαλινορ-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
†μονόρ-, Theod. Stud. (Koum.).
νευρο(ρ)-, Ar.,+
†χρυσόρ-, Eus. Al. 444 C Migne.
ὑποδηματορ-, Herodian 1. 225. 21,+
†ἐσθητορ-, Philes (Koum.).
σκυτορ-, Oribas. (Th.).
πολύρ-, Soph.,+
τράφος = τάφρος, ἡ, Tab. Heracl. 1. 130,+
†ζάτραφα, Alcm. 136 B Bergk.

κότραφος = κρόταφος, Pappus Collect. 1062. 8,+
ἐγ-κότραφος, late medic. (Th.).
†βούραφος, Niceph. Cpol. Hist. 49. 6 de Boor.
χρύσαφος, Marcell. Sidet. (Th.), Schol. Dion. Thrac. 196. 10 Hilg.[1] [p. 200.
τάφος, Hom.,+
Τάφος, P.
ἄ-ταφος, ον, Hdt.,+
βλαψί-ταφος, ον, IG. 14. 943. 4.
Τέκταφος, P. [p. 206.
-ταφος, ον, paroxytone and properoxytone.
σύν-, Plat.
†βιο-, pap. Grenf. 2. 15. 2. 7.
βιβλιο-, Isid. Pelus. 268 B Migne.
†κριο-, pap. Tebt. 1. 61 b 401, 72. 411.
κακό-, Schol. Opp. (Th.).
ὁμό-, Aesch.,+
καινό-, Palladas in Anth. P 7. 686.
ἀπό-, Dinarch., IG. 12. 1. 656,+
κηπόταφος ὁ, inscr. Papers Amer. School at Athens 3, No. 621.
κρόταφος, Hom., [pp. 203, 208.
ἐγ-κρόταφος, Etym. Gud. 158. 32.
νεκρο-τάφος, pap. Tebt. 2. 589, Ps.-Manetho,+
πυρι-κρόταφος, ον, Hesych.
πολιο-κρόταφος, ον, Hom.,+
κοιλο-κρόταφος, ον, Aretae.
†δολιχο-κρόταφος, ον, IG. 2. 1310.
†ξώ-ταφος, ον, Act. SS. Apr. 3 XXXII D = Iun. 4. 218 F.
†Ἄσταφος, Liban. Ep. 140 [p. 206.
?Ἰό-ψαφος, Hesych.
†ἁλίεφος, Gl. Botan. (Du Cange).
†γάλεφος, Interpol. Diosc. 4. 93 [p. 205.
?κοσάλεφος, Hesych.
κελεφος, Hegemonius 15. 9 Beeson,+ [p. 202.
σκέλεφορ (MS. σκέλεφερ), Hesych. [p. 202.
ἀστέλεφος, Hesych.
Τήλεφος, P.
κατά-νεφος, ον, Jul. Afric. Cest. 970 E Meurs.
σύν-νεφος, ον, Joseph.,+
†πάμ-βρεφος, ον, Georg. Codin. 155 Bekk.
ἥμ-βρεφος, ον, Anth. P.
ἄ-στεφος, ον, Apoll. Dysc. 1. 31. 15 Schneid.
†ὁμό-στεφος, ον, Steph. Diac. Vit. Steph, Iun. 1185 B Migne.
†ὑπό-στρεφος, ον, Pisid. Hexaem. 605.
†Ἄλθηφον or Ἄλθηφος, IG. 4. 757 B 26 [p. 205.
λίηφος, η, ον, Hesych. [p. 203.
?φλῆφος, Hesych.
Νῆφος, P.
†κνηφός, CGL. 2. 192. 23.
ψῆφος, ἡ, Aesch.,+
-ψηφος, ον.
ἄ-, Artemid.
περί-, Hesych. s. v. ῥυπαρός, Schol. Ar.
ἀντί-, Ps.-Plat.,+
ἥμ-, Inscr. Or. Sept. Pont. Eux. p. 104, Schol. Dion. Thrac. 465. 8 Hilg.
σύμ-, Plat.,+
†νεόψηφον, Anon. ap. Suet. Nero 39; see Bücheler RhM. 1906. 307 f.
†?ὁμοιό-, LXX Macc. 2. 14. 20.
ὁμό-, Hdt.
μονό-, Aesch., Pind.
ἀπό-, Phryn. in A.B. 9: 20.
ὑπό-, Synes. 1221 A Migne,+

[1] This conjecture of R. Schneider's is certainly correct, although Hilgard does not admit it into his text.

-ψηφος, ον
ἰσό-, Aesch.,+
λεπτό-, Plin. 36. 57; cf. CGL. 3. 568. 14.
πολύ-, Luc.,+
Δαγαλάιφος, P.
†μεγαλόλαιφος, ον, Manass. in Annu. de l'Assoc. 9. 61. 620.
σκιφός, ή, όν, Interpol. Suid. (Th.), Anon. Interpres Rhamplii (Du Cange).
Νάλιφος, P.
†*σκελιφος, [p. 202.
ἀνήλιφος, ον,[1] Cass. Dio,+
ἀνυπήλιφος, ον,[1] Phryn. in A.B. 21. 7.
Τύλιφος, P. [p. 206.
Μισόγνιφος, P.
κίνιφος, η, ον, Suid., Anton. Mon. [p. 203.
σκνιφός, ή, όν "niggardly," Phryn. 486 Ruth.,+ [p. 210.
σκνιφός ή, όν, "dim-sighted," Hesych. [p. 210.
†ὑπό-, pap. Petr.[2] 7. 26,+
ἀγάν-νιφος, ον, Hom.,+
δύσ-, Nonn.
πολύ-, E.M. 7. 9.
-ξιφος, ον
ἄ-, Lyc., Choerob. ad Theodos. Canon. 1. 166. 25 Hilg.
†*Ἀνάξιφος (from *Ἀναξι-ξιφος?), Tzetz. Lyc. 451.
ἔγ-, Schol. Dion. Thrac. 465. 11 Hilg., Theodos. Diac. Cret. 1. 51.
†σύγ-, Schol. Dion. Thrac. 465. 11 Hilg.
μυριό-, Theodos. Diac. Cret. 1. 6, 2. 116.
χρυσό-, Lex. MS. (Th.).
εὖ-, Apollon. de Synt. (Th.).
†οἰφός, Theocr. 5. 43, Schol. ad loc.
διφθεράλοιφος, inscr. Jour. Hell. St. 12. 330, Cyprii ap. Hesych.
φιλ-οιφος,[2] Herodian 2. 450. 2, Hesych.
κόρ-οιφος (κόρσ- in E.M. 531. 22), Schol. Theocr. 4. 62.
Κόροιφος, P.
σκάριφος, Hesych.,+ [p. 209.
σκάριφον, Georg. Codin. Antiq. Cpol. 147 Bekk.,+ [p. 209.
†?Σκάριφος, CIL. 4. 1892.
γρῖφος "riddle," Ar.,+ [p. 210.
?γρῖφος "creel," Plut., Opp. [p. 210.
†Γρῖφος, IG. 12. 8. 84. 4.
ἄγριφος, "wild olive," Hesych. [p. 205.
†ἄγριφος, "grapple," Porph. Cer. 670 Reiske [p. 205.
δρίφος = δίφρος, Sophron 10 Kaib.,+
ἔριφος, Hom.,+ [p. 197.
*Ἔριφος, P. [p. 206.
φιλέριφος, P.
†Νέριφος (v. l., -ιπος), Pliny N.H. 4. 74.
σέριφος, η, ον, Hesych., Suid.,+ [p. 202.
Σέριφος, P. [p. 202.
†ἑκατοντ-έριφος, inscr. Musée Belge 11, 33.
στέριφος "barren," Ar.,+ [p. 203.
στέριφος "firm," Thuc.,+ [p. 203.
αὐτο-στέριφος, ον, Hesych.
†Φιλ-ήριφος, IG. 2. 1208. 14.
Νήριφος, P.
†ἀναπόριφος, ον, pap. Keny. 282. 13,+
?τρίφος = τρίβος, Gl. (Du Cange) [p. 213.
†*Ἀγήσιφος, CIG. 2561 d 3, e 3 Add.
*Ἄντιφος, P. [p. 206.
ψιφός, ή, όν, Hesych.

[1] For the spelling, see Herodian 1. 472. 32 ff.

[2] The word is probably proparoxytone, like the great mass of o-stem compounds with φιλο as first member.

ἀλφός, Hes. fr. 29. 2 Rz.²,+ [p. 197.
?σιγαλφοί "ἄφωνοι," Hesych. [p. 199.
σιγαλφοί "ἄγριοι τέττιγες," Hesych. [p. 199.
†δαλφός = ἀδελφός, pap. Tebt. 1. 104. 11.
?ἔλφος, Hesych. s. v. ἕλπος [p. 210.
Βελφός = Δελφός, P.
†δελφός = ἀδελφός, pap. Par. 23. 13.
Δελφός, Δελφοί, P.
ἀδελφός, Aesch., Pind.,+
Ἀδελφος, P.
-άδελφος,[1] ον; also η, ον, cf. words in -αδέλφη.
†ὀλιγ-, Vett. Val. 123. 7, 8, 17 Kroll.
ψευδ-, N.T.,+
θε-, Theod. Stud. 785 C. Migne,+
Θε-, P.
†Δι-, pap. Berl. 1. 15. 1. 4, 9.
τρι-, Orac. Sib. 5. 215,+
Τρι-, P.
γυναικ-, Chron. Pasch. 561. 2 Dind.,+
φιλ- (η, ον, Ditt. Insc. Gr. Or. 1. 30), Soph.,+
Φιλ-, P.
ἀφιλ-, Vett. Val. 18. 21 Kroll,+
†ἐρημ-, Theod. Stud. 1644 C Migne.
ὁμ-, inscr. BCH. 21. 593, Schol. Ar. Ran. 768 Dind.,+
ἀν-, Eur.,+
σπαν-, Vett. Val. 17. 10 Kroll, Sext. Emp.,+
τεκν-, Apophth. 101 B Migne.
συν-, Xen.,+
ἐξ-, LXX Tobit 1. 22,+
ἀνδροεξ-, Schol. Basilic. (Th.).
†τετταρεξάδελφοι, Theod. Balsam. 1201 C, 1204 Migne.
δευτερεξ-, Georg. Acropolit. Ann. 106. 19 Bekk.
δισεξ-, Schol. Ap. Rh. 3. 359,+
τρισεξ-, Poeta ap. Schol. Thuc. 3. 2.
πρωτεξ-, Georg. Acropolit. Ann. 15. 19 Bekk.
γυναικο-, Eccl. (Th.).
†?Ἐπ-, cf. Fick-Bechtel.
λιπ-, Kaib. Ep. Gr. 241. 9.
ἀνδρ-, Theophan. Chron. 454. 21 de Boor,+
πατρ-, Eur. (?) Oeneus in pap. Hib. 1. 4. 5, Isae.,+
μητρ-, Plut. 2. 312 B,+
ἰσ-, Eur.
μισ-, Dion. H. Ant. Rom. 3. 21,+
περισσ-, Vett. Val. 18. 33 Kroll.
δυσ-, Aesch.,+
χριστ-, Pisid.
αὐτ-, Aesch.,+
φιλαντ-, Genes. 81. 15 Lachm.
†εὐ-, Vett. Val. 16. 26, 17. 20 Kroll.
πολυ-, Vett. Val. 16. 29, etc.,+
ὁμόδελφος, ον (or ὁμά-? cf. Kretschmer, Glotta 2. 202), Call. fr. 168 Schneid.
μιλφός, ή, όν, CGL. 2. 123. 45, 3. 86. 62, 180. 39, etc.
δολφός (ή?), Hesych.
†κόλφος = κόλπος, IG. 14. 189,+ [p. 211.
πολφός, Ar. fr. 798 Bl.
†Γανδοῦλφος, CIG. 8726 b.
Παυδοῦλφος, P.
Κάτουλφος, P.
?ῥαμφός, ή, όν (MS. ῥαμψόν, Hesych.
†μακροσκελόρραμφος, ον, Manass. in Annu. de l'Assoc. 9. 56. 507.
†Διδύραμφος, Kretschmer Vaseninschr. 152.
λέμφος, η, ον, Menand. Epitrep. 344 Körte, etc.,+
λέμφος, Liban. (Th.).
†ὑπόμεμφος, ον "tributary to Memphis," pap. Berl. 2. 460. 3.

[1] The tradition sometimes gives -αδελφός.

λιμφός, Hesych. [p. 215.
γόμφος, Hom.,+[p. 201.
Γόμφος, Γόμφοι, P.
-γομφος, ον.
καλλί-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
†περί-, inscr. BCH. 1890. 468.
τρί-, Soph. fr. 293. 2 Nauck.
ἀντί-, Pisid. Hexaem. 1707.
δερριδό-, Hesych.
χαλκεό-, Simon. 22. 7 Crusius.
σωκρατό-, Telecl. 2. 372 Mein.
εὖ-, Eur.
πολύ-, Hes.,+
?νεομφός, ή, όν, Anon. Definitt. (Th.).
Σκόμφος, P.
μόμφος, Eur. fr. 634 Nauck.
ἄμομφος, ον, Aesch.
κατά-, ον, Aesch.
ἐπί-, ον, Aesch.,+
†ἴν-, ον, inscr. Buck Dialects 16.35.
πομφός, Ps.-Hipp. 22. 286, 775 Kühn, Galen Lex. Hipp. [p. 209.
†Ἀπομφος, SGDI. 2580. 49.
σομφός, ή, όν, Alexis 3. 440 Mein., Ps.-Hipp.,+[p. 213.
χαννόσομφος, ον (or χαῦνον καί σομφόν?), Erotian (Th.).
ὑπό-, ον, Erotian (Th.), Galen 6. 571 K.,+
στόμφος, Anon. de Sublim. 3. 1, 32. 7, Modern Gk. [p. 213.
στομφός, ή, όν, Schol. Hermog. in Walz Rhett. 7. 2. 963.
†?εὔομφος, ον, "ὀνομαστός (MS. ὀνόματα)," Hesych.
εὔομφος, ον, Arcadian for εὔοσμος. Timachidas ap. Ath. 682 C. (cod. εὐόμφαλος, corr. Nauck).
Νύμφος, P.
-νυμφος, ον.
ἀ-, Soph.,+
παρά-, Acta Thomae 7, 11, 12, 124 Bonnet, Poll.,+
τετράνυμφον, Chron. Pasch. 474 Dind.
τρίνυμφον, Jo. Mal. 244. 9 Dind.
κλεψί-, Lyc.
σύν-, LXX Ruth 1. 15,+
ζενγό-, Porph., Cer. 379. 17 Reiske.
†θεό-, Jos. Hymnog. 1024 B Migne,+
νεό-, Parthenius op. Plut. 2. 310 E,+
κακό-, Eur.
φιλό-, Jo. Damasc. 3. 781 A Migne.
μελλό-, Soph.,+
ὁμό-, Orac. Sib.,+
ἀπο-, Poll.
λαθρό-, Lyc.
ἀπειρό-, Theod. Stud. (Th.).
μισό-, Lyc.
πρωτό-, Theod. Stud. (Th.).
δύσ-, Eur.,+
πολύ-, Poll.
ζόφος, Hom.,+
μελάνζοφος, ον, Simon. ap. Schol. Dion. Thrac. 346. 27 Hilg., E.M.
πάν-, Steph. Diac. Vit. Steph. Iun. 1129 D Migne,+
†ὑπό-, Mich. Acom. (Koum.).
†βαθύ-, Miller Journ. d. Sav. 1868. 251 fn., without ref.
†πτοκόφος = *πτοκύφος, pap. Tebt. 1. 5. 170.
λόφος, Hom.,+
-λοφος, ον
τετρά-, Paraphr. Il. (L. & S.)
ἑπτά-, Cic.,+
ἀργέλοφοι, Ar., Phryn. in A.B. 8. 14, 443. 4.
γή-, Xen.,+ (See note on γεώ-.)
δανή- (or τανή-?), Hesych.
ἀργί-, Pind. fr. 140 b 58 Schr.
δί-, Soph.
τρί-, Polyaen.,+
ἀερσί-, Ap. Rh.,+

-λοφος, ον
'Αντί-, Bechtel Ion. Inscr. 19. 158.
ἀμφί-, Soph.
ὑψί-, Pind.,+
ἄλ-, Hom.,+
?γοργό-, Lex. MS. (Th.).
ξανθό-, Hesych. s. v. φοινικολόφοιο, +
γειό=γεώ-, Ps.-Herodian (Th.).
φοινικό-, Eur.,+
λευκό-, Ar.,+
Λευκό-, P.
ὑψηλό- = ὑψί-, Ps.-Hipp. 23. 791 Kühn.
†Τιμό-, IGA. 372. 368.
δοχμό-, Aesch. Sept. 114 (MSS. -λόφων; Brunck and others -λοφᾶν).
κυνόλοφον, Poll. 2. 180.
φριξό-, Hesych.
ἱππό-, Ar.,+
ξηρό-, Mich. Mon. Vit. Theod. Stud. (Th.).
Ξηρό-, P.
ἀκρό-, Plut.,+
ἀργυρό-, Ideler Phys. (Th.).
Μεσόλοφον, P.
?σεισό-, Hesych.
πυρσόλοφοι, Antim. ap. Hesych. (MS. πυρώλοφοι), Phot.
περισσό-, Opp.
χρυσό-, Ar., Hesych.
Τόλοφος, P.
ὑπέρ-λοφος, ον, Nonn.,+
δυσ-, Aesch.,+
εὖ-, Soph.,+
αἰπύ-, Nonn.
γεώ-,[1] Xen. (?), Theophr. Physic. Opin. fr. 12. 23 Diels,+
παρώλοφα τά, Hesych.

γνόφος, Aesch. (?) fr. 464. 4 Nauck, Arist. 392 b 12 Bekk.,+
†τυραννογνόφος, Acta Philippi, 2d Recension, 116, 133, 134.
βαθύγνοφος, ον, Ps.-Greg. Nas. 4. 257 A Migne,+
†σύγνοφον, Corona Pretiosa (Meurs), Anon. de Nupt. Thes. (Du Cange).
δνόφος, Simon. 22. 8 Crusius,+
ἄγροφος, η, ον, Galen Lex. Hipp.,+ [p. 203.
-γροφος, see -γραφος, ἐγ-, σύγ-, ἀνεπί-, ἀντί-, πρό-.
Θελέροφος, P. [p. 206.
†θροφός, ἡ = τροφός, Kretschmer Vaseninschr. p. 150.
ὄροφος, Hom.,+
-όροφος, ον; see also -ώροφος. (See Herw. s. v. ὀροφά.)
δι-, Eus. (Wyttemb.), Hippol. 632 C Migne.
τρι-, Hdt.
ὁμ-, Ath., 437 E.
ἀν-, Eur.
ὑπ-, Eur.
πετρ-, Ps.-Herodian (Th.).
τετρ-, Hdt.
μετεωρ-, Lex. MS. (Th.).
†θασό-ροφον, Theoph. Nonn. (Koum.).
κυπαρισσ-όροφος, ον, Eur. Hypsipyle fr. 58. 10 in pap. Oxy. 6 (?), Mnesim. 3. 568 Mein.
χρυσ-, Philox. 11 Crusius,+
†πεντ-, Anna Comn. 15. 11.
αὐτ-, Dion. H.,+
εὐ-, Antip. in Anth. P.,+
πολ-, Strabo 17. 1. 6,+
ψυχό-ροφος, ον, Hesych.
ὑψ-όροφος, -ον,[2] Hom.,+

[1] This word is primarily an adjective. It occurs as an attributive of ὄρη in Strabo 16. 2. 16, and the substantive is of the neuter gender in Theocr. 1. 13, 5. 103, CGL. 3. 260. 37, and Nicet. Acom. 669 Bekk. Cf. γήλοφον τό, Joseph. B. J. 1. 420, beside γήλοφος, Xen. An. 1. 10. 12, etc.

[2] So also in Luc. Dom. 9. As L. was quoting Homer, he certainly did not write *ὑψώροφον.

-ρρόφος, ον
αἱμο-, Theodos. Diac. Cret. 4. 59.
αἱματο-, Aesch.,+
τροφός, όν, Hom.,+
τροφοί· θρέμματα, Hesych.
-τροφος, ον, paroxytone and properispomenon.
ἀ- "not nourishing," Arist.,+
ἄ- "not nourished," Xen.,+
συνανά-, Hesych. s.v. σύντροφον,+
εὐανά-, Schol. Lyc.
παρά-, Polyb.
†ἀγελη-, Poll. 1. 181.
σταχυη-, Antip. in Anth. P., Orac. Sib. 4. 74.
†ζωη-, inscr. CR. 24. 12.
?ὠρεί- (MS. ὠρεσσί-; Stadtm. ὠρό-), Anth. P.
† ἁλι-, Const. Rh. Apost. 666.
ἁλί-, Opp.,+
ἀκριδομελί-, Christoph. Patric. (Koum.).
ἀξί-, Orph. H.
αὐξί-, Orph. H.
ὀρί-, Babr.,+
πυρι-, Philipp. in Anth. P.
ποεσι-, Opp.
ὀρεσί-, Hom.,+
'Ονησί-, P.
πορτι- h. Hom. Ap., Bacchyl. 10. 30.
ἔκ-, Kaib. Ep. Gr. 872. 6.
συνέκ-, LXX.
παν-,[1] Aesch., Mel. in Anth. P., Ditt. Inscr. Gr. Or. 383. 52,+
ἐν-, Soph.,+
σύν-, active, Plat.,+
σύν-, passive, Soph.,+
Σύν-, P.
ἀσύντροφον, Interpol. Diosc. 4. 37,+
λαο-, Pind.
γλαγό-, Lyc.
τραγο-, Rembertus Dodonaeus (Th.).
ὀλιγο-, Ps.-Hipp. 21. 189 Kühn, Diph. ap. Ath. 120 E.
ὀλιγό- "taking little nourishment," Arist., Theophr. CP. 3. 13. 4, etc.
φλογο-, Greg. Nyss. 3. 737 D Migne.
ζευγο-, Plut.
ὀρτυγο-, Plat.,+
παιδο-, Simon 7 Crusius,+
†Παιδό-, Dumont Inscr. céram. d. Grèce 160.
ἀσπιδό-, Galen 11. 143 K.
λουδο-, CGL. 2. 120. 51.
†θεο-, Anast. Sin. 1053 B Migne,+
†Θεό-, IG. 1504. 2. 25.
νεό-, Aesch.,+
ὀρνεο-, Ps.-Jo. Chrys. (Th.), CGL. 3. 371. 36, pap. Berl. 3. 725. 7.
ὀρνιθο-, Diod., Modern Gk.
ἀνθο-, Hesych. s.v. ἀνθοβοσκόν.
†ἀκανθο-, Philes. (Koum).
†ἰακυνθο-, SGDI. 3502. 13, 3512. 4.
βυθό-, Manass. Chron. 6655.
σκυθο-, Pisid. Bell. Av. 204, Heracl. 2. 73.
†στρουθο-, Philes (Koum).
†ἰο-, Bacchyl. 19. 6.
ἀγελαιο-, Max. Tyr. 26. 6.
βιο-, Pisid. Hekaem. 718.
†διο-, Eur. Hypsipyle fr. 1. 3. 23 in pap. Oxy. 6. 37.
ἰδιο-, Plat.
ἰδιό-, Arist.
ἐλειό-, Archestr.
σακκογενειο-, Hegesand. ap. Ath. 4. 162 A.
ποιμνιο-, Aq. Regg. 4. 3. 4.
ποιο-, Opp.
†μολοβριο-, Philes (Koum.).
θηριο-, Strabo 2. 5. 33, 17. 3. 1,+

[1] The traditional properispomenesis is surely incorrect.

-τροφος, ον
θηριό-, Galen 11. 143 K.
μυριό-, Pisid. Hexaem. 1809.
† ἱστιό-, Philes (Koum.).
ὀφιο-, Theod. Stud. 1489 A Migne.
† κακό-, Th. without ref.
σκυλακο-, Opp.
δονακο-, Theogn.,+
ἱερακο-, Eunap. Excerpt. 95. 18 Bekk.
γυναικό-, Suid., E.M. s.v. τηθαλλαδοῦς.
περδικο-, Strabo.
φοινικο-, Strabo.
? οἰκό-, Dio Chr. 1. 97. 26 Dind.
ἀρκο-, Conc. Chalc. (Soph.), Procopius 3. 56. 15 Haury.
σαρκο-, Ideler Phys. (Th.).
λευκό-, Ar.
καλό-, Hesych. s.v. καλοτίθηνα.
ἀμπελο-, Bacchyl. 6. 5,+
μηλο-, Archil. fr. 31 Crusius,+
† καμηλο-, pap. Berl. 607. 12, 697. 9.
πηλό-, Opp.
φιλό-, Vett. Val. 18. 34 Kroll, IG. 12. 8. 472. 3,+
ὑλό-, Ps.-Theocr. 24.
ξυλο-, Chrestom. Strabonis (Th.).
πωλο-, Anth., P., CGL. 2. 426. 57.
? ἀνεμό-, Anacreont. 36 Crusius.
ἀμμό-, Mel. in Anth. P.
ὁμό-, h. Hom. Ap.,+
κοσμο-, Ps.-Manetho 1. 2, Procl. ad Plat. Crat. 93. 27 Pasquali, IG. 14. 1108 C.
† λιβανό-, Philes (Koum.).
† χοιροβαλανο-, Const. Rh. (Koum.).
βοτανο-, Schol. Eur. Phoen. 647, 1541.
ὀρφανο-, Eus. Al. 425 D Migne,+
ξενο-, VV. LL. (Th.).
† ? συσκηνο-, Buecheler's conj. in CGL. 2. 126. 58.
κτηνο-, LXX,+
προβατοκτηνο-, inscr. in Archiv f. Papyrusforsch. 2. 430, pap. Lond. 3. 79, 84, 86, 141.
χηνο-, Herodian 2. 848. 25 L., Wilck. Ostr. 2. 304 (written -τροπος).
† ὀνοκλαινο-, pap. Lond. 3. 191.
οἰνο-, Anth. P.
πινο-, Tzetz. Lyc.
† ἀκτινο-, Theod. Balsam. 28. 1. Horna.
† σχινό-, Philes (Koum.).
τεκνο-, Ps.-Jo. Chrys. (Th.).
σκυμνο-, Manass. Chron. 5861.
† ὀνο-, pap. Lips. 97. 8. 20, 16. 1, 21. 16.
† πλεονο-, CGL. 2. 199. 4.
† μισοφθονό-, G. Melit. (Koum.).
χιονο-, Eur.
ἀλεκτρυονο-, Aeschin.
πορνο-, Philo 3. 116. 17 Cohn.
κυνο-, Galen 14. 170. 6 K.,+
βοο-, Dion. P.,+
ἀπό- "alibi educatus," Hdt.,+
† ἀπό- = ἄτερ-, Ideler Phys. (Koum.).
ἱππο-, Hes.,+
φιλιππό- (or -τρόφος ?), Ps.-Phalar. Epist. (Th.).
τεθριππο-, Hdt.
καρπο-, Eur. Ion. 475 (?), Lyc.,+
ὑπό-, Eur., Kern Inscr. von Magn. 117. 10.
ἀνθρωπο-, Hesych.
βαρβαρο-, Theodos. Diac. Cret. 1. 180.
† δενδρο-, Max. Tyr. 31. 7.
χλοερο-, Eur.
ἑτερό-, Synes. 1089 C Migne.
ἰβηρο-, Manass. Chron. 5965,+
γηρο-, Pind. fr. 214 Schr.[2]
θηρο-, Eur.,+
θηρό-, Eur., Schol. Eur.

-τροφος, ον
κηρο- (κήρ), Nic.
κηρο- (κηρός), Philipp. in Anth. P. 6. 236.
ἑταιρο-, Ps.-Manetho, Athan. 1. 717 B Migne.
χειρο-, Philes.
χειρό-, Philes.
†χοιρο-, Cosmas Hierosol. ad Greg. Naz. Carm. 62,+
†βορβορό-, Philes (Koum.).
σπορο-, Psellus (Th.).
κουρο-, Hom.,+
Κο(υ)ρο , P.
πυρο-, Pisid. Hexaem. 1362,+
†ψυχρο-, Plin. 25. 84,+
ὡρο-, Orph. H., Anth. P. 9. 524 (? Stadtmüller's conjecture).
τιθασο-, Opp.
νοσο-, Lex. MS. (Th.), Modern Gk.
δροσό-, Manass. Chron. 4630.
μελισσο-, Eur. Tro. 799,+
πισσο-, Plut.
προβατο-, Schol. Pind. P. 12. 1, CGL. 2. 144. 50.
ὑδατό-, Manass. Chron. 192.
†λιμιτο-, Cod. Theod. 5. 13. 38 H., Cod. Just. 11. 60.
κυματο-, Joseph Rhacend. in Walz Rhett.
κητο-, Eust.
πενητο-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
σητο-, Isid. Pelus. 268 B Migne.
μελιτο-, Eust. (Th.)
νηριτο-, Aesch. fr. 285 Nauck.
γαλακτό-, Philox. 2. 29 Crusius.
†ἀποαρκτο-, Conc. Chal. (Soph.).
παντο-, Aesch. fr. 192. 4 Nauck,+
†σκοτο-, Theod. Balsam. 37. 31 Horna.
κλεπτό-, Suid. s.v. δειπνολόχον.
νεοττο-, Manass. Chron. 4973.
αὐτό-, Phryn. 285 Ruth.
φυτο-, Ap. Rh.,+
λωτο-, Eur.
ἐρωτο-, Orph. Arg.
πρωτο-, Manetho,+
πρωτό-, Ptol. (Soph.).
φωτο- (or -φόρος), Manass. Chron. 3887, 4484.
†φωτό-, Sophrns. 3228 C Migne.
ἰχθυο-, Plut.
ἐγχελυο-, Arist. fr. 294 Bekk., etc.
βοτρυο-, Orph. H. 29. 5.
συο-, Joseph.,+
πιτυο-, Alcaeus in Anth. Plan. 8.
σταχυο-, Orph. H.
βρεφο-, Cod. Just. 1. 3. 41. 20,+
μονομαχο-, CGL. 2. 120. 51.
μοσχο-, Hesych. s.v. τιθήνη.
ψυχο-, Orph. H.,+
ψυχότροφον (or ψυχρό-?) Diosc.,+
πτωχο-, Cod. Just. 1. 3. 41. 20,+
ζωο-, Clem. Al. 1. 111. 7 Stählin,+
στρόφος, Hom.,+[p. 212.
-στροφος, ον, paroxytone and proparoxytone.
ἀ-, Aesch.,+
ἀ- "without strophes," Hephaest. 69. 5 Consbruch.
Ἀγά-, P.
διά-, Aesch.,+
ἀδιά-, Ps.-Arist. Probl., LXX Macc. 3. 3. 3,+
ἐνδιά-, Basil. 1. 513 B. Migne,+ (Adv., Eus. H.E. 10. 5).
εὐδιά-, Theod. Prodr. (Th.).
μαστροφός = μασιροπός, Hesych. [p. 206.
ἀναστρόφως, Nicom. Isag. 1. 23. 10,+
†συνανά-, Germ. 357 A Migne.
ἐξανάστροφα, adv., Theoph. Chron. 408. 16 de Boor,+
κακοανά-, Procl. (Th.)
εὐανά-, Ptol. (Soph.), Procl. (Th.).
†τετρά-, Serv. 468. 21 K.,+
ἀκατά-, Dion. H.,+

-στροφος, ον
εὐκαταστρόφως, Ps.-Dem. Phal. 10.
ἀμετά-, Plat.,+
ἑπτά-, Hephaest. 74. 19 Consbruch.
†λυγί-, Const. Rh. Apost. 76.
δί-, pap. Berl. 590. 9, 11 (? cf. Herw.[2] 392 f.), Meges ap. Orib. 3. 638. 12,+
ἀεί-, Pisid. Van. Vit. 144,+
ἐλελί-, Hesych.
ἐπί-, Hom.,+
Ἐπί-, P.
φιλεπί- (or φιλυπό-), Nilus (Th.).
ἀνεπί-, Procl. ad Plat. Remp. 69, 19, 70. 7 Kroll,+
δυσεπί-, App.
αὐτεπί-, Olympiod. ad Plat. Alcib. 2. 209. 1 Creuzer.
εὐεπί-, Agath. 296. 12 Niebuhr,+
ἀπερί-, African. Cest. (Th.), Anast. Sin. 1076 A Migne, Cram. An. Ox. 3. 277. 22.
εὐπερί-, CGL. 2. 318. 62, Leo Grammat. 125 Bekk.,+
τρι-, Meges ap. Orib. 638. 12.
τρί- "with three strophes," Schol. Pind. (Th.).
ἀντί-, Plat.,+
ἐξαντιστρόφως, Act. SS. Aug. 2. 440 F.
ἀμφί-, Aesch., inscr. in BCH. 32 pp. 13 f. 3A 115, f.
ἀγχί-, Theogn.,+
ἔν-, Comicus Anon. 5. 124 Mein.
παλί(ν)-, Ps.-Opp. C. 2. 99,+
πελαγό-, Opp.
λογο-, Theod. Metoch. (Th.).
ποδο-, Jo. Chrys. (Th.), Theoph. Ceram. 816 Migne.
χορδο-, Dio Chrys. 1. 276. 28 Reiske,+
νεό-, Hom.
ἠνιο-, Soph.
?ἠνιό-, Aesch. Cho. 1022.
σχοινο-, Poll.,+
?σχοινιό- = σχοινό-, Interpol. Diosc. 4. 46.
ἰμονιο-, Ar.,+
ἀλλοιό-, Hephaest. 69. 15 Consbruch,+
ὁμοιό-, Schol. Eur. (Th.)
ἀνομοιό-, Hephaest. 69. 6 Consbruch.
μυριό-, Eust. (Th.).
οἰακο-, Pind., Aesch.,+
καλό-, Tzetz. (Th.).
ποικιλό-, Naucratius (Th.)
φιλό-, Poetae ap Poll.,+
ὁλό-, Hesych. s.v. ἐλελίστροφε.
†ἀνταρκτικοπολο-, Theod. Lasc. 767 A Migne.
ἀγκυλό-, Jo. Phoc. 952 D Migne.
?ἀνεμό-, Anacreont. 36 Crusius.
τηγανοστρόφον, Hesych. s.v. λίστριον,+
†ὠλενο-, pap. Petr.[2] 59 a 2. 10, CGL. 2. 199. 18, 29.
λινό-, Plin. 20. 241,+
σχοινο-, Plut.,+
†σχοινόστροφον, Diosc. 3. 155.
σφενδονο-, Theodos. Diac. Cret. 3. 173.
μονό-, Theophr. H.P. 5. 7. 6 (?), Pappus Collect. 1110. 2, 12 Hultsch,+
μονό- "with one strophe," Hephaest. 73. 16 Consbruch,+
ἀπό-, Soph.,+
Ἀπόστροφα, P.
φιλαπό (or φιλυπό), Simoc. 2. 17. 12 de Boor.
†παντοπό-, Manetho 6. 295.
Ἱππο-, P.
ὑπό-, Themist. (Th.), Hesych.
φιλυπό-, Hipp. 2. 267 Kühlew.,+
ἀνυπό-, Ps.-Hipp. Epidem. 23. 596 Kühn,+

-στροφος, ον
ἑδρο-, Ps.-Theocr.
ἀνδρό-, Ps.-Manetho.
†χονδρο- (or χορδο-), Ptol. (Soph.).
φοβερό-, Leont. Mag. Carm. 4. 47.
ἑτερό-, Hephaest. 69. 14 Consbruch,+
†νευρο-, Porphyr. Gaur. 12. 1.
πυρο-, CGL. 2. 76. 50, 79. 45.
ἰσό-, Nicom. Harm. 247. 2 Jan,+
ἀνισό-, Tzetz. Hist. 10. 563.
χρυσό-, Soph.
ἁρματο-, Manass.
†αὐτό-, inscr. (Koum.).
ψυχο-, Apollinarius (Th.).
Ναύ-, P.
δύσ-τροφος, ον, Theophr. C. P. 1. 8. 4,+
εὖ-στροφος, ον, Hom.,+
Εὖ-, P.
πολύ-, Pind. fr. 214 Schr.,+
ταυύ-, orac. ap. Eus.,+
βου-, Philipp. in Anth. P. 6. 104, Antiphilus ib. 6. 95.
βού-, Lyc.
σύ-, Olympiod. (Th.), CGL. 3. 474. 14; adv., Menand. Cith. 92 Körte (?).
ἀσύ-, Ps.-Hipp. 21. 499 Kühn,+
ἀντισύ-, Philes (Th.).
λοξοσύ-, Tzetz. in Bekker's Thuc. p. 584.
εὐσύ-, CGL. 3. 372. 63, Doroth. (Soph.).
ταχύ- Theodos. Diac. Cret. 1. 240.
καλω-, Plut.
-τροφος, ον, paroxytone and properoxytone.
εὖ-, Theophr.,+
εὖ-, Ps.-Hipp. 21. 482 Kühne,+
μεθυ-, Ps.-Simon. 183 B.[4], Anth. P. 7. 24.
πολυ-, Matro Pitan. ap. Ath. 134 D,+
πολύ-, Theophr. C. P. 4. 3. 5, 5. 15. 4,+
βου-, Poll.,+
-ώροφος, ον; see also -όροφος.
δι-, pap. Petr.[2] 20. 3. 10, 12 (-ωρυφος), LXX Gen. 6. 16,+
τρι-, LXX,+
ξυλ-, IG. 12. 3. 1102.
ὁμ-, Babr.,+
ἀν-, Lyc.,
μον-, Eust. (Th.).
†συν-, Luc. Amor. 12.
ἐξ-, Dion. H. Rhet. 1. 3, Diod.,+
ὑπ-, Eur.,+
πετρ-, Tzetz. Lyc. arg. 6. 2 Scheer.
τετρ-, Diod. 1. 45,+
χρυσ-, Plut. 2. 329 E,+
πεντ-, Dion. H., Diod.
ἑπτ-, Diod.
αὐτ-, Greg. Naz. 3. 1439 A Migne.
πολυ-, Eust.
σοφός, ή, όν, Archil. 44. 1 Crusius,+
Σόφος, P.
†Σόφον, IG. 2. 988. 2. 3, 3. 2474.
-σοφος, ον
ἄ-, Theogn.,+
†κατά-, Jo. Mon. 309 B Migne.
?προσποιή-, Ptol. (Th., Soph.).
Κλει-, P.
ἡμί-, Luc.
ἐπί-, see ἐπίσσοφος.
χειρί-,[1] Lesbon. ap. Luc. Salt. 69,+
Χειρί-, P.
τρί-, Tzetz. Hist. 5. 177.
†σί-, σιό- (Σίσυφος), Gl. in Cram. An. Ox. 2. 260.

[1] This rare word usually appears in the MSS as χειρόσοφος, and the latter form is usually adopted by scholars (cf. Lobeck *Path. Elem.* 1. 557, Thesaurus, *s.v.*), but the proper name Χειρίσοφος makes it probable that the rarer MS spelling with ι is the correct one.

-σοφος, ον
οἰησί-, Philo 1. 156. 5 Cohn.,+
δοκησί-, Ar.,+
φυσί-, Anon. in Walz Rhett. 3. 530.
κλεψί-, Method. 52 B Migne.
πάν-, Aesch-,+; πάσ-, Plat.
?πολυπάν-, Orac. Sib.
ἔν-, Ps.-Manetho 4. 549, IG. 14 1020.
ψευδό-, Philostr. 1. 306. 4 Kayser.
θεό-, Porphyr. (Soph.).
†Θεό-, IG. 3. 1478.
δοξοματαιό-, Hegesand. ap. Ath. 162 A.
ἀγροικό-, Philo 2. 283. 4 Cohn.,+
μεγαλό-, Theod. Met. (Th.).
ἐθελό-, Epiphan. 2. 577. 28 Dind.
φιλό-, Pythag. ap. Cic.,+
†Φιλό-, inscr. BCH. 14. 392, IG. 3. 1179.
-φιλόσοφος, ον
ἀ-, Plat.,+
ἐμ-, Philo 4. 34. 13 Cohn.,+
†συμ-, Syntipas 1. 140. 24 Eberh.
†ψευδο-, Nil. 132 B Migne.
ἐθελο-, Thuc. ap. Phryn. in A.B. 95. 19,+
μωρο-, late medic. (Th.).
μισο-, Eunap. (Th.).
-σοφος, ον
ὀφθαλμό-, Luc.
θυμό-, Ar.,+
Θυμό-, P.
κενό-, Th. without ref., Modern Gk.
†καινό-, Scriptor metr. in pap. Oxy. 2. 220. 6. 3.
δαφνό-, Tzetz. (Th.).
δοξό-, Plat.,+
ὑπό-, Philostr. 1. 305 Kayser.
ληρό-, Jo. Chrys. 4. 561 Migne.
ὀνειρό-, Tzetz. (Th.).
ἀκρό-, Pind.,+
μικρό-, Diod.
μωρό-, Luc.,+
μισό-, Plat.
πρωκτό-, Aristaen. (Th.).
παντό-, Plat. com. 2. 646 Mein.
αὐτό-, Tzetz., Anon. in Walz Rhett. 3. 530.
ζωό-, Anth. P.
ὑπέρ-, Ar.,+
πάσ-, see πάν-.
ἐπίσσφος, ον, IG. 12. 3. 330. 200, 203, 209, 224, 234, etc.
πολύ-, Philostr.,+
†χρύσοφος, CGL. 2. 26. 37 [p. 200.
Στάρτοφος, P.
†Ἄστοφος, pap. Tebt. 2. 343. 14, 67 [p. 206.
ψόφος, h. Hom. Merc.,+
-ψοφος, ον
ἀ-, Soph.,+
διά-, Conc. t. 4 (Th.).
ἔμ-, Paul. Sil. in Anth. P. 5. 243.
ποδό-, CGL. 2. 410. 56, 3. 172. 55, 240. 15.
μεγαλό-, Hesych. s.v. ἐρίβωλος, Schol. Ar. Nub. 284 Dind.
φιλό-, Justin M. Apol. 2. 38.
μονό-, Ephraem. Syr. 1. 58 F.
εὖ-, Dio Chrys. 224. 20 Dind. (?), Ephraem. Syr. 3. 44 C.
πολύ-, Philo (Herw.), Vett. Val. 15. 24 Kroll,+
†Σαπφοί αἱ, pl. of Σαπφώ, Herodian 2. 146. 25, 757. 4 L.
κέπφος, Ar.,+[p. 199.
σκύπφος ὁ, σκύπφον τό, Hes. fr. 165, 166 Rz.³,+
-καρφος, ον
Μυσί- (or -κάρφης), Apolloph. 2. 881 Mein., P.
ῥυσό-, Diosc.
λεπτό-, Diosc. 3. 24. 4. 180.
πολύ-, Schol. Aesch. (Koum.).
†ἀδερφός-ἀδελφός, IG. 3. 3531, Modern Gk.

σέρφος, Cratin. 2. 224 Mein., Ar.,+ [pp. 202, 203.
†μελάνστερφος, ον, Aesch. fr. 370 Nauck.
ὄρφος = ὀρφώς, Nic. fr. 18 Sch.,+ [p. 200.
Δίορφον, Δίορφος, P.
-μορφος, ον
ἀ-, Mimn. 5. 5 Crusius,+
ἐννεά-, pap. Reuvens Lettres, etc. 3. 154.
διά-, Emped. 21. 7 Diels.
δωδεκά-, Olympiod. ad Plat. Phaed. 110 B.
ποικιλοκαρά-, Ps.-Julian Ep. 75. 1.
τετρά-, Eur. fr. 943 Nauck,+
†μετά- (Dind. reads μετέ-), Jo. Mal. 120. 2 Dind.
†ἀμετά-, Simoc. 4. 8. 4.
πεντά-, Simplic. ad Epict. 269 Schweighäuser.
†ἑπτά-, Method. 73 C Migne.
†ἀστραπή-, Archelaus (Koum.).
δί-, Lyc.,+
καλλί-, Eur.,+
Καλλί-, P.
†περί-, Germ. Act. SS. Iun. 2. XXXIX D = Sept. 8. 395 A.
τρί-, Aesch.,+
†Τρι-, Phot. Bibl. 187.
πυρί-, Cyrill. Al. 10. 1052 D Migne,+
νυκτί-, Eust. 729. 64.
ἀντί-, Ps.-Luc. Amor. 44. (Adv., Plut.).
πάμ-, Iambl. Theol. Ar. 7,+
ἔμ-, Plut.,+
σύμ-, Nic.,+
ἀγλαό-, Orph. H. 61. 1,+
φαό-, h. in Virgin. (Th.).
ψευδό-, Achmet.
θεό-, Strato in Anth. P.
ὀρνεό-, Procl. (Th.).
†στερεό-, Acta Io. 29 Bonnet.
†ταυρεό-, pap. in Denkschrift. d. Wien. Akad. 36. 21. 2548.
†ἐλαιό-, Apoc. Paul. 54 Tischend.
ὡραιό-, Jo. Chrys. 6. 628 Ed. Par. I.
†ῥομφαιό-, Anast. Sin. 1076 A Migne.
ἰδιό-, Polyb.,+
ἡλιό-, Castorion 1 B.[4]
†δαιμονιό-, Jo. Damasc. (Koum.).
ἀξιό-, Ps.-Manetho.
ἀλλοιό-, Hanno Peripl. 7,+
ὁμοιό-, Diog. L.
σαρκομοιό-, Jo. Damasc. 2. 336. A Migne,+
ἀγριό-, Orph. Arg.
θηριό-, Athenag. 2. 71. 29 Dind.,+
μυριό-, Anth. P., Interpol. Diosc.,+
κριό-, Schol. Recent. Ap. Rh. (Th.).
ὀφιό-, Irenaeus 1. 232 Harvey.
κακό-, M. Argentarius in Anth. P. 5. 88,+
ἱερακό-, Philo ap. Eus.,+
πιθηκό-, Lyc.,+
γυναικό-, Eur.
εἰλικό-, Ps.-Opp.
ἀρκό-, Jo. Mal. 120. 4 Dind.
λευκό-, Theodos. Diac. Cret. 1. 227.
λυκό-, Lyc.
†θηλυκό-, MS. (Koum.).
ἐντελό-, Germ. II. Cpol. 653 C Migne.
ποικιλό-, Ar.,+
ἁλλό-, Ps.-Hipp. 22. 14. 16 Kühn.
αἰολό-, Orph. H., Nonn. Paraphr. 10. 15,+
†διπλό-, Const. Rh. Apost. 561.
δουλό-, Greg. Naz. (Th).
εἰδωλό-, African. in Geop. 10. 9,+
†οὐρανό-, Const. Rh. Apost. 735,+
ἀρσενό-, Orph. H.
γαληνό-, Jo. Damasc. 3. 833 A Migne,+

-μορφος, ον
κτηνό-, Pisid. Heracl. 2. 51.
λυκαινό-, Lyc.
δεινό-, Theodos. Diac. Cret. 5. 8.
†ἀνθρωποπετεινό-, Mich. Glyc. Ann. 507 Bekk.
†σκοτεινό-, Niceph. Presb. Cpol. in Act. SS. Mai. 6. 52* B.
†ἡλιοακτινό-, Anon. MS. (Koum.).
δελφινό-, Tzetz. Hist. 1. 413.
κυκνό-, Aesch.
εἰκονό-, Ps.-Manetho 4. 343.
μονό-, Lexx. Gr. (Th.).
κυνό-, Interpol. Diosc.
χλοό-, Orph. H.
ἀπό-, Soph. fr. 918 Nauck.
ἀστραπή-, Niceph. Presb. Cpol. in Act. SS. Mai. 6. 52* B.
χρυσολαμπό-, Const. Rh. Apost. 439.
ἱππό-, Plat.
κνωπό-, Lyc.
ἀνθρωπό-, Strabo 17. 1. 28,+
φαιδρό-, Epiphan.,+ (Th.).
ἀνδρό-, Apollod.,+
ἠερό-, Orph. H.
ἱερό-, Germ. II Cpol. 661 A Migne.
ἑσπερό-, Tzetz. Hist. 11. 226.
ἑτερό-, Philo 3. 254. 14 Cohn.,+
νερτερό-, Ps.-Manetho.
ἀστερό-, Leont. Mon. in Act. SS. Iul. 3. 541 D,+
†κηρό-, Const. Rh. Apost. 653.
ἐρυθρό-, MS. (Th.).
σφαιρό-, Pisid. Hexaem. 86,+
θεατρό-, Lyc.
†πενταστρό-, Const. Rh. Apost. 458.
ταυρό-, Eur.,+
σταυρό-, Pisid. Hexaem. 1892.
αἰλουρό-, Horapollo 1. 10.
πυρσό-, Jo. Damasc. 3. 836 A Migne,+
λαμπροπυρσό-, Greg. Naz. (Th.).
γλωσσοπυρσό-, Sophrns. in Anth. Gr. Carm. Christ. 46,+
χρυσό-, Soph. (?) fr. 1026 Nauck, +
ἀλαβαστροχρυσό-, Leont. Mag. Carm. 4. 14.
†ἀκροκρινοχρυσό-, Sophrns. in Anth. Gr. Carm. Christ. 46.
†ἀλαβαστροχρυσό-, Leont. Mag. Carm. 4. 14.
†σωματό-, Anast. Sin. 963 C Migne.
τερατό-, Cass. Probl.,+
†ἀετό-, Procl. ad Plat. Remp. 319 Kroll,+
ἑρπετό-, Epiphan. 2. 254. 8 Dind.
†θεοχαριτό-, Phlor. et Plasiaphl. (Koum.).
ἀρκτό-, Tzetz. Lyc. 481.
παντό-, Soph. fr. 561 Nauck,+
λεοντό-, Horapollo,+
δρακοντό-, Lyc.,+
βροτό-, Modest. 3297 B Migne.
†σεπτό-, Jo. Damasc. 2. 333 C Migne.
†βλαστό-, Const. Rh. Apost. 726.
χριστό-, Jo. Damasc. 3. 657 A Migne.
γλωττό-, Porph. Cer. 59. 17 Reiske.
αὐτό-, Eur. fr. 125. 3 Nauck.
φωτό-, Jo. Damasc. 3. 836 A Migne,+
ἰχθυό-, Syncell. 28. 14 Dind.
συό-, Jo. Mal. 120. 3 Dind.
ζωό-, Plut.,+
δύσ-, Eur.,+
εὖ-, Sappho 76 B.[4],+
Εὖ-, P.
πανεύ-, Tzetz.,+
παντεύ-, Tzetz.
γλυκύ-, Jo. Gaz. (Th.).
θηλύ-, Eur.,+
πολύ-, Hipp. Aer. 54. 19 Kühlew.,+
ὀξύ-, Jo. Damasc. 3. 836 Migne.
ζώ-, VV. LL. (Th.).

σύρφος, Hesych. [p. 201.
σφός, ή, όν, Hom.,+ [p. 197.
λίσφος, η, ον, Att. = λίσπος ap. Moer., Tzetz. Hes. Op. 156; subst. E.M. 567. 20 [p. 202.
ὑπόλισφος, ον, Philostr. de Gymn. 35 p. 162. 29 Jüthner, Hesych.
γρόσφος (κρ-, Eust.), Polyb.,+
ἄργυφος, ον, Hom.,+ [pp. 198, 203.
† ? δαπιδ-ύφος = sq., Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 1395 Suppl.
† ταπιδ-ύφος, pap. Par. 5. 19, Wilck. Ostr. 2. 1213.
δίζυφον = sq., Palladas in Anth. P. 9. 503, pap. Oxy. 6. 920. 1.
ζίζυφον, Col. 9. 4. 3,+
κυφός, ή, όν, Hom.,+ [pp. 211, 212.
Κύφος, P.
-κυφος, ον
πάγ-, Ar. fr. 811 Bl.
ἐπί-, LXX,+
περί-, E.M. 549. 14,+
ὑπό-, Strabo,+
γραμματό-, Method. 368 C Migne.
σκύφος, Hom.,+
Σκύφος, P.
ἀ-σκυφος, ον, Hippoloch.
ἰθύ-κυφος, η, ον, Hipp. Art. 2. 173. 11 Kühlew.,+
-κάλυφος, ον
ἀ-, Diog. L. [p. 213.
ἀπο-, Philo 1. 174. 5 Cohn. [p. 213.
-γλυφος, ον, paroxytone and properoxytone.
ἄ-, Schol. vet. Soph. O.C. 101, CGL. 2. 216. 37.
διά-, Greg. Nyss. 3. 1100 A Migne, +
ἀδιά-, Adamantius Physiognom. 2. 29,+
ἀνά-, LXX Regg. 3. 6. 18 (?), Clem. Al. 3. 18. 14 Dind.,+
κατά-, Hipp. Mochl. 2. 269 Kühlew., CIG. 3922.
ἐγ-, CGL. 3. 367. 74, Priscus Hist. 194 Bekk.
σμιλη- (lap. σμιλι-), Kaib. Ep. Gr. 402. 3.
δί-, Greg. Nyss. 1. 192. C Migne,+
περί-, LXX Regg. 3. 6. 27 (?), Aq. Regg. 3. 6. 18.
τρί-, Eur.,+
†ἡμιτρίγλυφος, ἡ, Vitruv. 4. 3. 8.
†μονοτρί-, Vitruv. 4. 3. 7.
†θεό-, Eust. (Koum.).
λιθο-, Philemon ap. Didym. ad Dem. Phil. p. 45 Diels,+
ζωδιο-, Plut.
δακτυλιο-, Critias, Plat. ap. Poll. 7. 108.
δονακο-, Leonidas in Anth. P.
τοκο-, Lucil. 497 Marx,+
τζουκαλο-, Wagner Carmina Graeca Med. Aev. 145. 130.
†δακτυλοκοιλο-, inscr. BCH. 7. 503. 4.
στρογγυλό-, Hero Autom. 1. 430. 22 Schmidt.
ξυλο-, Hesych. s.v. στυπογλύφος.
?στυλό-, Philo Byz. de VII Mir. 1.
καρδαμο-, Hesych. s.v. κυμινοπρίστης.
κυμινοπριστοκαρδαμο-, Ar.
καλαμο-, E.M.
ἑρμο-, Luc.,+
ξοανο-, Eust. (Th.).
†εἰκονο-, Niceph. Cpol. in Spicil. Solesm. 1. 500.
Πτερνο-, P.
†Λυχνο- ἡ, Theod. Prodr. Catom. 35.
καρδοπο-, Crates (?) 2. 234 Mein.
στυπο-, Hesych.
† μαρμαρο-, Const. Rh. Apost. 693.
ἱερο-, Ptol. (Th.), pap. Leid. U. 1. 9, 4. 2,+
†συνιερο-, pap. Oxy. 7. 1029. 6, 7.
Τυρο-, P.

-γλυφος, ον
χρυσό-, Hesych. s.v. χρυσοτόρευτα.
ἀγαλματο-, Vett. Val. 4. 12 Kroll, +
κερατο-, Ps.-Didym. ad Il. 4. 110, E.M. 505. 11.
δουρατο-, Lyc.
ἀνδριαντο-, Tzetz. Lyc.
ὀδοντογλύφον, Th., without ref.
αὐτό-, Ps.-Plut. Fluv. 12. 2.
ὠτογλύφον, CGL. 3. 368. 8.
ζωο-, Mel. in Anth. P.
εὖ-, Ambros. ad Psalm. 118 Serm. 16. 42,+
ζω-, pap. Lond. 1. 46. 15.
ἀ-κέλυφος, ον, Theophr.
κοσώλυφος, Hesych.
Κίνυφος, P.
λιν-ύφος, pap. Tebt. 1. 5. 249, Cod. Theod. 10. 20. 8,+
†* ρελινυφος, [p. 203.
βούφος, Anton. Mon. Lex. [p. 200.
ὀρθο-ῦφος, pap. Grenf. 2. 79. 1, 3 (see Wilcken Ostr. 1. 173 f.n.).
κοῦφος, η, ον, Hom.,+
†Κοῦφος, Act. SS. Sept. 8. 45 C.
†κοῦφον, Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 43, etc., pap. Goodsp. 30. 14. 22,+, Apophth. 257 C Migne [p. 211.
†καινοκοῦφον, pap. Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 1. 766 f.n. 2.
ὑπόκουφος, ον, Plut., CGL. 2. 466. 41.
καρυόκουφος, ον, Antioch. Pandect. 1573 D Migne.
†μουτλογαζονόσκουφος, Theod. Prodr. (Du Cange).
†κούκουφος, Coeranis MS., Anon MS. (Du Cange) [p. 199.
†πεπλο-ῦφος, pap. Tebt. 1. 5. 250.
λινο-ῦφος, AB. 302. 24, CGL. 2. 361. 24.
?τοῦφος, Hesych.
?Ἄρυφος, P.
πάρ-υφος, Poll.,+

-πάρυφος, ον
ἀ-, Ps.-Plut. Pro Nobil. (Th.).
φοινικο-, Dion. H.
λευκο-, Antip. ap. Plut. 2. 180 E.
χρυσο-, Plut.
εὐ-, Nicostr. 3.282 Mein.,+
†γρυφός, Mela 2. 1. 1, 3. 7. 2 [p. 200.
δρύφος, Hesych.
ἀμφίδρυφος, ον, Hom.,+
κρύφος, Pind.,+ [p. 213.
-κρυφος, ον
πάγ-, Justin Mart.
ἔγ-, Nonn.
ἐπί-, Pind.,+
ἀπό-, Hdt., Eur.,+
ἐναπό-, Acta Thomae 123 Bonnet,+
ὑπό-, Schol. Ar. Ach. 96 Dind.
κόρυφος, IG. 4. 929. 17, 18, 19, etc., Herodian 1. 225. 18 L.,+ [p. 204.
Κόρυφον, P. [p. 204.
-κόρυφος, ον
ἀ-, Dion H.
πεντα-, Theod. Stud. 1417 C Migne, Niceph. Presb. Cpol. in Act. SS. Mai. 6. 47* F.
μελαγ-, Ar.,
συγ-, Ps.-Arist. Probl.
δι-, Eur.,+
τρι-, Strabo,+
Τρι-, P.
μεγαλο-, Lyc. Orator ap. Arist.
ἀκρο-, Georg. Plethon (Th.).
ἰσο-, Dion. H.
εὐ-, Dion. H.,+
-τρυφος, ον
ἄ-, Alcm. 18 Crusius.
τετρά-, Hes.
φιλό-, Ptol. (Th.).
συφός, Lyc. [p. 203.
†σέσυφος (or Σίσυφος), Hesych.
Σίσυφος, P.
†κιχλο-κόσσυφος, Edict. Diocl. Eph. Arch. 1899. 153. 27.
†πετρο-κόσσυφος, CGL. 3. 436. 11.

τῦφος, Ps.-Hipp. 22. 496 Kühn, Antiph. 3. 110 Mein.,+ [p. 204.
-τυφος, ον
ἀ-, Plat.,+
ὑπά-, Timon 60. 1 Diels.
ἄκ-, Oenom. ap. Eus.
ἄν-, Tatian. Or. ad Graec. 4. 10 Schwartz,+
†ψευδό-, Interpol. Argum. 4. Av. Ran.
ὀλβιό-, Bion ap. Diog. L.
φιλό-, Philo 3. 274. 26 Cohn.,+
ὑπό-, Ion ap. Plut.,+
μισό-, Luc.
στυφός, ή, όν, Arist.,+ [p. 203.
στύφος, Greg. Nyss. 3. 185 B Migne, Hesych.
ἄστυφος, ον, Alex. Trall. (Th.).

†πυρροστύφον, CGL. 3. 478. 41.
κόττυφος, Arist.,+ [p. 199.
Κόττυφος, P. [p. 206.
†?Σάφφός, CIG. 1927.
κωφός, ή, όν, Hom.,+
†Κῶφος, pap. Oxy. 7. 1050. 15.
-κωφος, ον
ἐπί-, Sym. Metaphr. (Th.).
λασιό-, Synes. 1176 B Migne,+
ἰθελό-, Suid.
ὑπό-, Ar.,+
ἑτερό-, Lex. MS. (Th.).
δύσ-, Ps.-Hipp. 21. 263 Kühn, Arist.,+
†λωφός, ή, όν, sign. inc., Man. Malaxus (Du Cange).
ἀλωφός, ή, όν, Hesych. [pp. 198, 203.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

EMENDATION OF CHRYSIPPUS FRAG. 574 (VON ARNIM)

Stobaeus *Florilegium* 7. 21: χρυσίππου· Ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφόν, μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ· Καὶ δεῖσθαι μέν, μὴ προσδέχεσθαι δέ. In the last sentence it is hardly possible to find a satisfactory meaning for προσδέχεσθαι. To say that the wise man needs (things) but does not expect them is not very pointed, and, moreover, it is not true of the Stoic sage. An alternative would be to take προσδέχεσθαι in the technical sense of προσλαμβάνειν, λαμβάνειν, *sumere*. But there is, I believe, no authority for that use of the word, and, again, it is the reverse of the truth to say that the Stoic sage needs things but does not take or accept them. On the contrary, his way is to take things while denying that they are good or necessary to his happiness (Cic. *de Fin.* iv. 30). There is no authorized meaning of προσδέχεσθαι which yields a suitable sense here under analysis. The word is corrupt, and it is easy to find the word which it has displaced. It is προσδεῖσθαι. The chief obstacle to the acceptance of this reading is the fact that we think in English, not in Greek. To say that the sage needs but does not need in addition seems pointless. But δεῖσθαι here does not mean precisely "need," but rather "have use for," both in the serious and the slang sense of the phrase illustrated in my note on οὐδὲν δέομαι (*Classical Journal* II, 171–72). The meaning then becomes "the sage has use for things, but does not need or lack anything more than he has"—a distinction quite in the Stoic manner. This yields a good sense, is true of the Stoic sage, and, in the Greek, is epigrammatic. It is further confirmed by the fact that the converse is true of the ordinary man, the ἰδιώτης, φαῦλος, or ἄφρων. He "has no use" for things because he cannot use them rightly, but feels the need of something more because he is not, like the sage, sufficient unto himself, or complete and content with what he has. Cf. Plutarch *de Stoic. repug.* 1038:. "τοῖς φαύλοις οὐδὲν εἶναι χρήσιμον" ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν "οὐδ' ἔχειν χρείαν τὸν φαῦλον οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι."

de comm. not. 1068a: τουτὶ γὰρ λέγει Χρύσιππος, ὡς "οὐ δέονται μέν, ἐνδέονται δὲ οἱ φαῦλοι."

Seneca *Ep.* 9.14: *Volo tibi Chrysippi quoque distinctionem indicare. ait: "sapientem nulla re egere et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse. contra stulto nulla re opus est, nulla enim re uti scit, sed omnibus eget."*

The idea that underlies these sentences is also found in the distinction between χρήματα and κτήματα. Hense, *Teletis relliquiae*, p. 27; cf. also [Plato] *Eryxias* 402C: ὡς τά γε ἄχρεια ἡμῖν ὄντα οὐδὲ χρήματά ἐστι, and

the conclusion (406*B*) that the rich are the most wretched *εἴπερ ἀνάγκη τῶν χρησίμων πάντων προσδεῖσθαι*. The ultimate source is Plato (*Euthydemus* and elsewhere) or Socrates (Xen. *Econ.* 1.14). The use of *προσδεῖσθαι* which I postulate may be illustrated by Plato *Tim.* 34*B*: *καὶ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου προσδεόμενον*, said of the universe, which, like the sage, is sufficient unto itself, and Aristotle *Ethics* 1099*a* 15: *οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ*.

Lastly, for the rhetorical antithesis of *δεῖσθαι* and *προσδεῖσθαι*, cf. *δέονται* and *ἐνδεόνται* above and Demosthenes *Olynth.* 1.19: *εἰ δὲ μὴ, προσδεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἅπαντος ἐνδεῖ τοῦ πόρου*.

PAUL SHOREY

"BENE UTI"

Quintilian's chapter *de Risu* (*Inst. Orat.* vi. 3) and Macrobius' imitation of it (*Sat.*, Book ii) are of unique value to us in determining finesses of Latin idiom. In a joke, you must either see nothing, or see the point—which is everything: and the point of the joke is usually contained in an idiom of the language.

Quintilian tells us (vi. 3. 90), as an instance of ironical *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* (*opinionem decipere*), this story: C. Cassius, seeing a soldier parading at the *decursio* with no sword, said to him "*Heus, commilito, pugno bene uteris!*"

Exactly to appreciate this witticism, you must have an exact sense of what *bene uti* means. Besides the various meanings which are distinguished in the great Berlin thesaurus (*s.v.* "bonus") there is one which is not recognized there: it is the one which this story requires. *Bene uti* does not here mean "to make a good use of," but "to have the full use of, the unimpeded control of."

This sense is established by the following collection of passages:

Cic. *Tusc.* i. 106: "metuit ne laceratis membris *minus bene utatur;* ne combustis, non extimescit."

ibid., iii. 15: "Munus animi est ratione bene uti; et sapientis animus ita semper adfectus est ut ratione *optime utatur*."

Pro rege Deiotaro 28 (the only place in Cicero's speeches where the phrase is found): "*bene* ut armis, *optime* ut equis *uteretur*."

de Off. i. 133: "*optime uti* lingua Latina putabantur" (not, to make the best use of, but to have the best command of, the Latin language).

Corn. Nepos *Hann.* 4. 3: "hoc itinere adeo gravi morbo adficitur oculorum ut postea nunquam dextro aeque *bene usus* sit."

Livy xliv. 35: "ipsi natura et operibus insuperabilis ripa videbatur et praeterquam quod tormenta ubique disposita essent missilibus etiam *melius* et certiore ictu hostis *uti* audiebat." This does not mean that the enemy were better shots, but that they could bring their artillery more freely into action and so make better practice.

Seneca *de Ira* I. xvii. 1: "Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illis *bene utatur*, pro armis esse." Not: "if you can turn them to a good use," but "if they be instruments well in control, of which you can freely avail yourself."

Finally there are two passages in poetry, which only take their full significance if this idiom of *bene uti* be recognized in them.

Horace *Epist.* I. ii. 50:

valeat possessor oportet
si comportatis rebus *bene* cogitat *uti*.

Not: "if he means to put to a good use" but "if he means to take full advantage of, to avail himself of."

And Catullus x. 31, 32:

verum utrum illius an mei, quid ad me?
utor tam *bene* quam mihi pararim.

"I have absolutely free use, take full advantage of, the litter and bearers *tamquam mihi pararim*."

So Cassius' jest, a humorous irony in the style of παρὰ προσδοκίαν, was "You keep your fist free, mate—you know better than to encumber yourself with a sword! You know how to avail yourself of your fist."

J. S. PHILLIMORE

NOTE ON THE HAIR-DRESSING OF ATHENIAN GIRLS AND WOMEN

In a review of Tucker's *Life in Ancient Athens* (*Classical Philology* IV, 342), Professor O. M. Washburn announces this thesis, which he attributes to Professor Loeschke: "It seems to have been a custom [in ancient Greece] for married women to appear with their hair hanging loose, ... while a girl would use the net." For a contradictory doctrine see Furtwängler *Meisterwerke* 39, n. 4, and Conze *Die attischen Grabreliefs*, text to No. 873: "eine weibliche Gestalt, ... deren Haar nach Art der Jungfrauentracht lang in den Nacken fällt."

Although Mr. Washburn has stated his doctrine without qualification, I do not suppose that he would maintain it for the earlier historical period, or say for the period of the François Vase. In the idea that even later there may possibly have been local and temporal differences of fashion in the matter in question, I have tried to ascertain the facts for Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. My search has been far from thorough, but it appears to warrant certain conclusions.

That in the place and during the time indicated married women did not *always* wear their hair hanging loose is clear; witness Deianeira on two vases in Boston (Furtwängler-Reichhold *Griechische Vasenmalerei*, Pls. 128–29) and Eurydice in the relief, presumably Attic, representing Orpheus, Eurydice, and Hermes. Indeed the grave-reliefs appear to prove that the

contrary was usual; for, apart from the cases of hair cut to a moderate length and hanging loose—according to the common explanation, in sign of mourning—the female figures on these monuments, many of whom must surely be married women, usually have the hair done up in one way or another. Asia (Conze 58 = Athens 767), whose son is at her knees, Archestrate (Conze 290 = Athens 722) and Melite (Conze 803 = Athens 720), who are characterized as wives in the accompanying inscriptions, may serve for illustrations. It is unnecessary to labor this point.

Cases of long hair hanging loose are not very numerous on Attic monuments of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., and among these the cases where no doubt is possible as to the age and status of the wearers are very few indeed. So far as I can see, the persons so represented may be either matrons or maidens. This is certainly the fact in the earlier half of the fifth century, when we find on the one hand Hera and Clytemestra, on the other hand Athena, Oreithyia, and Pandrosus with long, loose hair (F.-R., Pls. 65, 72, 5, 94). There seems to be the same absence of distinction later. The figures in swings (F.-R., Pl. 125 and Abb. 11 in text) are probably girls. But the chief witness on this side of the argument is Athena (Athena Parthenos of Phidias, F.-R., 70, 96, 109, 2, 127). True, the frequency with which Athena is represented with unconfined hair might be due to the inconvenience of wearing a helmet over a chignon. The difficulty, however, was not insuperable, and the maiden goddess could hardly have followed a practice which on earth was confined to married women. Convincing cases of married women with loose hair are hard to find. Theophante on her grave-monument (Conze 309 = Athens 1055) may be a case in point, but her status is in some doubt and her hanging locks may mean nothing but the disarray of illness. If the figure rising from the earth on the Eleusinian *pelice* from Kertch (F.-R., Pl. 70) is Ge, as Furtwängler thought, this would be relevant evidence. The most unmistakable case I can find is that of Medea in F.-R., Pls. 38, 39; but Medea is a barbarian. If we go outside Attica, we find more satisfactory evidence afforded by the head of Hera on coins of Argos, Croton, etc.

The foregoing paragraph deals with cases of hair unconfined or at most confined by a band around the head. It remains to consider the various fashions in which the hair is drawn together behind the ears or somewhere lower down, but is not massed upon the head. In the earlier part of the period under consideration a favorite mode with Athena (e.g. on the Orvieto crater, F.-R., Pl. 108) and others (e.g. Europa and Artemis [F.-R., Pls. 114, 115]) is to tie the ends of the long hair into a bunch. This is scarcely found after 450 B.C. We are, therefore, concerned chiefly with cases where the hair is drawn together at the back of the neck or thereabouts. This is the coiffure of the "maidens" of the south porch of the Erechtheum. It is given to Athena, as on a relief at the head of a decree (*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 1878, Pl. XII) and two reliefs in Le Bas (*Voyage archéologique*,

Mon. fig. 47, 1, and 48, 1); also on vases (F.-R., Pls. 40, 69); not to speak of statues of presumably Attic origin, like the Athena of Velletri. On the grave-reliefs, among the figures whose hair is thus dressed, Eurynoe (Conze 1021), by reason of her size, and the two who hold their dolls (Conze 817, 880) are certainly girls. Mynnion (Conze 896 = Athens 763) is a probable case. On the stele of Lysarete (Conze 755) the figure at the extreme left, not full-grown, has long hair, perhaps braided.

Within the limits set to this inquiry I have not found an unquestionable instance of a matron with hair similarly arranged. I am inclined to think, therefore, that this arrangement was adopted principally by unmarried girls. In view of the Florentine statue of Niobe, cited by Mr. Washburn, and the figure of Mnemosyne (?) on the Chigi relief (*Römische Mittheilungen*, 1893, Pls. II, III), works of unknown provenience, I do not dare to make a more sweeping statement.

F. B. TARBELL

LYSIAS 19. 22

καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ὁμοπατρίου ἀποκειμένας παρ' αὐτῷ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς εἰπὼν κατεχρήσατο.

This son of Nicophemus and half-brother (*ὁμοπατρίου*) of Aristophanes is not elsewhere referred to in the speech, but there is abundant evidence to prove that there was no such person. In § 36 we read: *ἔτι δὲ φαίνονται* (*Κόνων καὶ Νικόφημος*) *οὐδὲν πώποτε διενεχθέντες, ὥστ' εἰκὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ταὐτὰ γνῶναι, ἱκανὰ μὲν ἐνθάδε τῷ υἱεῖ ἑκάτερον καταλιπεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔχειν· ἦν γὰρ Κόνωνι μὲν υἱὸς ἐν Κύπρῳ καὶ γυνή, Νικοφήμῳ δὲ γυνὴ καὶ θυγατήρ.* The other son is evidently neither in Athens nor in Cyprus, and it would seem that he had no share in his father's property, for "the rest" (*τὰ ἄλλα*), that is not given to Aristophanes, is held in Cyprus. Compare with this the calculation in §§ 42–43 that Aristophanes had expended about fifteen talents, and the closing words (§ 44): *καὶ οὐ προσλογιζόμεθα ὅσα αὐτὸς ἐν Κύπρῳ ἔσχε Νικόφημος, οὔσης αὐτῷ ἐκεῖ γυναικὸς καὶ θυγατρός.* Again, take these words from § 12: *ἐδεήθη δοῦναι τὴν ⟨ἐμὴν⟩ ἀδελφὴν αἰτοῦντι τῷ υἱεῖ τῷ Νικοφήμου.* It may be fairly argued that, if Nicophemus had two sons, the proper expression here would be *Ἀριστοφάνει τῷ Νικοφήμου.* Further evidence is to be deduced from the fact that on the death of Aristophanes his children do not become the wards of his brother, but their mother's family is "compelled to take care of them" (*ἠναγκασμένοι τρέφειν*, § 9; cf. § 33), and the speaker says that he is "deprived of relations by marriage" (*ἐστερημένοι κηδεστῶν*, § 9), and talks of his sister's dowry as a loss suffered by his own estate, whereas, if the children of Aristophanes had a paternal uncle, their mother's dowry would naturally have been held in trust by him for their benefit. And, finally, it should be recalled that the chief aim of the speaker is to prove that the estate of Nicophemus and

Aristophanes has been fully accounted for. He claims that the outlay of fifteen talents by Aristophanes, together with the presumably larger amount (§ 37) retained by Nicophemus for his own use, make up a sum far in excess of what they could have been expected to possess, considering that Conon had left but forty talents (§ 40). If, then, there had been a second son, to whom a proportional share would naturally have gone, the speaker would not have failed to utilize the fact to strengthen his argument.

The sum of forty minas, said (§ 22) to have been deposited with Aristophanes by his brother, is exactly the amount of his wife's dowry; and, since the dowry did not become the property of the husband, the phrase ἀποκειμένας παρ' αὐτῷ could be properly applied to it. It will take no great change in the text to rid us of the suspected brother. Instead of τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ὁμοπατρίου ἀποκειμένας παρ' αὐτῷ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς I suggest that we read τῆς ἀδελφῆς ⟨τὰς ὑπὸ⟩ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πατρὸς ἀποκειμένας. Supposing τὰς ὑπό[1] to have dropped out and ἐμοῦ πατρός corrupted to ὁμοπατρίου, the change of τῆς ἀδελφῆς to τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ would naturally follow.

This change not only removes the brother, but gives us a reasonable explanation of the loss of the dowry. Dowries were not subject to confiscation, and were usually secured by mortgage on the husband's estate. The speaker twice (§§ 9, 32) refers to the loss of the dowry, but does not refer to the illegality of its confiscation, though he does say that the children have been illegally deprived of their father's property (§ 8). It is not improbable that Aristophanes induced his father-in-law to let him venture his wife's dowry, relieved of mortgage, since he required control of all his real property to give security to the friends from whom he borrowed (τοὺς φίλους ἔπαθε δεόμενος καὶ ἐγγυώμενος). In § 22, immediately following the clause in question, we are told that Aristophanes borrowed seven minas from his father-in-law and "*this also* he took and spent" (ὁ δὲ καὶ ταύτας λαβὼν κατεχρήσατο). It is not pressing the point too far to suggest that the καί before ταύτας indicates that the forty minas had also come out of the speaker's pocket. Compare the connection of these two sums again in § 32: ἐθέλομεν πίστιν δοῦναι . . . . μηδὲν ἔχειν τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων, ἐνοφείλεσθαι δὲ τὴν προῖκα τῆς ἀδελφῆς καὶ ἑπτὰ μνᾶς,[2] ἃς ᾤχετο λαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ. A request for permission to use the dowry would be likely to precede one for a further loan. Before κατεχρήσατο in our sentence X has εἰπών, which has been variously corrected. I am inclined to read ἡμᾶς πείθων (cf. τοὺς φίλους ἔπειθε), the ἡμᾶς being easily lost after μνᾶς.

The failure of the speaker to emphasize the illegality of the confiscation of the dowry suggests that the lost speech of Lysias, cited by Harpocration—Κατ' Αἰσχίνου περὶ τῆς δημεύσεως τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων—was

[1] The number of omissions in this oration is very large. For ὑπό after κεῖμαι and various compounds cf. Dem. 24. 62; Isocr. 4. 168; Thuc. 7. 77; Plato *Apol.* 30 E.

[2] If the emendation of § 22 is correct the antecedent of ἃς will include τὴν προῖκα.

made in an attempt to save the dowry and the seven minas. In that case the *καὶ πρότερον πρὸς τοὺς συνδίκους* of § 32 will refer to the former trial and not to the preliminary hearing (*ἀνάκρισις*) of the present one.

LYSIAS 18. 14

πάντες γὰρ εἴσονται ὅτι τότε μὲν χιλίαις δραχμαῖς ἐζημίωσε τὸν βουλόμενον τὴν ἡμετέραν γῆν δημοσίαν ποιῆσαι κτέ.

Among the numerous emendations of this section I do not find that anyone has ever proposed *ἐζημιώσατ' ἄν*, and yet the simple insertion of an *ἄν* removes many difficulties. In the first place it explains how *ἐζημιώσατ'*, which is certainly right, was corrupted to *ἐζημίωσε*, for the *ταν* would be easily dropped before *τόν*. This corruption would not occur so easily before *αὐτόν*, and, indeed, if this first trial is purely hypothetical, it is no longer necessary to have a reference to Poliochus in this clause, and we can retain the *τόν* of X. The point of the whole passage from § 13 to § 19 is that the Athenians, by confiscating the property in question, will break their oath *μὴ μνησικακεῖν* (§ 19). This is the oath referred to in the *περὶ ὧν ὅρκους ὀμωμόκατε* of § 13, and the *ἃ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσασθε* of § 15. In the closing words of § 14 Lysias, indeed, speaks as if the assumed former trial were an actual one, but that is a mere trick, of which he is quite capable. In defense of *παρανόμως φεύγοντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός* he could claim that the case had already been decided once when the citizens voted to forget past wrongs.

If the insertion of *ἄν* is right, and there were not two trials, the *τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός* cannot possibly refer to Poliochus. We thus get rid of the possibility that the speech was made in a *γραφὴ παρανόμων* against Poliochus, as Thalheim still assumes in his *Argumentum* (p. xliii), and the *σύνδικοι* of § 26 will be the presiding officers. And, finally, we are relieved of the very improbable assumption that a man, who had already been fined 1,000 drachmas for an illegal act, would venture to bring a second suit, which could be attacked as doubly illegal, because it was contrary both to the decree *μὴ μνησικακεῖν* and to the law against a second suit about the same matter.

A. G. LAIRD

CICERO'S *DE SENECTUTE*, §§ 10 AND 37

In Cicero's *De senectute* 10, the Brussels MS (Bruxellensis 9591), tenth century, reads *virtus gravitas* and furnishes an explanation of a corruption which has appeared in most of the other MSS. *Virtus* was originally a gloss on *gravitas* which has here crept into the text without the change to *gravis* made by the scribes in other MSS to emend the sentence. This corrected reading, *virtus gravis*, also appears in A (Ashburnhamensis) and L (Leidensis), the other members of the family to which Br belongs, and represents, as stated above, the variation of their scribes from the original

virtus gravitas. In E (Erfurtensis), twelfth century, the gloss was inserted after *gravitas* instead of before, but the same subsequent change has occurred. A confirmation of the fact that *virtus* is a gloss is found in the reading of the second hand of V (Vossianus), thirteenth century, where *virtus* is not put into the text but occurs as a variant upon *gravitas*. Later, in MSS which had retained the original reading *gravitas*, as in H (Harleianus), eleventh century, the false reading *virtus gravis* was also inserted because found in other MSS and not for the same primary cause.

In § 37 of the *De senectute*, the reading of Br, *illa domos patrius disciplina*, is again indicative of the reading of the archetype of the other two members of its family, A and L. For the corruption *domos*, so easily formed from *domo+mos*, next gave way to *domus* as *domos* would not construe. Then, in order to avoid an apparently false agreement with *domus*, the *patrius* was changed to *patria* P^2 (according to Dahl), *patris* A^2, or *patri* A^1 and L^1, that it might agree with or be in some subjective relation to *disciplina*, the *et* necessarily disappearing for this purpose. We thus account for the reading of A^1, *illa domus patri disciplina*, while the repetition of *domus* by L^1 is probably a blunder of its own scribe. The *et* was probably dropped from Br, as in the great majority of the other MSS, through the failure to observe the plural subject and a desire to construe *disciplina* as ablative. This may, however, have been the initial stage of the corruption in all three MSS. The reading of ER, *illa domo mos patrius et disciplina*, was thus undoubtedly the reading of the archetype of AL Br and, though not necessarily the correct reading, yet furnishes the best tradition in this disputed passage. I propose shortly to publish a complete collation of Br with an indication of its various affinities.

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"JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HOMER"

In his examination of the much-discussed trial-scene in Homer's *Iliad* xviii. 497–508, Professor Bonner ("Justice in the Age of Homer," *Classical Philology* VI, 24 ff.) rightly concludes, I think, that the two talents which lie before the judges are the stakes contributed by the litigants (one talent each), and are "to be paid over to the one of them who shall plead his case before the court most effectively"—that is, win the verdict (vs. 508). Professor Bonner has also not disregarded the earlier suggested parallelisms with procedure under primitive Roman law. But his concluding sentence (p. 30) is: "In effect the wager [i.e., the two talents in this specific case] corresponds to the damages which according to Homeric practice usually accompanied restitution and redress." That is, the beaten litigant is mulcted in penal damages to the amount of one talent, presum-

ably, we are to understand, in addition to whatever satisfaction may be required under the verdict regarding the claim which was the basis of the wager.

This conclusion prompts a further small remark based on the consideration of Roman procedure—for a single talent—the value of one cow—seems a small sum of damages. It has a formal sound. The procedure by wager and affirmation (*sacramentum*) appears to be Indo-European in origin, and certain of its quaint forms as well as its known history point to an early recognition of it in the Roman community. Therefore there is of course much force in the citation of apparent parallels between early Roman and early Greek procedure of this sort. In the Roman *actio per sacramentum*, the amount staked by the litigants was a formal sum, bearing no sufficiently commensurate relation to the actual value at issue (cf. the single *as* with which the steelyards were struck in *mancipatio*), and this whether the stakes were paid over to the successful litigant, or, as in some cases, diverted to sacred uses as costs of court. The stakes originally were perhaps of the real value at issue, but they early ceased to be so. Is it not probable that the Homeric trial-scene represents a similar stage of development in procedure, and that the single talent forfeited by the loser is symbolic rather than actually corresponding to an award of damages, exemplary or otherwise? With regard to the meaning of ἴστωρ also (*loc. cit.*, p. 27), Roman procedure may well be cited. The issue in procedure *per sacramentum* was joined before the praetor, by whom the adjudication was referred to a single *iudex* or *arbiter*, to a commission of *recuperatores*, or to the centumviral court. Is it not possible that the ἴστωρ corresponds to the praetor, the γέροντες to the judicial body?

E. T. M.

XOPOY IN TERENCE'S *HEAUTON*

Scholars have recently been engaged in a diligent search for new act-conclusions in Plautus, Terence, and the fragments of the Νέα. One instance, which has hitherto escaped observation, occurs in the *Heauton* v. 170 and disposes of the only place in Terence where the stage was apparently left vacant in the middle of a scene. This new instance involves other consequences of considerable importance, as I hope to point out in the near future.

ROY C. FLICKINGER

BOOK REVIEWS

Cicero's Letters. Selected and edited by ERNEST RIESS. New York: Macmillan, 1910. lix+393 pp. $1.60 net.

The editor states in the preface that this book "is intended for the use of Freshmen classes," and that "the notes have been written with the condition of the Freshman in mind." He also explains why he regards the letters of Cicero as suitable for use in the first year in college. Many will differ from him on this point, but all will agree that, if this is the purpose of the book, it should be adapted to the student's needs.

The Introduction of forty-nine pages treats of letter-writing in general, of Cicero's correspondents, of the collections of his letters, their language and style, and of the chronology of Cicero's life. At the present time, when attacks upon the method and value of classical training are so vigorous, it is very important that the work of classical scholars should itself exhibit some of the characteristics that are commonly supposed to be the product of such training, especially in textbooks that are intended for the use of young students. Among these characteristics clearness and propriety of language may be placed first, and the Introduction in a book like this is precisely where they should be most conspicuous. It may perhaps be no fault of the editor himself in this case that he has not yet mastered the intricacies of English style, but there can be no excuse for those who have allowed his work to be published without careful revision. There is hardly a page of the Introduction that does not offend seriously against the laws of good English usage. The following illustrations will suffice: "The Romans became . . . . the classical nation for the literary letter," "the great letter classics of modern times," "Cicero was . . . . raised sky-high in his expectations," "Dolabella continued his spendthrifty and immoral life," "of which (office) his shortsighted vanity and quick temper made a fearful mess," "devoted his life to the upkeeping of Cicero's memory," "the oppression of the Conspiracy," "the assumption of the virile toga," "his high-flying hopes were dashed," "partly from the same point of view combined with the aesthetic standpoint," "other letters transcending the original limiting date," "Cicero adverts . . . . to the prying eyes of strangers but was himself not innocent of the latter crime," "towering head and shoulders above his fellows in breadth of culture," "It [the *sermo cotidianus*] is prone to exaggeration in both directions, as well aggrandizing its statements as emphasizing the littleness," "Diminutives serve to emphasize littleness, jocosely, modestly, contemptuously," "The gout kept Marius on his country seat," "the

ancients never reading in our soundless way." The word "addressee" is used continually, "maxim" is employed for "rule," in one sentence (p. xii) we find "rhetorics and schematisms," and in the notes occur such expressions as these: "Appius had done his level best," "the Ariovistus panic," "a trust to do the state out of its income," "cooked ballots," "he obligated the house of the Luculli," "Like in the modern claque this applause . . . . was started at the blow of a whistle."

To turn from form to content, it may be that the editor has been more fortunate in his experience, but no Freshmen with whom the reviewer has recently come in contact could properly interpret such French expressions as *au courant*, *chronique scandaleuse*, *insouci* (all three of which occur in the first eleven lines of p. xxvii), *rapprochement*, and *jeunesse dorée*, even if there were any possible reason for using them. Undoubtedly Freshmen should understand these words, but as a matter of fact they do not. Furthermore it is necessary, unfortunately, in our present sad condition, to translate Greek words and phrases for the benefit of the many students of Latin who do not know Greek, but this the editor has often omitted to do. Since the notes are intended expressly for the student and not for the instructor, it is idle to write thus: "*Asiam:* on this whole affair see *Mélanges d'Archéologie*, XXVIII, 171" (p. 297), and to refer to such books as Norden's *Kunstprosa* and Schmidt's *Cicero's Briefwechsel*, without giving any sufficient explanation in the text. In general it seems to the reviewer that the notes are very often quite inadequate for their purpose, if this is to furnish such information as is absolutely necessary to enable the careful and patient student to obtain a reasonably accurate understanding of the meaning of the text. An illustration of this inadequacy is found on p. 275, where the only note to ὕστερον πρότερον Ὁμηρικῶς (*ad Att.* i. 16. 1) is a reference to the passage in the *Iliad*.

The substance of the notes seems accurate in general, but a few possible slips may be noted, or suggestions offered. On p. xviii Terentia is spoken of as "self-sacrificing in the extreme," but on p. 290 we find the statement, "Such traits of selfishness which spoil the impression of [a] self-sacrificing wife . . . . seem to have been among the chief reasons for Cicero's divorce." On p. xxv the editor says of Cicero that "the elderly man had been inveigled into a second marriage with Publilia," but on p. lv "to rehabilitate his financial position he married the young and rich Publilia." The statement (p. xxxvii) that "the original flexibility of long and short syllables, the law of accent which tended to weaken the final syllables, had been consciously neglected" can hardly be called felicitous. On p. xxxix, among illustrations of a freer use of cases and prepositions, we find "an objective genitive instead of erga, F. xv. 4. 17," but the letter referred to has only sixteen sections, and in the sixteenth the text reads *tua tum benevolentia erga me*. On the same page, among "malformations and innovations" we find "the frequent syncopation of the suffix of the third plural in the perfect stems";

and "the metathesis of *arcessit* to *accersit*," a statement that does not agree with that of the Thesaurus at least. In the note on I. i, S is incorrectly used as the abbreviation of the praenomen Sextus; and Plato is said to have taught "in the Gynmasium Academi." The note on p. 290 (*ad Att.* iii. 7. 1) "*cadebat:* almost accomplished apodosis of contrary to fact condition with protasis understood" would puzzle even a good student; and a line quoted from Ennius' *Medea* (*Fam.* vii. 6. 1) is said to be "written in eight acatalectic trochees" (p. 304).

Nomina are frequently abbreviated: "P. M. Scaevola and M'. M." (p. 308), "L. T. Fadius" (p. 309), "C. C. Longinus" (p. 316), "A. Pollio" (p. 317), "M. C. Postumus" (p. 334)—a proceeding contrary to ordinary Roman practice, and one that results in giving each of these men two praenomina. The *De rerum natura* is called "a famous epic" (p. 312); and *αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας*, quoted from the well-known verse in the *Iliad* (vi. 442), is translated "I am ashamed of the men and women of Troy" (p. 326).

S. B. P.

Selected Epigrams of Martial. Edited with Introduction and Notes by EDWIN POST. [College Series of Latin Authors.] Boston: Ginn & Co., 1910. Pp. li+402. $1.50.

This edition is a happy combination of erudition and sound judgment. Mr. Post has made a careful study of ancient and modern sources, but in writing his commentary has borne in mind the fact that the books of the series are intended primarily for college students. The selection is representative, and includes the most interesting of the epigrams. The Introduction contains, besides a sketch of the poet's life and other conventional material, a brief but well-written account of the development of the epigram. Detailed discussion of the text has been relegated to a critical appendix. The index of passages cited in the notes (pp. 341–54) furnishes excellent material for class papers. The edition is the best now available for college courses in Martial.

While the editor's conclusions are for the most part sound, there are some passages in which his interpretation seems open to question. For example, at i. 15. 5, non bene distuleris videas quod posse negari | et solum hoc ducas, quod fuit, esse tuum, he says that *distuleris* and *ducas* are in the subjunctive "because Martial courteously uses the generalizing second person singular." But apart from the fact that the shift from the personal to the general would seriously impair the effectiveness of the lines, there is no necessity to resort to the generalizing second singular to account for the subjunctive. *Distuleris* is the subjunctive (ideal certainty) regularly used in the conclusion of the second class of conditional sentences (Less Vivid Future or Ideal); the condition is implied in *videas quod posse negari*. *Ducas*, on the other hand,

is a subjunctive of obligation or propriety. Doubtful also is the explanation of the syntax at v. 34. 9, mollia non rigidus caespes tegat ossa, where it is stated that *non* is used with a subjunctive of prayer instead of *ne*. But *non* goes with *rigidus*, not with *tegat*. In his note on i. 41. 4 the editor wavers between the two interpretations of *sulphurata* "bits of sulphur to be used as cement" and "bits of wood smeared with sulphur to be used as tinder." The former explanation, however, is made extremely improbable by the fact which the most obvious interpretation of the passages cited by Mr. Post himself seems to bring out, namely, that when cement is referred to, *sulphur*, not *sulphuratum*, is the word used. Cf. Plin. *N.H.* xxxvi. 199: vitrum sulphuri concoctum feruminatur in lapidem; Plin. *Ep.* viii. 20. 4: sulphuris udor saporque medicatus vis qua fracta solidantur; also the scholiast at Iuv. 5. 47–48, solent sulphure calices fractos sive calvariolas conponere; and possibly the Juvenal passage itself (calicem) quassatum et rupto poscentem sulphura vitro, and Stat. *Silv.* i. 6. 73–74: quique comminutis permutant vitreis gregale sulphur. The evidence seems distinctly in favor of the second explanation (i.e. *sulphurata* = tinder), which is supported by the close parallel furnished by x. 3. 2–4: foeda linguae probra circulatricis, | quae sulphurato nolit empta ramento | Vatiniorum proxeneta fractorum. Further, the passages quoted show that we should take *fractis vitreis* literally and that the editor is hardly justified in interpreting it "trumpery in general, not merely glass." The citation from Petronius 10, An videlicet audirem sententias, id est vitrea fracta et somniorum interpretamenta, is not in point. The editor's explanation of this passage is typical: the book shows a tendency toward excessive refinement in interpretation. A noticeable example of this is furnished by the note on i. 66. 7 ff.: virginis . . . . chartae, | quae trita duro non inhorruit mento, where we find "the allusion is twofold: (1) to a virgin who has never been affrighted by contact with a man's face; (2) to the fresh papyrus, unsoiled by use." But surely it is only the latter that the poet has in mind; it does not seem likely that kissing with the chin was more common in ancient than in modern times. Another example of strained interpretation is found in the note at ii. 43. 10: fulcitur testa fagina mensa mihi, where after giving the correct explanation that on account of a broken leg the table was propped up by a piece of earthenware, the editor adds that perhaps Martial means that for him an earthenware vessel served as a monopodium. In iii. 7. 3 quos (quadrantes) dividebat balneator elixus he adopts Friedländer's explanation that the "*balneator* is one of the patron's slaves who accompanied him to the thermae to serve him in the bath and to act as dispensator." But there is no connection between these two functions. Moreover the epithet *elixus* would have very little point if it were applied to a slave who had just arrived at the bath in his master's train; it seems to suggest a permanent functionary of the establishment (possibly the proprietor of a private bath), who may reasonably be supposed to have acted as the patron's agent in the distribution of the dole. The explanation given of iv.

39. 9 that Charinus actually had the kind of plate known as *argentum purum* (unembossed) weakens the point of the epigram. The phrase used in the first line, *argenti genus omne* is simply an echo of Charinus' boast and is not to be taken seriously. While the statement at v. 22. 6. that many of the aqueducts entered Rome by way of the Esquiline is of course true, it is extremely doubtful whether this fact accounts for the mud in the region where the *clivus Suburanus* was. At viii. 51. 7 the important word is *opus*, not *materiae;* the lines that follow (9–16) refer to the workmanship. The number of this epigram is incorrectly given as 50.

G. J. LAING

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Die orientalischen Religionen im römischen Heidentum. Vorlesungen am Collège de France gehalten von FRANCE CUMONT. Autorisierte deutsche Ausgabe von GEORG GEHRICH. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910.

The original French edition of this collection of lectures was reviewed by Professor Showerman in an earlier number of this Journal (III [1908], 465–67). This translation is based on the second French edition. The translator has made numerous additions to the notes, bringing the bibliography up to date, and has made the material of the lectures more accessible by providing an index. The work is done well.

G. J. LAING

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Le Procès de Phidias dans les Chroniques d'Apollodore d'après un papyrus inédit de la collection de Genève. Déchiffré et commenté par JULES NICOLE avec un fac-simile. Genève: Librairie Kündig, 1910.

The document consisting of two badly mutilated fragments belongs to the third century A.D. Only the central portions of the two columns are preserved. No considerable restorations were possible. For, though the text is in iambic trimeters, it is written continuously with spaces to indicate the separate verses. With great skill and learning Nicole has reconstructed the narrative in outline. As in Plutarch's account (Pericles 31) Menon is the accuser. The charge is embezzlement of ivory intended for the statue of Athena. The prosecution failed to secure a verdict in the assembly; a fuller investigation was ordered. In the meantime Phidias was kept in prison. Taking advantage of a revulsion of popular feeling in favor of the distinguished sculptor the Eleans secured his liberation by giving bail in the amount of 40 talents; and Phidias went to Elis to make the statue of Zeus.

This was in the year 438–437. Four or five years later the case against Phidias came to trial. As the Eleans refused to surrender him he was condemned and his bail was forfeited. On the completion of the statue of Zeus in the year 432–431 the Eleans showed their gratitude to Phidias by conferring isotelia on him.

The strength of Nicole's reconstruction lies in the fact that it accounts for practically all of the statements of the ancient authorities. It explains how Aristophanes (*Pax* 605 ff.) connected the trial of Phidias and the Megarian decree. Even the elder Seneca's incredible statement that the Eleans secured the services of Phidias by agreeing to pay 100 talents if they did not return him to Athens appears to be wrong only in the amount. But we may well hesitate to believe that the Eleans were willing to forfeit the enormous sum of 40 talents even to secure and retain the services of so distinguished an artist as Phidias. Is it not possible that the reference is to the amount of gold on the Zeus statue? The gold used for the Athena statue weighed 44 talents (Schol. Aristoph. *Pax* 605).

Limitations of space and the laudable desire to publish the document as speedily as possible precluded a full treatment of the subject on the basis of the extensive modern literature. Until this is done Nicole's views will be accepted with more or less reservation.

ROBERT J. BONNER

Roman Stoicism. By E. VERNON ARNOLD, Litt.D. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. ix+468. $3.50.

This excellent book may be recommended to the English student as the best guide to the subject. It does not, of course, attempt to supersede Zeller, or to take the place of the abundant special French and German literature on Stoicism referred to in the appended bibliography. But it is a much more solid performance than Davidson's *The Stoic Creed* or Capes's little handbook, and its 467 pages give opportunity for a more extended treatment of the theme than is possible in Hicks's *Stoics and Epicureans*. Writing avowedly for students of Latin literature, Professor Arnold has constructed the history of Stoicism as far as possible from the writings of Cicero and Seneca, copiously quoted in the footnotes. But with the aid of Von Arnim's fragments, Zeller, Stein, Pearson, and Schmekel, whom he sometimes follows quite closely, he has made the work a sufficient compendium of Stoic doctrine as a whole.

The first three chapters, broadly introductory, are entitled "The World Religions," "Heraclitus and Socrates," "The Academy and the Porch." The fourth and fifth chapters, on the preaching of Stoicism, and the Stoic sect in Rome, complete the historic introduction. The doctrine follows in ten chapters, "Of Reason and Speech," "The Foundations of Physics,"

"The Universe," "The Supreme Problems," "Religion," "The Kingdom of the Soul," "The Law for Humanity," "Daily Duties," "Sin and Weakness," "Counsels of Perfection," and the whole concludes with two admirable chapters on "Stoicism in Roman History and Literature," and "The Stoic Strain in Christianity."

The book, originally composed in the form of lectures, is pleasant reading, and if one admits the standpoint of perhaps excessive sympathy with Stoicism it is essentially sound in scholarship. "To understand Stoicism," says the author, "a man must himself become for the time being a Stoic .... whilst constantly referring to the original authorities, he will allow much to be forgotten and in other cases he will draw out more meaning than the writers themselves set in their words" (p. 28). This gives the reader fair warning. And if the reviewer were to apply these critical principles to Mr. Arnold's own book he would have nothing but praise for the way in which the author has accomplished the task which he set himself. But in a technical journal it may be permissible to indicate some reserves and to call attention to a few inadvertences or errors.

1. In the introductory chapters, and indeed, throughout the book, there is, I think, some exaggeration of the debt of Greek philosophy to oriental thought. The proemium of Diogenes Laertius is quoted with approval (p. 3); Xenophon, we are told, derived from Cyrus his belief in the immortality of the soul (p. 10); the doctrine of the λόγος is traced to Persism (pp. 12, 19, etc.); we are told that the emissaries of Buddhism "must" often have appeared in the Hellenistic world (p. 15), and that the system of Zeno "deals with all the great themes touched upon by Chaldaism, Persism, and Buddhism" (p. 17). And lastly Lightfoot is quoted with approval to the effect that "Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West" (p. 29). This is of course partly a matter of opinion. The Greek mind doubtless received impressions from the Orient, and it is impossible to determine a priori the precise measure of its debt. But, as Zeller has shown, the evolution of Greek philosophy is quite intelligible and complete in itself, and it seems unnecessary therefore to multiply hypotheses. Moreover, the vague appeal to oriental influence sometimes leads to neglect or misinterpretation of the Greek sources. It may or may not be true that Persian monotheism influenced the Greek religious thought of the fifth century. But it is quite fanciful to say (p. 38) that "the same Aeschylus who (in his *Persae*) celebrates the defeat of the national enemy, a few years later (in his *Agamemnon*) questions whether the Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus and the Greek method of worshiping him." This is simply to mislead the student with regard to a commonplace of Greek idiom and Greek religious language. It is wholly fantastic to see a concession to the religion of Persia in the words of the chorus, Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰ τόδ' αὐ|τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, as it is to say (p. 46) that it might

be fairly argued that Socrates was introducing the most essential parts of the religion of the national enemy, Persia.

2. The overestimate of Stoicism leads to some neglect of the priority of Plato and Aristotle. Professor Arnold repudiates the view of Antiochus that Stoicism is merely a new terminology for ideas borrowed from the Academy and the Lyceum (p. 152). He argues that the entire spirit and tendency of the Stoic philosophy is opposed to Platonism and therefore original. That is a tenable thesis. But it does not justify the repeated introduction of specific ideas, clearly formulated by Plato, as if they were new and characteristic Stoic discoveries. For example, on p. 87, Professor Arnold speaks of a passage of Cleanthes in which we are "introduced to an ethical paradox of the highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the will and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action." This elementary moral principle may or may not be a paradox. But it is explicitly stated in Plato's *Laws*. Again, while there is a general acknowledgment that the later Stoics Platonized, nothing is said of the repeated quotations of Plato by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. There is only the barest allusion to the anticipation of the entire Stoic theodicy in Plato's *Laws*. And in the final chapter the beginning of the Fourth Gospel is referred to Stoicism, not Platonism. Again it is a complete misunderstanding of the work of Plato and Aristotle in science to write (on p. 74) that "they [the Stoics and Epicureans] agreed in removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the pursuit of natural science" (cf. also p. 175). The tyro could only infer from this that the Stoics and Epicureans cultivated science more than the Platonists and Aristotelians did, than which nothing could be farther from the truth.

3. The weakest point in the exposition of Stoic doctrine is the account of the psychology, which Professor Arnold possibly despaired of making intelligible in a lecture. He perhaps reads too much modern meaning into his texts when he asks us to distinguish carefully between the simple sensation, the mind picture, and the notion, or idea. For this is what the ancients rarely did. They usually distinguished two things only: sense, and inference from sense, the action of mind, but rarely isolated the percept from the sensation on the one hand and the concept on the other. There is also, I think, some inadequacy in the treatment of *ἀσώματα*. It is somewhat misleading to say (p. 146) "thought is immaterial." The *λεκτόν*, which is immaterial, is not the phrase, or word, nor yet the idea, but, if I understand it, the "meaning" of the word, or perhaps rather the meaning of the predication or the sentence. For it is not quite clear that in the case of general nouns the Stoics always assumed an immaterial *λεκτόν* between the word and the idea, both of which were material.

4. Lastly, among minor inadvertences, I note the following: The word *ὑπόθεσις* is used as a synonym for the *ἰδέα* in Plato (p. 57). This is common doctrine in England, and its occurrence here is sufficiently explained by the

dedication of this volume to Professor Henry Jackson. It is nevertheless a demonstrable misinterpretation of a passage of the *Phaedo*, and will some time be recognized as such. On p. 142 ἀπερίσπαστος does not quite mean "such as no reasoning process can shake." On p. 145 ῥῆμα and κατηγόρημα are identified. Strictly, perhaps too strictly, speaking, I think ῥῆμα is the infinitive. On p. 167 κοινῶς ποιόν and ἰδίως ποιόν are not quite correctly exemplified by "heat in the universe and heat in particular objects." The ἰδίως ποιόν is more nearly the *haecceitas* of the schoolmen, the ἄθροισμα of Plato's *Theaetetus*, an individual thing regarded as a complex of qualities or predicates rather than as an Aristotelian first substance. On p. 193, the statement that in the conflagration the Deity "may at last claim for himself a period of rest during which he will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has passed away and plan for himself a better one to follow" is a rhetorical amplification of Senecan rhetoric hardly to be reconciled with the recognition on the same page of the doctrine that all things will recur in a cycle. On p. 391, we are told that "in a happy phrase Vergil sums up the whole ethics of Stoicism . . . . the Stoic sage can hesitate or be hasty, can love or weep, but the sovereignty of his mind is never upset. "Calm in his soul he abides, and the tears roll down but in vain." But surely in *mens immota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes*, it is not the tears of Aeneas but those of Dido that "rolled down in vain."

PAUL SHOREY

Eurythmia, vel compositio rythmica prosae antiquae. Exposuit CAROLUS ZANDER. I, Eurythmia Demosthenis. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1910.

In the preface to *The Crown of Wild Olive*, Ruskin writes, "No proud one! | no jewelled | circlet flaming through heaven above the height | of the unmerited throne, | only some few | leaves of wild olive, | cool to the tired brow, | through a few years of peace. | It should have been of gold, they thought; but Jupiter was poor; | this was the best the god could give them. | Seeking a greater than this, | they had known it a mockery. | Not in war, | not in wealth, | not in tyranny, | was there any happiness | to be found for them | —only in kindly peace, | fruitful and free." These words easily fall into the following eurhythmic scheme:



If we suppose such a scheme extended to several hundred pages of the prose of Ruskin and De Quincey, we shall have a fair conception of what our author has attempted for Demosthenes and parts of Isocrates. He protests (p. iii) against the tendency of certain critics to treat the new scientific study of rhythmical prose flippantly, and I have no desire to take so serious a piece of industry as this book otherwise than seriously. But to meet the author on his own ground is evidently impossible in the compass of a brief review. It would be necessary to rewrite his schemes or to show sentence by sentence where they fit and where they violate the natural pauses and stresses of a good reading. But even if there were space for this, I should still wish to raise the previous question in several forms.

All prose consists of longs and shorts which a very little ingenuity suffices to reduce to something that may be called meter. A writer on the poetry of Lincoln in the *North American Review* for February, 1911, prints the chief speeches of Lincoln in plausible blank verse, and a writer in the *Classical Review* for June, 1911, p. 104, shows that it is unsafe to argue from verse tags in Livy to a poetical source, because the verse tags are all over the shop, even where Livy is following Polybius.

But to waive this point, much good Greek, Latin, French, and English prose is really rhythmical, and admits of approximate metrical schematization with only a moderate percentage of allowance for the taste, caprice, or personal equation of the reader. But what is the use of such a scheme? In poetry, the rhythm is definite, fixed, and regularly recurrent, and is consciously intended by the writer, though he may not be, and generally is not, conscious of the *scheme* which, however inadequate, roughly guides the reader in reproducing the intended movement of the verse. In prose, the rhythm does not govern every syllable, but only such portions of the stream of speech as the schematizer sometimes arbitrarily selects, and in prose, though here and there a cadence or clausula may be consciously intended, the rhythm as a whole is due to the writer's unconscious feeling for verbal harmony, and preoccupation with a formal scheme will probably lead to false emphasis and affected sing-song reading.

So much of rhythmical prose in general. But in the case of Greek there are a number of other difficult problems to be settled before we can safely advance a step in these inquiries. It is perfectly idle to go on talking about a purely quantitative, unstressed rhythm. There is no such thing *in rerum natura*. Stress is an essential constituent of appreciable rhythm. In Greek poetry the stress is determined by the metrical arrangement of the quantities, so that the same word may be differently stressed in two consecutive lines. The Greeks were enabled to accept this convention, perhaps, by the lightness of their word-stress and the association of verse with music. At any rate they did accept it for verse. Shall we extend the principle to rhythmical prose, and hold that the normal word-stress shifted with the rhythm there also? Rhythmical prose in Greek can have no meaning for us until this

question is answered, yet the majority of investigators do not even ask it. Professor Zander, if I understand him, boldly accepts the paradox. He adds rhythmical stress accents, contradicting the word accents, to his metrical scheme, and would scan Greek oratory like poetry. The only difference he finds is that rhythmical prose admits only the quantities – and ⏑ and does not recognize the trisemes and cyclic dactyls of some verse. If we are to scan the prose, this assumption seems arbitrary, but I do not care to debate the point. I merely wish to call attention to the fact that all quantitative metrical schemes for rhythmical prose, if they mean anything, really involve the acceptance of Professor Zander's postulate. Such prose is to be scanned, with a stress quite different from that which we have been accustomed to give to the words taken singly. The aesthetic paradox might be defended by the analogy of the coloring of Greek statues, so repugnant to our taste, but I will leave the question, merely adding that to my own ear the rhythm of many fine sentences in Greek prose depends upon the stress of the printed accents. That may be an illusion—must be, if the accents never represented stress. But I doubt if it is any more likely to be an illusion than the choriambs, the cretics, the bacchics, and the antispasts of Professor Zander's schemes.

The next question is the relation of the metrical cola to the sense cola, the clauses of punctuation and the pauses of a good reader. If we are to scan, I see no more necessity for absolute coincidence between sense and rhythm in prose than in verse. But whatever their compromises with the principle in practice, it is the tendency of students of this subject to assume such coincidence in theory. The correct analysis of the sense cola is supposed to yield the true divisions and correspondences of the rhythm. In Professor Zander's application of the principle, however, there is a dangerous approximation to a circle in the reasoning. If our metrical schemes coincide, he says, with a necessary or a possible pause in the recital, they are presumably thereby verified (see p. 183). This leaves a wide field for the play of subjectivity. On p. 121 he establishes the rhythm

⏑ ⏓ ⏓ ⏑ ⏓
– ⏓ ⏓ ⏑ ⏓

thus:

ὃ γὰρ βούλεται·
[τοῦθ ἕκα] στος καὶ οἴεται

Are we to pause slightly in the middle of the word ἕκαστος? If not, στος καὶ οἴεται will hardly be sufficiently detached to be felt as a metrical unit of correspondence. Again on p. 174, in Demosth. *Ol.* 1. 4: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπιει | κῶς ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη | ναῖοι τοῦθ' ὃ δυσ (μαχώτατόν ἐστι τῶν Φιλίππου πραγμάτων) he finds this articulation:

⏓ – ⏓ ⏑ ⏑ ⏓
⏓ – ⏓ ⏑ ⏑ ⏓
⏓ ⏑ ⏓ (⏑) ⏑ ⏓

Is this a mere exercise of schematic ingenuity, or does he suppose that Demosthenes pronounced it so, with a break in the middle of three words? There are hundreds of such cases, in which the rhythmic divisions or correspondences divide words, separate articles, adjectives, and prepositions from their nouns, and interrupt the natural and normal flow of the stream of speech. Of course, if it is frank scansion or singing, that might be conceivable, but how is it to be reconciled with the principle of the correspondence of the divisions of the rhythm to the thought?

In further apology for my skeptical attitude to this entire method of inquiry, it may be noted that different investigators propound with equal confidence contradictory schemes. To take the first instance that presents itself, Zander (p. 305) schematizes the first sentence of the *Panegyricus* thus:

(πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν) τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων,
(καὶ τοὺς) γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων

but Blass, in his *Die Rhythmen der asianischen und römischen Kunstprosa* (p. 3), is equally certain that the intended rhythm is:

– ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ = – ⏑ ⏑ – *aa*
– ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ✕ ⏑ – – – – (*b*)

But if words not needed for the scheme may be bracketed and ignored in the one case, and an augment separated from its verb in the other, what is to hinder our fitting any scheme to any words?

Finally, let me say again that it was quite impossible to review adequately, or do justice to Zander's laborious and suggestive book. But however superficial this notice must seem to him, I think the questions that I have raised will have to be answered before the majority of scholars can either understand or feel much confidence in the new science of rhythmical prose.

PAUL SHOREY

Die Anschauungen vom Wesen des Griechentums. Von GUSTAV BILLETER. Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1911.

This work is rather the plan and materials of a book than a book in the proper sense. An *Allgemeiner Theil* of 87 pages sets forth in highly generalized and abstract language the questions that may be asked, the problems that may be debated, the judgments that may be passed, about the origin, character, and historical development of the Greeks, and the quality of their civilization. The *Besonderer Theil*, pp. 88–463, illustrates each topic of the general part by copious bibliographical references to, and brief, often commonplace, quotations from an immense but somewhat indiscriminatingly selected literature, both philological and general. There are in the index no

references to Shelley, Mill, Coleridge, Jowett, Macaulay, De Quincey, Landor, De Maistre, Brunetière; 25 to R. Eucken, 24 to Limburg Brouwer, 19 to J. A. St. John, 48 to O. F. Schlegel, 67 to Wilamowitz, 65 to Nietsche, 53 to Herder, 40 to R. Pöhlmann, 49 to Eduard Meyer, 33 to E. Rohde, 29 to Grote, 26 to Butcher, 26 to Goethe, 16 to Jebb, 10 to Schopenhauer, 7 to Renan, 13 to Walter Pater, 6 to Ruskin, 4 to Oliver Goldsmith, but none to Gibbon, Johnson, Burke, Gray, Fitzgerald, Tennyson, Browning; 50 to J. Burckhardt, but none to John Addington Symonds; 2 each to Matthew Arnold, D'Annunzio, and Walter Bagehot; 1 each to Rabelais, Montaigne, Emerson, and Maeterlinck. I give these figures not by way of censure, but as an indication of the character of the material here gathered, and in confirmation of what ought to be the truism that from the point of view of our own national culture the perspective of books prepared for the German scientific public must be hopelessly out of focus.

I should be sorry to seem to underrate this laborious, and for those who can use it rightly, helpful compilation. A work of this sort can in the nature of things never be complete. We must judge it by what it gives, rather than by what it omits. Taken in this way, the present volume will be an extremely useful tool in the scholar's working library.

PAUL SHOREY

Diogenes von Apollonia. By DR. ERNST KRAUSE. Posen, 1908.

In the second part of his treatise on *Diogenes of Apollonia* Dr. Krause manifests the same conservatism and good sense as in the first part, reviewed in this Journal (IV, No. 3). The main subjects treated are the formation of the world, the generation, growth, and structure of living beings.

Dr. Krause in the main follows the traditional accounts. Only in occasional minor points does he make suggestions that are new, and these are usually sound. We may note, however, that he attributes the generation of plants to the fermenting of water, while in Theophrastus' account this process seems incidental to the creative, vitalizing power of air. (Theophrastus *Hist. Plant.* iii. 1. 4.) Again Dr. Krause seems to have misconceived the sense in which the mists arising from the sea are said to support the heavens (Arist. *Meteor.* B 2, 355 *a* 21), since he concludes from it, on p. 8, that probably the end of the world will come when the sea is dried up and the heavens fall in consequence.

The most significant part of the treatise is the discussion of the circulation of the blood, which is taken up in great detail. The circulatory system of Diogenes does not recognize the central position of the heart, but consists chiefly of two great blood vessels going from the head to the feet and sending out branches to the other parts of the body, including the heart. The distinction between the veins and arteries is not observed, probably because the arteries are empty in the dead body and would easily escape notice.

Dr. Krause makes the interesting suggestion, which explains many features of Diogenes' circulatory system, that his ideas were obtained, not from dissection of the human body, which certainly was not customary in his day, but from animals. The vital organs of animals were very familiar to the Greeks, because the examination of them was one of the commonest methods of divination. An excellent diagram accompanies this portion of Dr. Krause's work.

CLARA E. MILLERD

Lo Stato e l'Istruzione Pubblica nell' Impero Romano. Da CORRADO BARBAGALLO. Catania: Francesco Battiato, 1911. Pp. 430. L. 6.

"Public instruction in Europe is wholly of Italic origin." These are the first words of the Introduction to Barbagallo's book on *The State and Public Instruction in the Roman Empire*, and certainly in the truth of this statement is justification enough for the most detailed study of the educational institutions of the ancient Romans. For purposes of comparison with modern institutions, however, a study of the schools of the Republican period is not enough; we need also to understand those of the Empire, for it was in the Empire that the schools received their fullest development. Barbagallo has undertaken in the present work to explain the connection of the central government with public instruction in the period from Augustus to Justinian; the work is therefore an exposition of the development of the educational side of the imperial polity during the first five centuries of the Roman Empire. The most notable feature of this polity was the increasing interference of the emperor in matters of oversight and control relating to the schools—interference that led in the end to a form of public instruction not unlike that which is the most common form of public instruction in Europe at the present day.

Barbagallo has performed his task well, and the result is a book of great value and interest. It was not a part of Barbagallo's plan to give an account of the inner workings of the schools or a complete picture of the schools as they were at any one period of their existence, and these things we do not find in the book. But we have a discussion, at once clear and acutely reasoned, of the various acts of the emperors in succession from Augustus to Justinian relative to the subject of education. Only in a subordinate way is the relation of the various municipalities to the teachers and schools touched upon. Though the method of treatment is annalistic, the book is organically constructed; the outlines of the structure as a whole and the bearing of the different parts on each other are not lost sight of in the discussion of details.

Some of the more important conclusions of Barbagallo's study may be summarized thus: Two different theories of public instruction existed

at different times among the ancient Romans; one was that which prevailed under the Republic, the other was that which came into existence under the Empire. According to the first of these theories, the state has no concern with the establishment or the maintenance of schools or with the instruction that is given in them. According to the second, the ideal state is that which provides instruction at its own expense and under its own direction. The latter theory was developed gradually out of the former, and this development took place in three ways: (*a*) by the establishment of public and official schools; (*b*) by the regulation of municipal instruction; and (*c*) by the oversight given to private instruction.

In the institution of state schools two methods were at different times followed: either (1) the state established in important cities, like Rome and Athens, chairs of certain studies, delegating, perhaps, to the local councils the privilege of appointing the incumbents of the chairs, but assuming to itself the burden of paying the salaries, or (2) it designated certain cities where certain studies, already established, should be pursued under imperial patronage and without inconvenience from competition of other cities; a case of this sort was the school of Berytus, reorganized by Justinian. Schools of the latter kind do not appear earlier than the time of Diocletian.

In these two forms of state institutions we have the beginnings of the real university, wherein the state took charge of all branches considered fundamental or necessary. Such a real university was the Capitol at Constantinople, reorganized (not established) by Theodosius II. The branches considered fundamental or necessary were oratory, "grammar," philosophy, and, toward the end of our period, law. The tendency was for the central government to concern itself more and more and in more and more ways in the affairs of the schools. Thus, in some places, as at Rome and Constantinople, it furnished the university building, or, again, it made regulations relative to the conduct of the students. This activity of the central government, except in a few cases, affected solely the external features of the schools; it did not interfere with the freedom of instruction.

The second way in which the development of the ancient theory of education took place was through the regulation by the state of municipal instruction. Such regulation is to be noted as early as Antoninus Pius, by whom the privilege was granted, or the obligation imposed, on certain municipalities of supporting chairs of certain subjects and granting exemptions from certain public duties. The municipal councils acted in these cases as the representatives of the emperor, who occasionally interfered in person.

In the matter of private instruction the policy of the central government was in the line of restriction as regards all but the lower grades. The emperor Julian, by requiring that every teacher of higher learning who wished to set up a school should first receive permission from the local council of the city in which he wished to teach, as well as the consent of the

emperor, took one step in this direction; and still further restrictions were imposed upon private teaching by Theodosius II. Under this emperor only house-to-house teaching was left unregulated.

It would be impossible to give here an idea of the many interesting points that are discussed in the course of this treatise. Especially noteworthy is the discussion of the emperor Julian's attitude toward the schools. Barbagallo is inclined to assign greater importance to the influence of Nero in the line of education than most authors, and less importance to that of Vespasian. The appointment of Quintilian, for example, signified rather the personal advancement of a distinguished teacher than the foundation of a real chair of eloquence. The influence of Hadrian, it is held, was chiefly in the way of encouragement to education; real educational chairs did not come into existence until the time of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. Besides the more strictly educational institutions, space is given in the book to such subjects also as libraries, museums, galleries, the maintenance of works of art, etc. Some points invite comment, of which but a few can be mentioned here.

Of the two chairs of rhetoric at Athens in the second century A.D., Barbagallo believes the one to have been an imperial donation (of Marcus Aurelius) and the other a municipal chair established under Antoninus Pius. This is Zumpt's view, and that which on the whole seems the more probable. Brandstätter's view, however, that the chair held by Lollianus was a chair of *political* oratory, would seem to deserve notice. Barbagallo refers to Brandstätter's article elsewhere in a different connection.

Barbagallo states that at the death of the sophist Julian at Athens, about 340, a change was made in the number of official chairs of sophistry in that city, so that in the future there were to be six such chairs instead of a single chair. This view is based on one, and, in the reviewer's opinion, not the most probable, interpretation of a doubtful passage (Eunap., p. 79). We may well doubt whether Athens was honored with six imperial chairs of sophistry (there were only five such Greek chairs at Constantinople in the next century, and apparently three at Antioch in this century), especially as certain passages (e.g. Lib. i. 19. 16; 59. 3) seem to intimate but three.

Mention is made by Barbagallo of the salaries said to have been established at Antioch by the emperor Probus; these salaries, he believes, were to be paid by the municipality. This may have been the case; we miss, however, reference to those passages in which salaries in various cities are said to have come from the emperor, and, in general, we should have liked a full discussion, with citation of passages, of the difficult question of the respective relations of the emperors and the municipal councils to the schools in the fourth century. A summary statement of some of the facts has, it is true, been given in the final chapter, but apparently all the passages bearing on the subject have not been used.

The services of the emperor Constantius in the field of education are

spoken of at length, but no mention is made of the adverse judgment of Libanius (e.g. iii. 436. 18) and others on Constantius.

Barbagallo states (p. 223) that Constantine was the first emperor to extend privileges to members of the family of a teacher. Hadrian, however, is said (Philos. 532) to have extended to Polemo's children the privilege of traveling by land or sea free of charge.

These are comparatively slight matters, however, in part involving but questions of personal judgment, and do not detract from the value of the book as a whole.

J. W. H. WALDEN

The Separation of the Attributive Adjective from Its Substantive in Plautus. By WINTHROP L. KEEP. [*University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 151–64. Berkeley, 1911.]

Such impropriety as may be involved in my reviewing an abstract of a dissertation of which I suggested the subject may be condoned by the fact that the close criticism of the thesis in its later stages was in more competent hands. My interest in the theme prompts some general remarks that may be suggestive to future investigators.

The earliest Latin prose is said to exhibit the close juxtaposition of the attributive adjective and its substantive; rarely a word or two intervenes, in that case of an enclitic nature or constituting a single unit of thought. Contemporary poetry clearly shows greater freedom. Later prose shows greater freedom, though the extent and nature of it remain as yet undefined. Is it possible to trace any historical development in this matter? Is the greater freedom of later prose a reflection of the freedom that grew up naturally under metrical and stylistic conditions peculiar to poetry in the earliest period of Latin? Or did rhythmical conditions and other factors within the prose itself after it became more consciously artistic promote separation? Such are some of the questions I hoped to see partially answered in the present paper. The writer in his abstract has intelligently described some phases of the question in Plautus; such criticism as I should be disposed to make concerns rather omissions than errors of statement. These omissions are perhaps due to the abbreviated form in which the paper appears.

The writer starts with a generalization for which I crave all the evidence. He declares that close juxtaposition is normal in Plautus and all early poetry before 100 B.C. The mere proof of this statement would be of more value than the content of the abstract. The implication is that the examples of various sorts discussed in the abstract are not real, but only apparent, violations of the norm. But, however we may abhor statistics, some figures are necessary to convince us of the norm; a single play of Plautus would

furnish, temporarily, sufficient and suggestive evidence; we cannot easily grant that the examples are merely apparent exceptions until we know the proportion in which they stand to the total. Nor is the writer fortunate in his choice of the inseparability of *res divina, Iuppiter supremus*, as evidence to support the generalization; formulas, especially ritualistic formulas, will be the last to yield to separation; one might as well quote *iusiurandum* as *Iuppiter supremus;* yet precisely this type of groups we should be glad to see the writer enlarge from Plautus. Without knowing the extent of inseparable formulaic groups we are in danger of misinterpreting evidence.

In general the rubrics of the descriptive treatment are well chosen, although "art-separations" is singularly infelicitous. The writer is well aware that any rubrics are misleading, that no one feature is easily proved to be dominant exclusive of other features. But some objection may reasonably be made in so far as the author has contented himself with describing features within well-established categories when his material often leads to the determination of new factors; the pitiless pursuit of several lines of thought suggested here and there would be of great assistance to his co-laborers. For example, our attention is rightly called (p. 154) to cases in which adjective and noun appear respectively before the principal caesura or diaeresis, and at the end of the verse; this feature is very general in many varieties of classical verse; now the very fact that the caesura and the end of the verse appear in this description should suggest metrical conditions as dominant factors, and one has only to look up Mr. Keep's examples to find that in the different types of iambic and trochaic verse the adjectives before the caesura or diaeresis fall within a very limited number of metrical types; a study of these metrical types, molossic words, bacchiac words, etc., in a single play might lead to convincing conclusions as to the dominant factor in such separation. In other words, fully as he knows the metrical peculiarities of the end of the verse, the author does not discover for himself the peculiarities that mark the end of the shorter metrical phrase. Again (pp. 160 ff.), the author has material that points to the possibility of an old and well-established triadic grouping of adjective, verb, and noun; here a glance at Homer, or at Lindhamer *Zur Wortstellung im Griechischen*, Münster, 1908, would establish certain presuppositions of value to the student of the phenomenon in Latin.

In details the writer occasionally misses valuable points. The significance of *Bacch.* 926 (p. 160) is certainly not in the metrical convenience of *manu*, but in the sound-effects; otherwise *moenitum divina manu* would serve. The generalization on the top of p. 162 is important and warrants more careful account of the exceptions. On the top of p. 163 the inference with regard to *bonus* is not convincing until we know how often the adjective stands at the beginning of the verse in Plautus, quite apart from the question of emphasis. In the list that follows, the adjectives, except *verus*, seem to belong to special categories (size and quantity) that set them apart;

in this same class would fall the cases of *omnis* on p. 164. In other words, there is no clear evidence of the need of such a loose rubric as "miscellaneous separations."

As a brief abstract the paper is intelligent so far as it goes. But a student who professes to have covered his subject not only for Plautus but for all early poetry prior to 100 B.C. may well have reached more clear-cut and significant conclusions. I hope that "after further study and reflection" the writer will publish a more nearly complete account which will make unnecessary a repetition of his industrious effort by other scholars.

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Horace: Odes and Epodes. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by PAUL SHOREY. Revised by PAUL SHOREY and GORDON J. LAING. Boston: Benj. H. Sanborn & Co., 1910. Pp. 514.

This revision of Professor Shorey's well-known edition of Horace's *Odes* has made no change of importance, as the preface informs us, in the general introduction or the introductions to the different odes except for the addition of a few references to recent literature, as, e.g., to Reitzenstein's valuable investigations of the "consolatio" and "recusatio" and other common themes of ancient lyric poetry. The introduction to the *Carmen saeculare*, however, has been considerably expanded by a sketch of the origin and occasion of the *Ludi saeculares* in place of the brief reference to the classical dictionary in the first edition.

The text is practically unchanged except by the substitution of the ending *-is* for *-es* in the accusative plural of *i*-stems. The notes, however, show on almost every page numerous additions, excisions, and alterations, made for the greater part by Professor Laing with a view of assisting more effectively the unlearned student. In this he seems to have succeeded admirably and to have met the only serious criticism of the previous edition. The former frequent references to the lexicon, viz., "Lex. *s.v.*," for the exact meaning of a word have been replaced by the proper rendering itself, and these English equivalents are both felicitous and numerous. Concise explanations of allusions have also been inserted instead of references to the classical dictionary. Thus, for example, the somewhat baffling remark on *Od.* i. 19, "Horace's wines are all in the lexicon," is replaced by an almost equally brief line sufficiently explaining the allusion. Other notes, indirect or subtle, have been made plainer, and many long, involved phrases of the odes have been elucidated more fully by translation or explanation of the construction.

To find space for these additions without rendering the volume more cumbersome than before, numerous parallel passages, especially in French

and Italian, and those in English which did not need to be quoted at length to bring out the comparison have been omitted or abridged. Cf. *Od.* i. 3. 21–34 *passim;* i. 2. 38; i. 12. 1. Alternative constructions and interpretations are also omitted; cf. *Od.* i. 31. 17; ii. 2. 1–4; ii. 13. 19; iii. 3. 12, etc. It may be noted here that in several cases the preferred construction of the first edition has been rejected (*Od.* i. 32. 2–3; ii. 8. 3; *Epod.* 16. 15); in others the alternative rendering has superseded the one preferred by Professor Shorey formerly; cf. *Od.* i. 6. 1–2; i. 12. 21; ii. 10. 6; iii. 7. 41–42; iii. 21. 4; *Carm. saec.* 65. A further improvement is an index of first lines.

On the whole errors in the revision are rare, but I have noted a few which have survived from the previous edition or appeared now for the first time. Text and notes in some instances do not agree: viz., ii. 13. 23, *discretas* and *discriptas;* i. 5. 13, *intemptata* and *intentata;* i. 37. 23, *ensem* and *ensen;* ii. 8. 20, *iminati* is a misprint. In *Carm. saec.* 65, the notes reject the previous reading *arces* and adopt *aras*, but the text still reads *arces*. The mispunctuation in i. 1. 30 still remains in the revision. *Epod.* ix. 11 might be more clearly written, and Miss Case's article in the *Classical Journal* (December, 1908), p. 65, should be added to the references on Horace's religion in *Od.* iii. 23. Furthermore, would it not have been more helpful to the student to replace very technical terms like "brachylogy" (*Od.* i. 8. 9), "cacophonous" (iii. 3. 67), "trajection" (iii. 4. 11), and "anadiplosis," with brief explanatory phrases?

But these are minor points. The revisers are to be congratulated on making the work so helpful to an understanding of Horace without impairing its literary flavor, which is, as before, its special charm.

HAROLD L. AXTELL

Abhandlungen zur römischen Religion. Von ALFRED VON DOMASZEWSKI. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. Pp. viii+240. M. 6.

Scholars have reason to be grateful to the late Albrecht Dieterich for persuading Domaszewski to gather into a volume his most important articles on Roman religion. Hitherto these have been accessible only to such as were near the largest libraries, for they originally appeared in widely scattered publications. Now we have in a handy volume twenty-four papers, no one of which can be neglected, even if each and every one cannot secure our acquiescence in equal degree. In all essentials the original form of the articles has been preserved. Obviously a reviewer cannot even name all the titles here included, but must confine himself to noting the most important. Yet, first of all, the modest form in which the articles appear certainly deserves mention. In many cases a few pages contain what another writer would have expanded into a paper many times the length; indeed it must be confessed that in certain instances expansion would

probably have been an advantage, for at times excessive compression and a neglect of literary form, such as is so exasperating in Domaszewski's important *Religion des römischen Heeres*, tend to conceal the writer's aim and to obscure the significance of his work.

Domaszewski's great knowledge of all that relates to the Roman army makes us naturally turn first to those articles which deal with the religion of the troops, such as No. I, *Die Tierbilder der Signa*, in which the author shows that the animals represented on the signa under the empire were chiefly drawn from the zodiacal signs, the creature indicating in each case the nativity of the imperial house or of the Emperor under whom the legion was formed, or of the legion itself. This result is of value not only in determining the date of the organization of the legions but it also explains a number of minor matters, as for example such dedications as *CIL.* II, 2553, *ob natales signorum*, and 6183, *ob natalem aquilae*. The other two articles of this class are briefer: the first, No. II, *Lustratio Exercitus*, is an interpretation of *CIL.* V, 808, and III, 8112, both of the third century; the other, No. VIII, *Das Tribunal der Signa*, elucidates *CIL.* VI, 3559.

Next we may note the short papers which deal with special divinities. No. III, *Neptunus auf lateinischen Inschriften*, shows that while the concept of Neptune as lord of the sea was foreign to Roman thought originally and only had its place as the result of Greek influence, the divinity frequently appears as god of springs and once (*Eph. Epig.* III, 99) even as protector of a bridge. No. IV, *Tempestates*, presents the evidence for the cult of these Latin powers of the deep, so far as they were not banished by Greek influence. An inscribed relief in honor of Fortuna and Bonus Eventus, found near Isca in Britain, *CIL.* VII, 97, furnishes the theme for No. XII, *Bonus Eventus*. Although this divinity appears elsewhere as the god of profit in money transactions or of good luck, in the monument from Isca he seems to show his original Italic nature as the god of success in agriculture. The old Roman character of this concept appears in the dress of the god, which is that of the Roman priest, the toga and the limus, a representation not found elsewhere on the monuments of this god. In No. XV, *Virgo Caelestis*, Domaszewski employs *CIL.* VII, 759, the famous apotheosis of Julia Domna as Virgo Caelestis, to elucidate Virg. *Aen.* iv. 58, where he would identify legifera Ceres with the Carthaginian goddess. This is no doubt correct, but why he should say that Servius' identification of Ceres with Δημήτηρ θεσμοφόρος "ist nur ein Scholiastenwits" is beyond comprehension. The very inscription which he is using calls Caelestis iusti inventrix, which is exactly equivalent to θεσμοφόρος (cf. *HSCP.* XI, 58 ff.). The longest paper of this class is No. VII, *Silvanus auf lateinischen Inschriften*, in which is shown how this ancient god of wood and field became the patron of wood-dealers, hunters, herdsmen, and shepherds. The deforestation of Italy may be the reason why only a single dedication to the god by caplatores has been found in the entire peninsula, while the number of similar dedications

in Illyricum and Dalmatia testifies to the active wood trade in those provinces. In like fashion the dedications to Silvanus as protector of cattle show that the grazing lands lay chiefly in the central Apennines and on the southern slopes of the Alps. These inscriptions were set up chiefly by slaves and freedmen whose guardian the god naturally became. Furthermore the article proves how the distribution of the dedications in the provinces reflects the native religions.

Two numbers deal directly with religious phenomena of the Germanic provinces. The first of these, No. XIII, *Die Schutzgötter von Mainz*, discusses the four pairs of gods represented on a monument of the third century, found within the limits of the Roman Mogontiaceum. The gods are identified as Silvanus and Diana, the Celtic Sucellus and Nantosvelta; genius castrorum and Fortuna; Apollo and Salus, the Celtic Grannus and Sirona; and Mercury and Victoria. The other paper, No. XIV, *Die Juppitersäule in Mainz*, deals with a monument of the time of Nero, which, with its complex of divinities, shows how Greco-Roman civilization had penetrated into Gallic lands.

Only three articles treat subjects belonging specifically to the Republic. No. X, *die Eigenschaftsgötter der altrömischen Religion*, discusses such pairs as Lua Saturni, Salacia Neptuni, etc. With the conclusions of No. XVII, *Dei Certi und Dei Incerti*, it is difficult to agree, for Domaszewski would regard as dei certi those divinities whose sphere of action was indicated and delimited by the effects they produced on human affairs, as for example the gods Vervactor, Reparator, Imporcitor, etc. The more probable explanation has a less philosophic basis: Varro designated as dei certi those gods about whom the theologians could say something definite; the dei incerti included all others, both those who had never been definitely conceived as individual divinities and those who had more or less died out of Roman religious consciousness. This was long since pointed out by Wissowa (see his *Gesam. Abhandlungen*, 306 ff.). In the third paper of this class, No. XVIII, *Die Festcyclen des römischen Kalenders*, the writer follows up an earlier observation of his own on the cyclic arrangement of the Roman festivals and endeavors to prove that in each month there was a tendency to group the sacred days around one central festival. For example, in August the Vulcanalia of August 23, which celebrated the ripening power of the sun's flaming heat, formed the center of the group Portunalia, August 17, Vinalia, August 19, Consualia, August 21, Opiconsiva, August 25, and the Volturnalia, August 26. Domaszewski holds that all these stand in a natural relation to the central festival, and would establish similar cycles in the other months. The contention contains much truth, beyond all question, but the present reviewer is unable to see everywhere the same close connection which the author seeks to establish.

Three other important papers deserve more attention than the mere mention which can here be given them. In No. V, *Die politische Bedeutung*

des Traiansbogen in Benevent, Domaszewski analyzes the reliefs on the arch and points out how the whole work was intended to celebrate Trajan, princeps optimus, as the benefactor of the provinces. No. IX, *Die Familie des Augustus auf der Ara Pacis*, as the title indicates, is an interpretation of the sculptured groups on the famous Augustan monument, against the conclusions of which it should be said that the procession is no longer commonly thought to be that of 13 B.C. *Der Festgesang des Horaz auf die Begründung des Principates*, No. XI, is a discussion of Hor. *C.* 3. 1–6, in relation to Augustus' own words in the Monumentum Ancyranum which demands the careful attention of students of Horace.

Of the eight remaining papers only No. XXII, *Die politische Bedeutung der Religion von Emesa*, can be noticed here. In it Domaszewski attributes the source of the extraordinary influence exerted by the women of the imperial house for the half-century following the marriage of Septimius Severus with Julia Domna to the commanding position which the religion of Emesa had previously won in Syria. With this monotheistic cult of the sun and with oriental theosophy in general the first of the Severi had become acquainted probably at the time when he was in command of the legio IV Scythica in Syria during the latter years of Marcus Aurelius' reign. How completely he had come under this religious influence is shown by the readiness with which he accepted the guidance of the stars in selecting his second wife. Julia Domna, Julia Soaemias, Julia Maesa, and Julia Mamaea were all connected with the priestly line of Emesa, whose superior position prompted their high ambitions.

Much more might be said, but this notice has already passed its normal bounds. The individual papers all deserve careful study, for in spite of their compression and lack of style, they are both stimulating and illuminating, even where the reader must dissent from their conclusions.

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Opferbräuche der Griechen. Von PAUL STENGEL. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910.

Students of Greek religion well know their constant debt to Paul Stengel. For more than thirty years he has modestly and continuously been adding to our precise knowledge of Greek ritual by a series of special studies in which he has examined the evidence in point in objective fashion and has drawn his conclusions uninfluenced by prejudice or by theories previously conceived. In response to many requests he has now issued twenty-eight of the most important of his studies in a handy volume. Eleven of these papers deal with the technical terms of ritual, such as, for example, those entitled, I, "Homerisches, *ἱερήιον, πρωτόγονος, τελήεσσα ἑκατόμβη, ἀποσπένδειν, θυήεις—θύελλα—θυόεις*"; III, "*Θύειν* und *Θύεσθαι*"; VI, "*Χέρνιψ*"; XIX,

"Νεκύσια"; XXI, "Ἱερώσυνα und Θεσμορία"; of the fourteen which have to do with the manner and meaning of ritual acts the most important are V, "Opferblut und Opfergerste"; XV, "Zum griechischen Opferritual"; and XXVII, "Buphonien"; the remaining three discuss the nature and worship of special divinities under the titles, XVI, "Chthonischer und Totenkult"; XVII, "Der Kult der Winde"; and XVIII, "Ἀΐδης κλυτόπωλος."

Happily Stengel has not followed the usual custom of being content to publish his papers in the form in which they originally appeared, valuable as such publication would have been; he has instead taken the trouble to revise the whole series of articles, rewriting the older when necessary; so he has brought all up to date and given the collection a contemporaneous character for which scholars will be duly grateful. The table of contents gives under each number references to the original place of publication.

No doubt some of Stengel's results will appear scanty or questionable, especially to members of the anthropological or the "comparative" school, for of analogous ritual acts and religious practices among other peoples than the Greeks he has nothing to say. Probably such analogies could often be used to advantage for illustration or explanation of the matters Stengel discusses, but the dangers of the "comparative" method are so great that we cannot fail to feel a certain satisfaction that the author has chosen to confine himself to a consideration of the data which the Greeks themselves have left us and to be content with the results which can be obtained therefrom. This is sound philological method and vastly to be preferred to that "comparative" course which has so often led to strange conclusions.

CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE

Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: Ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen. Von R. REITZENSTEIN. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. Pp. 212. M. 4.

One of the most striking phenomena in the course of classical studies during the last twenty years has been the increasing appreciation of the fact that antiquity must be studied in all its manifestations, and that consequently the New Testament and the writings of the church Fathers belong to the classical philologist as much as to the theologian. The several writers of the New Testament, Paul above all the rest, were the children of their time no less than Seneca, Epictetus, and Plutarch; their words and ideas must be interpreted with due regard to their Hellenistic as well as their Jewish environment. How much our knowledge of the language of the New Testament has gained from the study of the profane writings of the time, especially of the papyri, is well known; it is not too much to expect that many of the religious ideas of early Christianity may be illuminated by a study of the contemporary non-Christian religious literature. This

mportant task Reitzenstein has undertaken in part in the publication before us.

The book falls into two divisions: the first, pp. 1–60, is an address delivered on November 11, 1909, before the Wissenschaftlicher Predigerverein für Elsass-Lothringen; the second, pp. 63–212, is made up of elaborate notes and excursuses in which the important points of the address are illustrated or established in detail. Some of these excursuses form almost articles in themselves. In his address Reitzenstein first discusses the spread and modification of Egyptian and oriental mysteries in the Hellenistic world, and shows how the idea of a universal religion, which was at the same time a personal one, was established and developed. In many, if not most, of these mysteries the devotee believed that through direct revelation he had received a call to divine service; that in the initiation he had been taken out of this world to a divine position in which he had seen divinity face to face and had received a direct knowledge which no teaching was needed to impart, and which, indeed, no teaching could impart; and that he had laid aside his mortal for a divine body and ever after was other than what he seemed to profane eyes to be.

Very interesting in this connection is Reitzenstein's view of Gnosticism, which he maintains belongs not exclusively to church history as an extreme Hellenization of Christianity, but rather to the general history of religion. The word γνῶσις he holds means "direct vision of God," that secret knowledge which can be obtained only through direct revelation and personal relation to divinity. This position he supports with proofs which seem to the reviewer at least convincing. He further discusses at length certain of Paul's words and phrases, the most important of which may be mentioned here. The terms στρατιῶται θεοῦ, κάτοχοι, δέσμιοι are handled in an interesting excursus; his treatment of πνεῦμα in connection with γνῶσις and ψυχή throws light on a number of passages in I Cor.; likewise illuminating are his elucidations of the opposite terms ψυχικός and πνευματικός and his discussion of Paul as a Pneumatic. The decision whether his interpretation of the words εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν (I Cor. 11:24) is correct must be left to more learned judges than the present reviewer.

To correct a possible misunderstanding it should be said that Reitzenstein naturally does not attempt to interpret Paul as a Hellenistic mystic, but simply to prove that the apostle to the gentiles was familiar with the religious literature and thought of his time and that he employed their speech and ideas in his mission, thus making himself a Greek to the Greeks as well as a Jew to the Jews.

This work thus forms a worthy sequel to Reitzenstein's earlier *Poimandres* and his *Hellenistische Theologie in Ägypten*. In spite of the fact that many will oppose the views here set forth, there is not a page which will not repay careful study by the general student of religion in the Hellenistic period and by the Christian theologian alike. But whoever would pass adequate

judgment on the work must be as thoroughly acquainted with the sources of our knowledge of the mysteries, with the Hermetic literature, and with the magical papyri, as is Reitzenstein himself.

CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE

The Aphrodito Papyri. [Greek Papyri in the British Museum, Catalogue with Texts, Vol. IV.] By H. I. BELL. With an Appendix of Coptic Papyri edited by W. E. CRUM. London: The British Museum, 1910. Pp. xlviii+648.

The 315 papyri described and printed in the fourth volume of the British Museum catalogue are without exception late and documentary; there are no literary pieces among them. They constitute nevertheless a very noteworthy collection, for all of them come from a single site, Aphrodito, the modern Kôm Ishgau, and from a single short period, A.D. 698–722. They comprise the bulk of the papyri discovered at Kôm Ishgau in 1901, and now divided between Cairo, Heidelberg, Strassburg, and London. The papyri throw a flood of light upon conditions in a town of Upper Egypt sixty or seventy years after the Arab conquest, and a melancholy picture it is. The ruinous financial system which later reduced naturally affluent Egypt to misery and decay is already operative in this period; it was indeed an inheritance from the Byzantine time, but it naturally became more and more ill-adapted to conditions in Egypt, driving out the peasantry by sheer pressure of taxation. The Arab governors of the years covered by these documents were 'Abd-allāh and Kurrah-ben-Shirāk. The notoriety of the former as an oppressive and inefficient ruler is not relieved by the papyri, but Kurrah, who has been rated one of the worst of tyrants, appears in them—and many of them are his own letters—as a vigorous and public-spirited man. Not the least value of these papyri will be found in the way in which they will enable the historical student of these Arab times to control the statements of Arab and other mediaeval historians. It has been customary to divide papyri into Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine, but the Aphrodito papyri of 1901 necessitate the recognition of the Arab period as one richly represented by Greek papyrus texts.

Mr. Bell's introduction deals with the Arab organization of Egypt, the taxes, the naval organization (*cursus*) of the Khalifate (that is, the regular raids made by the Khalif's fleets against the Empire), the character of Arab rule, etc. In printing the texts the custom of previous British Museum volumes is followed; there is no table of papyri, the documents are without descriptive titles, abbreviations are not expanded, and there are no translations. There are short, helpful introductions to the several papyri, and valuable notes. The mass of texts is helpfully organized, too: letters from the governor to the pagarch and to the taxpayers, pp. 1–80; accounts and

registers, pp. 81–413; protocols, pp. 414–23; and convenient titles at the top of the page help to guide one through the mass of material.

The Coptic texts are more varied. They relate to sailors and workmen, to fugitives driven away by the growing burden of taxation, to guarantees and presentments, and to financial matters. The longer Coptic texts are followed by translations. A full series of indices, including one of abbreviations, concludes this monumental volume. With Jean Maspero's recent publication of the Cairo pieces from the same deposit (*Papyri d'Aphrodito*), Mr. Bell's work annexes at least the early Arab period to the lifetime of the Greek speech in Egypt, and gives new evidence of the extraordinary persistence of Greek in one of the lands of its adoption. To the thousand years from Alexander to Omar, which we have been accustomed to regard as the Greek period in Egypt, something at least must be added, and the economist and the mediaevalist, as well as the lexicographer and the grammarian, will find material in Mr. Bell's new volume.

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

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